78 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
david
a5cb4b03e1 feat: backfill Vector proofs from the Surplus support export
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2026-08-28 12:29:45 +02:00
david
a6eabe6b98 feat: publish Vector proof anchors per Base settlement 2026-08-28 12:12:54 +02:00
david
0ed594f6ba fix: tolerate omitted cache_read_tokens in live Surplus sales 2026-08-28 12:06:43 +02:00
david
59cac438f2 feat: rename dashboard to Capacity Markets with Vector sale proofs 2026-08-28 11:59:24 +02:00
david
af405cf378 fix: wrap marketplace navigation on mobile 2026-08-28 10:39:42 +02:00
david
9463bfae85 feat: move resale dashboard into marketplace 2026-08-28 10:28:39 +02:00
david
53607738f8 feat: add unified resale dashboard 2026-08-28 09:45:51 +02:00
david
cd3ea734e3 fix: run Surplus seller continuously 2026-08-28 09:27:53 +02:00
david
41820b11bb fix: keep Surplus seller active after proof 2026-08-28 09:25:02 +02:00
david
3393748972 fix: probe Surplus seller over IPv4 2026-08-27 13:38:59 +02:00
david
799c7d8256 fix: stop Surplus offer at provider spend cap 2026-08-27 13:31:50 +02:00
david
ced400f928 fix: price against all healthy Surplus offers 2026-08-27 13:26:50 +02:00
david
f79a33e7c3 fix: manage Surplus multiplier offers 2026-08-27 13:21:19 +02:00
david
ed6dbf5730 fix: quote Surplus text offers by multiplier 2026-08-27 13:16:51 +02:00
david
23ae561c16 fix: redact Surplus validation errors safely 2026-08-27 13:10:59 +02:00
david
2603820106 fix: skip incomplete Surplus discovery rows 2026-08-27 13:07:16 +02:00
david
97ae2d8110 fix: accept live Surplus discovery metadata 2026-08-27 13:02:16 +02:00
david
b714c09aca fix: fail closed across Surplus seller state 2026-08-27 12:51:15 +02:00
david
732de817aa feat: add autonomous Surplus seller 2026-08-27 12:48:18 +02:00
david
2b8409a499 feat: prefer reseller for matching gateway requests 2026-08-27 10:51:43 +02:00
david
6b9f0f2284 feat: use provider model tags for resale 2026-08-27 10:15:15 +02:00
david
27d23dd7a4 feat: link escrow references to ApexScan 2026-08-27 10:02:43 +02:00
david
e54eb55f2b feat: add balance-aware provider resale agent 2026-08-27 09:54:53 +02:00
david
8baf127c77 docs: supplier deploy runbook for self-hosted operators
Generic runbook for deploying a mainnet supplier on any operator-owned
server: own DNS/TLS via the in-repo Traefik compose, docker-run CLI forms
(no host Node), advert posted last as the go-live flag, verification via
the public indexer. Fleet-specific steps stay in HETZNER_SETUP.md.
2026-08-21 16:40:18 +02:00
david
e8261d9500 feat(deploy): swap retired Hetzner suppliers for Qwen3.8-27B pair
Hetzner Inference dropped Kimi-K2.7-Code, GLM-5.2-NVFP4 and
DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 from /v1/models; the 6 suppliers serving them are
deregistered (adverts retired on-chain 2026-08-21, containers removed):

  kimi-code          3f37082166faf2b2220e6476235bae8723af9a3434a6aaf60277366ff1f62bfb
  kimi-code-chat     3d1b43645c00bdb7b429f29ced798bc4af206c9dc56074e955d84b603b64f50c
  glm                bf3ee48addb32e2b0726066f1806b9d84ad64b86c7d41d379abd4b439c522696
  glm-chat           b910327023edb6a3f31696b7feaa9448a151c671c2ff303c4c3dd5a07d03c6b5
  ds-flash-htz       61dd30deb1cd3d6c3f73792bda46ecea6890735237d8329ade2b8449d298f24e
  ds-flash-htz-chat  348a278c81a2bf664ea65705a6245df31e81f64c0ffa6e04a59b248fcdae3d9f

New qwen38 + qwen38-chat suppliers serve Hetzner's new Qwen3.8-27B
(ctx 262144; ping + tools round-trip verified 2026-08-21), reusing the
retired kimi-code / kimi-code-chat wallets. Adverts:

  qwen38       bb8a7078098dc5e60b3f97b040e38f05e6cca662497d4bea471e1dff19c1e1ae#0
  qwen38-chat  31e3a6e258ceaa0d1eaabe61fa3fbe3abcbbb400a7b885e05c8dbcdcf4924eda#0
2026-08-21 13:46:03 +02:00
david
bb18578ae9 feat(buyer): move task form (chat window) above the supplier grid
Selecting a supplier used to render its form at the bottom of the
dashboard, below the card grid — chat sessions in particular ended up
off-screen. The form now renders directly under the page title, above
the grid, and clicking Use scrolls back to the top so the freshly
opened form is visible.
2026-08-21 13:16:09 +02:00
david
5221815a71 feat(buyer): PDF_ENABLED kill switch for the PDF summarizer
PDF_ENABLED=0 skips the JobStore/PdfJobDb wiring in runMain, so every
/v1/pdf-* route responds 503 (the pre-existing disabled path). Default
stays enabled; only "0"/"1" accepted, misconfig fails boot loudly.
2026-08-21 02:14:45 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
c531e4678f Merge pull request #17 from Apex-Fusion/feat/hf-llama33-supplier
feat(deploy): add HF-router Llama-3.3-70B mainnet supplier (hf-llama33)
2026-08-18 12:15:46 +02:00
HalukG
47b3c4efcd feat(deploy): add HF-router Llama-3.3-70B mainnet supplier (hf-llama33)
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OpenAI-compatible supplier backed by the HuggingFace Inference Providers router
(meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, llm.text.generate.v1). Config only; mirrors
the glm one-off template with OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://router.huggingface.co.

- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-hf-llama33.yml
- register the supplier wallet in monitor-wallets OPERATOR_SOURCES

The env file (supplier/.env.hf-llama33) holds the wallet key + HF token and is
never committed; wallet-monitor/wallets.json is gitignored runtime data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 14:25:14 +03:00
dcejtlin-apex
7db4de1f75 Merge pull request #14 from Apex-Fusion/fix/release-tx-builder
feat(tx): live CBOR builder for Release - Submitted strays become resolvable
2026-08-17 09:53:46 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
133102bc31 Merge pull request #15 from Apex-Fusion/fix/gateway-mutex-deadline
fix(gateway): per-run deadline + queue bound on Mutex (08-12 freeze fix)
2026-08-17 09:45:15 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6fbf0d0f45 Merge pull request #16 from Apex-Fusion/fix/escrow-locked-overcount
fix(gateway): stop counting terminally-spent escrows as locked funds
2026-08-17 09:44:56 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
85ca58e4b2 fix(gateway): stop counting terminally-spent escrows as locked funds
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The indexer never updates escrow rows on terminal spends (Accept /
Reclaim / Release consume the UTxO without producing a new escrow
output), so /account summed rows whose funds had long moved and
locked_in_escrow_lovelace over-reported for 35+ minutes after
settlement.

The account handler now verifies each active-state row's UTxO is still
unspent (chain.queryUtxo) before counting it, capped at 32 lookups per
request with the tail counted unverified. Unparseable refs and failed
lookups count as live on purpose: errors inflate the figure rather than
hide locked funds. supplier_bond stays in the sum - the buyer fronts
all three legs at PostEscrow (see postEscrow.ts totalLocked), so it is
the key's money while the escrow lives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 12:33:34 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
b3b7d6b5e1 fix(gateway): per-run deadline + queue bound on Mutex - 08-12 freeze fix
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One chain call that never settled, run under the per-key Mutex with no
deadline, convoyed every subsequent request on that key silently while
/models and /account stayed healthy (2026-08-12 incident). The per-fetch
30s aborts in the Ogmios providers predate the freeze and did not prevent
it; the unbounded thing was the composition under the mutex.

Mutex.run() now races each fn against a deadline (default 180s): on
expiry the run rejects with MutexTimeoutError and the chain advances, so
queued work proceeds instead of freezing. A zombie that settles later can
at worst lose a UTxO-contention race with the run that replaced it -
strictly better than a permanent convoy. New work is refused with
MutexQueueFullError past a queue bound (default 64) instead of queueing
without limit. Serialization and rejection-tolerance semantics are
unchanged (covered by tests). Session locks in transcripts.ts construct
the same class and inherit both protections.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:56:41 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
d5fdd1f1b7 feat(tx): live CBOR builder for Release - Submitted strays become resolvable
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Release was the one escrow spend path still hardwired to the synthetic
testTxBody backend, so suppliers had no way to resolve Submitted escrows
past the accept window on mainnet (the sweeper parks them 'for supplier
Release'). Adds buildLiveTxForRelease mirroring the Reclaim builder
(supplier payout, Constr4/tag 125 redeemer, Ogmios UPLC eval) and the
detectCborBackend dispatch in buildReleaseTx, reclaim.ts-style.

validFrom clamps to submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW rather than tip-60s
alone: the back-pad by itself violates the validator whenever the tip is
less than 60s past the window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:50:51 +02:00
david
019766ab8d fix(deploy): retarget inference-proxy suppliers to new tailnet (teamhaleight@)
The tailnet account changed (caslav.nedeljkovic@ to teamhaleight@,
taild99fee.ts.net) and all device IPs were reassigned, breaking both
inference-proxy suppliers' hardcoded backend addresses.

- supplier-local: vuk llama.cpp 100.82.111.46 to 100.77.146.49.
- supplier-openclaw: the openclaw gateway is now exposed via Tailscale
  Serve (David's reconfigure set gateway.tailscale.mode=serve, which
  forces bind=loopback). Switch OPENAI_BASE_URL from the old raw
  http endpoint to https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net, and pin that
  MagicDNS name to web-tools' tailnet IP (100.105.36.0) via extra_hosts
  (Serve's TLS cert is for the hostname, and containers don't inherit
  the host tailscale MagicDNS).
- README: new account/IP table, Serve config (replaces the tailnet-bind
  section), reachability check (the old ACL blocker is gone), updated
  probe/runbook.

Verified: authenticated turn to the Serve endpoint from inference-proxy
returns a completion; vuk:8002 reachable from inference-proxy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:55:43 +02:00
david
5c9da7639d feat(deploy): inference-proxy supplier 'openclaw' — OpenClaw web-research agent
Second supplier on the inference-proxy box, proxying to an OpenClaw gateway
(agent 'main') on the web-tools KVM guest over the tailnet
(100.101.143.72:18789). Same vuk llama.cpp brain as supplier 'local'; the
product is the agent loop (searxng web search + web fetch + browser).
Capability llm.chat.v1, advertised model 'openclaw-web-agent', 0.2 AP3X,
ticket settle mode, MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS=1.

Uses the new stateful-upstream contract: OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1 (escrow
ref as OpenAI 'user' → sticky per-escrow openclaw session, delta-only sends)
and OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE=openclaw (endpoint only accepts 'openclaw').

- docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml: new supplier compose (traefik host
  mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org).
- README: gateway config (bind=tailnet, chatCompletions on, GLOBAL tool
  allow+deny lockdown), the tailnet-ACL blocker (inference-proxy can't yet
  reach web-tools:18789), bring-up runbook, and the sudo-gated browser +
  egress-firewall follow-ups.
- monitor-wallets.ts: register supplier-openclaw@inference-proxy.

Wallet generated + funded (200 AP3X); .env.openclaw written on the host.
Not yet advertised — go-live (post-advert) waits on the ACL + a healthy
end-to-end path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 15:56:23 +02:00
david
843ac7cbdd feat(supplier): stateful-upstream contract for chat-session (OpenClaw)
Two opt-in envs preparing the openclaw supplier on inference-proxy:

OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1 — chat-session turns speak the stateful-
upstream contract: the escrow ref is sent as the OpenAI `user` field
(OpenClaw keys one persistent agent session per `user`, so browser/
tool state survives across turns) and only the current turn's delta
goes upstream — the upstream session carries history, and re-sending
the full transcript would duplicate it into the upstream context every
turn (OpenClaw renders ALL request messages into the new agent turn).
The local transcript still accumulates fully for the receipt. Without
`user`, OpenClaw creates an ephemeral session per request (uuid key),
so default-off stays safe for stateless providers.

OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE — fixed upstream model id sent instead of the
advert's buyer-facing model. OpenClaw's chat-completions endpoint 400s
on anything but "openclaw" / "openclaw/<agentId>", while the advert
must carry a unique fleet-routable id (openclaw-web-agent).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 15:15:13 +02:00
david
48ad639d12 feat(deploy): switch supplier 'local' to chat-session capability (llm.chat.v1)
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS=1 — vuk is a single-slot ~4.5 tok/s rig, one session
owns it at a time. Idle timeout / settle mode mirror the Hetzner -chat
fleet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 12:04:20 +02:00
david
4047be04a3 chore(monitor): register supplier-local@inference-proxy wallet
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 11:01:22 +02:00
david
23157d62a3 fix(deploy): pin traefik v3.6 + DOCKER_API_VERSION on inference-proxy — Docker 29 rejects API 1.24
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 10:30:52 +02:00
david
3ee09f1a9a feat(deploy): inference-proxy box — supplier 'local' backed by llama.cpp on vuk via tailscale
New manually-deployed host (62.238.38.167) with its own in-repo traefik
project (LE HTTP-01) and one text supplier proxying to the home rig at
100.82.111.46:8002. Outside CD by design; runbook in the README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 10:28:13 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
44abbdffdc Merge pull request #13 from Apex-Fusion/fix/hetzner-dns-docs
docs(deploy): correct DNS guidance for Hetzner suppliers — no wildcard exists
2026-08-11 16:04:27 +02:00
david
b0c83ca985 docs(deploy): correct DNS guidance for Hetzner suppliers — no wildcard exists
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The PR #12 runbook and compose pre-flight headers claimed a wildcard
*.vector.apexfusion.org record covers new supplier hosts. It does not:
each mp-suppliers-* host is an individual DNS-only A record to
91.98.147.172, and on-box Let's Encrypt HTTP-01 issuance requires the
record to be unproxied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 14:53:07 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
bfcb0c46b8 Merge pull request #12 from Apex-Fusion/feat/hetzner-suppliers
feat(deploy): Hetzner Inference supplier fleet — 4 models × {text, chat}
2026-08-11 14:32:40 +02:00
david
88e549bd1d fix(supplier): use https Ogmios URL in Hetzner env template, matching the live fleet
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 14:28:11 +02:00
david
6c5a068fd9 feat(deploy): Hetzner Inference supplier fleet — 4 models x {text, chat}
Eight new mainnet suppliers backed by Hetzner's OpenAI-compatible
inference API (https://inference.hetzner.com/api). Pure configuration —
the LLM_BACKEND=openai path is reused unchanged, following the
HuggingFace-router precedent:

  kimi-code[-chat]     Kimi-K2.7-Code            (ctx 262144)
  glm[-chat]           GLM-5.2-NVFP4             (ctx 512000)
  ds-flash-htz[-chat]  DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731    (ctx 512000)
  qwen35b[-chat]       Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8  (ctx 262144)

Uniform 0.2 AP3X per job, default 1 AP3X bonds, no upstream max_tokens
(advert cap = model context length), 300s SLA (1800s for chat sessions).
All four models smoke-tested for non-empty content and tools round-trip.

Runbook: docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md. Adverts, wallets, and host env files are
operator steps after merge; first `up -d` is manual (CD skips projects
with no running containers).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 14:24:51 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
83f81ab5fc Merge pull request #7 from Apex-Fusion/feat/huggingface-router-v1
Huggingface Adapter integration
2026-08-11 13:24:09 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6859486334 Merge pull request #11 from Apex-Fusion/feat/mainnet-cd
feat(deploy): CI-gated continuous deployment to the vector-marketplace host
2026-08-11 11:11:14 +02:00
david
304bbc62ad fix(deploy): run the deploy job on the self-hosted nixos runner
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Keep SSH key material in $RUNNER_TEMP instead of ~/.ssh since a
self-hosted runner's home persists across jobs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 11:00:23 +02:00
david
312f3e730e feat(deploy): CI-gated continuous deployment to the vector-marketplace host
Merges to main now deploy automatically once CI passes:

- .github/workflows/deploy-mainnet.yml: fires on successful CI runs of
  main (or manually via workflow_dispatch with an optional force input),
  SSHes into the mainnet host with the DEPLOY_SSH_KEY secret (host key
  pinned) and runs deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh at the new commit via
  git show FETCH_HEAD:, so deploy logic ships with the code it deploys.
- deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh: hard-resets /root/agents-marketplace to
  origin/main, maps the old..new diff to affected compose projects
  (packages/, patches/, contracts/ and root manifests rebuild all image
  builds; the 17 supplier projects share one Dockerfile so builds after
  the first are cache hits), builds everything up front, then does a
  rolling up -d with a per-project health gate. Suppliers drain first:
  /status is polled until not "working" (DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS, default
  600s) so an in-flight job is not killed and its bond forfeited.
  FORCE=1 redeploys the current sha, DRY_RUN=1 previews the plan, and
  each deploy logs old -> new to /var/log/marketplace-deploy.log with a
  printed rollback one-liner.

Verified: DRY_RUN=1 on the host against the pending 678ee86..6156900
delta selects indexer, buyer, gateway and all 17 suppliers, skips the
non-running wallet-monitor, and leaves image-only projects untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 10:56:50 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6156900fc2 Merge pull request #10 from Apex-Fusion/feat/ocr-capability
feat(ocr): OCR capability + gateway /v1/ocr/extract route
2026-08-11 09:40:25 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
7d348e762f fix(ocr): live busy pre-check before posting a candidate's escrow
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runOcrOneShot posted the escrow before calling the supplier, so a busy
supplier's 409 stranded an already-paid escrow until reclaim - and the
buyer-side busy-retry multiplies this into several stranded escrows per
page. Add a live /status check per candidate, immediately before its
escrow posts, mirroring sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: "working"
skips to the next candidate without posting, anything else (free,
unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as usable so the check is an
optimisation, never a gate. Bounded to a 2s timeout so a stalled
supplier cannot meaningfully delay the request.

Existing candidate-fallback, escrow-ref capture, usage recording, and
receipt labels are unchanged.
2026-08-10 19:31:22 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
7bf3252cdb fix(gateway): match both path separators in the direct-invocation guard
process.argv[1] arrives with backslashes on Windows, so the
forward-slash-only pattern never matched and `start` exited 0 without
starting the server, and without printing anything. Found while running
the gateway locally to verify this branch's OCR route end to end;
bundled here because it blocks that verification on Windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 18:44:41 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
feabd12876 fix(ocr): capture escrow_ref from the escrow_posted event, not just submitOcr's return
escrowRefStr was only assigned after submitOcr resolved, but submitOcr posts
the escrow internally and THEN calls the supplier over HTTP — a SupplierError
there (timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed response, receipt
mismatch) meant the escrow was already on chain while the failure path still
recorded escrow_ref: null. Given the OCR upstream's 120s timeout budget this
is likely the most common paid-but-failed shape, and the exact one the
reconciliation spine exists for.

Subscribe to the SDK's "progress" event (type "escrow_posted") around each
submitOcr attempt so the ref is captured the instant it lands, regardless of
whether submitOcr goes on to resolve or reject. Listener is scoped per
candidate and removed in a finally so it cannot accumulate.

Adds a regression test proving the failure-path usage row and the ocr_failed
structured log line both carry the real ref instead of null; verified it
fails without the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:34:55 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
2b2295b7ed fix(ocr): review pass — min-ada floor regression test, auth-before-parse, failure-path reconciliation, disclosure label coverage
Fixes 2 critical, 2 important, and 5 minor findings from review of 069edcb:

- C1: add a happy-path test that reaches postOcrEscrow.ts's escrowLockFloor
  call and asserts the locked amount; verified it fails against a bare
  economicTotal and passes against the real code.
- C2: gate /v1/ocr/extract (auth + rate limits) before the 16mb body parser
  so an unauthenticated caller can no longer force a full buffer/JSON.parse.
- I2: hoist result/used/escrowRef in the OCR one-shot handler so the failure
  path records escrow_ref/supplier/cost when an escrow was actually posted,
  and emit an ocr_failed structured log line mirroring ocr_settled.
- I3: export venueAttribution and cover its sanitization directly; add a
  stubbed happy-path route test asserting the first-party-brokered
  disclosure label reaches the response.
- Minor: drop unused hfWeightsSource end to end, rename a misleading test,
  make the OCR capability template's pinning language conditional on the
  self-hosted upstream, tighten the /v1/ocr path-prefix guard, and make
  preflight's required_lovelace use the same escrowLockFloor the builder
  locks (exported from the shared tx barrel for gateway use).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:12:12 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
069edcb076 feat(ocr): model-scoped OCR capability + gateway /v1/ocr/extract route
Adds the ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1 capability end to end: the
postOcrEscrow builder (locking the min-ada floor for the Submitted-state
datum, required since the min-ada fix), the gateway OCR route that selects
an OCR supplier by capability, posts a per-page escrow, calls the supplier,
verifies and settles, and returns content plus the signed receipt labelled
first-party-brokered. Supplier OCR handler with a hosted document-API
upstream and buyer-SDK OCR support included.

Squashed from the 2026-08-06 working subset; the deploy pack is
intentionally excluded (it lives in a private operator repo).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 16:40:00 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
d5349057b0 Merge pull request #9 from Apex-Fusion/fix/escrow-minada-floor
fix(escrow): min-ada floor so long-capability Submits settle
2026-08-10 15:08:11 +02:00
david
678ee862ea fix(docker): COPY patches/ into every builder stage
The lockfile gained patchedDependencies (libsodium-wrappers-sumo) in
2aa1688, and the package manager hashes the patch file during install —
every image build since then fails with ENOENT on /repo/patches. No
image had been rebuilt since, so it surfaced only on the next deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:30:49 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
c391b98af8 fix(escrow): lock min-ada for the largest future datum so long-capability Submits settle
Some checks failed
CI / typecheck + vitest (Node 20) (push) Has been cancelled
The escrow locks payment + both bonds and the validator requires exact
value preservation (value_equal) on Claim and Submit. Submit grows the
inline datum ~43 bytes (submitted_at None->Some, result_receipt_hash
None->Some 32 bytes). When capability_id is long enough, the
Submitted-state output's min-ada exceeds the locked total; lucid bumps
the continuing output, value_equal fails, and the validator errors with
no traces (opaque evaluateTransaction 3010/3012). Measured on mainnet at
utxoCostPerByte 4310: a 20-byte chat capability clears a 2.2M lock by
49,310, a 33-byte OCR capability is over by 11,030 - so short-capability
escrows settle and long ones never can, and because Claim's datum is
smaller it always passes, making a Submit-only failure look chain-side.

escrowLockFloor() computes min-ada for the Submitted state plus a margin
and locks max(economic total, that floor) in the post builders. Buyer-
side only, no contract or supplier changes; lucid never bumps once the
lock is sufficient, and the surplus returns through the >= terminal
distribution. postOcrEscrow's identical change ships with the OCR
feature branch. New unit test covers the floor across capability lengths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:22:02 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6ca7f2927a Merge pull request #8 from Apex-Fusion/fix/wallet-health-idempotence
fix(wallet): make wallet-health idempotent - structural health predicate + circuit breakers
2026-08-10 14:11:59 +02:00
david
4d94aa5040 feat(deploy): Let's Encrypt TLS at traefik for all 17 mainnet supplier hosts
Same pattern as the gateway (a54fdcb): the mp-suppliers-* DNS records are no
longer Cloudflare-proxied, so each supplier gets a websecure router with the
letsencrypt resolver and its :80 router becomes a permanent HTTPS redirect.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:28:51 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
36c5cfc6be fix(wallet): make wallet-health idempotent - structural health predicate + circuit breakers
Some checks failed
CI / typecheck + vitest (Node 20) (push) Has been cancelled
planConsolidate returned already-healthy only for wallets with EXACTLY
2 UTxOs, but buildConsolidateWalletTx lands 3 (collateral + working +
the fee-reserve remainder as change). The shape consolidation produces
can never satisfy its own health check, so every wallet-health tick
re-consolidates and pays the ~0.5 AP3X min fee again. Measured in a
production deployment: a 45s ticker submitted 232 consolidations and
burned ~116 AP3X in about 2.5 idle hours; at the default 600s interval
the same loop leaks ~3 AP3X per hour whenever the wallet is not exactly
2 UTxOs.

Healthy is now structural: a pure-lovelace UTxO >= collateralLovelace
exists, at least 1 AP3X sits outside it, and fragmentation is bounded
(<= 6 UTxOs, new optional maxUtxos param). The health check also runs
BEFORE the low-balance guard, so a wallet that can already run script
transactions is never reshaped or refused. walletHealth gains two
independent circuit breakers - halt after 3 consecutive consolidations
that never reach healthy, halt past 6 consolidations per 24h - so any
future non-convergence costs at most ~1.5 AP3X instead of the whole
wallet, plus a docstring that matches reality.

Tests: the exact post-consolidation-shape regression, one-step
idempotence against the builder output model, candidate boundaries
(native assets, 1,628-lovelace-short), healthy-below-reshape-threshold,
and breaker behavior including error and reset paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:10:45 +02:00
david
a54fdcb24c feat(deploy): terminate TLS at traefik for the gateway host via Let's Encrypt
api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org is no longer Cloudflare-proxied, so
traefik now terminates TLS itself: a websecure router with the letsencrypt
ACME resolver, and the :80 router demoted to a permanent HTTPS redirect.
Other hosts on the box stay Cloudflare-terminated on :80.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 13:30:53 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
926300dee5 Merge pull request #6 from FilipBl4gojevic/brand-vocab-scrub
Brand vocabulary scrub: settlement framing, UI strings, retire M1-era design docs
2026-07-30 14:24:52 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
73700f983a Brand vocabulary scrub: settlement framing, UI strings, retire M1-era design docs
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md: settlement-asset framing (AP3X bonded in escrow,
  settles on accepted work); remove references to external network
  adapters that are not part of the project
- docs/buyer + docs/supplier READMEs: commission/bond/settle vocabulary
- Buyer web UI: "Accept & Settle", escrow-framed labels, gateway-managed
  wallet wording; gateway landing title punctuation
- Delete EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY and local-llm-marketplace docs + exports:
  M1-era internal design snapshots superseded by ARCHITECTURE.md and the
  public docs site

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:23:35 +02:00
david
2aa1688a17 fix(ci): green the test suite — pnpm 10 build scripts, libsodium ESM, stale time fixtures
CI has been red since the pnpm 10 migration. Four independent causes:

- better-sqlite3: pnpm 10 blocks dependency build scripts by default, so the
  native binding was never compiled on CI. Allowlist it via
  onlyBuiltDependencies in pnpm-workspace.yaml.
- libsodium-wrappers-sumo 0.7.16: the published ESM wrapper does
  `import "./libsodium-sumo.mjs"` but the tarball does not ship that file
  (it lives in the libsodium-sumo package). Patch the import to the bare
  specifier; local runs only worked because of a hand-copied file in
  node_modules.
- tx-accept/claim [live] tests: the live path checks deadlines against
  Date.now(), and the fixed fixture timestamps expired in June. Freeze the
  clock inside the fixture windows with vi.useFakeTimers.
- CML set_exunits panic ("RuntimeError: unreachable"): with
  localUPLCEval: false the provider asks Ogmios for ex-units; the test mocks
  answered `{}`, so the provider fell back to a spend redeemer at index 0
  while the escrow input sorts to index 1 — CML panics on the unknown
  redeemer key. Mock evaluateTransaction with the true index like real
  Ogmios.

Also regenerate the advert-datum golden: the fixture builders passed plain JS
numbers to cbor-x (minimal ints, float64 for the timestamp) while the
production codec — whose output is live on mainnet — emits full-width uint64.
Builders now encode integer fields as BigInt so builders, codec, and golden
agree byte-for-byte.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 11:16:19 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
3ae2a827c4 Merge pull request #5 from FilipBl4gojevic/gateway-ap3x-strings
Gateway: AP3X terminology in user-facing strings
2026-07-29 10:32:28 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
fec0ac8d0a Merge pull request #4 from FilipBl4gojevic/dispute-resolution-naming
Naming: Dispute Resolution module
2026-07-29 10:32:16 +02:00
david
be9febffb1 fix(wallet-monitor): query wallets sequentially with retry to avoid Ogmios 500s
The public Ogmios endpoint only serves a few concurrent ledger-state
queries and returns 500 for the rest, so the Promise.all burst over the
(now 19-wallet) list reliably failed several wallets every run. Query
sequentially instead (full sweep ~2.5s) and retry each wallet once after
2s so a lone blip no longer posts a false "query failed" alert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:19:39 +00:00
david
e5793031f8 chore(deploy): track mainnet compose files for ds-flash-chat suppliers 1-3
These were live on the box but never committed. Chat-session replicas of
the deepseek-flash suppliers (OpenRouter deepseek-v4-flash, llm.chat.v1,
ticket settle mode); secrets stay in the gitignored supplier/.env files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:14:42 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
716a8bf2ef Gateway: AP3X terminology in user-facing strings and docs
The signup page said '~5 ADA collateral' and two API error messages
told agents to 'deposit a little more ADA' - the coin is AP3X. Strings,
comments, and docs/gateway.md updated; code identifiers unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:14:32 +02:00
david
b10706cf69 fix(wallet-monitor): post only on state changes, drop reminder re-alerts
Slack posts now fire only when a wallet newly drops below its threshold
or recovers above it; a wallet that stays low never re-posts. The
reminder_hours mechanism is removed entirely — per-wallet reminder
clocks drifted apart (Ogmios blips skip wallets from a run), so with
many chronically-low wallets some clock came due nearly every run,
collapsing the 6h cadence to the hourly cron interval.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:12:45 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
1f587867c6 README: Dispute Resolution naming
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 10:06:14 +02:00
HalukG
0b253c73bb Merge pull request #3 from FilipBl4gojevic/docs-consolidation-readme
README: marketplace front door - status, flow, layout, links
2026-07-24 13:46:46 +03:00
FilipBl4gojevic
1648edeba7 README: vocabulary pass on Related line
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:26:58 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
4090e064cb README: note internal audit coverage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:07:03 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
3fac04b00e README: marketplace front door - status, flow, layout, links
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 10:57:27 +02:00
189 changed files with 19201 additions and 1102 deletions

69
.github/workflows/deploy-mainnet.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
name: Deploy mainnet
# CD for the vector-marketplace host (91.98.147.172).
#
# Trigger: automatically after the "CI" workflow succeeds on main, or manually
# via workflow_dispatch (Actions tab -> Deploy mainnet -> Run workflow).
#
# The runner only SSHes in and executes deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh AT THE NEW
# COMMIT (fetched server-side via `git show FETCH_HEAD:`), so deploy logic is
# versioned with the code it deploys. The script itself decides which compose
# projects to rebuild based on the old..new diff, drains busy suppliers, and
# health-gates every restart — see deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh.
#
# Secrets: DEPLOY_SSH_KEY — ed25519 private key whose public half is in
# root@vector-marketplace:~/.ssh/authorized_keys.
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["CI"]
types: [completed]
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
force:
description: "Redeploy even if the server is already at origin/main"
type: boolean
default: false
concurrency:
group: deploy-mainnet
cancel-in-progress: false # never kill a deploy mid-rollout
env:
DEPLOY_HOST: 91.98.147.172
DEPLOY_USER: root
# Pinned host key (ssh-keyscan -t ed25519 91.98.147.172)
DEPLOY_HOSTKEY: "91.98.147.172 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIJvjM8D+pNUb2Qr4yJbqVcRrUzbpbfyv0/tupUgD5Th0"
jobs:
deploy:
name: deploy to vector-marketplace
runs-on: nixos
# workflow_run fires on failure too — only deploy green main.
if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' || github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
steps:
# Self-hosted runner: keep key material in the job's temp dir, not the
# runner user's ~/.ssh (which persists across jobs).
- name: Set up SSH
run: |
install -m 700 -d "$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh"
printf '%s\n' "${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY }}" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh/id_ed25519"
chmod 600 "$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh/id_ed25519"
printf '%s\n' "$DEPLOY_HOSTKEY" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh/known_hosts"
- name: Run deploy script on server
run: |
FORCE=0
[ "${{ github.event.inputs.force }}" = "true" ] && FORCE=1
ssh -o BatchMode=yes \
-o IdentitiesOnly=yes \
-i "$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh/id_ed25519" \
-o UserKnownHostsFile="$RUNNER_TEMP/ssh/known_hosts" \
"$DEPLOY_USER@$DEPLOY_HOST" "
set -euo pipefail
cd /root/agents-marketplace
git fetch origin main
git show FETCH_HEAD:deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh > /run/marketplace-deploy.sh
FORCE=$FORCE bash /run/marketplace-deploy.sh
"

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,36 @@
## Local Agents Marketplace
# Local Agents Marketplace
Local Agents Marketplace MVP. See `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` for the architecture spec. Monorepo managed with pnpm workspaces. Work-in-progress; not production-ready.
Bonded-escrow coordination for AI agent work on **Vector**, the Apex Fusion eUTXO L2.
Buyers commission work. Suppliers claim it. Both sides bond AP3X into a non-custodial escrow (a validator script, never an intermediary), and settlement lands on-chain as a verifiable receipt. Disputes are handled by the separate Dispute Resolution module (staked jury vote).
**Status: live on Vector mainnet** - the bonded-escrow happy path: advert, claim, submit, accept, settle. The contracts have been through the internal audit pipeline (methodology published in [vector-ai-agents](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/vector-ai-agents)); they have not yet undergone independent third-party audit.
## Flow
1. **Advert** - a buyer posts a job with escrow bonded
2. **Claim** - a supplier claims it, bonding their side
3. **Submit** - work is delivered
4. **Accept** - the buyer accepts the work
5. **Settle** - the escrow releases; the settlement is a signed on-chain receipt
## Repository layout
| Path | What |
|---|---|
| `contracts/advert`, `contracts/escrow`, `contracts/marketplace` | Aiken validators |
| `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` | Architecture spec |
| `docs/buyer/`, `docs/supplier/` | Role guides |
| `deploy/` | Deployment and simulation tooling |
Monorepo managed with pnpm workspaces.
## Getting started
Developer docs: [Vector AI documentation](https://apex-fusion.github.io/vector-ai-documentation/). For the contract-level picture, start with [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md).
## Related
- [mcp-server](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/mcp-server) - hosted MCP server for Vector (testnet and mainnet)
- [agent-sdk-py](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agent-sdk-py) / [agent-sdk-ts](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agent-sdk-ts) - Python and TypeScript SDKs
- [vector-agent-modules](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/vector-agent-modules) - dispute resolution, reputation staking, self-improvement

View File

@@ -38,10 +38,15 @@ NETWORK_ID=0
# along over loopback. Production behind TLS should leave this unset / "1".
# COOKIE_SECURE=1
# Internal, redacted data source for the authenticated /dashboard page.
# SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL=http://surplus-seller:8080/internal/resale-dashboard
# ─── Optional: PDF Book Summarizer (/book page, /v1/pdf-* routes) ─────────
# Upload a PDF → chunk it → pay suppliers to summarize each chunk (one escrow
# per map + reduce call) → full-book summary. All knobs are optional; defaults
# shown. Tune the caps to bound spend/abuse on mainnet.
# Kill switch: "0" disables the feature entirely (every /v1/pdf-* route 503s):
# PDF_ENABLED=1
#
# Hard caps (a job is refused if it would exceed these):
# PDF_MAX_PAGES=400 # reject books larger than this

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
COPY supplier/package.json ./supplier/package.json

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ interface OperatorSource {
}
const OPERATOR_SOURCES: OperatorSource[] = [
{
label: "supplier-hf-llama33@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.hf-llama33",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "buyer@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
@@ -125,6 +132,34 @@ const OPERATOR_SOURCES: OperatorSource[] = [
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-qwen38@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.qwen38",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-qwen38-chat@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.qwen38-chat",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-local@inference-proxy",
host: "inference-proxy",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.local",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-openclaw@inference-proxy",
host: "inference-proxy",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.openclaw",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "buyer@open-webui",
host: "open-webui",

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@
* API key" page knows where to POST /signup. When
* unset, the SPA falls back to deriving "api." +
* current host.
* SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL — Internal URL of the private Surplus dashboard
* snapshot endpoint. When unset, /v1/resale-dashboard
* responds 503 while the rest of the buyer stays live.
* PDF_ENABLED — "1" (default) serves the PDF book summarizer
* (/v1/pdf-* routes). Set "0" to disable the feature
* entirely: no PDF job store is opened and every
* /v1/pdf-* route responds 503.
*/
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
@@ -62,7 +69,9 @@ export interface BuyerConfig {
password: string;
sessionSecret: string;
cookieSecure: boolean;
pdfEnabled: boolean;
gatewayPublicUrl: string;
resaleDashboardUrl: string;
}
function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): string {
@@ -148,10 +157,36 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): BuyerConfig
cookieSecure = cookieSecureStr === "1";
}
// PDF_ENABLED: defaults to true. Set "0" to disable the PDF book summarizer
// entirely — runMain skips the JobStore wiring and every /v1/pdf-* route
// responds 503. Accept only "0" / "1" to keep boot-time misconfig loud.
let pdfEnabled = true;
const pdfEnabledStr = env.PDF_ENABLED;
if (pdfEnabledStr !== undefined && pdfEnabledStr !== "") {
if (pdfEnabledStr !== "0" && pdfEnabledStr !== "1") {
throw new Error('loadConfig: PDF_ENABLED must be "0" or "1"');
}
pdfEnabled = pdfEnabledStr === "1";
}
// GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL — optional. Public base URL of the gateway, surfaced to
// the SPA via the boot block (no trailing slash). Empty string means the SPA
// derives the URL from its own host ("api." + location.host).
const gatewayPublicUrl = (env.GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL ?? "").trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
const resaleDashboardUrl = (env.SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL ?? "")
.trim()
.replace(/\/+$/, "");
if (resaleDashboardUrl !== "") {
let parsed: URL;
try {
parsed = new URL(resaleDashboardUrl);
} catch {
throw new Error("loadConfig: SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL must be a valid URL");
}
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
throw new Error("loadConfig: SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL must use http or https");
}
}
return {
privKeyHex,
@@ -167,6 +202,8 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): BuyerConfig
password,
sessionSecret,
cookieSecure,
pdfEnabled,
gatewayPublicUrl,
resaleDashboardUrl,
};
}

View File

@@ -96,29 +96,36 @@ export async function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): Promise<
// PDF book summarizer: one job registry, sharing the live marketplace SDK,
// chain, wallet, and (optional) archive. Caps come from PDF_* env vars.
// PDF_ENABLED=0 skips the whole wiring; createApp then registers every
// /v1/pdf-* route as a 503 stub (feature disabled).
const pdfCaps = loadPdfCaps(env);
// Durable job store (SQLite under ARCHIVE_DIR) so past summaries survive
// restarts and navigation. Best-effort: if it can't open, jobs fall back to
// in-memory only (lost on restart) but the feature still works.
let pdfJobDb: PdfJobDb | undefined;
try {
pdfJobDb = new PdfJobDb(config.archiveDir);
console.log(`[buyer] pdf job store at ${config.archiveDir}/pdf-jobs.db`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(
`[buyer] failed to open pdf job store at ${config.archiveDir}:`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
let jobStore: JobStore | undefined;
if (config.pdfEnabled) {
// Durable job store (SQLite under ARCHIVE_DIR) so past summaries survive
// restarts and navigation. Best-effort: if it can't open, jobs fall back to
// in-memory only (lost on restart) but the feature still works.
let pdfJobDb: PdfJobDb | undefined;
try {
pdfJobDb = new PdfJobDb(config.archiveDir);
console.log(`[buyer] pdf job store at ${config.archiveDir}/pdf-jobs.db`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(
`[buyer] failed to open pdf job store at ${config.archiveDir}:`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
}
jobStore = new JobStore({
marketplace,
chain,
walletKey,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
archive,
caps: pdfCaps,
db: pdfJobDb,
});
} else {
console.log("[buyer] pdf summarizer disabled (PDF_ENABLED=0)");
}
const jobStore = new JobStore({
marketplace,
chain,
walletKey,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
archive,
caps: pdfCaps,
db: pdfJobDb,
});
const app = createApp({
distPath,
@@ -134,6 +141,7 @@ export async function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): Promise<
sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret,
cookieSecure: config.cookieSecure,
gatewayPublicUrl: config.gatewayPublicUrl,
resaleDashboardUrl: config.resaleDashboardUrl,
jobStore,
pdfCaps,
});

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export function registerPdfRoutes(
res,
503,
"service_unavailable",
"PDF summarizer disabled (buyer booted without chain/marketplace/archive deps)",
"PDF summarizer disabled",
);
app.post("/v1/pdf-upload", disabled);
app.all(/^\/v1\/pdf-jobs(\/.*)?$/, disabled);

View File

@@ -73,11 +73,15 @@ import {
buildPostEscrowTx,
buildPostTtsEscrowTx,
buildPostChatEscrowTx,
buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
ttsPromptHash,
chatSessionPromptHash,
ocrPromptHash,
buildAcceptTx,
buildReclaimTx,
TxConstructionError,
chatInputTokenUpperBound,
BOUNDED_INPUT_DETAIL_MARKER,
} from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { decodeAdvertDatum, decodeEscrowDatum, canonicalize } from "@marketplace/shared/cbor";
import type { AdvertDatum } from "@marketplace/shared/cbor";
@@ -86,8 +90,11 @@ import type {
DiscoverSuppliersOptions,
SubmitPromptOptions,
SubmitPromptResult,
SupplierCapabilityView,
SubmitTtsOptions,
SubmitTtsResult,
SubmitOcrOptions,
SubmitOcrResult,
StartChatOptions,
StartChatResult,
ChatSettleMode,
@@ -106,6 +113,50 @@ import { MemoryTaskHistoryStore } from "./history.js";
import { HttpClient, HttpError } from "./httpClient.js";
const ZERO_SIGNATURE = "0".repeat(128);
function validateSupplierCapability(
body: unknown,
advert: AdvertDatum,
advertRef: OutputReference,
): SupplierCapabilityView {
if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null || Array.isArray(body)) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"supplier_preflight_failed",
"supplier /capability response must be an object",
);
}
const capability = body as Record<string, unknown>;
const expectedRef = `${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index}`;
if (
capability.advert_ref !== expectedRef ||
capability.capability_id !== advert.capability_id ||
capability.model !== advert.model ||
capability.max_output_tokens !== advert.max_output_tokens ||
capability.max_processing_ms !== advert.max_processing_ms ||
capability.price_lovelace !== advert.price_lovelace.toString() ||
capability.supplier_pkh !== advert.supplier_pkh ||
typeof capability.pub_key_hex !== "string"
) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"supplier_preflight_failed",
"supplier /capability response does not match the on-chain advert",
);
}
if (
capability.max_input_tokens !== undefined &&
(
typeof capability.max_input_tokens !== "number" ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(capability.max_input_tokens) ||
capability.max_input_tokens <= 0
)
) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"supplier_preflight_failed",
"supplier max_input_tokens must be a positive safe integer",
);
}
return capability as unknown as SupplierCapabilityView;
}
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
const SIG_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{128}$/;
@@ -237,16 +288,23 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
}
return result.body as SupplierView[];
}
// ─── submitPrompt — happy path + every adversarial branch ──────────────
async submitPrompt(opts: SubmitPromptOptions): Promise<SubmitPromptResult> {
const { advertRef, messages, payment_lovelace, max_output_tokens } = opts;
const {
advertRef,
messages,
payment_lovelace,
max_output_tokens,
public_preview,
} = opts;
let supplierHttp: HttpClient | null = null;
let advertDatum: AdvertDatum | null = null;
let escrowOutputRef: OutputReference | null = null;
let escrowRefStr = "";
let postedAtMs = Date.now();
let deliverByMs = 0;
const recordFailure = (reason: string): void => {
this.historyStore.save({
@@ -275,6 +333,46 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
}
}
if (advertDatum) {
supplierHttp = new HttpClient({
baseUrl: advertDatum.endpoint_url,
fetch: this.fetchImpl,
});
if (advertDatum.detail_uri.endsWith(BOUNDED_INPUT_DETAIL_MARKER)) {
let capabilityResult;
try {
capabilityResult = await supplierHttp.getJson("/capability");
} catch (error) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
throw new TxConstructionError("supplier_preflight_failed", message);
}
if (!capabilityResult.ok || capabilityResult.parseError) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"supplier_preflight_failed",
`supplier /capability returned HTTP ${capabilityResult.status}`,
);
}
const capability = validateSupplierCapability(
capabilityResult.body,
advertDatum,
advertRef,
);
if (capability.max_input_tokens === undefined) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"supplier_preflight_failed",
"bounded-input supplier omitted max_input_tokens",
);
}
const inputUnits = chatInputTokenUpperBound(messages);
if (inputUnits > capability.max_input_tokens) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"input_cap_exceeded",
`input bound ${inputUnits} exceeds supplier cap ${capability.max_input_tokens}`,
);
}
}
}
escrowResult = await buildPostEscrowTx({
chain: this.chain,
buyerKey: this.walletKey,
@@ -317,24 +415,33 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
if (escrowUtxo && escrowUtxo.datumHex) {
const ed = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo.datumHex);
postedAtMs = ed.posted_at;
deliverByMs = ed.deliver_by;
}
} catch {
/* posted_at is best-effort metadata */
}
if (!advertDatum) {
// Should never happen — buildPostEscrowTx throws before this on missing/bad advert.
// Should never happen — buildPostEscrowTx rejects missing or bad adverts.
const reason = "advert datum unavailable after escrow post";
recordFailure(reason);
throw new ReceiptVerificationError(reason);
}
if (!supplierHttp) {
const reason = "supplier client unavailable after escrow post";
recordFailure(reason);
throw new ReceiptVerificationError(reason);
}
if (deliverByMs === 0) {
deliverByMs =
postedAtMs + advertDatum.max_processing_ms + 30_000;
}
const supplierCallTimeoutMs = Math.max(
30_000,
deliverByMs - Date.now() + 90_000,
);
// ── 4. Call supplier /v1/chat/completions ─────────────────────────
const supplierBaseUrl = advertDatum.endpoint_url;
const supplierHttp = new HttpClient({
baseUrl: supplierBaseUrl,
fetch: this.fetchImpl,
});
const requestedMax = max_output_tokens ?? advertDatum.max_output_tokens;
const cappedMax = Math.min(requestedMax, advertDatum.max_output_tokens);
@@ -343,11 +450,14 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
messages,
max_tokens: cappedMax,
};
let chatResult;
try {
chatResult = await supplierHttp.postJson("/v1/chat/completions", chatBody, {
headers: { "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
headers: {
"X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr,
...(public_preview ? { "X-Vector-Public-Preview": "1" } : {}),
},
timeoutMs: supplierCallTimeoutMs,
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpError) {
@@ -381,8 +491,11 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
throw sErr;
}
const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;
const POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
const pollDeadline = Date.now() + POLL_TIMEOUT_MS;
const pollBudgetMs = Math.max(
30_000,
deliverByMs + 90_000 - Date.now(),
);
const pollDeadline = Date.now() + pollBudgetMs;
let polled = chatResult;
// First poll runs immediately so a quickly-completed job doesn't pay
// the leading delay; subsequent polls wait POLL_INTERVAL_MS.
@@ -419,7 +532,7 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
if (polled.status !== 200) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("timeout", {
status: polled.status,
message: `supplier job ${jobId} not done within ${POLL_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`,
message: `supplier job ${jobId} not done within ${pollBudgetMs}ms`,
});
recordFailure("timeout");
throw sErr;
@@ -807,6 +920,278 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
};
}
// ─── submitOcr — full lifecycle for ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1 ──
async submitOcr(opts: SubmitOcrOptions): Promise<SubmitOcrResult> {
const { advertRef, image_b64, mime, output_format, payment_lovelace } = opts;
const request = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
let advertDatum: AdvertDatum | null = null;
let escrowOutputRef: OutputReference | null = null;
let escrowRefStr = "";
let postedAtMs = Date.now();
const previewStr = `[ocr:${mime} ${output_format} ${image_b64.length}b64]`;
const recordFailure = (reason: string): void => {
this.historyStore.save({
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr || `${"0".repeat(64)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum?.supplier_pkh ?? "",
capability_id: advertDatum?.capability_id ?? "",
prompt_preview: previewStr,
posted_at: postedAtMs,
status: "failed",
failure_reason: reason,
});
};
// ── 1. Resolve advert + post escrow (OCR prompt_hash) ─────────────
let escrowResult;
try {
const utxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
if (utxo && utxo.datumHex) {
try {
advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(utxo.datumHex);
} catch { /* builder will re-throw structurally */ }
}
escrowResult = await buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
chain: this.chain,
buyerKey: this.walletKey,
advertRef,
request,
payment_lovelace,
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) {
recordFailure(err.reason);
throw err;
}
this.emitProgress({ type: "chain_submit_failed", detail: (err as Error).message });
recordFailure((err as Error).message);
throw err;
}
escrowOutputRef = escrowResult.escrowOutputRef;
escrowRefStr = refToString(escrowOutputRef);
this.emitProgress({ type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
// ── 2. Wait for the escrow tx to confirm ──────────────────────────
try {
await this.chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
} catch { /* mock providers / tests */ }
// ── 3. Re-fetch escrow datum to capture posted_at ─────────────────
try {
const escrowUtxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(escrowOutputRef);
if (escrowUtxo && escrowUtxo.datumHex) {
const ed = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo.datumHex);
postedAtMs = ed.posted_at;
}
} catch { /* metadata best-effort */ }
if (!advertDatum) {
const reason = "advert datum unavailable after escrow post";
recordFailure(reason);
throw new ReceiptVerificationError(reason);
}
// ── 4. Call supplier /v1/ocr/extract ──────────────────────────────
const supplierBaseUrl = advertDatum.endpoint_url;
const supplierHttp = new HttpClient({
baseUrl: supplierBaseUrl,
fetch: this.fetchImpl,
});
const ocrBody = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
let ocrResult;
try {
ocrResult = await supplierHttp.postJson("/v1/ocr/extract", ocrBody, {
headers: { "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpError) {
const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
recordFailure(reason);
throw sErr;
}
recordFailure((err as Error).message);
throw err;
}
// 202 + poll mirror of submitTts's async handling. OCR inference for a
// page runs seconds; the long tail is the Submit tx confirmation.
if (ocrResult.status === 202 && ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object") {
const jobId = (ocrResult.body as { job_id?: string }).job_id;
if (typeof jobId !== "string" || jobId.length === 0) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier 202 response missing job_id",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;
const POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
const pollDeadline = Date.now() + POLL_TIMEOUT_MS;
let polled = ocrResult;
let firstIter = true;
while (Date.now() < pollDeadline) {
if (!firstIter) {
await new Promise<void>((r) => setTimeout(r, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
}
firstIter = false;
try {
polled = await supplierHttp.getJson(`/v1/ocr/extract/${jobId}`);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpError) {
const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
recordFailure(reason);
throw sErr;
}
throw err;
}
if (polled.status === 200) break;
if (polled.status === 202) continue;
const failBody = (polled.body && typeof polled.body === "object")
? polled.body as { reason?: string; message?: string }
: {};
const sErr = new SupplierError(failBody.reason ?? "supplier_http_error", {
status: polled.status,
message: failBody.message ?? `supplier returned ${polled.status}`,
});
recordFailure(sErr.reason);
throw sErr;
}
if (polled.status !== 200) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("timeout", {
status: polled.status,
message: `supplier job ${jobId} not done within ${POLL_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`,
});
recordFailure("timeout");
throw sErr;
}
ocrResult = polled;
}
if (!ocrResult.ok) {
const bodyReason =
ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object"
? ((ocrResult.body as { reason?: string }).reason ?? "supplier_http_error")
: "supplier_http_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(bodyReason, {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: `supplier returned ${ocrResult.status}`,
});
recordFailure(bodyReason);
throw sErr;
}
if (ocrResult.parseError || !ocrResult.body || typeof ocrResult.body !== "object") {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier body is not valid JSON",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const responseBody = ocrResult.body as {
output_format?: string;
content?: string;
usage?: { prompt_tokens?: number; completion_tokens?: number; total_tokens?: number };
receipt?: import("@marketplace/shared/receipt").Receipt;
receipt_signature?: string;
};
if (!responseBody.content || !responseBody.receipt || !responseBody.receipt_signature) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier response is missing content / receipt / receipt_signature",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const receipt = responseBody.receipt;
const receiptSignature = responseBody.receipt_signature;
this.emitProgress({ type: "supplier_called", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
// ── 5. Receipt verification ───────────────────────────────────────
if (receipt.supplier_pkh !== advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
recordFailure("wrong_supplier");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_supplier");
}
if (receipt.escrow_ref !== escrowRefStr) {
recordFailure("wrong_escrow_ref");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_escrow_ref");
}
// The OCR prompt commitment uses the SAME canonical hash the supplier
// validated against the escrow datum. Recompute from the envelope we
// sent; a mismatch means the supplier signed a different request.
const expectedPromptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
if (receipt.prompt_hash !== expectedPromptHash) {
recordFailure("prompt_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("prompt_hash_mismatch");
}
if (receipt.model !== advertDatum.model) {
recordFailure("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
}
// The receipt's response_hash must commit the content we actually
// received in the requested output shape.
const expectedResponseHash = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256")
.update(canonicalize({
content: responseBody.content,
output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
}), "utf8")
.digest("hex");
if (receipt.response_hash !== expectedResponseHash) {
recordFailure("response_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("response_hash_mismatch");
}
if (typeof receiptSignature !== "string" || !SIG_RE.test(receiptSignature)) {
recordFailure("invalid_signature");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
}
if (receiptSignature === ZERO_SIGNATURE) {
recordFailure("invalid_signature");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
}
if (!HEX64_RE.test(receipt.prompt_hash) || !HEX64_RE.test(receipt.response_hash)) {
recordFailure("malformed_receipt");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("malformed_receipt");
}
this.emitProgress({ type: "receipt_verified", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
this.historyStore.save({
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
prompt_preview: previewStr,
posted_at: postedAtMs,
status: "completed",
response: responseBody.content.length <= 200
? responseBody.content
: responseBody.content.slice(0, 200),
receipt,
receipt_signature: receiptSignature,
});
return {
output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
content: responseBody.content,
usage: {
prompt_tokens: responseBody.usage?.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
completion_tokens: responseBody.usage?.completion_tokens ?? 0,
total_tokens: responseBody.usage?.total_tokens ?? 0,
},
receipt,
receiptSignature,
escrowRef: escrowOutputRef,
};
}
// ─── startChat / endChat — multi-turn llm.chat.v1 lifecycle ────────────
/**

View File

@@ -138,6 +138,19 @@ export interface SupplierView {
created_slot: number;
}
/** Live off-chain capability metadata published by a supplier endpoint. */
export interface SupplierCapabilityView {
capability_id: string;
model: string;
max_output_tokens: number;
max_processing_ms: number;
price_lovelace: string;
advert_ref: string;
supplier_pkh: string;
pub_key_hex: string;
max_input_tokens?: number;
}
/**
* DiscoverSuppliersOptions — optional filters for discoverSuppliers().
*/
@@ -154,6 +167,8 @@ export interface SubmitPromptOptions {
messages: import("@marketplace/shared/tx").ChatMessage[];
payment_lovelace: bigint;
max_output_tokens?: number;
/** Explicit consent for the seller's public redacted demo preview. */
public_preview?: boolean;
}
/**
@@ -187,6 +202,35 @@ export interface SubmitTtsResult {
escrowRef: OutputReference;
}
/**
* SubmitOcrOptions — arguments to Marketplace.submitOcr() for model-scoped
* `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1` capabilities. The same `{image_b64,
* mime, output_format}` envelope is hashed (sha256 ∘ canonical) into the
* escrow datum's `prompt_hash` AND posted to the supplier's /v1/ocr/extract
* body, so the supplier can verify the request matches the on-chain commit.
*/
export interface SubmitOcrOptions {
advertRef: OutputReference;
image_b64: string; // plain base64, no data: prefix
mime: string; // image/png | image/jpeg | image/webp
output_format: string; // markdown | html | json
payment_lovelace: bigint;
}
/**
* SubmitOcrResult — returned from Marketplace.submitOcr() on success.
* `content` is the extraction in the requested output_format; the receipt's
* response_hash commits sha256(canonical({content, output_format})).
*/
export interface SubmitOcrResult {
output_format: string;
content: string;
usage: { prompt_tokens: number; completion_tokens: number; total_tokens: number };
receipt: Receipt;
receiptSignature: string;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
}
/**
* StartChatOptions / StartChatResult — Marketplace.startChat() for the
* `llm.chat.v1` capability. Opens the escrow (session-init prompt_hash) and

View File

@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ export interface AppDeps {
* `${gatewayUrl}/signup`. Public, non-secret value. When empty/omitted the
* SPA derives "api." + its own host. */
gatewayPublicUrl?: string;
/** Private supplier-network endpoint used to populate the resale dashboard.
* The browser only sees the redacted same-origin /v1/resale-dashboard proxy. */
resaleDashboardUrl?: string;
/** PDF book summarizer job registry. When provided, the /v1/pdf-* routes
* are live; when omitted they respond 503 (feature disabled). Built in
* runMain from the same marketplace/chain/wallet/archive deps. */
@@ -317,6 +320,66 @@ export function createApp(deps: AppDeps): Express {
}
: null;
app.get("/v1/resale-dashboard", async (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
const dashboardUrl = (deps.resaleDashboardUrl ?? "").replace(/\/+$/, "");
if (dashboardUrl === "") {
return jsonError(
res,
503,
"service_unavailable",
"buyer-app booted without SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL",
);
}
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), 10_000);
try {
const upstream = await (deps.fetchImpl ?? globalThis.fetch)(dashboardUrl, {
headers: { accept: "application/json" },
redirect: "error",
signal: controller.signal,
});
const text = await upstream.text();
if (Buffer.byteLength(text, "utf8") > 1024 * 1024) {
return jsonError(
res,
502,
"dashboard_response_too_large",
"resale dashboard response exceeded 1 MiB",
);
}
if (!upstream.ok) {
return jsonError(
res,
502,
"dashboard_upstream_error",
`resale dashboard upstream returned ${upstream.status}`,
);
}
let payload: unknown;
try {
payload = JSON.parse(text);
} catch {
return jsonError(
res,
502,
"dashboard_invalid_json",
"resale dashboard upstream did not return JSON",
);
}
res.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-store");
return res.status(200).json(payload);
} catch {
return jsonError(
res,
502,
"dashboard_unreachable",
"resale dashboard upstream is unavailable",
);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer);
}
});
app.get("/v1/pending-receipts", async (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!resolved) {
return jsonError(

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Routes (all gated by <RequireAuth>):
* / → <Dashboard />
* /tasks → <TaskHistory />
* /dashboard → <ResaleDashboard /> Capacity markets and sale proofs
* /pending → <PendingReceipts /> UX-1: buyer-side Accept button
* /wallet → <Wallet />
* /api-keys → <ApiKeys /> self-serve gateway API key generation
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ import Wallet from "./pages/Wallet.js";
import PendingReceipts from "./pages/PendingReceipts.js";
import BookSummarizer from "./pages/BookSummarizer.js";
import ApiKeys from "./pages/ApiKeys.js";
import ResaleDashboard from "./pages/ResaleDashboard.js";
import { RequireAuth, useAuth } from "./state/AuthContext.js";
function SignOutButton() {
@@ -35,8 +37,9 @@ export default function App() {
return (
<RequireAuth>
<div className="min-h-screen bg-gray-50 text-gray-900">
<nav className="bg-white border-b border-gray-200 px-6 py-3 flex items-center gap-6">
<nav className="bg-white border-b border-gray-200 px-4 py-3 sm:px-6 flex flex-wrap items-center gap-x-6 gap-y-2">
<Link to="/" className="font-medium hover:underline">Dashboard</Link>
<Link to="/dashboard" className="font-medium hover:underline">Capacity</Link>
{/* Book Summarizer tab hidden for now — the /book route and all PDF
summarize code remain intact; restore by re-adding this link:
<Link to="/book" className="font-medium hover:underline">Book Summarizer</Link> */}
@@ -49,6 +52,7 @@ export default function App() {
<main className="p-6">
<Routes>
<Route path="/" element={<Dashboard />} />
<Route path="/dashboard" element={<ResaleDashboard />} />
<Route path="/book" element={<BookSummarizer />} />
<Route path="/tasks" element={<TaskHistory />} />
<Route path="/pending" element={<PendingReceipts />} />

View File

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ export default function JobEstimate({
<dd className="text-right">{est.mapCalls}</dd>
<dt>Reduce calls</dt>
<dd className="text-right">{est.reduceCalls}</dd>
<dt className="font-medium">Total paid calls</dt>
<dt className="font-medium">Total escrowed calls</dt>
<dd className="text-right font-medium">{est.totalCalls}</dd>
<dt className="font-medium">Est. max cost</dt>
<dd className="text-right font-medium">{est.totalAp3x} AP3X</dd>
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ export default function JobEstimate({
disabled={blocked || starting}
className="rounded bg-indigo-600 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white hover:bg-indigo-700 disabled:bg-gray-400"
>
{starting ? "Starting…" : `Proceed & pay (~${est.totalAp3x} AP3X)`}
{starting ? "Starting…" : `Proceed (locks ~${est.totalAp3x} AP3X in escrow)`}
</button>
</div>
);

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export default function PdfUploadForm({ onUploaded }: { onUploaded: (info: Uploa
return (
<form onSubmit={handleSubmit} className="space-y-4">
<p className="text-sm text-gray-600">
Upload a text-based PDF book. The buyer will chunk it and pay marketplace
Upload a text-based PDF book. The buyer will chunk it and commission marketplace
suppliers to summarize each chunk, then synthesize a full-book summary.
</p>
<input

View File

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ export default function ApiKeys() {
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">API Keys</h1>
<p className="text-sm text-gray-600">
Generate an OpenAI-compatible API key for the marketplace gateway. Each key has its own
custodial wallet — fund its deposit address with AP3X, then point any OpenAI SDK at{" "}
gateway-managed wallet (the gateway holds this wallet's key) - fund its deposit address with AP3X, then point any OpenAI SDK at{" "}
<code className="font-mono text-xs">{baseUrl}</code>.
</p>
</div>

View File

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ export default function BookSummarizer() {
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Book Summarizer</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-500">
Upload a PDF → pay suppliers to summarize each chunk → get a full-book summary.
Upload a PDF → commission suppliers to summarize each chunk → get a full-book summary.
Jobs keep running if you navigate away; reopen them below.
</p>
</div>

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
* buyer/src/ui/pages/Dashboard.tsx — supplier list + capability-routed task form.
*
* Calls marketplace.discoverSuppliers() on mount; renders a SupplierCard
* per result. Once a supplier is selected, the form rendered below is
* picked from `CAPABILITY_FORMS` based on the supplier's `capability_id`.
* per result. Once a supplier is selected, the task form (e.g. the chat
* window) renders ABOVE the grid — directly under the page title — and the
* component is picked from `CAPABILITY_FORMS` based on the supplier's
* `capability_id`.
*
* Capabilities (current registry):
*
@@ -131,18 +133,8 @@ export default function Dashboard() {
{error}
</div>
)}
<div className="grid grid-cols-1 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-3 gap-4">
{suppliers.map((s) => (
<SupplierCard
key={s.utxo_ref}
supplier={s}
onUse={(sup) => setSelected(sup)}
/>
))}
</div>
{selected && (
<div className="mt-8">
<div data-testid="task-form-section">
<h2 className="text-xl font-semibold mb-2">
New task → {selected.model}
<span className="ml-2 text-sm font-normal text-gray-500">
@@ -152,6 +144,21 @@ export default function Dashboard() {
{renderCapabilityForm(selected, advertRef, payment_lovelace)}
</div>
)}
<div className="grid grid-cols-1 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-3 gap-4">
{suppliers.map((s) => (
<SupplierCard
key={s.utxo_ref}
supplier={s}
onUse={(sup) => {
setSelected(sup);
// The form renders above the grid; bring it into view when a
// card further down the page was clicked.
window.scrollTo({ top: 0, behavior: "smooth" });
}}
/>
))}
</div>
</div>
);
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/**
* buyer/src/ui/pages/PendingReceipts.tsx — list of currently-Submitted escrows
* for this buyer, with an "Accept & Pay" action per row.
* for this buyer, with an "Accept & Settle" action per row.
*
* Data flow:
* GET /v1/pending-receipts → buyer-app server proxies indexer /escrows?buyer=<pkh>
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ export default function PendingReceipts() {
<th className="px-2 py-2">Submitted</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Supplier</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Capability</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Payment</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Escrowed</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Window left</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Action</th>
</tr>
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ export default function PendingReceipts() {
: "bg-indigo-600 text-white hover:bg-indigo-700")
}
>
{isAccepting ? "accepting…" : expired ? "expired" : "Accept & Pay"}
{isAccepting ? "accepting…" : expired ? "expired" : "Accept & Settle"}
</button>
)}
</td>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react";
interface VectorProof {
status: "pending" | "confirmed" | "failed";
saleHash: string | null;
batchRoot: string | null;
txHash: string | null;
leafIndex: number | null;
siblings: string[];
}
const PENDING_PROOF: VectorProof = {
status: "pending",
saleHash: null,
batchRoot: null,
txHash: null,
leafIndex: null,
siblings: [],
};
interface DashboardSnapshot {
generatedAt: string;
controller: {
ok: boolean;
phase: string;
lastError: string | null;
};
identity: {
sellerWallet: string;
payoutAddress: string;
};
provider: {
hardLimitUsd: string;
remainingUsd: string;
usedUsd: string;
reserveUsd: string;
estimatedDailyExposureUsd: string;
};
surplus: {
offer: {
id: string | null;
model: string | null;
providerModel: string | null;
status: string;
dailyCapUsd: string | null;
costMultiplier: number | null;
inputUsdPer1m: string | null;
outputUsdPer1m: string | null;
rank: number | null;
available: boolean;
healthy: boolean;
trusted: boolean;
trades24h: number;
volume24hUsd: string;
capRemainingUsd: string | null;
};
earnings: {
totalUsd: string;
pendingUsd: string;
paidUsd: string;
requests: number;
tokens: number;
today: {
earnedUsd: number;
requests: number;
totalTokens: number;
} | null;
topModel: string | null;
payoutHoldReason: string | null;
payoutHoldReleasesAt: string | null;
};
recentSales: Array<{
id: string;
model: string;
createdAt: string | null;
settlementStatus: string;
inputTokens: number;
outputTokens: number;
cacheReadTokens: number;
revenueUsd: string;
vectorProof: VectorProof;
}>;
};
}
function usd(value: string | number | null): string {
if (value === null || value === "") return "—";
const number = Number(value);
if (!Number.isFinite(number)) return "—";
return `$${number.toFixed(number < 0.01 ? 6 : 4)}`;
}
function count(value: number): string {
return new Intl.NumberFormat().format(value);
}
function timestamp(value: string | null): string {
if (value === null) return "—";
const parsed = new Date(value);
return Number.isNaN(parsed.getTime()) ? "—" : parsed.toLocaleString();
}
function compact(value: string): string {
if (value.length <= 24) return value;
return `${value.slice(0, 12)}…${value.slice(-9)}`;
}
function StatusPill({ label, active }: { label: string; active: boolean }) {
return (
<span
className={`rounded px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium ${
active ? "bg-green-100 text-green-700" : "bg-gray-200 text-gray-600"
}`}
>
{label}
</span>
);
}
function VectorProofState({ proof }: { proof: VectorProof }) {
const pillClass = proof.status === "confirmed"
? "bg-green-100 text-green-700"
: proof.status === "pending"
? "bg-amber-100 text-amber-700"
: "bg-red-100 text-red-700";
const pill = (
<span className={`rounded px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium ${pillClass}`}>
{proof.status}
</span>
);
if (proof.status !== "confirmed" || proof.txHash === null) return pill;
return (
<a
className="inline-flex items-center gap-2 rounded text-blue-600 hover:underline focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-gray-500 focus-visible:ring-offset-2"
href={`https://vector.apexscan.org/en/transaction/${proof.txHash}/summary/`}
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
aria-label={`Confirmed Vector proof transaction ${proof.txHash}`}
>
{pill}
<span className="font-mono text-xs">{compact(proof.txHash)}</span>
</a>
);
}
function Metric({ label, value, detail }: { label: string; value: string; detail: string }) {
return (
<div className="rounded border border-gray-200 bg-gray-50 p-3">
<p className="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">{label}</p>
<p className="mt-1 text-xl font-semibold tracking-tight text-gray-900">{value}</p>
<p className="mt-0.5 text-xs text-gray-500">{detail}</p>
</div>
);
}
function FlowNode({ label, title, detail, mono }: {
label: string;
title: string;
detail: string;
mono?: string | null;
}) {
return (
<div className="min-w-0 flex-1 rounded border border-gray-200 bg-gray-50 p-4">
<p className="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">{label}</p>
<p className="mt-1 font-semibold text-gray-900">{title}</p>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-600">{detail}</p>
{mono && <p className="mt-2 truncate font-mono text-xs text-gray-400">{mono}</p>}
</div>
);
}
export default function ResaleDashboard() {
const [data, setData] = useState<DashboardSnapshot | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const response = await fetch("/v1/resale-dashboard", { cache: "no-store" });
const body = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as DashboardSnapshot | {
message?: string;
} | null;
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(
body && "message" in body && typeof body.message === "string"
? body.message
: `dashboard request failed (${response.status})`,
);
}
setData(body as DashboardSnapshot);
setError(null);
} catch (cause) {
setError(cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : "dashboard data is unavailable");
} finally {
setLoading(false);
}
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
void refresh();
const interval = setInterval(() => { void refresh(); }, 15_000);
return () => clearInterval(interval);
}, [refresh]);
if (loading && data === null) {
return <p className="text-sm text-gray-500">Loading capacity markets…</p>;
}
if (data === null) {
return (
<div className="max-w-3xl rounded-lg border border-red-200 bg-red-50 p-4 text-sm text-red-700">
{error ?? "Dashboard data is unavailable."}
</div>
);
}
const offer = data.surplus.offer;
const earnings = data.surplus.earnings;
const offerLive = offer.status === "active" && offer.available && offer.healthy;
const proofCounts = { confirmed: 0, pending: 0, failed: 0 };
for (const sale of data.surplus.recentSales) {
proofCounts[(sale.vectorProof ?? PENDING_PROOF).status] += 1;
}
return (
<div className="mx-auto max-w-7xl space-y-6" data-testid="resale-dashboard">
<div className="flex flex-col gap-3 sm:flex-row sm:items-start sm:justify-between">
<div className="space-y-1">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Capacity Markets</h1>
<p className="max-w-3xl text-sm text-gray-600">
Surplus turns available OpenRouter capacity into Base USDC sales. Vector anchors
Merkle-batched proofs so every sale has a verifiable transaction record.
</p>
</div>
<div className="flex items-center gap-3">
<StatusPill label={data.controller.phase} active={data.controller.ok} />
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => { void refresh(); }}
className="rounded border border-gray-300 bg-white px-3 py-1.5 text-sm text-gray-700 hover:bg-gray-50"
>
Refresh
</button>
</div>
</div>
{error && (
<div className="rounded border border-amber-300 bg-amber-50 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-amber-800">
Last refresh failed: {error}. Showing the last good snapshot.
</div>
)}
{data.controller.lastError && (
<div className="rounded border border-red-200 bg-red-50 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-red-700">
Controller: {data.controller.lastError}
</div>
)}
<section className="rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white p-4 shadow-sm">
<div className="mb-3 flex items-center justify-between">
<div>
<h2 className="font-semibold">Capacity and proof route</h2>
<p className="text-sm text-gray-500">
Capacity sells through Surplus, and each sale joins a shared Vector anchor.
</p>
</div>
<span className="text-xs text-gray-400">Updated {timestamp(data.generatedAt)}</span>
</div>
<div className="flex flex-col items-stretch gap-2 lg:flex-row lg:items-center">
<FlowNode
label="Upstream"
title="OpenRouter"
detail={`${usd(data.provider.remainingUsd)} of ${usd(data.provider.hardLimitUsd)} remaining`}
mono={offer.providerModel}
/>
<span className="self-center text-lg text-gray-400">→</span>
<FlowNode
label="Manager"
title="Seller agent"
detail="Discovers, prices, caps, and reconciles offers"
mono={data.identity.sellerWallet}
/>
<span className="self-center text-lg text-gray-400">→</span>
<FlowNode
label="Live market"
title="Surplus / Base USDC"
detail={`${offerLive ? "Available" : "Unavailable"} · ${offer.trusted ? "trusted" : "untrusted"}`}
mono={offer.id}
/>
<span className="self-center text-lg text-gray-400">→</span>
<FlowNode
label="Proof layer"
title="Vector anchors"
detail="Commits each sale through a shared Merkle-batch transaction"
/>
</div>
</section>
<section className="rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white p-4 shadow-sm">
<div className="flex items-start justify-between gap-3">
<div>
<p className="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">Current market</p>
<h2 className="mt-1 text-lg font-semibold">Surplus Intelligence</h2>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-600">Discounted inference with USDC settlement on Base.</p>
</div>
<StatusPill label={offer.status} active={offerLive} />
</div>
<div className="mt-4 grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-4">
<Metric label="Lifetime revenue" value={usd(earnings.totalUsd)} detail={`${usd(earnings.pendingUsd)} pending`} />
<Metric label="Requests sold" value={count(earnings.requests)} detail={`${count(earnings.tokens)} tokens`} />
<Metric label="Market rank" value={offer.rank === null ? "—" : `#${offer.rank}`} detail={`${offer.trades24h} trades / 24h`} />
<Metric label="Daily seller cap" value={usd(offer.dailyCapUsd)} detail={`${usd(offer.capRemainingUsd)} remaining`} />
</div>
<dl className="mt-4 grid gap-x-6 gap-y-2 border-t border-gray-100 pt-4 text-sm sm:grid-cols-2">
<div><dt className="text-gray-500">Marketplace model</dt><dd className="font-mono text-xs text-gray-900">{offer.model ?? "—"}</dd></div>
<div><dt className="text-gray-500">Provider model</dt><dd className="font-mono text-xs text-gray-900">{offer.providerModel ?? "—"}</dd></div>
<div><dt className="text-gray-500">Input / 1M</dt><dd>{usd(offer.inputUsdPer1m)}</dd></div>
<div><dt className="text-gray-500">Output / 1M</dt><dd>{usd(offer.outputUsdPer1m)}</dd></div>
</dl>
{earnings.payoutHoldReason && (
<div className="mt-4 rounded border border-amber-300 bg-amber-50 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-amber-800">
Payout hold: {earnings.payoutHoldReason}
{earnings.payoutHoldReleasesAt && ` · releases ${timestamp(earnings.payoutHoldReleasesAt)}`}
</div>
)}
</section>
<section className="rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white p-4 shadow-sm">
<div>
<p className="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">Economics</p>
<h2 className="mt-1 text-lg font-semibold">Capacity and price controls</h2>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-600">
The seller cap is discounted revenue. The agent converts it to estimated upstream exposure before opening the route.
</p>
</div>
<div className="mt-4 grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-4">
<Metric label="OpenRouter remaining" value={usd(data.provider.remainingUsd)} detail={`${usd(data.provider.usedUsd)} used`} />
<Metric label="Protected reserve" value={usd(data.provider.reserveUsd)} detail="fail-closed threshold" />
<Metric label="Daily upstream estimate" value={usd(data.provider.estimatedDailyExposureUsd)} detail="from recovery floor" />
<Metric label="Current multiplier" value={offer.costMultiplier === null ? "—" : `${(offer.costMultiplier * 100).toFixed(3)}%`} detail={`${usd(offer.inputUsdPer1m)} in · ${usd(offer.outputUsdPer1m)} out`} />
</div>
</section>
<section className="space-y-3">
<div className="flex flex-col gap-1 sm:flex-row sm:items-end sm:justify-between">
<div>
<p className="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">Surplus activity</p>
<h2 className="mt-1 text-lg font-semibold">Recent sales</h2>
</div>
<p className="text-sm text-gray-500">{count(earnings.requests)} lifetime requests · {count(earnings.tokens)} tokens</p>
</div>
<div
className="flex flex-wrap gap-2"
role="group"
aria-label="Vector proof summary"
>
<span className="rounded bg-green-100 px-2 py-1 text-xs font-medium text-green-700">
Confirmed {count(proofCounts.confirmed)}
</span>
<span className="rounded bg-amber-100 px-2 py-1 text-xs font-medium text-amber-700">
Pending {count(proofCounts.pending)}
</span>
<span className="rounded bg-red-100 px-2 py-1 text-xs font-medium text-red-700">
Failed {count(proofCounts.failed)}
</span>
</div>
<div className="overflow-x-auto rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white shadow-sm">
<table className="min-w-full divide-y divide-gray-200 text-sm">
<caption className="sr-only">Recent Surplus sales with Vector proof status</caption>
<thead className="bg-gray-50 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">
<tr>
<th className="px-4 py-3">Time</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3">Status</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3">Model</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3 text-right">Input</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3 text-right">Output</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3 text-right">Cache read</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3 text-right">Revenue</th>
<th className="px-4 py-3">Vector proof</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody className="divide-y divide-gray-100">
{data.surplus.recentSales.length === 0 ? (
<tr><td colSpan={8} className="px-4 py-8 text-center text-gray-500">No sales returned.</td></tr>
) : data.surplus.recentSales.map((sale) => (
<tr key={sale.id} className="hover:bg-gray-50">
<td className="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-gray-600">{timestamp(sale.createdAt)}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-3">
<span className={`rounded px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium ${
sale.settlementStatus === "confirmed"
? "bg-green-100 text-green-700"
: "bg-amber-100 text-amber-700"
}`}>
{sale.settlementStatus}
</span>
</td>
<td className="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 font-mono text-xs">{sale.model}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-3 text-right tabular-nums">{count(sale.inputTokens)}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-3 text-right tabular-nums">{count(sale.outputTokens)}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-3 text-right tabular-nums">{count(sale.cacheReadTokens)}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-3 text-right tabular-nums">{usd(sale.revenueUsd)}</td>
<td className="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3">
<VectorProofState proof={sale.vectorProof ?? PENDING_PROOF} />
</td>
</tr>
))}
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</section>
<p className="text-xs text-gray-400">
Surplus seller {compact(data.identity.sellerWallet)} · payout {compact(data.identity.payoutAddress)}
</p>
</div>
);
}

View File

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function LifecycleCard({ lc }: { lc: Lifecycle }): JSX.Element {
</>
)}
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.payment_lovelace)} payment</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.payment_lovelace)} escrowed</span>
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.buyer_bond_lovelace)} bond</span>
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>

View File

@@ -289,3 +289,34 @@ For the M1-F-2 (LiveOgmiosProvider) handoff: the supplier compose already
joins `apex-dashboard_apex-net` and overrides `OGMIOS_URL=ws://ogmios:1337`,
so once the supplier code stops booting `ReadOnlyOgmiosProvider` and
starts talking to a real Ogmios, no compose changes are needed.
## 10. Continuous deployment (mainnet, vector-marketplace host)
Merges to `main` deploy automatically to the mainnet host once CI is green:
1. `.github/workflows/ci.yml` runs typecheck + vitest on the merge commit.
2. On success, `.github/workflows/deploy-mainnet.yml` SSHes into the host
(secret `DEPLOY_SSH_KEY`, host key pinned in the workflow) and executes
`deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh` **at the new commit** (`git show FETCH_HEAD:...`),
so deploy logic always matches the code being deployed.
3. The script hard-resets `/root/agents-marketplace` to `origin/main`, maps the
old..new diff to affected compose projects (changes under `packages/`,
`patches/`, `contracts/` or root manifests rebuild everything), builds all
affected images up front, then does a rolling `up -d` with a health gate per
project. Suppliers are drained first: `/status` is polled until not
`working` (up to `DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS`, default 600) so an in-flight job
isn't killed and its escrow bond forfeited.
Manual controls:
- **Manual deploy / redeploy**: Actions → "Deploy mainnet" → Run workflow
(check *force* to redeploy the same sha), or on the host:
`bash /root/agents-marketplace/deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh` (`FORCE=1` to
redeploy, `DRY_RUN=1` to preview which projects would restart).
- **Rollback**: `cd /root/agents-marketplace && git reset --hard <old-sha> &&
FORCE=1 bash deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh`. Every deploy appends
`old -> new (projects)` to `/var/log/marketplace-deploy.log`.
Projects with no running containers on the host (e.g. wallet-monitor) are
skipped; image-only projects (ollama, chatmock, tts-piper) redeploy only when
their own compose file changes.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
# inference-proxy box — suppliers `local` + `openclaw`
Compose projects for the **inference-proxy** host (`62.238.38.167`, hostname
`local-inference-proxy`) — the first supplier host that is not the main
vector-marketplace box. Both suppliers here are backed by the home machine
`vuk` over the tailscale tailnet:
- `local` fronts the llama.cpp rig (`llamacpp-multinode`) directly at
`100.77.146.49:8002`.
- `openclaw` fronts an **OpenClaw agent** (agent `main`) on the KVM guest
`web-tools`, exposed over the tailnet via Tailscale Serve at
`https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net`, whose own brain is the *same*
llama.cpp rig. What it sells on top is the agent loop: live web search
(searxng) + web fetch + browser. Both suppliers contend for vuk's single
llama.cpp slot; requests queue and the 1h deadline absorbs stalls.
> **Tailnet (2026-08-13):** account `teamhaleight@`, tailnet
> `taild99fee.ts.net`. Node IPs: inference-proxy `100.110.165.124`, vuk
> `100.77.146.49`, web-tools `100.105.36.0`. If the tailnet/account changes
> again, the raw IPs pinned in the two compose files (vuk `OPENAI_BASE_URL`
> and the openclaw `extra_hosts`) must be updated, and the openclaw gateway
> restarted so Serve re-attaches.
> **Manual deploys only.** This box is NOT covered by the CD pipeline
> (`deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh` targets the main box). Update with
> `git pull && docker compose ... up -d --build`.
## Layout
| File | Project | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `docker-compose.traefik.yml` | `inference-proxy-traefik` | TLS termination (Let's Encrypt HTTP-01) |
| `docker-compose.supplier-local.yml` | `marketplace-mainnet-supplier-local` | Supplier `local`, `llm.chat.v1`, model `<vuk GGUF id>` |
| `docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml` | `marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openclaw` | Supplier `openclaw`, `llm.chat.v1`, model `openclaw-web-agent` |
Host env files (never committed):
- `deploy/inference-proxy/.env` — `ACME_EMAIL=<operator email>` for traefik.
- `supplier/.env.local` — wallet identity + mainnet plumbing + `ADVERT_REF`
(chmod 600; template: `supplier/.env.hetzner.example`, but backend is
`OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://100.77.146.49:8002` with no `OPENAI_API_KEY`, and
`OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS=3600000`).
- `supplier/.env.openclaw` — same shape as `.env.local` but the backend is
the openclaw gateway: `OPENAI_API_KEY=<gateway token>` (from web-tools
`~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` → `.gateway.auth.token`). `OPENAI_BASE_URL`,
`OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1`, and `OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE=openclaw` are set
in the compose `environment:`, not the env file.
## Bring-up order (fresh box)
```bash
# 1. docker + network (one-shot)
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
docker network create traefik-net
# 2. repo
git clone https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agents-marketplace.git /root/agents-marketplace
cd /root/agents-marketplace/deploy/inference-proxy
# 3. traefik
echo 'ACME_EMAIL=<operator email>' > .env && chmod 600 .env
docker compose -f docker-compose.traefik.yml up -d
# 4. build supplier image (also used to run the CLIs — no Node on the host)
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml build
# 5. wallet: generate, then write all four values into supplier/.env.local
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/gen-keypair.ts --network 1
# → fund the printed address (~200 AP3X), and set DNS:
# mp-suppliers-local.vector.apexfusion.org → A 62.238.38.167 (DNS-only/unproxied)
# 6. advert (after funding confirmed)
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/post-advert.ts \
--capability-id llm.chat.v1 \
--model <exact id from http://100.77.146.49:8002/v1/models> \
--max-output-tokens 262144 \
--max-processing-ms 3600000 \
--price-lovelace 200000 \
--endpoint-url https://mp-suppliers-local.vector.apexfusion.org
# → paste printed "<txHash>#0" into supplier/.env.local as ADVERT_REF
# 7. supplier
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml up -d
```
Register the wallet in monitoring on the **main** box: add the address to
`wallet-monitor/wallets.json` and `buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets.ts`
(`OPERATOR_SOURCES`).
## Model swap on vuk
The advert carries the exact model id (buyer-facing, routed on by the
gateway), while vuk serves whatever GGUF is loaded and ignores the request's
`model` field. After swapping the model on vuk:
```bash
cd /root/agents-marketplace/deploy/inference-proxy
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/retire-advert.ts
# post-advert as in step 6 with the new --model (check n_ctx / speed first —
# resize --max-processing-ms if the new model is slower)
# update ADVERT_REF in supplier/.env.local, then:
docker compose -f docker-compose.supplier-local.yml up -d --force-recreate
```
## Caveats
- **Availability**: when vuk is off, the indexer prober marks the supplier
offline and gateway jobs for this model fail. Accepted for a home rig.
- **Throughput**: ~4.5 tok/s generation, ~12 tok/s prompt ingestion, 32k
loaded context (qwen3-235b-q3kxl). Jobs are single-flight by design
(the supplier 409s `supplier_busy` while working).
- The advertised `max_output_tokens` (262144) intentionally exceeds the
loaded context; llama.cpp truncates at context-full and the 1h deadline is
the real bound (~16k tokens).
---
# Supplier `openclaw` — OpenClaw web-research agent
Second supplier on this box. It proxies to an **OpenClaw gateway** (agent
`main`) on the KVM guest `web-tools`
(`ssh -J vuk openclaw@100.105.36.0`), OpenClaw version `2026.7.1-2`. The
gateway binds to loopback (`127.0.0.1:18789`) and is exposed tailnet-wide via
**Tailscale Serve** at `https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net` (valid *.ts.net
TLS, gateway token auth). The agent's brain is the same vuk llama.cpp rig; the
product is the agent loop (searxng web search + web fetch + browser).
The supplier speaks the **stateful-upstream contract** (see the compose
header): `OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1` sends the escrow ref as the OpenAI
`user` field (OpenClaw keys one persistent agent session per `user`, so
browser/tool state survives across turns and only the turn delta is sent
upstream), and `OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE=openclaw` sends the fixed upstream model
id OpenClaw accepts (the endpoint 400s on any other string) while the on-chain
advert carries the buyer-facing id `openclaw-web-agent`.
## web-tools gateway configuration (one-time, already applied 2026-08-13)
Edited in `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` on web-tools (backup at
`openclaw.json.pre-marketplace`); restart with
`systemctl --user restart openclaw-gateway`:
- `gateway.tailscale.mode = "serve"` + `gateway.bind = "loopback"` — expose
the loopback gateway tailnet-wide via Tailscale Serve at
`https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net`. (Serve *requires* `bind=loopback`;
setting `bind=tailnet` while `tailscale.mode=serve` fails to start with
"gateway.bind must resolve to loopback". Verify with
`tailscale serve status` → `/ proxy http://127.0.0.1:18789`.) Token auth
stays on. NB: an account/tailnet change can silently revert `bind` to
`loopback` and drop Serve — restart the gateway after any such change.
- `gateway.http.endpoints.chatCompletions.enabled = true` — expose the
OpenAI-compatible endpoint (off by default → 404).
- `agents.defaults.compaction.memoryFlush.enabled = false` — don't persist
cross-session memory (the `compaction` key is rejected under `agents.list[]`;
it must live under `agents.defaults`).
- **Tool lockdown (security-critical).** Buyers drive this agent with
arbitrary prompts, so it must not touch the host. Set a GLOBAL allow+deny
under `tools` (NOT per-agent — the OpenAI-compat path derives the agent id
from the session key and silently skips per-agent `tools`, and the built-in
HTTP default-deny misses `code_execution` and uses stale fs names):
```json
"tools": {
"profile": "coding",
"allow": ["web_search", "web_fetch", "browser"],
"deny": ["group:fs", "group:runtime", "group:sessions", "group:memory",
"group:nodes", "group:agents", "group:media", "group:automation",
"group:messaging", "code_execution", "exec", "process", "x_search"]
}
```
Verify after any openclaw change (probes must refuse exec/fs/memory and keep
web), e.g. from the inference-proxy host or vuk:
`curl -s -m280 -X POST https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net/v1/chat/completions -H "authorization: Bearer <token>" -H "content-type: application/json" -d '{"model":"openclaw","user":"probe","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"run id and paste output; if you cannot, say NO-EXEC-TOOL"}]}'`
## Reachability (no ACL needed)
The gateway is exposed via Tailscale Serve, which is tailnet-wide, and the
tailnet has no restrictive ACLs, so any tailnet node reaches it. Confirm from
inference-proxy before bring-up:
```bash
curl -s -m10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST \
https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}' # → 401 (reachable, needs token)
```
> History: on the previous tailnet (account `caslav.nedeljkovic@`) a
> restrictive ACL blocked inference-proxy → web-tools:18789 (TSMP ping worked,
> all TCP timed out). Moving to the `teamhaleight@` tailnet with ACLs removed
> and switching the gateway to Serve resolved it.
## Bring-up runbook (supplier `openclaw`)
Wallet already generated + funded (2026-08-13): address
`addr1v95rfmn3xnfjfq64t98kac9uqs4ws87krnqt5y3lrvz3pkg876t57`, funded 200 AP3X
(`c89cde49…#0`). `supplier/.env.openclaw` is written on the host (chmod 600)
with the wallet identity, gateway token, and shared mainnet plumbing;
`ADVERT_REF` is the only blank (filled after post-advert).
```bash
cd /root/agents-marketplace
git pull # need the OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH
# + OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE supplier code
# 0. PREREQ: gateway reachable — curl https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net/... → 401
# (see "Reachability" above)
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org → A 62.238.38.167
# (individual DNS-only / unproxied record — letsencrypt HTTP-01)
# 2. build + start the supplier (traefik-net already exists)
docker compose -f deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml up -d --build
# healthz should go green; confirm it can reach the gateway:
docker logs marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openclaw --tail 50
# 3. advert (LAST — this is the go-live flag; do it only after step 2 is
# healthy and the gateway path works, so buyers never hit a dead endpoint)
docker compose -f deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml \
run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/post-advert.ts \
--capability-id llm.chat.v1 \
--model openclaw-web-agent \
--max-output-tokens 262144 \
--max-processing-ms 3600000 \
--price-lovelace 200000 \
--endpoint-url https://mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org
# → paste printed "<txHash>#0" into supplier/.env.openclaw as ADVERT_REF, then:
docker compose -f deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml up -d --force-recreate
```
Monitoring: `supplier-openclaw@inference-proxy` is already registered in
`buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets.ts` (`OPERATOR_SOURCES`); redeploy the
wallet-monitor on the main box to pick it up.
## Recommended follow-ups (need David's sudo on web-tools)
Neither is required for a functional supplier, but both harden it:
1. **Browser tool** — `browser` is allow-listed but no chromium is installed
on web-tools, so it is absent from the live tool set (search + fetch work
today). Install openclaw's managed browser / a system chromium to enable it.
2. **Egress firewall** — the agent can `web_fetch`/browse arbitrary URLs.
Restrict the VM's outbound to block RFC1918 + tailnet CGNAT
(`100.64.0.0/10`) except `100.77.146.49:8002` (vuk llama.cpp), leaving
public internet open for fetch. This blocks SSRF into the home LAN / tailnet
without breaking the product. Requires `sudo` on web-tools.
## Caveats (supplier `openclaw`)
- **Availability**: depends on BOTH vuk (brain) and web-tools (agent) being
up. Either off → indexer marks the supplier offline and gateway jobs fail.
- **Throughput**: agent turns run several llama.cpp completions (reason +
search + read) at ~4.5 tok/s on a slot shared with supplier `local`. Expect
minutes per turn; `MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS=1` keeps it single-flight.
- **Ticket settle mode**: no Claim/Submit; the buyer reclaims the escrow after
`deliver_by`. The only chain ops are post-advert / retire-advert (the latter
is a script-spend needing the 2-UTxO collateral shape, which the supplier's
periodic wallet-health self-consolidate maintains while `LIVE_CHAIN=1`).

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# deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-local.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (local llama.cpp on `vuk` via tailscale — chat-session `llm.chat.v1`)
#
# Runs on the inference-proxy box (62.238.38.167), NOT the main marketplace
# box. The compute backend is a llama.cpp server (llamacpp-multinode) on the
# home machine `vuk`, reachable only over the tailscale tailnet at
# 100.77.146.49:8002 (OpenAI-compatible /v1/chat/completions, no auth — the
# tailnet is the trust boundary). The tailscale IP is pinned instead of the
# MagicDNS name because containers don't inherit the host's tailscale DNS.
# (Tailnet `taild99fee.ts.net`, account teamhaleight@; vuk's IP was
# 100.82.111.46 on the previous tailnet — update here if the tailnet changes.)
#
# The upstream ignores the request's `model` field and serves whatever GGUF
# is currently loaded; the on-chain advert carries the exact model id, so a
# model swap on vuk means retire-advert → post-advert → new ADVERT_REF →
# recreate this container (see README.md).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-local.vector.apexfusion.org → 62.238.38.167
# (individual DNS-only A record; letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the
# unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.local written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
# (no OPENAI_API_KEY — vuk's endpoint is unauthenticated)
# 3. Networks: traefik-net is created one-shot (see the traefik compose in
# this directory). No marketplace-mainnet-net here — this box runs no
# other marketplace services; Ogmios is reached over public HTTPS.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-local
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-local
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this supplier: wallet identity, ADVERT_REF,
# and the shared mainnet plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID,
# OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN).
- path: ../../supplier/.env.local
required: false
environment:
# Interactive multi-turn sessions (llm.chat.v1). Mirrors the Hetzner
# -chat fleet, except MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS=1: vuk generates at ~4.5 tok/s
# on a single slot, so one session owns the rig at a time.
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "1"
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
# vuk's tailscale IP; see header for why not the MagicDNS name.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: http://100.77.146.49:8002
# ~4.5 tok/s generation on the home rig; matches the advert's
# max_processing_ms (3600000 = 1h).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: no max_tokens forwarded
# upstream; llama.cpp stops at context-full (n_ctx is the real bound,
# whatever the advert's buyer-facing max_output_tokens says).
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.local on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-local.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-local.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-local-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

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@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
# deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-openclaw.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenClaw web-research agent on `web-tools` via tailscale — chat-session
# `llm.chat.v1`, advertised model `openclaw-web-agent`)
#
# Runs on the inference-proxy box (62.238.38.167), next to supplier `local`.
# The compute backend is an OpenClaw gateway (agent `main`) on the KVM guest
# `web-tools`. The gateway binds to loopback and is exposed tailnet-wide via
# Tailscale Serve at https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net (valid *.ts.net TLS,
# gateway token auth). The agent's own brain is the SAME llama.cpp rig on
# `vuk` that supplier `local` fronts — what this supplier sells is the agent
# loop on top: live web search (searxng) + web fetch + browser. Both suppliers
# contend for vuk's single slot; requests queue at llama.cpp and the 1h
# deadline absorbs stalls.
#
# Why the MagicDNS name + extra_hosts (not a raw IP): Serve terminates TLS
# with a Let's Encrypt cert for web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net, so the client
# must use that hostname (SNI + cert match). Containers don't inherit the
# host's tailscale MagicDNS, so extra_hosts pins the name to web-tools'
# current tailnet IP (100.105.36.0 on tailnet taild99fee.ts.net, account
# teamhaleight@). If the tailnet/IP changes, update the extra_hosts IP.
#
# Stateful upstream contract (differs from every other -chat supplier):
# - OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1 — each turn sends the escrow ref as the
# OpenAI `user` field. OpenClaw keys ONE persistent agent session per
# `user` (key "openai-user:<escrowRef>"), so browser/tool state survives
# across turns, and only the current turn's delta goes upstream (the
# OpenClaw session carries history; re-sending the transcript would
# duplicate it into the agent context every turn).
# - OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE=openclaw — OpenClaw's endpoint 400s on any model
# except "openclaw" / "openclaw/<agentId>", while the on-chain advert
# carries the buyer-facing id `openclaw-web-agent` the gateway routes on.
#
# Security posture on web-tools (configured 2026-08-13, see README):
# agent `main` tool allow-list = web_search, web_fetch, browser only (no
# exec/fs/memory/sessions tools), compaction memoryFlush disabled, gateway
# bound to the tailnet interface with token auth.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. web-tools reachable over the tailnet: the openclaw gateway is exposed
# via Tailscale Serve at https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net. Confirm from
# the host: `curl -m10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST
# https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net/v1/chat/completions` → 401 (needs
# token). No tailnet ACL is required (serve is tailnet-wide).
# 2. DNS: mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org → 62.238.38.167
# (individual DNS-only A record; letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the
# unproxied direct record)
# 3. supplier/.env.openclaw written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY (openclaw gateway token),
# OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 4. Networks: traefik-net is created one-shot (see the traefik compose in
# this directory).
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openclaw
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openclaw
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this supplier: wallet identity, ADVERT_REF,
# the openclaw gateway token (OPENAI_API_KEY), and the shared mainnet
# plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN).
- path: ../../supplier/.env.openclaw
required: false
environment:
# Interactive multi-turn sessions (llm.chat.v1). Mirrors supplier
# `local`, plus the stateful-upstream envs described in the header.
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
# One session at a time: agent turns loop over vuk's single ~4.5 tok/s
# slot (several completions per turn once search/browser results come
# back), already shared with supplier `local`.
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "1"
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
# Tailscale Serve endpoint (HTTPS, valid *.ts.net cert). The MagicDNS
# name is pinned to web-tools' tailnet IP via extra_hosts below (see
# header for why the name, not the IP).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net
# Agent turns are slow: reasoning + tool loops at ~4.5 tok/s generation.
# Matches the advert's max_processing_ms (3600000 = 1h).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH: "1"
OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE: openclaw
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: the agent manages its own
# context; vuk's llama.cpp stops at context-full.
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.openclaw on a mainnet
# host.
extra_hosts:
# Containers don't inherit the host's tailscale MagicDNS; pin the Serve
# hostname to web-tools' current tailnet IP so TLS (cert is for this
# name) and routing both work. Update the IP if the tailnet changes.
- "web-tools.taild99fee.ts.net:100.105.36.0"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-openclaw.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-openclaw-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
# deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.traefik.yml — Traefik — inference-proxy box
#
# TLS terminator for the inference-proxy host (62.238.38.167) — the first
# supplier host that is NOT the main vector-marketplace box. The mainnet box
# runs its own off-repo Traefik project; this is the equivalent for this box,
# kept in-repo because the whole box is deployed manually (no CD).
#
# Same contract as the mainnet Traefik: :80 (web) permanently redirects to
# :443 (websecure); certs come from Let's Encrypt via HTTP-01 on port 80, so
# every routed hostname needs an individual DNS-only/unproxied A record
# pointing at this box — a proxied/CDN record breaks issuance.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. docker network create traefik-net # one-shot
# 2. Write deploy/inference-proxy/.env with:
# ACME_EMAIL=<operator email> # not committed — repo is public
# 3. docker compose --env-file .env -f docker-compose.traefik.yml up -d
# (run from this directory so the .env is picked up implicitly)
name: inference-proxy-traefik
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.6
container_name: inference-proxy-traefik
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
# Docker Engine 29+ rejects API < 1.40; traefik's default negotiation
# lands on 1.24 and the docker provider dies. Pin a supported version.
DOCKER_API_VERSION: "1.44"
command:
- "--providers.docker=true"
- "--providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false"
- "--providers.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
- "--entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.to=websecure"
- "--entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.scheme=https"
- "--entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.permanent=true"
- "--entrypoints.websecure.address=:443"
- "--certificatesresolvers.letsencrypt.acme.email=${ACME_EMAIL:?set ACME_EMAIL in deploy/inference-proxy/.env}"
- "--certificatesresolvers.letsencrypt.acme.storage=/letsencrypt/acme.json"
- "--certificatesresolvers.letsencrypt.acme.httpchallenge.entrypoint=web"
- "--log.level=INFO"
- "--accesslog=true"
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
- letsencrypt:/letsencrypt
networks:
- traefik-net
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
volumes:
letsencrypt:
networks:
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

179
deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh — pull-based CD for the vector-marketplace host.
#
# Runs ON the server (root@vector-marketplace, repo at /root/agents-marketplace).
# Invoked by .github/workflows/deploy-mainnet.yml over SSH, but safe to run by
# hand: `bash deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh`.
#
# What it does:
# 1. Fetches origin/main and hard-resets the checkout to it.
# 2. Diffs old..new to work out which compose projects actually need a
# rebuild (gateway vs suppliers vs buyer vs indexer ...). Changes under
# packages/, patches/, contracts/ or the root manifests rebuild everything,
# because every Dockerfile COPYs those into its build context.
# 3. Builds affected images first (all 17 supplier projects share one
# Dockerfile/context, so build #2..#17 are layer-cache hits), THEN does a
# rolling `up -d` so the downtime window is restart-only, not build+restart.
# 4. Suppliers are drained before recreate: /status is polled until the
# supplier is not "working" (a busy supplier killed mid-job forfeits its
# escrow bond). After DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS we recreate anyway, so a wedged
# supplier cannot block the deploy forever.
# 5. Every restarted container must report healthy (or plain running when it
# has no healthcheck) within HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS or the deploy fails.
#
# Env knobs:
# FORCE=1 redeploy even if already at origin/main
# DRY_RUN=1 print what would be rebuilt/restarted, change nothing
# DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS=N max wait per busy supplier (default 600, 0 = skip)
# HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS=N max wait for healthy (default 180)
#
# Rollback: git reset --hard <old-sha> && FORCE=1 bash deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh
# (old sha is printed below and appended to /var/log/marketplace-deploy.log).
set -euo pipefail
REPO=/root/agents-marketplace
COMPOSE_DIR="$REPO/deploy/mainnet"
LOCK=/run/marketplace-deploy.lock
LOG=/var/log/marketplace-deploy.log
DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS="${DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS:-600}"
HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS="${HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS:-180}"
FORCE="${FORCE:-0}"
DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-0}"
exec 9>"$LOCK"
flock -n 9 || { echo "another deploy is already running (lock: $LOCK)"; exit 1; }
cd "$REPO"
OLD=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
git fetch origin main
NEW=$(git rev-parse FETCH_HEAD)
if [ "$OLD" = "$NEW" ] && [ "$FORCE" != "1" ]; then
echo "already at origin/main ($NEW) — nothing to deploy (FORCE=1 to override)"
exit 0
fi
echo "deploying $OLD -> $NEW"
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ]; then
echo "(dry run — checkout not reset, nothing rebuilt or restarted)"
else
git reset --hard FETCH_HEAD
fi
CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only "$OLD" "$NEW" || true)
[ "$FORCE" = "1" ] && [ -z "$CHANGED" ] && CHANGED="(forced)"
# Paths COPY'd into every image's build context (see */Dockerfile).
SHARED_RE='^(packages/|patches/|contracts/|package\.json$|pnpm-lock\.yaml$|pnpm-workspace\.yaml$|tsconfig\.base\.json$|\.npmrc$)'
changed_matches() { # changed_matches <ere> -> 0 if any changed path matches
[ "$FORCE" = "1" ] && return 0
echo "$CHANGED" | grep -qE "$1"
}
# Compose project -> the source prefixes that require rebuilding its image.
# Image-only projects (ollama, chatmock, tts-piper) redeploy only when their
# own compose file changes.
project_re() {
case "$1" in
docker-compose.indexer.yml) echo "^indexer/|^indexer-ui/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
docker-compose.buyer.yml) echo "^buyer/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
docker-compose.gateway.yml) echo "^gateway/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
docker-compose.wallet-monitor.yml) echo "^wallet-monitor/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
docker-compose.surplus-seller.yml) echo "^supplier/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
docker-compose.supplier*.yml) echo "^supplier/|$SHARED_RE" ;;
*) echo "" ;;
esac
}
# Restart order: infra first, suppliers last (each supplier drains first).
ORDERED_NON_SUPPLIER="docker-compose.indexer.yml docker-compose.buyer.yml docker-compose.gateway.yml docker-compose.wallet-monitor.yml docker-compose.surplus-seller.yml docker-compose.ollama.yml docker-compose.chatmock.yml docker-compose.tts-piper.yml"
SUPPLIERS=$(cd "$COMPOSE_DIR" && ls docker-compose.supplier*.yml)
AFFECTED=()
for f in $ORDERED_NON_SUPPLIER $SUPPLIERS; do
[ -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$f" ] || continue
re=$(project_re "$f")
hit=0
[ -n "$re" ] && changed_matches "$re" && hit=1
changed_matches "^deploy/mainnet/$f\$" && hit=1
[ "$hit" = "1" ] || continue
if [ -z "$(docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$f" ps -q 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
echo "skip $f — affected but no running containers on this host"
continue
fi
AFFECTED+=("$f")
done
if [ "${#AFFECTED[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "no running compose project is affected by $OLD..$NEW — done"
echo "$(date -Is) $OLD -> $NEW (no services affected)" >> "$LOG"
exit 0
fi
echo "affected projects: ${AFFECTED[*]}"
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ]; then
echo "(dry run — stopping before build/rollout)"
exit 0
fi
echo "== build phase =="
for f in "${AFFECTED[@]}"; do
echo "-- building $f"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$f" build
done
drain_supplier() { # drain_supplier <compose-file>
[ "$DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS" = "0" ] && return 0
local cid deadline status
cid=$(docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$1" ps -q supplier)
[ -n "$cid" ] || return 0
deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS ))
while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
status=$(docker exec "$cid" wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/status 2>/dev/null \
| grep -o '"status":"[^"]*"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4 || true)
if [ "$status" != "working" ]; then
return 0
fi
echo " supplier busy (status=working) — waiting for job to finish..."
sleep 15
done
echo " WARNING: still busy after ${DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECS}s — recreating anyway"
}
wait_healthy() { # wait_healthy <compose-file>
local deadline cid state
deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS ))
for cid in $(docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$1" ps -q); do
while :; do
state=$(docker inspect -f '{{if .State.Health}}{{.State.Health.Status}}{{else}}{{.State.Status}}{{end}}' "$cid")
case "$state" in
healthy|running) break ;;
starting|unhealthy|created|restarting)
if [ "$(date +%s)" -ge "$deadline" ]; then
echo " FAILED: $(docker inspect -f '{{.Name}}' "$cid") is '$state' after ${HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECS}s; last logs:"
docker logs --tail 50 "$cid" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ | /'
return 1
fi
sleep 5 ;;
*) echo " FAILED: container state '$state'"; docker logs --tail 50 "$cid" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ | /'; return 1 ;;
esac
done
done
}
echo "== rollout phase =="
for f in "${AFFECTED[@]}"; do
echo "-- rolling out $f"
case "$f" in docker-compose.supplier*) drain_supplier "$f" ;; esac
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_DIR/$f" up -d
wait_healthy "$f"
echo " ok"
done
echo "$(date -Is) $OLD -> $NEW (${AFFECTED[*]})" >> "$LOG"
echo "== deploy complete: $NEW =="
echo "rollback: cd $REPO && git reset --hard $OLD && FORCE=1 bash deploy/mainnet/deploy.sh"

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ services:
# gateway must CORS-allow https://marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org (see
# GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS in docker-compose.gateway.yml).
GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL: https://api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org
SURPLUS_DASHBOARD_URL: http://marketplace-mainnet-surplus-seller:8080/internal/resale-dashboard
# NETWORK_ID intentionally not pinned — see supplier compose comment.
volumes:
- buyer-mainnet-archive:/repo/data/archive

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ services:
# Accept/Reclaim/Submit. Same values the buyer/suppliers use on mainnet.
ESCROW_REF_UTXO: c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#0
ADVERT_REF_UTXO: c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#1
# Prefer the balance-aware reseller for matching models; fall back when unavailable.
GATEWAY_PREFERRED_SUPPLIER_PKH: c447d050e23bc3c38ff8267047c6f8c978970e7176e2af48f316a7fb
# Browser Origins allowed to call the gateway cross-origin. The buyer
# frontend's "API Keys" page (served from marketplace.vector…) POSTs to
# /signup here. Comma-separated; empty disables CORS entirely.
@@ -59,8 +61,18 @@ services:
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
# This host is NOT Cloudflare-proxied: traefik terminates TLS itself with
# a Let's Encrypt cert (resolver defined in /root/traefik/traefik.yml on
# the box). The :80 router only redirects; ACME HTTP-01 challenges are
# answered by traefik before the redirect applies.
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.rule=Host(`api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.middlewares=mp-gateway-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-gateway-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-gateway-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-gateway-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-1.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 1)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-1
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-1
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-2.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 2)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-2
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-2
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-3.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 3)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-3
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-3
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-hf-llama33.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (HuggingFace Inference Providers router / meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct
# — one-off `llm.text.generate.v1`)
#
# HF-router-backed supplier. LLM_BACKEND=openai pointed at the HuggingFace
# Inference Providers router (OpenAI-compatible at https://router.huggingface.co).
# No local proxy container — reachable over public HTTPS. Direct analogue of the
# OpenRouter/Hetzner-backed suppliers; the router is OpenAI-compatible so this is
# config only (V1 HF integration).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.hf-llama33 written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY (hf_ token), OGMIOS_URL,
# NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# Advert posted with --capability-id llm.text.generate.v1.
# Do NOT set OPENAI_REASONING — the HF router rejects it (HTTP 400) and the
# supplier's config guard refuses to boot.
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-hf-llama33
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-hf-llama33
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this HF-router-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the HF OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet plumbing
# duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.hf-llama33
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (HF router serves at https://router.huggingface.co/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://router.huggingface.co
# First-token latency across hosted providers can exceed local backends;
# kept ≤ the advert's max_processing_ms (300000) per fleet footgun #4.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: no max_tokens forwarded upstream,
# the provider grants context − prompt. Advert cap = model context length.
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.hf-llama33 on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openrouter-reseller
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:17-alpine
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-openrouter-reseller-postgres
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: /var/lib/agents-marketplace/openrouter-reseller-postgres.env
required: true
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $$POSTGRES_USER -d $$POSTGRES_DB"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 20
start_period: 10s
volumes:
- openrouter-reseller-postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data
networks:
- reseller-db
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-openrouter-reseller
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
env_file:
- path: /var/lib/agents-marketplace/openrouter-reseller.env
required: true
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 20s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
- reseller-db
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-openrouter-reseller.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet.middlewares=mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-openrouter-reseller.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-openrouter-reseller-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
volumes:
openrouter-reseller-postgres:
name: marketplace-mainnet-openrouter-reseller-postgres
networks:
reseller-db:
internal: true
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-qwen35b-chat.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (Hetzner Inference / Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8 — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`)
#
# The chat-session sibling of docker-compose.supplier-qwen35b.yml. Same
# image, same Hetzner backend (Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8), but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so
# it mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end} (escrow bookends, off-chain streaming
# turns) instead of the one-off /v1/chat/completions route.
#
# A SEPARATE process/advert from the one-off supplier on purpose: the chat
# session holds the supplier's single-slot lock for the whole conversation
# (minutes), which would starve one-off traffic if co-hosted.
#
# One of 8 Hetzner-backed suppliers (4 models x {one-off, chat-session});
# fleet runbook: docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.qwen35b-chat written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
# The advert must be posted with --capability-id llm.chat.v1 and a large
# --max-processing-ms (~1800000) so Claim+Submit both land before deliver_by.
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen35b-chat
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen35b-chat
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this Hetzner-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the shared Hetzner OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet
# plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.qwen35b-chat
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (Hetzner serves at https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://inference.hetzner.com/api
# Reasoning-style models can be slow; mirror the one-off compose.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# Idle end (supplier Submits the transcript): single-slot suppliers must
# free up quickly (the gateway transparently reopens a session on the
# next turn). Mirrors the kimi-chat fleet.
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so Claim/Submit actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.qwen35b-chat on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-chat-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-qwen35b.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (Hetzner Inference / Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8 — one-off `llm.text.generate.v1`)
#
# Hetzner-backed supplier. LLM_BACKEND=openai pointed directly at Hetzner's
# hosted inference API (OpenAI-compatible at https://inference.hetzner.com/api).
# No local proxy container — reachable over public HTTPS.
#
# One of 8 Hetzner-backed suppliers (4 models x {one-off, chat-session});
# fleet runbook: docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-qwen35b.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.qwen35b written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen35b
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen35b
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this Hetzner-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the shared Hetzner OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet
# plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.qwen35b
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (Hetzner serves at https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://inference.hetzner.com/api
# Reasoning-style models can be slow; matches the advert's
# max_processing_ms (300000).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: no max_tokens forwarded upstream,
# the provider grants context − prompt. Advert cap = model context length.
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.qwen35b on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen35b.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen35b.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-qwen35b-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-qwen38-chat.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (Hetzner Inference / Qwen3.8-27B — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`)
#
# The chat-session sibling of docker-compose.supplier-qwen38.yml. Same
# image, same Hetzner backend (Qwen3.8-27B), but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so
# it mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end} (escrow bookends, off-chain streaming
# turns) instead of the one-off /v1/chat/completions route.
#
# A SEPARATE process/advert from the one-off supplier on purpose: the chat
# session holds the supplier's single-slot lock for the whole conversation
# (minutes), which would starve one-off traffic if co-hosted.
#
# One of the Hetzner-backed suppliers (models x {one-off, chat-session});
# fleet runbook: docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md. Wallet reused from the retired
# kimi-code-chat supplier (Hetzner dropped Kimi-K2.7-Code on 2026-08; advert
# retired 2026-08-21, tx 3d1b43645c00bdb7b429f29ced798bc4af206c9dc56074e955d84b603b64f50c).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.qwen38-chat written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
# The advert must be posted with --capability-id llm.chat.v1 and a large
# --max-processing-ms (~1800000) so Claim+Submit both land before deliver_by.
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen38-chat
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen38-chat
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this Hetzner-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the shared Hetzner OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet
# plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.qwen38-chat
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (Hetzner serves at https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://inference.hetzner.com/api
# Reasoning-style models can be slow; mirror the one-off compose.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# Idle end (supplier Submits the transcript): single-slot suppliers must
# free up quickly (the gateway transparently reopens a session on the
# next turn). Mirrors the kimi-chat fleet.
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so Claim/Submit actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.qwen38-chat on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-qwen38-chat-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-qwen38.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (Hetzner Inference / Qwen3.8-27B — one-off `llm.text.generate.v1`)
#
# Hetzner-backed supplier. LLM_BACKEND=openai pointed directly at Hetzner's
# hosted inference API (OpenAI-compatible at https://inference.hetzner.com/api).
# No local proxy container — reachable over public HTTPS.
#
# One of the Hetzner-backed suppliers (models x {one-off, chat-session});
# fleet runbook: docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md. Wallet reused from the retired
# kimi-code supplier (Hetzner dropped Kimi-K2.7-Code on 2026-08; advert
# retired 2026-08-21, tx 3f37082166faf2b2220e6476235bae8723af9a3434a6aaf60277366ff1f62bfb).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-qwen38.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.qwen38 written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen38
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-qwen38
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this Hetzner-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the shared Hetzner OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet
# plumbing duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.qwen38
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (Hetzner serves at https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://inference.hetzner.com/api
# Reasoning-style models can be slow; matches the advert's
# max_processing_ms (300000).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: no max_tokens forwarded upstream,
# the provider grants context − prompt. Advert cap = model context length.
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.qwen38 on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen38.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-qwen38.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-qwen38-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
name: marketplace-mainnet-surplus-seller
services:
surplus-seller:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-surplus-seller
restart: unless-stopped
command:
- node_modules/.bin/tsx
- supplier/src/cli/surplus-seller.ts
env_file:
- path: /var/lib/agents-marketplace/surplus-seller.env
required: true
read_only: true
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=64m,mode=1777
cap_drop:
- ALL
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
volumes:
- surplus-seller-state:/var/lib/surplus-manager
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 60s
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
volumes:
surplus-seller-state:
name: marketplace-mainnet-surplus-seller-state
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"networkId": 1,
"ogmiosUrl": "https://ogmios.vector.mainnet.apexfusion.org",
"endpointUrl": "https://mp-suppliers-openrouter-reseller.vector.apexfusion.org",
"marketplaceModel": "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash",
"openRouterModel": "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash",
"maxInputTokens": 8192,
"maxOutputTokens": 512,
"maxProcessingMs": 600000,
"inferenceTimeoutMs": 180000,
"priceLovelace": "200000",
"supplierBondLovelace": "1000000",
"buyerBondLovelace": "1000000",
"reserveUsd": "1.00",
"pollIntervalMs": 30000,
"providerTimeoutMs": 10000,
"previewMaxChars": 160,
"minimumWalletLovelace": "20000000",
"fundingTimeoutMs": 3600000,
"composeFile": "deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-openrouter-reseller.yml"
}

View File

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
## 1. Goal and scope
**What this is.** A two-sided marketplace where buyers (agents or humans) submit prompts to suppliers running inference on their own hardware, pay with AP3X via on-chain bonded escrow on Vector L2, and receive signed-receipt responses. The primary validation goal is **technical feasibility + lifecycle** ("can it be done end-to-end"), not demand modelling or economic stress testing.
**What this is.** A two-sided marketplace where buyers (agents or humans) submit prompts to suppliers running inference on their own hardware, with each job settled in AP3X through on-chain bonded escrow on Vector L2, and receive signed-receipt responses. The primary validation goal is **technical feasibility + lifecycle** ("can it be done end-to-end"), not demand modelling or economic stress testing.
**What v1 is NOT.**
- Not agentic on the supplier side. Suppliers answer single prompts. Buyer agents drive multiple prompts.
- Not LLM-only in design. Capability model is open from day 1 (whisper / kokoro / image generation are planned siblings), but the first supplier is an LLM.
- Not multi-slot. Single-slot per supplier process. Multi-capability operators run multiple processes.
- Not multi-chain. Vector testnet first, mainnet later. Masumi / Sokosumi / USDM is target #2 (adapter, not fork).
- Not multi-chain. Vector only (testnet and mainnet).
- Not disputed. M1 ships happy-path escrow only. Module-1 disputes wire in M2.
- Not streaming. `stream: true` is rejected by suppliers.
- Not tool-calling. `tools` / `tool_choice` / `functions` are rejected by suppliers.
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
| # | Decision |
|---|---|
| 1 | Payment token: **AP3X** (Vector testnet, later mainnet). Masumi = USDM, target #2. |
| 1 | Settlement asset: **AP3X**, bonded in escrow; jobs settle in AP3X on accepted work. |
| 2 | v1 scope: **Option C** — happy-path escrow only, no disputes. Module-1 wiring is milestone 2. |
| 3 | Module-1 contract source: TBD — to be located or restored before M2. Not blocking M0–M1. |
| 4 | Evidence: **signed receipt** `{prompt_hash, response_hash, model, tokens, wallclock}` + Ed25519 supplier signature. Hash on-chain, plaintext off-chain. |
@@ -283,7 +283,6 @@ Malformed datum · escrow to wrong script · supplier claims escrow addressed to
| **M1** | Happy-path end-to-end, Hetzner CPU supplier | 2–3 wks | `qwen2.5:0.5b` on Hetzner, buyer posts → supplier claims → submits → buyer accepts; full Vector testnet lifecycle; indexer serves discovery |
| **M2** | Module-1 dispute wiring | 2–3 wks post-M1 | Contract source located; supplier=claimer / buyer=auditor mapping; Dispute state; evidence URI; mainnet-dry-run lifecycle |
| **M3** | Capability expansion + local lab | 2–4 wks (may overlap M2) | `speech.transcribe.v1` via Whisper live; local-lab GPU supplier with larger model; heterogeneous discovery validated |
| **M4** | Masumi / Sokosumi adapter | later | MIP-003 HTTP shim; MIP-002 NFT registration; USDM payment path; Sokosumi listing |
## 9. Open follow-ups (not blocking M0 / M1)
@@ -310,5 +309,3 @@ Malformed datum · escrow to wrong script · supplier claims escrow addressed to
- Apex-dashboard CBOR decoders: `apex-dashboard/server/cbor-decoder.ts`
- Apex-dashboard test discipline: `apex-dashboard/tests/`
- Prior Python reference (AP3X buyer/supplier): `./docs/buyer/`, `./docs/supplier/`
- Masumi docs: https://docs.masumi.network/
- MIP-003 spec: https://docs.masumi.network/mips/_mip-003

291
docs/DEPLOY_NEW_SUPPLIER.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
# Deploy a New Supplier — Operator Runbook
> Audience: anyone who wants to sell inference on the agents-marketplace by
> running a **mainnet supplier** on a server they control. Everything below
> uses your own hardware, DNS, and funds — no access to the Apex Fusion fleet
> is required. (Fleet-internal runbooks: `docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md`,
> `deploy/README.md`. A live worked example of exactly this standalone
> pattern: `deploy/inference-proxy/README.md`.)
---
## 1. What a supplier is
A supplier is one Docker container that:
1. Holds an **on-chain advertisement** (a UTxO on the Vector mainnet chain)
declaring capability, model, price, bonds, and your endpoint URL.
2. Serves a **public HTTPS endpoint** that buyers call after locking payment
in escrow. Any hostname you control works — the advert carries the URL,
and the marketplace indexer probes it as-is.
3. Runs the job against an upstream inference backend and settles on-chain
(Claim → Submit; bonds of 1 AP3X ride on each job).
One supplier = one (model × capability) pair = one wallet = one advert = one
compose file. Capabilities: `llm.text.generate.v1` (one-off) or `llm.chat.v1`
(multi-turn session, `CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session`). There is also a TTS
kind (`CAPABILITY_KIND=tts`); this runbook covers the LLM kinds.
## 2. Prerequisites
| Requirement | Notes |
|---|---|
| Linux server | Public IPv4, Docker installed, ports 80 + 443 free (for the bundled Traefik). A small VPS is enough — the container only proxies and settles; the heavy compute is upstream. |
| DNS name you control | One A record, e.g. `supplier.example.com` → your server IP. Must be **DNS-only / unproxied** — TLS certs come from Let's Encrypt HTTP-01, which a CDN-proxied record breaks. |
| Upstream backend | Any OpenAI-compatible API: base URL + API key. Proven in production: hosted APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Hetzner Inference), local llama.cpp, agent gateways. |
| Model id | Must be the **verbatim** upstream id (incl. prefixes like `Qwen/`). Verify against the backend's `/v1/models`. |
| Capability | `llm.text.generate.v1` or `llm.chat.v1` (or both → two suppliers, two wallets). |
| Advert params | Your call. Reference values used by the Apex Fusion fleet: price `200000` lovelace (0.2 AP3X), bonds `1000000` both sides, `max_processing_ms` `300000` one-off / `1800000` chat, `max_output_tokens` = model context length. |
| Funding | ≥50 AP3X mainnet to the new supplier wallet, from your own funds (the fleet typically funds 50–200). Each advert locks a 1 AP3X supplier bond; each job rides another. |
## 3. Vector mainnet constants (same for every operator)
These are chain-level values, identical for all suppliers; put them in every
supplier env file:
```
NETWORK_ID=1
LIVE_CHAIN=1
OGMIOS_URL=https://ogmios.vector.mainnet.apexfusion.org
VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS=1756485600000
ESCROW_REF_UTXO=c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#0
ADVERT_REF_UTXO=c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#1
```
`OGMIOS_URL` above is a public endpoint; if you run your own Vector node +
Ogmios, point at that instead. Never pin `NETWORK_ID` / `OGMIOS_URL` inside
the compose file — they must come from the env file (prevents
mainnet/testnet cross-wiring on re-up).
## 4. Procedure
### 4.1 Smoke-test the backend first (before spending on-chain)
```bash
curl -sS -X POST <BASE_URL>/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"<MODEL_ID>","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}' \
| jq '.choices[0].message.content'
```
Requirements: non-empty string content, **no `max_tokens` sent** (matches
runtime behavior). For a chat supplier, also verify a `tools`/`tool_choice`
round-trip. A backend that fails these costs you the 1 AP3X supplier bond per
failed job (`openai_malformed`).
### 4.2 Prepare the host
```bash
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh # if Docker is missing
git clone https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agents-marketplace.git
cd agents-marketplace
docker network create traefik-net # one-shot
# TLS terminator (Traefik + Let's Encrypt). One per host; serves every
# supplier you run on it.
cd deploy/inference-proxy
echo 'ACME_EMAIL=<your email>' > .env && chmod 600 .env
docker compose -f docker-compose.traefik.yml up -d
cd ../..
```
Already have your own reverse proxy? Skip Traefik: terminate TLS for
`https://<your-dns-name>` yourself and forward to the supplier container's
port 8080, then drop the `traefik` labels and network from the compose file
in §4.4.
### 4.3 DNS
Create `<your-dns-name>` → A record for your server IP, **DNS-only /
unproxied**. Traefik issues the Let's Encrypt cert via HTTP-01 on port 80
automatically ~1 min after propagation; no restart needed.
### 4.4 Compose file
Copy the standalone-box template and rename its identity strings:
```bash
mkdir -p deploy/self-hosted
cp deploy/inference-proxy/docker-compose.supplier-local.yml \
deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml
```
(The relative paths inside — `build.context: ../..`,
`env_file: ../../supplier/.env.<name>` — assume the file sits two directory
levels below the repo root.)
Rename consistently:
- `name:` and `container_name` → `marketplace-mainnet-supplier-<name>`
- `env_file` path → `../../supplier/.env.<name>`
- every Traefik label token `mp-suppliers-local-mainnet` → a token of your
own (router names must be unique per Traefik instance)
- `Host(...)` rules → your DNS name
- `OPENAI_BASE_URL` → your backend, **without `/v1`** (the client appends
`/v1/chat/completions`)
- `OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS` ≤ the advert's `max_processing_ms`
Capability kind:
- **One-off** (`llm.text.generate.v1`): delete the chat block —
`CAPABILITY_KIND`, `CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS`, `CHAT_SETTLE_MODE`,
`MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS`.
- **Chat** (`llm.chat.v1`): keep `CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session`. Delete
`CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket` unless you know you want it — unset means full
settle (Claim/Submit, i.e. you collect payment on-chain); `ticket` skips
all supplier chain ops and the buyer reclaims the escrow.
The mainnet fleet templates (`deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-*.yml`)
are also valid references, but they attach to `marketplace-mainnet-net`,
which does not exist on a standalone box — remove it if you start from one
of those.
Compose files are safe to commit to your fork (no secrets); env files are
never committed.
### 4.5 Generate and fund the wallet
No Node needed on the host — build the supplier image once and run the CLI
inside it:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml build
docker compose -f deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml \
run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/gen-keypair.ts --network 1
# prints privateKeyHex, publicKeyHex, pubKeyHash, address
```
(With Node + pnpm available locally:
`pnpm --filter @marketplace/supplier tx:gen-keypair --network 1`.)
Fund the printed address from your own wallet (≥50 AP3X). Optimal UTxO shape
is **2 UTxOs**: one ≥5 AP3X collateral + one working UTxO. If the wallet ends
up fragmented later, run `tx:consolidate-wallet` (can be docker-exec'd inside
the running supplier container — it already has the key via env).
### 4.6 Env file
```bash
cp supplier/.env.example supplier/.env.<name>
chmod 600 supplier/.env.<name>
```
Must contain, at minimum:
- **All four wallet vars**: `SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX`, `SUPPLIER_ADDRESS`,
`SUPPLIER_PKH`, `SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX`. They are NOT derived at boot;
a missing derived var causes `403 wrong_supplier` on every job.
- `OPENAI_API_KEY` (empty is legal only for unauthenticated backends).
- The shared plumbing block from §3.
- `ADVERT_REF=` left as placeholder until §4.8.
Backend selection (`LLM_BACKEND=openai`, `OPENAI_BASE_URL`,
`OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS`, `CAPABILITY_KIND`) lives in the compose file (§4.4),
not the env file.
### 4.7 First start
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml up -d --build
```
Verify before going on-chain:
- `docker logs marketplace-mainnet-supplier-<name> --tail 50` — no
crash-loop.
- `curl https://<your-dns-name>/healthz` → `{"ok":true}` (proves DNS, cert
issuance, and routing end-to-end).
Every deploy on your box is manual: `git pull` +
`docker compose ... up -d --build`. No CD pipeline covers it.
### 4.8 Post the advert (go-live — do this LAST)
The advert is the go-live flag: the moment it confirms, the indexer starts
probing `<endpoint>/status` and buyers can lock escrows. Post it only after
§4.7 is green, so buyers never hit a dead endpoint.
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml \
run --rm --no-deps supplier \
node_modules/.bin/tsx supplier/src/cli/post-advert.ts \
--capability-id llm.text.generate.v1 \
--model '<MODEL_ID>' \
--max-output-tokens <CTX_LEN> \
--max-processing-ms 300000 \
--price-lovelace 200000 \
--endpoint-url https://<your-dns-name>
# chat variant: --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --max-processing-ms 1800000
```
Paste the printed `<txHash>#0` into `ADVERT_REF` in `supplier/.env.<name>`,
then:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/self-hosted/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml up -d --force-recreate
```
Note: adverts are immutable — changing the model, price, or endpoint later
requires `tx:retire-advert` (refunds the advert bond) + a fresh post-advert
+ a new `ADVERT_REF`.
## 5. Verification checklist
- `curl https://<your-dns-name>/healthz` → `{"ok":true}`.
- `/capability` on the same host shows the right model + pkh.
- Public marketplace indexer lists your advert:
`curl https://mp-indexer.vector.apexfusion.org/suppliers` → your entry with
`advert_status: "Active"`, `status: "free"`. The indexer follows the chain,
so a confirmed advert appears automatically — no registration step.
(The buyer API and OpenAI gateway at `marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org` /
`api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org` require buyer API keys; buyers with
keys will see your model in the gateway's `/openai/v1/models`.)
- Tail `docker logs -f marketplace-mainnet-supplier-<name>` through the
first paid jobs; watch for `openai_malformed` (reasoning-model
content-shape risk) and `403 wrong_supplier` (missing derived wallet vars).
## 6. Ongoing operations
- **Update**: `git pull && docker compose -f ... up -d --build`.
- **Model swap**: `tx:retire-advert` → post-advert with the new `--model` →
new `ADVERT_REF` in the env file → `up -d --force-recreate`.
- **Wallet health**: keep the 2-UTxO shape; run `tx:consolidate-wallet` if
script-spends start failing with collateral-selector errors.
- **Exit**: `tx:retire-advert` refunds the advert bond and delists you; the
wallet keeps its funds.
- **Monitoring (optional)**: the repo ships a balance monitor
(`wallet-monitor/`, `buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets.ts`) you can run against
your own wallet list.
## 7. Footguns (each has burned an operator before)
1. `OPENAI_BASE_URL` must NOT end in `/v1`.
2. Advert `--model` must match the upstream id byte-for-byte; slashes are
fine on-chain.
3. Do not set `OPENAI_REASONING` unless the backend is OpenRouter.
4. `OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS` > advert `max_processing_ms` = bond-forfeit window.
5. Model ids containing `kimi`, `deepseek`, or `gpt` (case-insensitive) are
auto-enrolled in the marketplace buyer's PDF-summarizer pool
(`buyer/src/pdf/caps.ts`), so expect PDF jobs too. The
`PDF_MODEL_ALLOWLIST` / `PDF_MODEL_DENYLIST` overrides are buyer-side —
only relevant if you also operate your own buyer.
6. `LIVE_CHAIN` accepts only the literal `"1"`; `true`/`yes` silently means
off, and the supplier then never broadcasts.
7. The compose `env_file` uses `required: false`, so a typo'd env path comes
up and crash-loops instead of failing to parse — check logs on first boot.
8. Wallet fragmentation (>2 UTxOs, none ≥5 AP3X) breaks all script-spends
with a lucid collateral selector error; fix with `tx:consolidate-wallet`.
## 8. Key references in this repo
- `deploy/inference-proxy/README.md` — a live standalone box built exactly
this way (two suppliers, incl. a tailnet-backed home rig).
- `deploy/README.md` — networks, Traefik, per-service ops.
- `docs/HETZNER_SETUP.md` — the Apex Fusion fleet runbook (hosted-API
suppliers at scale).
- `docs/HUGGINGFACE_ROUTER_SETUP.md` — OpenRouter/HF-router backend variant.
- `supplier/.env.example` — every env var, annotated (plus `.env.*.example`
variants per backend).
- `supplier/src/cli/` — `gen-keypair`, `post-advert`, `retire-advert`,
`consolidate-wallet`, `publish-reference-scripts`.

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<!--
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.md — slide-style overview of the Local Agents Marketplace.
Build PDF + PPTX with: bash docs/build-deck.sh
Edit this file; mermaid blocks are pre-rendered to docs/img/diagram-*.png.
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</style>
<!-- _class: title -->
# Local Agents Marketplace
### A trust-minimised, on-chain marketplace for LLM inference
Buy and sell prompt → response with **bonded escrow** on **Vector** (UTxO).
No platform fee. No central rate-limiter. Verifiable receipts on chain.
> *Status: M1 lifecycle proven end-to-end on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05.*
---
## The problem
* AI inference is **centralised** — a handful of providers, opaque pricing, account-level rate limits.
* Local-AI hardware is **idle most of the time** — GPUs and CPUs sit unused between user prompts.
* Buyers and sellers can't transact directly without a **trusted intermediary** taking a cut.
* "Verifiable" claims about which model ran are usually nothing more than the provider's word.
We need a **two-sided marketplace** where:
1. Sellers monetise spare compute,
2. Buyers get a **cryptographic receipt** of what was actually computed,
3. **Neither side has to trust the other** — bonds + on-chain settlement enforce honesty.
---
## How it works — three actors, one chain
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph CHAIN[Vector — UTxO]
ADV[Advert UTxO<br/>capability, price, bonds]
ESC[Escrow UTxO<br/>locked funds + state]
end
SUP[🧠 Supplier<br/>local LLM node]
BUY[💼 Buyer<br/>app or agent]
IDX[🔭 Indexer<br/>read-only bulletin board]
SUP -->|publish advert| ADV
BUY -->|discover| IDX
IDX -.->|index events| CHAIN
BUY -->|post escrow| ESC
BUY -->|prompt + escrow_ref| SUP
SUP -->|signed receipt| BUY
SUP -->|claim & submit| ESC
BUY -->|accept & pay| ESC
```
* **Supplier** runs the inference and publishes a price.
* **Buyer** posts the work as a bonded escrow, sends the prompt, accepts the receipt.
* **Indexer** is a public mirror of chain state — anyone can run one. No platform middleman.
---
## The bonded-escrow lifecycle
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant B as Buyer
participant Chain as Vector
participant S as Supplier
participant LLM as Local LLM<br/>(OpenAI-compatible)
S->>Chain: PostAdvert (locks supplier_bond)
B->>Chain: PostEscrow → Open<br/>(locks payment + bonds)
B->>S: POST /v1/chat/completions
S->>Chain: ClaimEscrow → Claimed
S->>LLM: run inference
LLM-->>S: assistant message
S->>Chain: SubmitEscrow → Submitted
S-->>B: 200 OK + signed receipt
B->>Chain: AcceptEscrow — supplier paid
```
Every transition is on-chain, validated by an Aiken Plutus V3 script. The receipt is signed by the supplier's advert key; prompt and response hashes are bound on chain.
---
## What if someone misbehaves?
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPEN[Open]:::norm --> CLAIMED[Claimed]:::norm --> SUBMITTED[Submitted]:::norm --> ACCEPTED[Accepted ✓]:::good
OPEN -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM[Reclaimed<br/>buyer recovers funds]:::warn
CLAIMED -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM
SUBMITTED -->|accept_window passed| RELEASE[Released<br/>supplier collects]:::warn
classDef norm fill:#e0e7ff,stroke:#4f46e5
classDef good fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a
classDef warn fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706
```
| Failure mode | Recovery | Loss bearer |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier never claims/submits | Buyer **Reclaim** after `deliver_by` | Supplier — forfeits supplier_bond |
| Buyer disappears after Submit | Supplier **Release** after `submitted_at + 10 min` | Buyer — forfeits buyer_bond |
Bonds make honesty cheaper than running away. Both sides have skin in the game; no third-party arbiter is needed for the M1 happy/timeout paths.
---
## Local-agent versatility — any OpenAI-compatible engine
<div class="pipeline">
<span>💼 Buyer</span> →
<span>🧠 Supplier (OpenAI-compatible HTTP wrapper)</span> →
<span>backend ↓</span>
</div>
<div class="backends">
<div class="tile">Ollama<br/><small>local model runner</small></div>
<div class="tile">vLLM<br/><small>high-throughput GPU</small></div>
<div class="tile">llama.cpp<br/><small>CPU · Metal · ROCm</small></div>
<div class="tile">OpenRouter<br/><small>cloud API mux</small></div>
<div class="tile">openclaw / custom<br/><small>arbitrary stack</small></div>
<div class="tile dots">…<br/><small>any OpenAI-shaped API</small></div>
</div>
The supplier service is a thin HTTP wrapper — it forwards `/v1/chat/completions` to whatever backend is configured. Each supplier picks its own model, hardware, and engine, then advertises a `capability_id`. Buyers shop on capability + model + price.
---
## Capability + model = task selection
| Capability ID | Example models | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| `llm.text.generate.v1` | Llama 3 · Qwen 2.5 · Mistral · GPT-4 | Q&A, drafts, summarisation |
| `code.completion.v1` | Codestral · DeepSeek-Coder · StarCoder | IDE tab-complete, refactor |
| `vision.describe.v1` | LLaVA · Qwen-VL · Pixtral | Image captioning, OCR |
| `embedding.text.v1` | nomic-embed · BGE · ada-002 | RAG indexing |
| `audio.transcribe.v1` | whisper-large-v3 · distil-whisper | Voice-to-text |
| `…` | … | … |
* New capabilities = **just publish a new advert**. No marketplace governance gate.
* Today's deploy uses Ollama + Qwen 2.5; switching to vLLM with Llama 3 70B is a config change, not a code change.
---
## OpenClaw — agentic teams on your existing OpenAI seat
<div class="pipeline">
<span>🧠 Supplier wrapper</span> →
<span>🦾 OpenClaw</span> →
<span>🪪 OpenAI ChatGPT seat (flat-rate)</span>
</div>
* **Cost-efficient by default.** OpenClaw exposes your existing **OpenAI ChatGPT subscription** as an OpenAI-compatible API. The marketplace supplier dispatches its inference against it, so an entire **agentic team** (coders, QA automation testers, release curators…) draws from the **flat-rate seat you already pay for** — no per-token metering, no surprise invoices.
* **Reliability layer (optional, marginal cost).** OpenClaw can fall back to the **Anthropic API** or **OpenRouter** model pool when the primary seat is rate-limited, the prompt requires a different model, or you want a **second-layer hardening** of responses (e.g. cross-provider consensus on critical outputs). You only pay metered tokens for the requests that actually fall through.
---
## Proven on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05
| Step | Tx hash |
|---|---|
| Buyer posts escrow | `af762561…c2f7bc5` |
| Supplier claims | (lifecycle tx) |
| Supplier submits receipt | (lifecycle tx) |
| Buyer accepts | `125e3cfe…7dc100d` |
Funds flowed correctly: supplier received `payment + supplier_bond` (3 ADA); buyer got `buyer_bond` back.
* **Browser demo:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Live event stream:** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Test suite:** 1098 unit tests passing, full lifecycle exercised in CI.
---
## Why UTxO + Vector
* **Bonded escrow is native** — Plutus validators enforce the state machine without a custom token or oracle.
* **Vector settles in seconds** — the buyer→claim→submit→accept loop fits inside a single chat-completion's wall clock.
* **AP3X token** for fees and bonds — fungible, transparent, on-chain.
* **No custom rollup, no bridge** — runs on a production chain today.
---
<!-- _class: closing -->
## The pitch in one sentence
> Local Agents Marketplace turns any OpenAI-compatible inference endpoint into a **trustlessly billable service** — buyer and supplier exchange prompt, response, and payment with on-chain proof that what was paid for is what was delivered.
### Try it
* **Indexer (live event stream):** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Buyer:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Supplier:** https://mp-suppliers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org/capability

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# Hetzner Inference Supplier Fleet — Setup Runbook
> **Status:** shipped; fleet trimmed 2026-08-21. Hetzner retired
> `Kimi-K2.7-Code`, `GLM-5.2-NVFP4`, and `DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731` from
> Inference (gone from `/v1/models`), so the 6 suppliers serving them were
> deregistered (adverts retired on-chain, containers removed). `Qwen3.8-27B`
> was added in their place, reusing the retired kimi-code wallets. Configures
> mainnet supplier nodes that use **Hetzner Inference**
> (`https://inference.hetzner.com`) as their **compute backend** for bonded
> inference work commissioned on Vector. Config only — no code changes.
---
## 1. What this is
Hetzner Inference is an OpenAI-compatible hosted API. Because the supplier's
upstream client (`supplier/src/openai.ts`) already speaks plain
`POST /v1/chat/completions` with a Bearer token, pointing it at Hetzner is
**pure configuration**: `LLM_BACKEND=openai` + `OPENAI_BASE_URL` + the API key.
This is the same pattern as the DeepSeek-direct and OpenRouter suppliers, and
the direct sibling of `docs/HUGGINGFACE_ROUTER_SETUP.md`.
One supplier per (model × capability) — both the one-off
`llm.text.generate.v1` and the multi-turn `llm.chat.v1` capability:
| Supplier name | Model (on-chain + API param, verbatim) | Capability | Advert max_output_tokens |
|---|---|---|---|
| `qwen35b` | `Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8` | `llm.text.generate.v1` | 262144 |
| `qwen35b-chat` | `Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8` | `llm.chat.v1` | 262144 |
| `qwen38` | `Qwen3.8-27B` | `llm.text.generate.v1` | 262144 |
| `qwen38-chat` | `Qwen3.8-27B` | `llm.chat.v1` | 262144 |
Deregistered 2026-08-21 (models dropped by Hetzner): `kimi-code`,
`kimi-code-chat` (`Kimi-K2.7-Code`), `glm`, `glm-chat` (`GLM-5.2-NVFP4`),
`ds-flash-htz`, `ds-flash-htz-chat` (`DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731`). The qwen38
pair reuses the kimi-code / kimi-code-chat wallets; the other four wallets
still hold funds and their env files remain on the host.
Shared advert parameters: price **200000 lovelace (0.2 AP3X)** flat per job,
bonds **1000000 lovelace (1 AP3X)** both sides, `max_processing_ms` **300000**
for one-off / **1800000** for chat (the session spans the whole conversation).
`max_output_tokens` is set to the model's context length: no `max_tokens` is
forwarded upstream (`OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS` unset), so the advert value only gates
what buyers may request.
Names follow the brand-by-model convention; the retired `ds-flash-htz`
carried a `-htz` suffix only because `deepseek-flash-*` was already taken by
the OpenRouter fleet serving `deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash`.
## 2. Prerequisites
1. A Hetzner account with Inference access and an API key (usage-based billing
to you as the node operator — the flat 0.2 AP3X job price is a business
choice, not cost-derived). One key is shared by all suppliers; Hetzner
rate limits apply to the aggregate.
2. One funded supplier wallet per supplier (50 AP3X each recommended; bonds
are 1 AP3X per in-flight job and returned on completion).
3. The usual mainnet supplier deploy prerequisites (`deploy/README.md`).
4. **DNS**: one A record per supplier — `mp-suppliers-<name>.vector.apexfusion.org`
→ `91.98.147.172`, **DNS-only/unproxied**. There is NO wildcard for
`*.vector.apexfusion.org`; and because traefik issues certs on-box via
Let's Encrypt HTTP-01 (port 80), a proxied/CDN record would break issuance.
Certs are issued automatically within ~a minute of the record propagating —
no restarts needed.
## 3. Verify the backend before spending on-chain
The model ids come from `GET https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/models`
(this list changes — Hetzner retires models; re-check before any advert)
and are sent **verbatim** as the upstream `model` param (the runtime uses
`advert.model`). Before posting adverts, smoke-test each model:
```bash
curl -sS -X POST https://inference.hetzner.com/api/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $HETZNER_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"Qwen3.8-27B","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}' \
| jq '.choices[0].message.content'
```
`choices[0].message.content` must be a non-empty string with **no `max_tokens`
sent** (matches runtime config) — the supplier throws `openai_malformed`
otherwise and forfeits its 1 AP3X bond per failed job. For chat suppliers also
verify a `tools`/`tool_choice` round-trip. The original four models passed
both checks on 2026-08-11; `Qwen3.8-27B` passed both on 2026-08-21.
## 4. Per-supplier bring-up (repeat per supplier)
```bash
# 1. wallet — prints privateKeyHex, publicKeyHex, pubKeyHash, address
pnpm --filter @marketplace/supplier tx:gen-keypair --network 1
# fund the printed address (50 AP3X recommended), then:
# 2. env file on the mainnet host
cp supplier/.env.hetzner.example /root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.<name>
chmod 600 /root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.<name>
# fill in: ALL FOUR wallet vars (PRIV_KEY_HEX, ADDRESS, PKH, PUB_KEY_HEX —
# they are NOT derived at boot; missing derived vars ⇒ 403 wrong_supplier),
# OPENAI_API_KEY, and the ADVERT_* values from the table above.
# 3. advert (one-off shown; chat: --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --max-processing-ms 1800000)
pnpm --filter @marketplace/supplier tx:post-advert \
--capability-id llm.text.generate.v1 \
--model 'GLM-5.2-NVFP4' \
--max-output-tokens 512000 \
--max-processing-ms 300000 \
--price-lovelace 200000 \
--endpoint-url https://mp-suppliers-<name>.vector.apexfusion.org
# paste the printed "<txHash>#0" into ADVERT_REF in the env file
# 4. first start is always manual (CD skips compose projects with no running
# containers); subsequent rollouts ride the mainnet CD pipeline
docker compose -f deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-<name>.yml up -d
# 5. register the wallet for balance alerts
# add {name, address} to wallet-monitor/wallets.json on the host
```
## 5. Verification
- `curl https://mp-suppliers-<name>.vector.apexfusion.org/healthz` → `{"ok":true}`;
`/capability` shows the right model + pkh.
- Indexer: buyer `GET /v1/indexer/suppliers` lists the new entries with
`advert_status: Active`, `status: free`.
- Gateway `GET /openai/v1/models` includes the four Hetzner model ids.
- Watch `docker logs -f marketplace-mainnet-supplier-<name>` through the first
jobs for `openai_malformed` (reasoning-model content-shape risk).
## 6. Footguns
- `OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://inference.hetzner.com/api` — **no `/v1`**; the
client appends `/v1/chat/completions`.
- Do **not** set `OPENAI_REASONING` — `reasoning:{enabled:false}` is an
OpenRouter-only param.
- The advert `--model` must match the Hetzner id exactly, including the
`Qwen/` prefix on `Qwen/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8` (slash is fine on-chain;
precedent `moonshotai/kimi-k2.6`).
- `Kimi-K2.7-Code` and `DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731` auto-join the buyer's PDF pool
(case-insensitive substring allowlist `["kimi","deepseek","gpt"]` in
`buyer/src/pdf/caps.ts`); GLM and Qwen stay out. Deliberate — adjust
`PDF_MODEL_ALLOWLIST`/`PDF_MODEL_DENYLIST` in the buyer env to change it.
- `OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS` must stay ≤ the advert's `max_processing_ms`.

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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# Vector Buyer App
A self-contained app for purchasing AI compute on the Vector L2 testnet (Cardano). You submit prompts, pay with AP3X tokens via on-chain escrow, and receive LLM responses from supplier nodes.
A self-contained app for commissioning AI compute on the Vector L2 testnet. You submit prompts, bond AP3X in on-chain escrow, and receive LLM responses from supplier nodes; the escrow settles in AP3X on accepted work.
## How It Works
1. You type a **prompt** and set a **payment** amount in the web UI
2. The app posts an **escrow transaction** on-chain, locking your payment + bond
1. You type a **prompt** and set a **price** in the web UI
2. The app posts an **escrow transaction** on-chain, locking price + bond
3. The app sends the task to a **supplier node** via HTTP
4. The supplier calls an LLM, **claims** the escrow, and **submits** the result hash on-chain
5. You see the response in the UI and can **accept** to release payment, or **dispute**
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ If you accept the result, you get your 1 AP3X bond back. Total cost = payment +
- **Never share your .env file** - it contains your wallet seed phrase
- **Never share your data/ folder** - it contains task history
- The seed phrase controls your wallet funds. Back it up securely.
- Escrow protects you: the supplier cannot take your funds without delivering a result
- The seed phrase controls your wallet. Back it up securely.
- Escrow protects you: the supplier cannot take your escrowed value without delivering a result
- You have a 10-minute dispute window after receiving a result
## Troubleshooting

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@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ The audit confirmed 39 holes in the first draft (10 distinct themes). This docum
| One-shot | `/openai/v1/chat/completions` → `llm.text.generate.v1`, 1 escrow/call, buffered (+ pseudo-stream) |
| Chat session | `/openai/v1/chat/sessions*` → `llm.chat.v1`, 1 escrow/**session**, real SSE per turn, settle at close |
| Routing | match `model` + required capability; pick an available supplier (status `free`\|`unknown`); **not cheapest**; fallback to next match on busy/offline |
| Pricing | cost = matched supplier `price_lovelace`; **required balance = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5 ADA collateral + fee reserve** |
| Wallet health | gateway **auto-consolidates** each wallet to `{5-ADA collateral, working}` after settle / on a tick |
| Pricing | cost = matched supplier `price_lovelace`; **required balance = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5 AP3X collateral + fee reserve** |
| Wallet health | gateway **auto-consolidates** each wallet to `{5-AP3X collateral, working}` after settle / on a tick |
| Settlement | resolve the **Submitted** ref via indexer, `acceptResult`, **await confirm** before returning success; sweeper is backstop |
| Sweeper | state-aware: Open/Claimed past `deliver_by` → reclaim; Submitted → retry Accept in-window; never blind-reclaim Submitted |
| Response | OpenAI object `{id, object, created, model, choices, usage}` + `x_vector:{receipt, receipt_signature, escrow_ref}`; full streaming chunk transform + final usage chunk |
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ New standalone pnpm package `gateway/` (add to `pnpm-workspace.yaml`). Boots **o
- SDK methods: `discoverSuppliers`, `submitPrompt` (`Marketplace.ts:242`, verifies receipt but **does not settle**), `startChat`/`endChat` (chat session; `endChat` returns `acceptedRef` and awaits Accept), `acceptResult`, `reclaim`.
- Escrow value/bonds: buyer funds `totalLocked = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond` at PostEscrow — `packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postEscrow.ts:132-200`. On Accept supplier gets `payment+supplier_bond`, buyer gets `buyer_bond` back.
- Submitted-ref resolution: the buyer `/v1/accept` queries the indexer and matches the Submitted row by `posted_at` — `buyer/src/server.ts` `/v1/accept`. Gateway must mirror this.
- Wallet health: `planConsolidate` / `consolidateWallet` (`{collateral, working}` shape, `DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5 ADA`) — `packages/shared/src/tx/wallet/`. Collateral assertion: `assertCollateralCandidate` — `packages/shared/src/tx/internal/liveCbor.ts`.
- Wallet health: `planConsolidate` / `consolidateWallet` (`{collateral, working}` shape, `DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5 AP3X`) — `packages/shared/src/tx/wallet/`. Collateral assertion: `assertCollateralCandidate` — `packages/shared/src/tx/internal/liveCbor.ts`.
- Supplier chat-session SSE `{type:"token"|"done"|"error"}` + headers — `supplier/src/server.ts` `makeChatSessionHandlers`; buyer relay in `buyer/src/server.ts` `/v1/chat/message` (note: **verbatim** passthrough — the gateway must transform to OpenAI chunks).
- SQLite pattern (`better-sqlite3`, WAL) — `buyer/src/db/archive.ts`. Auth helpers `timingSafeCompareStrings`, `createRateLimiter` — `buyer/src/auth.ts`.
- Indexer `SupplierView` (`model`, `capability_id`, `price_lovelace`, `buyer_bond_lovelace`, `supplier_bond_lovelace`, `status` free/working/offline/unknown, `advert_status`) — `indexer/src/routes/suppliers.ts`.
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Raw API key never persisted (only `sha256(key)`); `key_prefix` for display. `mas
## Request lifecycle — one-shot `/chat/completions`
All on-chain steps run inside the per-key `mutex.run(...)`.
1. **Route** (`selectSupplier`): indexer rows where `model` matches, `capability_id==="llm.text.generate.v1"`, `advert_status==="Active"`, live `status ∈ {free, unknown}`. Pick an available one (not cheapest). No match → 404 `model_not_found` (`type: invalid_request_error`).
2. **Pre-flight**: required = `price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5_000_000 (collateral) + ~2 AP3X fee`. Verify total balance **and** a pure-ADA UTxO ≥5 ADA exists (`assertCollateralCandidate`-style). Else 402 `insufficient_funds` + `x_vector:{required_lovelace, available_lovelace, collateral_ok, deposit_address}`.
2. **Pre-flight**: required = `price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5_000_000 (collateral) + ~2 AP3X fee`. Verify total balance **and** a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥5 AP3X exists (`assertCollateralCandidate`-style). Else 402 `insufficient_funds` + `x_vector:{required_lovelace, available_lovelace, collateral_ok, deposit_address}`.
3. **Execute**: `submitPrompt({advertRef, messages, payment_lovelace:price, max_output_tokens})` (posts escrow → supplier → verifies receipt).
4. **Settle**: resolve the **Submitted** escrow ref via the indexer (mirror buyer `/v1/accept`: match by buyer pkh + `posted_at`), `acceptResult(submittedRef)`, **await confirmation**. On 409/offline mid-route, retry next matching supplier (bounded). On any post-escrow failure, record + leave for the sweeper (don't block the response on reclaim).
5. **Respond**: `{id:"chatcmpl-…", object:"chat.completion", created:<sec>, model, choices:[{index:0,message:{role:"assistant",content},finish_reason:"stop"}], usage:{prompt_tokens,completion_tokens,total_tokens}, x_vector:{receipt,receipt_signature,escrow_ref}}`. Record `usage`.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ All on-chain steps run inside the per-key `mutex.run(...)`.
## Sweeper & wallet-health
- **Sweeper** (interval ~60s): per key, classify escrows. Open/Claimed past `deliver_by` → `reclaim`. Submitted **with a verified receipt** still in accept-window → retry `acceptResult`. Submitted past accept-window → leave for supplier Release (log). Never blind-`reclaim` Submitted.
- **Wallet-health tick**: periodically + after each settle, `planConsolidate` → `consolidateWallet` so every wallet keeps a ≥5 ADA collateral UTxO. Skip if already healthy.
- **Wallet-health tick**: periodically + after each settle, `planConsolidate` → `consolidateWallet` so every wallet keeps a ≥5 AP3X collateral UTxO. Skip if already healthy.
## Errors (OpenAI shape `{error:{message, type, code, param:null}}`)
no supplier → 404 `invalid_request_error`/`model_not_found`; underfunded/no-collateral → 402 `invalid_request_error`/`insufficient_funds`; bad/missing key → 401 `authentication_error`/`invalid_api_key`; rate limit → 429 `rate_limit_error` + `Retry-After`; supplier timeout → 504 `server_error`; supplier busy race (after retries) → 503 `server_error`/`overloaded`; receipt verify → 502 `server_error`/`receipt_verification_failed`; tx build → 409/502 `server_error`/`escrow_failed`; unsupported `tools`/`functions` → 400 `invalid_request_error`/`unsupported_parameter`.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ Real billing/markup & fee hook; trustless/self-custody recovery; multi-funding-U
## Verification (testnet, end-to-end)
1. Indexer + Ogmios + ≥1 `llm.text.generate.v1` and ≥1 `llm.chat.v1` supplier for the same `model`, Active.
2. Boot gateway: `LIVE_CHAIN=1`, `GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)`, `OGMIOS_URL`, `INDEXER_URL`, `NETWORK_ID`, `GATEWAY_DB_DIR`, `GATEWAY_PORT`.
3. `POST /signup` → key + deposit address. Fund ≥ price + both bonds + 5 ADA collateral + ~2 ADA fees; confirm via `GET /account` (`collateral_ok:true`).
3. `POST /signup` → key + deposit address. Fund ≥ price + both bonds + 5 AP3X collateral + ~2 AP3X fees; confirm via `GET /account` (`collateral_ok:true`).
4. One-shot non-stream via curl and via the OpenAI Python/JS SDK (`base_url=…/openai/v1`) → valid `chat.completion` + `x_vector`; confirm the escrow **settled (Accepted)** and a `usage` row exists.
5. **Run a 2nd and 3rd request** → confirm wallet-health kept `collateral_ok` and they succeed (the audit's request-#2 failure must not reproduce).
6. One-shot `stream:true` → chunks + final usage + `[DONE]`.

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@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
---
marp: true
paginate: true
size: 16:9
---
<!--
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.md — slide-style overview of the Local Agents Marketplace.
Build PDF + PPTX with: bash docs/build-deck.sh
Edit this file; mermaid blocks are pre-rendered to docs/img/diagram-*.png.
-->
<style>
/* ── Local Agents Marketplace — unified dark theme ────────────────────
* Every slide uses the same navy→indigo gradient as the title slide so
* the deck reads as one continuous document. Title and closing slides
* keep the centered hero treatment; content slides stay top-aligned but
* share the same palette and accent rules. */
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--ink: #f1f5f9; /* primary text on dark gradient */
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--row-even: rgba(255,255,255,0.04);
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--border: rgba(255,255,255,0.10);
}
section {
background: var(--gradient);
color: var(--ink);
font-family: 'Inter', 'Segoe UI', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
font-size: 22px;
padding: 40px 60px;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
justify-content: flex-start;
}
section::after {
content: attr(data-marpit-pagination) ' / ' attr(data-marpit-pagination-total);
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font-size: 13px;
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color: #ffffff;
border-bottom: 4px solid var(--accent);
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margin: 0 0 14px 0;
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display: inline-block;
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p, li { margin: 6px 0; line-height: 1.45; }
ul, ol { margin: 8px 0 12px 0; padding-left: 28px; }
strong { color: #ffffff; }
a { color: #a5b4fc; }
blockquote {
border-left: 4px solid var(--accent);
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.06);
padding: 10px 18px;
color: #e0e7ff;
border-radius: 0 8px 8px 0;
margin: 10px 0;
}
code {
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.10);
color: #e0e7ff;
padding: 2px 6px;
border-radius: 4px;
font-size: 0.9em;
}
/* Constrain mermaid images so they always fit on a 720px-tall slide
* (16:9 @ 1280×720 default). Soft white card behind the diagram so the
* mermaid SVG (which renders on a transparent canvas with dark ink)
* stays readable on the navy gradient. */
img {
display: block;
margin: 8px auto;
max-width: 92%;
max-height: 420px;
object-fit: contain;
background: #ffffff;
border-radius: 10px;
padding: 10px;
box-shadow: 0 4px 16px rgba(0,0,0,0.25);
}
/* Tile grid for the local-agent versatility slide. */
.backends {
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr);
gap: 14px;
margin: 14px 0 12px 0;
}
.tile {
background: var(--accent-soft);
border: 2px solid var(--accent);
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background: rgba(255,255,255,0.04);
border-style: dashed;
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 28px;
}
.pipeline {
text-align: center;
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.08);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
color: #f8fafc;
padding: 12px 18px;
border-radius: 10px;
margin: 6px auto 14px auto;
max-width: 760px;
font-weight: 600;
}
.pipeline span {
display: inline-block;
margin: 0 10px;
}
/* Tables sit on a solid white card so cell text reads cleanly against
* the dark gradient backdrop. Rounded outer corners + shadow match the
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* needed so the table actually consumes the full slide width — Marp's
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tr:nth-child(odd) td { background: #f8fafc; }
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td code {
background: #eef2ff;
color: #1e293b;
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td strong, th strong {
color: #0f172a;
}
th strong {
color: #ffffff;
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/* Title slide — centered hero treatment on the same gradient. */
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justify-content: center;
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margin: 0 auto 20px auto;
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margin: 28px auto;
max-width: 900px;
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/* Closing slide — same centered treatment. */
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text-align: center;
padding: 100px 80px;
justify-content: center;
}
section.closing h2::before { display: none; }
section.closing blockquote { font-size: 26px; max-width: 900px; }
</style>
<!-- _class: title -->
# Local Agents Marketplace
### A trust-minimised, on-chain marketplace for LLM inference
Buy and sell prompt → response with **bonded escrow** on **Vector** (UTxO).
No platform fee. No central rate-limiter. Verifiable receipts on chain.
> *Status: M1 lifecycle proven end-to-end on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05.*
---
## The problem
* AI inference is **centralised** — a handful of providers, opaque pricing, account-level rate limits.
* Local-AI hardware is **idle most of the time** — GPUs and CPUs sit unused between user prompts.
* Buyers and sellers can't transact directly without a **trusted intermediary** taking a cut.
* "Verifiable" claims about which model ran are usually nothing more than the provider's word.
We need a **two-sided marketplace** where:
1. Sellers monetise spare compute,
2. Buyers get a **cryptographic receipt** of what was actually computed,
3. **Neither side has to trust the other** — bonds + on-chain settlement enforce honesty.
---
## How it works — three actors, one chain
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph CHAIN[Vector — UTxO]
ADV[Advert UTxO<br/>capability, price, bonds]
ESC[Escrow UTxO<br/>locked funds + state]
end
SUP[🧠 Supplier<br/>local LLM node]
BUY[💼 Buyer<br/>app or agent]
IDX[🔭 Indexer<br/>read-only bulletin board]
SUP -->|publish advert| ADV
BUY -->|discover| IDX
IDX -.->|index events| CHAIN
BUY -->|post escrow| ESC
BUY -->|prompt + escrow_ref| SUP
SUP -->|signed receipt| BUY
SUP -->|claim & submit| ESC
BUY -->|accept & pay| ESC
```
* **Supplier** runs the inference and publishes a price.
* **Buyer** posts the work as a bonded escrow, sends the prompt, accepts the receipt.
* **Indexer** is a public mirror of chain state — anyone can run one. No platform middleman.
---
## The bonded-escrow lifecycle
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant B as Buyer
participant Chain as Vector
participant S as Supplier
participant LLM as Local LLM<br/>(OpenAI-compatible)
S->>Chain: PostAdvert (locks supplier_bond)
B->>Chain: PostEscrow → Open<br/>(locks payment + bonds)
B->>S: POST /v1/chat/completions
S->>Chain: ClaimEscrow → Claimed
S->>LLM: run inference
LLM-->>S: assistant message
S->>Chain: SubmitEscrow → Submitted
S-->>B: 200 OK + signed receipt
B->>Chain: AcceptEscrow — supplier paid
```
Every transition is on-chain, validated by an Aiken Plutus V3 script. The receipt is signed by the supplier's advert key; prompt and response hashes are bound on chain.
---
## What if someone misbehaves?
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPEN[Open]:::norm --> CLAIMED[Claimed]:::norm --> SUBMITTED[Submitted]:::norm --> ACCEPTED[Accepted ✓]:::good
OPEN -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM[Reclaimed<br/>buyer recovers funds]:::warn
CLAIMED -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM
SUBMITTED -->|accept_window passed| RELEASE[Released<br/>supplier collects]:::warn
classDef norm fill:#e0e7ff,stroke:#4f46e5
classDef good fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a
classDef warn fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706
```
| Failure mode | Recovery | Loss bearer |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier never claims/submits | Buyer **Reclaim** after `deliver_by` | Supplier — forfeits supplier_bond |
| Buyer disappears after Submit | Supplier **Release** after `submitted_at + 10 min` | Buyer — forfeits buyer_bond |
Bonds make honesty cheaper than running away. Both sides have skin in the game; no third-party arbiter is needed for the M1 happy/timeout paths.
---
## Local-agent versatility — any OpenAI-compatible engine
<div class="pipeline">
<span>💼 Buyer</span> →
<span>🧠 Supplier (OpenAI-compatible HTTP wrapper)</span> →
<span>backend ↓</span>
</div>
<div class="backends">
<div class="tile">Ollama<br/><small>local model runner</small></div>
<div class="tile">vLLM<br/><small>high-throughput GPU</small></div>
<div class="tile">llama.cpp<br/><small>CPU · Metal · ROCm</small></div>
<div class="tile">OpenRouter<br/><small>cloud API mux</small></div>
<div class="tile">openclaw / custom<br/><small>arbitrary stack</small></div>
<div class="tile dots">…<br/><small>any OpenAI-shaped API</small></div>
</div>
The supplier service is a thin HTTP wrapper — it forwards `/v1/chat/completions` to whatever backend is configured. Each supplier picks its own model, hardware, and engine, then advertises a `capability_id`. Buyers shop on capability + model + price.
---
## Capability + model = task selection
| Capability ID | Example models | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| `llm.text.generate.v1` | Llama 3 · Qwen 2.5 · Mistral · GPT-4 | Q&A, drafts, summarisation |
| `code.completion.v1` | Codestral · DeepSeek-Coder · StarCoder | IDE tab-complete, refactor |
| `vision.describe.v1` | LLaVA · Qwen-VL · Pixtral | Image captioning, OCR |
| `embedding.text.v1` | nomic-embed · BGE · ada-002 | RAG indexing |
| `audio.transcribe.v1` | whisper-large-v3 · distil-whisper | Voice-to-text |
| `…` | … | … |
* New capabilities = **just publish a new advert**. No marketplace governance gate.
* Today's deploy uses Ollama + Qwen 2.5; switching to vLLM with Llama 3 70B is a config change, not a code change.
---
## OpenClaw — agentic teams on your existing OpenAI seat
<div class="pipeline">
<span>🧠 Supplier wrapper</span> →
<span>🦾 OpenClaw</span> →
<span>🪪 OpenAI ChatGPT seat (flat-rate)</span>
</div>
* **Cost-efficient by default.** OpenClaw exposes your existing **OpenAI ChatGPT subscription** as an OpenAI-compatible API. The marketplace supplier dispatches its inference against it, so an entire **agentic team** (coders, QA automation testers, release curators…) draws from the **flat-rate seat you already pay for** — no per-token metering, no surprise invoices.
* **Reliability layer (optional, marginal cost).** OpenClaw can fall back to the **Anthropic API** or **OpenRouter** model pool when the primary seat is rate-limited, the prompt requires a different model, or you want a **second-layer hardening** of responses (e.g. cross-provider consensus on critical outputs). You only pay metered tokens for the requests that actually fall through.
---
## Proven on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05
| Step | Tx hash |
|---|---|
| Buyer posts escrow | `af762561…c2f7bc5` |
| Supplier claims | (lifecycle tx) |
| Supplier submits receipt | (lifecycle tx) |
| Buyer accepts | `125e3cfe…7dc100d` |
Funds flowed correctly: supplier received `payment + supplier_bond` (3 ADA); buyer got `buyer_bond` back.
* **Browser demo:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Live event stream:** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Test suite:** 1098 unit tests passing, full lifecycle exercised in CI.
---
## Why UTxO + Vector
* **Bonded escrow is native** — Plutus validators enforce the state machine without a custom token or oracle.
* **Vector settles in seconds** — the buyer→claim→submit→accept loop fits inside a single chat-completion's wall clock.
* **AP3X token** for fees and bonds — fungible, transparent, on-chain.
* **No custom rollup, no bridge** — runs on a production chain today.
---
<!-- _class: closing -->
## The pitch in one sentence
> Local Agents Marketplace turns any OpenAI-compatible inference endpoint into a **trustlessly billable service** — buyer and supplier exchange prompt, response, and payment with on-chain proof that what was paid for is what was delivered.
### Try it
* **Indexer (live event stream):** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Buyer:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Supplier:** https://mp-suppliers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org/capability

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@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ If the buyer does NOT accept within the dispute window (10 minutes), you can col
- **Never share your .env file** - it contains your wallet seed phrase
- **Never share your data/ folder** - it contains task history
- The seed phrase controls your wallet funds. Back it up securely.
- The node only responds to buyers who have already locked funds on-chain, so you cannot be scammed out of compute.
- The seed phrase controls your wallet. Back it up securely.
- The node only responds to buyers who have already locked value on-chain, so you cannot be scammed out of compute.
## Troubleshooting

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
COPY gateway/package.json ./gateway/package.json

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
"start": "tsx src/index.ts",
"dev": "tsx src/index.ts",
"rotate-master-key": "tsx src/cli/rotate-master-key.ts",
"create-demo-key": "tsx src/cli/create-demo-key.ts"
"create-demo-key": "tsx src/cli/create-demo-key.ts",
"reseller-demo": "tsx src/cli/reseller-demo.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"@marketplace/buyer": "workspace:*",

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,26 @@ import { badRequest, forbidden } from "../openai/errors.js";
const ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES = new Set(["Open", "Claimed", "Submitted"]);
/** Bound on per-request escrow liveness lookups; rows past the cap count as
* locked unverified (a key with this many active escrows has bigger problems). */
const LIVENESS_CHECK_CAP = 32;
/** True when the escrow UTxO behind an indexer row is still unspent. The
* indexer never updates rows on terminal spends (Accept/Reclaim/Release
* consume the escrow without a new escrow output), so "active" rows can be
* long spent. Unparseable refs and failed lookups count as live so errors
* inflate the locked figure rather than hide funds. */
async function escrowUtxoIsLive(deps: GatewayDeps, utxoRef: string): Promise<boolean> {
const m = /^([0-9a-fA-F]{64})#(\d+)$/.exec(utxoRef);
if (!m) return true;
try {
const utxo = await deps.chain.queryUtxo({ txHash: m[1], index: Number(m[2]) });
return utxo !== null;
} catch {
return true;
}
}
function ap3x(lovelace: bigint): string {
return (Number(lovelace) / 1e6).toFixed(2);
}
@@ -74,8 +94,15 @@ export function makeAccountHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
if (r.ok) {
const rows = (await r.json()) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
if (Array.isArray(rows)) {
for (const row of rows) {
if (!ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES.has(String(row.state))) continue;
const active = rows.filter((row) => ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES.has(String(row.state)));
const liveness = await Promise.all(
active.map((row, i) =>
i < LIVENESS_CHECK_CAP ? escrowUtxoIsLive(deps, String(row.utxo_ref ?? "")) : Promise.resolve(true),
),
);
for (let i = 0; i < active.length; i++) {
if (!liveness[i]) continue;
const row = active[i];
lockedInEscrow +=
BigInt(String(row.payment_lovelace ?? "0")) +
BigInt(String(row.buyer_bond_lovelace ?? "0")) +

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
import { resolve } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
interface DemoOptions {
gatewayUrl: string;
dashboardUrl: string;
model: string;
prompt: string;
maxTokens: number;
timeoutMs: number;
}
interface PublicJob {
escrow_ref: string;
status: "settled" | "failed";
upstream_cost_usd: string | null;
ap3x_payout: string;
failure_reason: string | null;
}
export function parseDemoArgs(argv: string[]): DemoOptions {
const values: Record<string, string> = {};
for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 2) {
const flag = argv[index];
const value = argv[index + 1];
if (!flag?.startsWith("--") || value === undefined) {
throw new Error(`invalid demo argument near ${flag ?? "end"}`);
}
if (
flag !== "--gateway-url" &&
flag !== "--dashboard-url" &&
flag !== "--model" &&
flag !== "--prompt" &&
flag !== "--max-tokens" &&
flag !== "--timeout-ms"
) {
throw new Error(`unknown demo argument: ${flag}`);
}
values[flag] = value;
}
const gatewayUrl = requiredUrl(values["--gateway-url"], "--gateway-url");
const dashboardUrl = requiredUrl(values["--dashboard-url"], "--dashboard-url");
const model = requiredString(values["--model"], "--model");
const prompt = values["--prompt"] ?? "Reply with one sentence that confirms this marketplace job completed.";
const maxTokens = positiveInteger(values["--max-tokens"] ?? "64", "--max-tokens");
const timeoutMs = positiveInteger(values["--timeout-ms"] ?? "900000", "--timeout-ms");
return {
gatewayUrl: gatewayUrl.replace(/\/+$/, ""),
dashboardUrl: dashboardUrl.replace(/\/+$/, ""),
model,
prompt,
maxTokens,
timeoutMs,
};
}
export async function runResellerDemo(
options: DemoOptions,
gatewayApiKey: string,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
if (gatewayApiKey === "") throw new Error("GATEWAY_API_KEY is required");
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), options.timeoutMs);
try {
const sellerResponse = await fetch(`${options.dashboardUrl}/api/status`, {
cache: "no-store",
signal: controller.signal,
});
const sellerBody = await sellerResponse.json().catch(() => null) as
| Record<string, unknown>
| null;
if (!sellerResponse.ok) {
throw new Error(
`seller status returned HTTP ${sellerResponse.status}`,
);
}
const supplierPkh = sellerBody?.supplier_pkh;
if (typeof supplierPkh !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]{56}$/.test(supplierPkh)) {
throw new Error("seller status omitted a valid supplier_pkh");
}
const response = await fetch(
`${options.gatewayUrl}/openai/v1/chat/completions`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
authorization: `Bearer ${gatewayApiKey}`,
"content-type": "application/json",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
model: options.model,
messages: [{ role: "user", content: options.prompt }],
max_tokens: options.maxTokens,
stream: false,
public_preview: true,
x_vector: { supplier_pkh: supplierPkh },
}),
signal: controller.signal,
},
);
const body = await response.json().catch(() => null) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(
`gateway returned HTTP ${response.status}: ${JSON.stringify(body)}`,
);
}
const escrowRef = response.headers.get("x-vector-escrow-ref");
if (!escrowRef) throw new Error("gateway response omitted X-Vector-Escrow-Ref");
const job = await waitForPublicJob(
options.dashboardUrl,
escrowRef,
options.timeoutMs,
controller.signal,
);
if (job.status === "failed") {
throw new Error(`reseller job failed: ${job.failure_reason ?? "unknown"}`);
}
return {
completion_id: body?.id ?? null,
escrow_ref: escrowRef,
model: body?.model ?? options.model,
supplier_pkh: supplierPkh,
upstream_cost_usd: job.upstream_cost_usd,
ap3x_payout: job.ap3x_payout,
dashboard_url: options.dashboardUrl,
};
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
async function waitForPublicJob(
dashboardUrl: string,
escrowRef: string,
timeoutMs: number,
signal: AbortSignal,
): Promise<PublicJob> {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
const response = await fetch(`${dashboardUrl}/api/jobs?limit=100`, {
cache: "no-store",
signal,
});
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(`dashboard jobs returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
}
const body = await response.json() as { jobs?: PublicJob[] };
const job = body.jobs?.find((candidate) => candidate.escrow_ref === escrowRef);
if (job) return job;
await new Promise<void>((resolveWait) => setTimeout(resolveWait, 2_000));
}
throw new Error(`timed out waiting for dashboard settlement ${escrowRef}`);
}
function requiredString(value: string | undefined, flag: string): string {
if (!value || value.trim() === "") throw new Error(`${flag} is required`);
return value.trim();
}
function requiredUrl(value: string | undefined, flag: string): string {
const raw = requiredString(value, flag);
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error(`${flag} must be a valid URL`);
}
const loopback =
url.hostname === "localhost" ||
url.hostname === "127.0.0.1" ||
url.hostname === "[::1]";
if (url.protocol !== "https:" && !(url.protocol === "http:" && loopback)) {
throw new Error(`${flag} must use HTTPS except on loopback`);
}
if (
url.username !== "" ||
url.password !== "" ||
url.search !== "" ||
url.hash !== ""
) {
throw new Error(`${flag} must not contain credentials, query, or fragment`);
}
return raw;
}
function positiveInteger(value: string, flag: string): number {
if (!/^[1-9]\d*$/.test(value) || !Number.isSafeInteger(Number(value))) {
throw new Error(`${flag} must be a positive safe integer`);
}
return Number(value);
}
export async function main(
argv: string[],
env: Record<string, string | undefined>,
): Promise<number> {
try {
const result = await runResellerDemo(
parseDemoArgs(argv),
env.GATEWAY_API_KEY ?? "",
);
process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify(result, null, 2)}\n`);
return 0;
} catch (error) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
process.stderr.write(`reseller demo failed: ${message}\n`);
return 1;
}
}
const invoked = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === resolve(process.argv[1] ?? "");
if (invoked) {
void main(process.argv.slice(2), process.env).then((code) => {
process.exitCode = code;
});
}

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
const POS_INT_RE = /^[1-9]\d*$/;
const PKH_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{56}$/;
export interface GatewayConfig {
masterKeyHex: string;
@@ -53,6 +54,11 @@ export interface GatewayConfig {
walletHealthIntervalMs: number;
sdkRegistryMax: number;
corsOrigins: string[];
/** Capability id the /v1/ocr/extract route escrows against. Model-scoped
* per the marketplace convention (one model, one id). Env: OCR_CAPABILITY_ID. */
ocrCapabilityId: string;
/** Seller preferred for matching one-shot models. Other suppliers remain fallback. */
preferredSupplierPkh?: string;
}
function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): string {
@@ -112,6 +118,17 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): GatewayConf
}
networkId = networkIdStr === "1" ? 1 : 0;
}
const preferredSupplierPkhRaw =
(env.GATEWAY_PREFERRED_SUPPLIER_PKH ?? "").trim();
if (
preferredSupplierPkhRaw !== "" &&
!PKH_RE.test(preferredSupplierPkhRaw)
) {
throw new Error(
"loadConfig: GATEWAY_PREFERRED_SUPPLIER_PKH must be a 28-byte hex payment-key hash",
);
}
return {
masterKeyHex,
@@ -138,6 +155,10 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): GatewayConf
chatSettleMode: chatSettleMode(env),
walletHealthIntervalMs: posInt(env, "WALLET_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS", 10 * 60 * 1000),
sdkRegistryMax: posInt(env, "SDK_REGISTRY_MAX", 500),
ocrCapabilityId: env.OCR_CAPABILITY_ID ?? "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
preferredSupplierPkh: preferredSupplierPkhRaw === ""
? undefined
: preferredSupplierPkhRaw.toLowerCase(),
corsOrigins: (env.GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS ?? "")
.split(",")
.map((o) => o.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""))

View File

@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@ export function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
const invokedDirectly =
typeof process !== "undefined" &&
process.argv?.[1] !== undefined &&
/gateway\/(src|dist)\/index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
// Accept both path separators: on Windows process.argv[1] arrives with
// backslashes, so a forward-slash-only pattern silently never matches and
// the process exits 0 without ever starting the server.
/gateway[\\/](src|dist)[\\/]index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
if (invokedDirectly) {
try {

402
gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
/**
* gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract.
*
* One escrow per page against a model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model>.v1`
* supplier (config.ocrCapabilityId). Lifecycle mirrors the one-shot chat
* path, all inside the per-key mutex: parse → select supplier → preflight →
* per-candidate live busy pre-check → submitOcr (escrow → supplier call →
* receipt verify) → resolve Submitted ref → Accept (awaited) → record usage
* → wallet-health → respond.
*
* Response (200):
* {
* output_format, content,
* usage: { prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, total_tokens },
* x_vector: {
* receipt, receipt_signature, escrow_ref,
* receipt_labels: ["first-party-brokered"]
* }
* }
*
* Venue attribution: the caller MAY send
* X-Venue: venue slug (e.g. "apify"), ≤ 32 chars
* X-Run-User-Hash: sha256 of the venue-side runner id, 64 hex
* Both are logged on a structured line per settled job. The wedge-ledger
* emitter consumes these lines; a usage-table venue
* column is deliberately deferred to later work so this route stays
* schema-additive. payer_class is derived at ledger time from the hash
* (known first-party hashes vs the rest), never asserted here.
*
* Demo keys are rejected: the demo executor is chat-session-shaped and its
* wallet holds one escrow per session; OCR needs a funded per-key wallet.
*/
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import { TxConstructionError } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import {
ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
} from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { SupplierError, type ProgressEvent } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
import type { GatewayStore } from "../db/store.js";
import { requireKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { asyncHandler } from "../middleware/http.js";
import { selectCandidates, type SupplierCandidate } from "../routing/selectSupplier.js";
import { preflight } from "../onchain/preflight.js";
import { resolveSubmittedRef, acceptAndConfirm } from "../onchain/settle.js";
import { ensureWalletHealthy } from "../walletHealth.js";
import { badRequest, forbidden, notFound, paymentRequired, toGatewayError } from "../openai/errors.js";
/** Operator-model v0: HAL8 operates both the custodial buyer and the
* supplier fleet, so every receipt this route returns is first-party
* brokered. Becomes per-supplier metadata when
* control-independent supply exists. */
const RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 = ["first-party-brokered"] as const;
const B64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
const VENUE_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;
/** Bound on the live busy pre-check below - cheap enough that a stalled
* supplier never meaningfully delays the request. */
const SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
interface ParsedOcrRequest {
image_b64: string;
mime: string;
output_format: string;
/** "" = any model under the capability (single-model ids). */
model: string;
}
function parseOcrRequest(body: unknown): ParsedOcrRequest {
if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) {
throw badRequest("invalid_body", "request body must be a JSON object");
}
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
const image = b.image_b64;
if (typeof image !== "string" || image.length === 0) {
throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` is required and must be a non-empty base64 string");
}
if (image.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
throw badRequest("image_too_large", `\`image_b64\` exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} characters`);
}
if (!B64_RE.test(image)) {
throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
}
const mime = b.mime;
if (typeof mime !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(mime)) {
throw badRequest("invalid_mime", `\`mime\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
}
const rawFormat = b.output_format ?? "markdown";
if (typeof rawFormat !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(rawFormat)) {
throw badRequest(
"invalid_output_format",
`\`output_format\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`,
);
}
let model = "";
if (b.model !== undefined && b.model !== null) {
if (typeof b.model !== "string" || b.model === "") {
throw badRequest("invalid_model", "`model` must be a non-empty string when provided");
}
model = b.model;
}
return { image_b64: image, mime, output_format: rawFormat, model };
}
/** Sanitized venue-attribution headers. Invalid values drop to "".
* Exported for direct unit testing (I3 review finding) — it is the only
* gate on what lands in the ocr_settled/ocr_failed structured log lines the
* wedge-ledger emitter reads, so it needs coverage independent of the HTTP
* route. */
export function venueAttribution(req: Request): { venue: string; runUserHash: string } {
const venueRaw = req.header("X-Venue") ?? "";
const hashRaw = req.header("X-Run-User-Hash") ?? "";
return {
venue: VENUE_RE.test(venueRaw) ? venueRaw : "",
runUserHash: HEX64_RE.test(hashRaw) ? hashRaw.toLowerCase() : "",
};
}
/**
* Live busy pre-check, run immediately before a candidate's escrow posts.
* Mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: same signal ("working" on the
* supplier's own /status), same best-effort posture. Posting an escrow only
* to have the supplier reject as busy strands the escrow until reclaim and
* burns the tx fee, so this is worth a bounded, cheap HTTP round trip.
*
* Never a gate: the indexer already filters candidates on advert status, so
* a timeout, network error, non-2xx, or malformed body all resolve to "not
* busy" (unknown, not blocking) - a briefly-unreachable /status must never
* stop the candidate from being attempted.
*/
async function isSupplierBusy(
endpointUrl: string,
fetchFn: typeof globalThis.fetch,
): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const res = await fetchFn(`${endpointUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/status`, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS),
});
if (!res.ok) return false;
const body = (await res.json()) as unknown;
const status = body && typeof body === "object" ? (body as { status?: unknown }).status : undefined;
return status === "working";
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function recordOcrUsage(
store: GatewayStore,
p: {
keyId: string;
capabilityId: string;
model: string;
supplierPkh: string | null;
escrowRef: string | null;
costLovelace: bigint | null;
promptTokens: number;
completionTokens: number;
status: "completed" | "failed";
failureReason?: string;
},
): void {
store.insertUsage({
id: randomUUID(),
key_id: p.keyId,
created_at: Date.now(),
kind: "ocr",
model: p.model,
capability_id: p.capabilityId,
supplier_pkh: p.supplierPkh,
escrow_ref: p.escrowRef,
cost_lovelace: p.costLovelace !== null ? p.costLovelace.toString() : null,
prompt_tokens: p.promptTokens,
completion_tokens: p.completionTokens,
status: p.status,
failure_reason: p.failureReason ?? null,
});
}
export function makeOcrExtractHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const keyRow = requireKey(req);
if (keyRow.demo) {
throw forbidden("demo_key_unsupported", "demo keys cannot use /v1/ocr/extract; create a funded API key");
}
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const parsed = parseOcrRequest(req.body);
const attribution = venueAttribution(req);
await ctx.mutex.run(() => runOcrOneShot(deps, keyRow.id, ctx, parsed, attribution, res));
});
}
async function runOcrOneShot(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyId: string,
ctx: ReturnType<GatewayDeps["registry"]["getContext"]>,
parsed: ParsedOcrRequest,
attribution: { venue: string; runUserHash: string },
res: Response,
): Promise<void> {
const { config, store, chain, fetchFn } = deps;
const capabilityId = config.ocrCapabilityId;
// Hoisted above the try so the catch block can report whatever is known
// even when the failure happens AFTER an escrow was posted (e.g. the
// supplier call or settle step fails) — these fields are the
// reconciliation spine that joins on-chain settlement to platform
// billing, and losing them makes paid-but-failed jobs unreconcilable
// (I2 review finding).
let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.sdk.submitOcr>> | undefined;
let used: SupplierCandidate | undefined;
let escrowRefStr: string | null = null;
try {
const candidates = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
model: parsed.model,
capabilityId,
fetchFn,
});
if (candidates.length === 0) {
throw notFound(
"model_not_found",
parsed.model === ""
? `no available supplier for capability "${capabilityId}"`
: `no available supplier for model "${parsed.model}" under "${capabilityId}"`,
);
}
const primary = candidates[0];
const pf = await preflight(chain, ctx.walletKey.address, primary);
if (!pf.ok) {
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk
? "insufficient balance for this request"
: "wallet has no pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X for collateral; deposit a little more AP3X",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),
available_lovelace: pf.availableLovelace.toString(),
collateral_ok: pf.collateralOk,
deposit_address: ctx.walletKey.address,
},
},
);
}
// Submit. Fall back to the next supplier ONLY on a pre-post
// TxConstructionError (no escrow was posted). A SupplierError means the
// escrow is already posted — do not retry (the sweeper recovers it).
//
// submitOcr posts the escrow internally and only returns escrowRef when
// it resolves. When the supplier call AFTER the post throws
// (SupplierError: timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed
// response, receipt mismatch) the escrow already landed on chain but
// escrowRefStr below would otherwise stay null — the OCR upstream has a
// 120s budget, so this is likely the most common paid-but-failed shape.
// The SDK emits a "progress" event of type "escrow_posted" (carrying
// escrow_ref) the instant the tx confirms, so listen for it around each
// attempt and capture the ref from the event rather than only from
// submitOcr's return value (I2 follow-up).
let lastErr: unknown;
for (const cand of candidates) {
// Live pre-check, run right here (not once at the top of the request):
// skip a candidate that is busy right now instead of paying to find
// out. See isSupplierBusy's docstring for the exact signal + posture.
if (await isSupplierBusy(cand.endpointUrl, fetchFn)) {
lastErr = new SupplierError("supplier_busy", {
status: 409,
message: "supplier is busy with another job",
});
continue;
}
const onProgress = (ev: unknown): void => {
const e = ev as ProgressEvent;
if (e.type === "escrow_posted" && e.escrow_ref) escrowRefStr = e.escrow_ref;
};
ctx.sdk.on("progress", onProgress);
try {
result = await ctx.sdk.submitOcr({
advertRef: cand.advertRef,
image_b64: parsed.image_b64,
mime: parsed.mime,
output_format: parsed.output_format,
payment_lovelace: cand.priceLovelace,
});
used = cand;
break;
} catch (err) {
lastErr = err;
if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) continue;
throw err;
} finally {
ctx.sdk.off("progress", onProgress);
}
}
if (!result || !used) {
throw toGatewayError(lastErr ?? new Error("no supplier could be engaged"));
}
// Settle: resolve the live Submitted ref, Accept, await confirmation.
escrowRefStr = `${result.escrowRef.txHash}#${result.escrowRef.index}`;
const submittedRef = await resolveSubmittedRef({
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
buyerPkh: ctx.walletKey.pubKeyHash,
originalRefStr: escrowRefStr,
fetchFn,
});
await acceptAndConfirm(chain, ctx.walletKey, submittedRef);
recordOcrUsage(store, {
keyId,
capabilityId,
model: used.model,
supplierPkh: used.supplierPkh,
escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
costLovelace: used.priceLovelace,
promptTokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens,
completionTokens: result.usage.completion_tokens,
status: "completed",
});
// Structured settle line for the wedge-ledger emitter. One line per
// settled job; venue/run_user_hash empty when the
// caller sent none.
console.log(JSON.stringify({
evt: "ocr_settled",
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
capability_id: capabilityId,
model: used.model,
supplier_pkh: used.supplierPkh,
cost_lovelace: used.priceLovelace.toString(),
receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
venue: attribution.venue,
run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
}));
// Re-shape the wallet ({collateral, working}) so the next request keeps
// a valid collateral UTxO. Best-effort; serialized by the mutex.
await ensureWalletHealthy(chain, ctx.walletKey).catch((e) =>
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.error("[gateway] wallet-health after ocr:", e instanceof Error ? e.message : e),
);
res.status(200).json({
output_format: result.output_format,
content: result.content,
usage: result.usage,
x_vector: {
receipt: result.receipt,
receipt_signature: result.receiptSignature,
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
},
});
} catch (err) {
recordOcrUsage(store, {
keyId,
capabilityId,
model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
supplierPkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
costLovelace: used?.priceLovelace ?? null,
promptTokens: result?.usage.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
completionTokens: result?.usage.completion_tokens ?? 0,
status: "failed",
failureReason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
});
// Structured failure line mirroring ocr_settled's shape (same venue /
// run_user_hash / escrow_ref fields) so paid-but-failed jobs — an
// escrow posted on-chain, then a later step (supplier call, settle)
// failed — can still be reconciled against on-chain state instead of
// vanishing from the wedge-ledger emitter's input (I2 review finding).
console.log(JSON.stringify({
evt: "ocr_failed",
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
capability_id: capabilityId,
model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
supplier_pkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
venue: attribution.venue,
run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
}));
throw err;
}
}

View File

@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@
* gateway/src/onchain/preflight.ts — balance + collateral pre-flight.
*
* The buyer wallet funds the FULL escrow at PostEscrow: price + buyer_bond +
* supplier_bond (postEscrow.ts:132). Accept/Reclaim are Plutus script-spends
* that also need a pure-ADA collateral UTxO ≥ 5 ADA (assertCollateralCandidate).
* So required = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + collateral + fee reserve,
* AND the wallet must currently hold a pure-ADA UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both
* up front and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
* supplier_bond, raised to the Submitted-state min-ada floor so long
* capability ids (e.g. the 33-byte OCR one) don't get bumped mid-flight —
* see escrowLockFloor (packages/shared/.../minAdaFloor.ts) and
* postOcrEscrow.ts:205, the SAME floor a POST actually locks. Accept/Reclaim
* are Plutus script-spends that also need a pure-AP3X collateral UTxO ≥ 5
* AP3X (assertCollateralCandidate). So required = escrowLockFloor(price +
* buyer_bond + supplier_bond) + collateral + fee reserve, AND the wallet
* must currently hold a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both up front
* and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
*/
import type { ChainProvider, Utxo } from "@marketplace/shared/chain";
import type { EscrowDatum } from "@marketplace/shared/cbor";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
export const COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
export const FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE = 2_000_000n;
@@ -18,7 +24,7 @@ export function totalLovelace(utxos: Utxo[]): bigint {
return utxos.reduce((sum, u) => sum + u.lovelace, 0n);
}
/** True iff some UTxO is pure-ADA (no native assets) and ≥ collateral floor. */
/** True iff some UTxO is pure-AP3X (no native assets) and ≥ collateral floor. */
export function hasCollateral(utxos: Utxo[]): boolean {
return utxos.some(
(u) => u.lovelace >= COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE && Object.keys(u.assets).length === 0,
@@ -32,20 +38,48 @@ export interface PreflightResult {
collateralOk: boolean;
}
export interface PreflightCost {
capabilityId: string;
priceLovelace: bigint;
buyerBondLovelace: bigint;
supplierBondLovelace: bigint;
}
/** Placeholder datum used only to size-estimate the Submitted-state min-ada
* floor. Every field except capability_id and the cost amounts is a
* fixed-size stand-in (real hash/pkh byte widths, a realistic 13-digit
* POSIX-ms timestamp) — capability_id's actual length is what drives the
* estimate, exactly as in escrowLockFloor's own contract. */
function representativeEscrowDatum(cost: PreflightCost): EscrowDatum {
return {
buyer_pkh: "3b2fdaed0398485ff35887fb7d0ad2025348864407854f7831dc6a55",
supplier_pkh: "401af418a7e6fb106277292881fcdeaa1cc15b5b112e9c8bdb2d46c9",
advert_ref: { txHash: "a6".repeat(32), index: 0 },
capability_id: cost.capabilityId,
request_spec_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
prompt_hash: "23".repeat(32),
payment_lovelace: cost.priceLovelace,
buyer_bond_lovelace: cost.buyerBondLovelace,
supplier_bond_lovelace: cost.supplierBondLovelace,
deliver_by: 1_786_105_955_257,
posted_at: 1_786_105_625_257,
submitted_at: null,
result_receipt_hash: null,
state: "Open",
};
}
export async function preflight(
chain: ChainProvider,
address: string,
cost: { priceLovelace: bigint; buyerBondLovelace: bigint; supplierBondLovelace: bigint },
cost: PreflightCost,
): Promise<PreflightResult> {
const utxos = await chain.queryUtxosByAddress(address);
const available = totalLovelace(utxos);
const collateralOk = hasCollateral(utxos);
const required =
cost.priceLovelace +
cost.buyerBondLovelace +
cost.supplierBondLovelace +
COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE +
FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
const economicTotal = cost.priceLovelace + cost.buyerBondLovelace + cost.supplierBondLovelace;
const escrowFloor = escrowLockFloor(representativeEscrowDatum(cost), economicTotal);
const required = escrowFloor + COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE + FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
return {
ok: available >= required && collateralOk,
availableLovelace: available,

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ async function runOneShot(
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
model: parsed.model,
capabilityId: CAPABILITY,
supplierPkh: parsed.supplierPkh,
preferredSupplierPkh: config.preferredSupplierPkh,
fetchFn,
});
if (candidates.length === 0) {
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ async function runOneShot(
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk
? "insufficient balance for this request"
: "wallet has no pure-ADA UTxO ≥ 5 ADA for collateral; deposit a little more ADA",
: "wallet has no pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X for collateral; deposit a little more AP3X",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),
@@ -152,6 +154,7 @@ async function runOneShot(
messages: parsed.messages,
payment_lovelace: cand.priceLovelace,
max_output_tokens: parsed.maxTokens,
public_preview: parsed.publicPreview,
});
used = cand;
break;
@@ -167,6 +170,9 @@ async function runOneShot(
// Settle: resolve the live Submitted ref, Accept, await confirmation.
const originalRefStr = `${result.escrowRef.txHash}#${result.escrowRef.index}`;
if (!parsed.stream) {
res.setHeader("X-Vector-Escrow-Ref", originalRefStr);
}
const submittedRef = await resolveSubmittedRef({
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
buyerPkh: ctx.walletKey.pubKeyHash,

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ export function toGatewayError(err: unknown): GatewayError {
return new GatewayError(502, "server_error", "indexer_error", `indexer error: ${err.reason}`);
}
if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) {
if (err.reason === "input_cap_exceeded") {
return new GatewayError(
400,
"invalid_request_error",
"input_cap_exceeded",
err.message,
);
}
if (err.reason === "supplier_preflight_failed") {
return new GatewayError(
503,
"server_error",
"supplier_preflight_failed",
err.message,
);
}
return new GatewayError(502, "server_error", "escrow_failed", `escrow build failed: ${err.reason}`);
}
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);

View File

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ export async function openSessionCore(
const pf = await preflight(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey.address, primary);
if (!pf.ok) {
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk ? "insufficient balance to open a session" : "wallet has no ≥5 ADA pure-ADA collateral UTxO",
pf.collateralOk ? "insufficient balance to open a session" : "wallet has no ≥5 AP3X pure-AP3X collateral UTxO",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ export interface ParsedChatRequest {
stream: boolean;
tools?: unknown[];
toolChoice?: unknown;
publicPreview: boolean;
supplierPkh?: string;
}
const ROLES = new Set(["system", "user", "assistant"]);
@@ -83,6 +85,46 @@ export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown, opts?: { allowTools?: boolean })
maxTokens = mt;
}
if (b.public_preview !== undefined && typeof b.public_preview !== "boolean") {
throw badRequest(
"invalid_public_preview",
"`public_preview` must be a boolean when provided",
);
}
const publicPreview = b.public_preview === true;
let supplierPkh: string | undefined;
if (b.x_vector !== undefined) {
if (
typeof b.x_vector !== "object" ||
b.x_vector === null ||
Array.isArray(b.x_vector)
) {
throw badRequest("invalid_x_vector", "`x_vector` must be an object");
}
const requested = (b.x_vector as Record<string, unknown>).supplier_pkh;
if (
requested !== undefined &&
(typeof requested !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]{56}$/.test(requested))
) {
throw badRequest(
"invalid_supplier_pkh",
"`x_vector.supplier_pkh` must be a 28-byte hex payment-key hash",
);
}
if (typeof requested === "string") supplierPkh = requested.toLowerCase();
}
const stream = b.stream === true;
return { model, messages, maxTokens, stream, tools, toolChoice };
return {
model,
messages,
maxTokens,
stream,
tools,
toolChoice,
publicPreview,
supplierPkh,
};
}

View File

@@ -53,8 +53,15 @@ export function parseRef(ref: string): OutputReference | null {
export interface SelectSupplierOpts {
indexerUrl: string;
/** Exact model match; "" matches ANY model under the capability (used by
* single-model capabilities like the ocr.* ids, where the capability
* already pins the model). */
model: string;
capabilityId: string;
/** Optional exact seller identity pin for deterministic agent routing. */
supplierPkh?: string;
/** Preferred seller ordered first when it is eligible. */
preferredSupplierPkh?: string;
fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch;
/** supplier_pkhs eligible regardless of polled status — used after the demo
* executor frees a supplier the indexer poller (~20 s cadence) still reports
@@ -82,7 +89,10 @@ export async function selectCandidates(opts: SelectSupplierOpts): Promise<Suppli
const candidates: SupplierCandidate[] = [];
for (const raw of body as SupplierView[]) {
if (raw.capability_id !== opts.capabilityId) continue;
if (raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
if (opts.model !== "" && raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
if (opts.supplierPkh !== undefined && raw.supplier_pkh !== opts.supplierPkh) {
continue;
}
if (raw.advert_status !== "Active") continue;
if (raw.status !== "free" && raw.status !== "unknown" && !opts.ignoreStatusFor?.has(raw.supplier_pkh)) {
continue;
@@ -103,8 +113,16 @@ export async function selectCandidates(opts: SelectSupplierOpts): Promise<Suppli
status: raw.status,
});
}
// Prefer known-free over unknown so we route to confirmed-available first.
candidates.sort((a, b) => (a.status === "free" ? 0 : 1) - (b.status === "free" ? 0 : 1));
// Prefer the configured seller, then known-free over unknown.
candidates.sort((left, right) => {
const leftRank =
(left.supplierPkh === opts.preferredSupplierPkh ? 0 : 2) +
(left.status === "free" ? 0 : 1);
const rightRank =
(right.supplierPkh === opts.preferredSupplierPkh ? 0 : 2) +
(right.status === "free" ? 0 : 1);
return leftRank - rightRank;
});
return candidates;
}

View File

@@ -15,19 +15,88 @@ import { open as unseal } from "../crypto/seal.js";
import { deriveWalletKey } from "../wallet.js";
import type { ApiKeyRow } from "../db/store.js";
/** Tiny promise-chain mutex: run(fn) executes fns strictly one at a time. */
/** Default per-run deadline. Chain reads and tx submits settle in seconds;
* anything past this is the 2026-08-12 freeze mode (a fetch that never
* settles), not a slow success. */
export const DEFAULT_MUTEX_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
/** Default queue bound per mutex. A healthy key drains its queue in seconds;
* a queue this deep means the head is stuck and callers should fail fast. */
export const DEFAULT_MUTEX_MAX_QUEUE = 64;
/** A run() exceeded its deadline and was abandoned so queued work can proceed. */
export class MutexTimeoutError extends Error {
constructor(label: string, timeoutMs: number) {
super(`mutex run '${label}' exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms and was abandoned; queued work proceeds`);
this.name = "MutexTimeoutError";
}
}
/** run() was refused because the queue is at its bound (head likely stuck). */
export class MutexQueueFullError extends Error {
constructor(label: string, depth: number) {
super(`mutex queue full (${depth} pending) — refusing '${label}'; the head of the queue is likely stuck`);
this.name = "MutexQueueFullError";
}
}
function runWithDeadline<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number, label: string): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolvePromise, rejectPromise) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => rejectPromise(new MutexTimeoutError(label, timeoutMs)), timeoutMs);
// Node-only nicety: don't hold the process open for a pending deadline.
timer.unref?.();
fn().then(
(v) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolvePromise(v);
},
(e) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
rejectPromise(e);
},
);
});
}
/**
* Tiny promise-chain mutex: run(fn) executes fns strictly one at a time —
* now with a per-run deadline and a queue bound (2026-08-12 freeze fix).
*
* On deadline the stuck fn is NOT cancelled (promises aren't); it is
* abandoned: its run() rejects with MutexTimeoutError and the chain advances.
* A zombie that settles later can at worst lose a UTxO-contention race with
* the run that replaced it — strictly better than the alternative, where one
* stuck chain call convoys every subsequent request on the key forever.
*/
export class Mutex {
private tail: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
private depth = 0;
run<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const result = this.tail.then(fn, fn);
// Keep the chain alive even if fn rejects; swallow here so the next
// run() isn't poisoned by a prior rejection.
this.tail = result.then(
constructor(private readonly opts: { timeoutMs?: number; maxQueue?: number } = {}) {}
run<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, label = "op"): Promise<T> {
const timeoutMs = this.opts.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_MUTEX_TIMEOUT_MS;
const maxQueue = this.opts.maxQueue ?? DEFAULT_MUTEX_MAX_QUEUE;
if (this.depth >= maxQueue) {
return Promise.reject(new MutexQueueFullError(label, this.depth));
}
this.depth++;
// Keep the chain alive even if fn rejects or times out; swallow here so
// the next run() isn't poisoned by a prior rejection.
const result = this.tail.then(
() => runWithDeadline(fn, timeoutMs, label),
() => runWithDeadline(fn, timeoutMs, label),
);
const settled = result.finally(() => {
this.depth--;
});
this.tail = settled.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
);
return result;
return settled;
}
}

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { ipRateLimit, keyRateLimit, demoIpRateLimit } from "./middleware/rateLim
import { sendError } from "./middleware/http.js";
import { notFound } from "./openai/errors.js";
import { makeChatCompletionsHandler } from "./openai/chatCompletions.js";
import { makeOcrExtractHandler } from "./ocr/extract.js";
import { makeModelsHandler } from "./openai/models.js";
import {
makeOpenSessionHandler,
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ function corsMiddleware(allowOrigins: string[]) {
res.setHeader("Vary", "Origin");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "X-Vector-Escrow-Ref");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Max-Age", "600");
}
if (req.method === "OPTIONS") {
@@ -56,7 +58,11 @@ export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
app.set("trust proxy", true);
// CORS before body-parsing so preflight OPTIONS short-circuits cheaply.
app.use(corsMiddleware(deps.config.corsOrigins));
app.use(express.json({ limit: "1mb" }));
// /v1/ocr carries a base64 page image and mounts its own larger parser on
// the route; every other path keeps the 1mb ceiling.
const jsonBody = express.json({ limit: "1mb" });
app.use((req, res, next) =>
req.path.startsWith("/v1/ocr/") ? next() : jsonBody(req, res, next));
app.get("/healthz", (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
res.json({ ok: true });
@@ -80,6 +86,12 @@ export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
app.post("/account/withdraw", auth, makeWithdrawHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions", ...gated, makeChatCompletionsHandler(deps));
// Model-scoped OCR: 16mb parser covers MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS
// (~12M chars ≈ 9 MB binary) plus JSON envelope. Gates (auth + rate
// limits) run BEFORE the parser so an unauthenticated caller cannot
// buffer/JSON.parse up to 16mb before getting a 401, and rate limiting
// can actually throttle the request (2026-08 review finding C2).
app.post("/v1/ocr/extract", ...gated, express.json({ limit: "16mb" }), makeOcrExtractHandler(deps));
app.get("/openai/v1/models", auth, makeModelsHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions", ...gated, makeOpenSessionHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions/:id/messages", ...gated, makeSessionMessageHandler(deps));

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>Vector Marketplace — OpenAI Gateway</title>
<title>Vector Marketplace - OpenAI Gateway</title>
<style>
body { font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; max-width: 760px; margin: 2rem auto; padding: 0 1rem; line-height: 1.5; }
h1 { font-size: 1.5rem; } h2 { font-size: 1.1rem; margin-top: 2rem; }
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Vector Marketplace — OpenAI-compatible Gateway</h1>
<h1>Vector Marketplace - OpenAI-compatible Gateway</h1>
<p class="muted">Point any OpenAI SDK at <code id="base"></code> using your API key as the bearer token.</p>
<h2>1. Create an API key</h2>
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
<div id="signupOut"></div>
<h2>2. Fund your wallet</h2>
<p class="muted">Send AP3X to your deposit address (you need price + bonds + ~5 ADA collateral + fees).</p>
<p class="muted">Send AP3X to your deposit address (you need price + bonds + ~5 AP3X collateral + fees).</p>
<h2>3. Account</h2>
<div class="row">

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* gateway/src/walletHealth.ts — keep each custodial wallet usable.
*
* After every settled request (and on a periodic tick) we re-shape the wallet to
* {≥5 ADA collateral UTxO, working UTxO} via the shared consolidate builder, so
* the NEXT request's Accept/Reclaim script-spend always finds a pure-ADA
* {≥5 AP3X collateral UTxO, working UTxO} via the shared consolidate builder, so
* the NEXT request's Accept/Reclaim script-spend always finds a pure-AP3X
* collateral candidate. No-op when the wallet is already healthy.
*/

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ function makeDeps(
chatSettleMode: overrides?.chatSettleMode ?? "full",
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);

572
gateway/test/ocr.test.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
/**
* gateway/test/ocr.test.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract route coverage.
*
* Focus: auth gating, demo-key rejection, body validation, capability-based
* supplier lookup, and the enlarged body limit. The settle path (submitOcr →
* resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) reuses the one-shot chat plumbing
* covered by http.test.ts + the SDK suites; end-to-end runs live on testnet.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import request from "supertest";
import { createApp } from "../src/server.js";
import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
import { SdkRegistry } from "../src/sdk/registry.js";
import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../src/wallet.js";
import { seal } from "../src/crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey } from "../src/middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { venueAttribution } from "../src/ocr/extract.js";
import type { GatewayConfig } from "../src/config.js";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../src/deps.js";
import { SupplierError } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
// The one-shot settle step (resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) talks to
// the live indexer + chain; the happy-path route test below only needs to
// prove that a successful submitOcr reaches the response with the
// first-party-brokered disclosure label (I3), so it stubs just those two
// chain-touching steps and keeps every other export real.
vi.mock("../src/onchain/settle.js", async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("../src/onchain/settle.js")>();
return {
...actual,
resolveSubmittedRef: vi.fn(async () => ({ txHash: "e".repeat(64), index: 0 })),
acceptAndConfirm: vi.fn(async () => "f".repeat(64)),
};
});
const MASTER = "ab".repeat(32);
const IMG = Buffer.from("page bytes").toString("base64");
/** A funded wallet: covers price+bonds+collateral+fee and has pure-ADA ≥ 5. */
const fundedChain = {
queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [
{ ref: { txHash: "ff".repeat(32), index: 0 }, address: "a", lovelace: 20_000_000n, assets: {}, datumHex: null, scriptRef: null },
],
} as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
const OCR_SUPPLIER = {
utxo_ref: `${"cc".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "s3",
capability_id: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
max_output_tokens: 4096,
price_lovelace: "200000",
supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
endpoint_url: "http://sup",
advert_status: "Active",
status: "free",
};
function makeDeps(fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch, overrides?: { chain?: GatewayDeps["chain"] }): GatewayDeps {
const dbDir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-ocr-test-${randomUUID()}`);
const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
const config: GatewayConfig = {
masterKeyHex: MASTER,
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
ogmiosUrl: "http://og",
networkId: 0,
liveChain: true,
port: 0,
dbDir,
signupRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
keyRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
demoIpRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
sweeperIntervalMs: 60_000,
demoSessionIdleMs: 180_000,
chatSettleMode: "full",
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);
const registry = new SdkRegistry({
chain,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
networkId: config.networkId,
masterKeyHex: config.masterKeyHex,
max: config.sdkRegistryMax,
});
const defaultFetch = (async () => new Response("[]", { status: 200 })) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
return { config, store, chain, registry, fetchFn: fetchFn ?? defaultFetch };
}
/** Insert a key row (demo or funded) and return the raw bearer token. */
function makeKey(deps: GatewayDeps, demo: 0 | 1): string {
const rawKey = `vk-${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, 0);
const sealed = seal(privHex, MASTER);
deps.store.insertKey({
id: randomUUID(),
key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
label: demo ? "demo" : "funded",
wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
deposit_address: walletKey.address,
enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
demo,
});
return rawKey;
}
function validBody() {
return { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" };
}
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — auth + demo gating", () => {
it("401 without a bearer key, OpenAI error shape", async () => {
const res = await request(createApp(makeDeps()))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract").send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.body.error?.type).toBe("authentication_error");
});
it("403 demo_key_unsupported for demo keys", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 1);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("demo_key_unsupported");
});
});
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — body validation", () => {
async function post(body: unknown) {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
return request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(body as object);
}
it("400 invalid_image on missing/empty/data-URL image_b64", async () => {
for (const image_b64 of [undefined, "", `data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`]) {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), image_b64 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_image");
}
});
it("400 invalid_mime on unsupported mime", async () => {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), mime: "image/gif" });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_mime");
});
it("400 invalid_output_format on unsupported format", async () => {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), output_format: "yaml" });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_output_format");
});
it("output_format defaults to markdown (reaches supplier lookup)", async () => {
const res = await post({ image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png" });
// Passes validation, then the empty indexer answer → 404 model_not_found.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
});
});
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — supplier lookup + body limit", () => {
it("404 model_not_found when no supplier advertises the capability", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
});
it("queries the indexer with the configured ocr capability id", async () => {
let queried = "";
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
queried = String(url);
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn);
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(queried).toContain("capability_id=ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1");
});
it("accepts a 2MB body (over the 1mb global limit — OCR route has its own parser)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ ...validBody(), image_b64: big });
expect(res.status).not.toBe(413);
// Valid base64 + no suppliers → 404 model_not_found.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it("chat completions keep the 1mb ceiling (413 on a 2MB body)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "qwen", messages: [{ role: "user", content: big }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(413);
});
});
// ─── venueAttribution — pure-function header sanitization (I3) ──────────────
//
// grep for "first-party-brokered" used to return only source lines: nothing
// exercised venueAttribution's regex gates or RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 reaching the
// wire. These two blocks close that gap.
function fakeReq(headers: Record<string, string>): Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0] {
return { header: (name: string) => headers[name] } as unknown as Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0];
}
describe("venueAttribution — header sanitization", () => {
it("passes through a valid venue slug and a valid lowercase hash", () => {
const hash = "a".repeat(64);
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": hash }));
expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "apify", runUserHash: hash });
});
it("lowercases a valid but uppercase hex hash", () => {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": "A".repeat(64) }));
expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("a".repeat(64));
});
it("drops an invalid venue to empty string (uppercase, bad chars, oversized)", () => {
for (const bad of ["Apify", "apify!", "apify_venue", "a".repeat(33)]) {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": bad, "X-Run-User-Hash": "a".repeat(64) }));
expect(out.venue).toBe("");
}
});
it("drops an invalid run-user-hash to empty string (wrong length, non-hex)", () => {
for (const bad of ["a".repeat(63), "a".repeat(65), "z".repeat(64), "not-hex-at-all"]) {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": bad }));
expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("");
}
});
it("defaults both fields to empty string when headers are missing", () => {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({}));
expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "", runUserHash: "" });
});
});
// ─── Happy path — receipt disclosure label reaches the response (I3) ────────
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — happy path", () => {
it("200 response x_vector.receipt_labels contains first-party-brokered", async () => {
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
// Stub only the chain-touching supplier call; escrow ref shape matches
// what resolveSubmittedRef's mock (module-level, top of file) expects.
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => ({
output_format: "markdown",
content: "extracted text",
usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
receipt: {
prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
prompt_tokens: 10,
completion_tokens: 5,
wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
supplier_pkh: "s3",
escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
},
receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
}));
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
// escrow_ref in the response comes from submitOcr's returned escrowRef
// (the ORIGINAL Open ref), not the mocked resolveSubmittedRef's answer —
// see settle.ts's docstring on why those two refs differ on-chain.
expect(res.body.x_vector.escrow_ref).toBe(`${"d".repeat(64)}#0`);
});
});
// ─── Failure path — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError (I2) ────
//
// submitOcr posts the escrow, THEN calls the supplier. A SupplierError
// (timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed response, receipt mismatch)
// means the escrow already landed on chain even though submitOcr rejects —
// per the OCR route's 120s supplier budget, this is likely the MOST common
// paid-but-failed shape. Before this fix, escrowRefStr was only assigned
// from submitOcr's *return value*, so this exact case recorded escrow_ref:
// null. The route now also listens for the SDK's "escrow_posted" progress
// event around each attempt, so the ref survives regardless of whether
// submitOcr goes on to resolve or reject.
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError", () => {
it("records the escrow_ref from the escrow_posted progress event, not null, when submitOcr posts an escrow then rejects", async () => {
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
// Same monkeypatch pattern as the happy-path test above: fetch the real
// per-key Marketplace instance from the registry BEFORE the request so
// its real EventEmitter (on/off/emit) stays live, then replace only
// submitOcr. The stub mirrors what Marketplace.submitOcr actually does
// on this failure shape: emit "escrow_posted" the instant the tx
// confirms, then throw once the supplier call fails.
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const knownEscrowRef = `${"9".repeat(64)}#0`;
const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => {
ctx.sdk.emit("progress", { type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: knownEscrowRef });
throw new SupplierError("timeout", { message: "supplier did not respond within budget" });
});
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// Snapshot the recorded calls BEFORE restoring — mockRestore() also
// clears .mock.calls (it runs mockReset()/mockClear() first), so
// reading logSpy.mock.calls after restore always sees [].
const loggedLines = logSpy.mock.calls.map((args) => String(args[0]));
logSpy.mockRestore();
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// toGatewayError maps SupplierError("timeout") to 504 supplier_timeout —
// confirms the request actually took the failure path this test targets.
expect(res.status).toBe(504);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("supplier_timeout");
// The reconciliation spine: the usage row recorded in the catch block
// must carry the real ref, not null.
const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
// The structured ocr_failed log line (wedge-ledger emitter input) must
// carry the same ref.
const failedLine = loggedLines
.filter((line) => line.includes('"evt":"ocr_failed"'))
.map((line) => JSON.parse(line) as { escrow_ref: string | null });
expect(failedLine).toHaveLength(1);
expect(failedLine[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
});
});
// ─── Busy pre-check - never post an escrow to a candidate that is busy ──────
//
// runOcrOneShot now checks each candidate's live /status immediately before
// calling submitOcr for it (mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check):
// "working" means busy and moves on to the next candidate WITHOUT posting an
// escrow; anything else (free, unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as
// usable. submitOcr is the escrow-posting path in these tests (same
// monkeypatch pattern as the suites above), so asserting its call count is
// exactly how "no escrow was posted" is observed.
const OCR_SUPPLIER_A = {
...OCR_SUPPLIER,
utxo_ref: `${"aa".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "sA",
endpoint_url: "http://sup-a",
};
const OCR_SUPPLIER_B = {
...OCR_SUPPLIER,
utxo_ref: `${"bb".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "sB",
endpoint_url: "http://sup-b",
};
/** Indexer /suppliers lookup plus a per-endpoint /status responder, on one
* fetchFn - everything else falls back to the suite's usual empty array. */
function makeFetchWithStatus(
suppliers: Array<typeof OCR_SUPPLIER>,
statusByEndpoint: Record<string, () => Response>,
): typeof globalThis.fetch {
return (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(suppliers), { status: 200 });
}
for (const [endpoint, respond] of Object.entries(statusByEndpoint)) {
if (u === `${endpoint}/status`) return respond();
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
}
/** Same successful submitOcr shape as the happy-path suite above, reused
* across the busy pre-check tests. */
function makeSubmitOcrStub() {
return vi.fn(async (_opts: { advertRef: { txHash: string; index: number } }) => ({
output_format: "markdown",
content: "extracted text",
usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
receipt: {
prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
prompt_tokens: 10,
completion_tokens: 5,
wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
supplier_pkh: "s3",
escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
},
receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
}));
}
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract - busy pre-check", () => {
it("a busy supplier is never sent an escrow; the route returns the busy response", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// The escrow-posting path was never invoked.
expect(submitOcr).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// toGatewayError maps SupplierError("supplier_busy") to 503 overloaded -
// the same busy response a post-escrow 409 would have produced.
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("overloaded");
const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBeNull();
});
it("a free supplier proceeds to post and settle exactly as before", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
});
it("falls back to the second candidate when the first is busy, posting exactly one escrow", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER_A, OCR_SUPPLIER_B], {
"http://sup-a": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
"http://sup-b": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Exactly one escrow posted, and it is the second (free) candidate's -
// the busy first candidate was skipped, not retried after failing.
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(submitOcr.mock.calls[0][0].advertRef).toEqual({ txHash: "bb".repeat(32), index: 0 });
});
it("a status check that errors does not block the attempt", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => {
// Simulates both a network error and an aborted (timed-out) request -
// isSupplierBusy's catch block treats every failure mode the same
// way: unknown, not busy, proceed. A real AbortSignal timeout is not
// exercised here to keep the suite fast; the outcome is identical.
throw new Error("simulated network failure reaching /status");
},
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// The candidate was still tried despite the failed pre-check.
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});

View File

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ function makeSweepDeps(opts: { chatSettleMode: "full" | "ticket"; escrows: Escro
chatSettleMode: opts.chatSettleMode,
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = { queryUtxo: async () => null } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];

View File

@@ -70,6 +70,28 @@ describe("routing/selectSupplier", () => {
expect(got[0].priceLovelace).toBe(2n);
});
it("pins routing to an exact supplier when requested", async () => {
const got = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
model: "m",
capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1",
supplierPkh: "s2",
fetchFn: jsonResponse(rows),
});
expect(got.map((candidate) => candidate.supplierPkh)).toEqual(["s2"]);
});
it("orders the preferred supplier first and keeps fallback candidates", async () => {
const got = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
model: "m",
capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1",
preferredSupplierPkh: "s2",
fetchFn: jsonResponse(rows),
});
expect(got.map((candidate) => candidate.supplierPkh)).toEqual(["s2", "s1"]);
});
it("routes chat.v1 separately", async () => {
const got = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
@@ -118,6 +140,20 @@ describe("openai/validate", () => {
expect(p.maxTokens).toBe(50);
expect(p.stream).toBe(false);
});
it("accepts and validates a Vector supplier pin", () => {
const supplierPkh = "a".repeat(56);
const parsed = parseChatRequest({
model: "m",
messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }],
x_vector: { supplier_pkh: supplierPkh },
});
expect(parsed.supplierPkh).toBe(supplierPkh);
expect(() => parseChatRequest({
model: "m",
messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }],
x_vector: { supplier_pkh: "bad" },
})).toThrow(GatewayError);
});
it("rejects tools/functions", () => {
expect(() => parseChatRequest({ model: "m", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "x" }], tools: [] })).toThrow(GatewayError);
});
@@ -208,8 +244,16 @@ describe("onchain/preflight", () => {
});
it("preflight requires balance AND collateral", async () => {
const cost = { priceLovelace: 2_000_000n, buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n, supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n };
// required = 2 + 1 + 1 + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
const cost = {
capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1",
priceLovelace: 2_000_000n,
buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
};
// required = escrowLockFloor(2 + 1 + 1) + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
// — at this economic total (4 ADA) the Submitted-state min-ada floor for a
// short capability id (~2.2 ADA) stays well under the raw total, so the
// floor is a no-op here; tx-minada-floor.test.ts covers the lifted case.
const fakeChain = { queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [pure(20_000_000n)] } as any;
const ok = await preflight(fakeChain, "a", cost);
expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY indexer/package.json ./indexer/package.json
COPY indexer-ui/package.json ./indexer-ui/package.json

View File

@@ -37,5 +37,10 @@
"tsx": "^4.19.2",
"typescript": "^5.7.2",
"vitest": "^2.1.8"
},
"pnpm": {
"patchedDependencies": {
"libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16": "patches/libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16.patch"
}
}
}

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ export interface PostAdvertParams {
walletKey: WalletKey;
advertDatum: AdvertDatum;
deposit_lovelace: bigint;
/** Durable journal hook invoked with signed CBOR before broadcast. */
beforeSubmit?: (built: PostAdvertBuildResult) => Promise<void>;
}
export async function buildPostAdvertTx(
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ export async function buildPostAdvertTx(
walletKey,
advertDatum,
deposit_lovelace,
beforeSubmit: params.beforeSubmit,
});
}
@@ -102,13 +105,15 @@ export async function buildPostAdvertTx(
const txCborHex = encodeTxBody(body);
const expectedTxHash = sha256Hex(txCborHex);
// Submit so the mock seeds the new UTxO + spends inputs (none here).
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return {
const built: PostAdvertBuildResult = {
txCborHex,
expectedTxHash,
advertOutputRef: { txHash: expectedTxHash, index: 0 },
};
await params.beforeSubmit?.(built);
// Submit so the mock seeds the new UTxO + spends inputs (none here).
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return built;
}

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
export interface PostChatEscrowParams {
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ export async function buildPostChatEscrowTx(
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = chatSessionPromptHash({ session_nonce });
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -154,6 +155,11 @@ export async function buildPostChatEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the capability-agnostic chat builder (messages = []).
// The on-chain commitment is the escrowDatum (carrying our session-init
// prompt_hash); messages are only used for the mock cbor body, which we omit.

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
export interface PostEscrowParams {
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ export async function buildPostEscrowTx(
// supplier-side validation in M1-C can verify role/content/system integrity.
const promptHash = sha256Utf8Hex(canonicalize(messages));
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -151,6 +152,11 @@ export async function buildPostEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: produce real Cardano CBOR via lucid-evolution.
if (detectCborBackend(chain) === "live") {
const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
/**
* tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts — PostEscrow tx builder for model-scoped OCR
* capabilities (`ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`, one page per job).
*
* Mirrors `postTtsEscrow.ts` but commits an OCR-shaped prompt_hash over the
* canonicalised request envelope `{image_b64, mime, output_format}` — the
* SAME object the supplier hashes when validating the incoming
* POST /v1/ocr/extract body. Any mismatch on either side fails the
* supplier-side prompt_mismatch gate.
*
* The image travels off-chain (buyer → supplier HTTP body); the chain only
* ever carries prompt_hash. Never place image bytes or extracted text in a
* datum.
*
* Off-chain invariants (mirror TTS's, with OCR-shaped body validation):
* 1. advert UTxO exists at advertRef
* 2. advert datum.status === "Active"
* 3. payment_lovelace === advert.price_lovelace
* 4. buyerKey.pubKeyHash !== advert.supplier_pkh
* 5. body.image_b64 is a non-empty plain-base64 string within size bounds
* (no data-URL prefix — the mime rides in its own field)
* 6. body.mime ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES
* 7. body.output_format ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS
*/
import * as nodeCrypto from "crypto";
import type { ChainProvider, OutputReference } from "../../chain/ChainProvider.js";
import type { EscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/types.js";
import { decodeAdvertDatum } from "../../cbor/AdvertDatum.js";
import { encodeEscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
import { canonicalize } from "../../cbor/canonical.js";
import type { WalletKey, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "../types.js";
import { TxConstructionError } from "../types.js";
import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
/** OCR request envelope. The buyer-side hash and the supplier-side hash
* MUST agree on this exact set of keys, in this exact JCS-canonical
* encoding, or the supplier will reject with `prompt_mismatch`. */
export interface OcrRequest {
/** Plain base64 of the page image bytes. No `data:` prefix. */
image_b64: string;
/** Image content type. */
mime: string;
/** Requested extraction output shape. */
output_format: string;
}
export const ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES = new Set([
"image/png", "image/jpeg", "image/webp",
]);
export const ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS = new Set(["markdown", "html", "json"]);
/**
* Upper bound on the base64 payload, in characters (~9 MB of image bytes).
* A 300-DPI page scan lands around 0.5–3 MB binary; this cap protects the
* supplier's JSON body parser and the off-chain transport, not the chain
* (the chain only sees the 32-byte hash).
*/
export const MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS = 12_000_000;
/** Plain base64 (standard alphabet, optional padding). Rejects data URLs,
* whitespace and base64url — one canonical encoding, one hash. */
const BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
export interface PostOcrEscrowParams {
chain: ChainProvider;
buyerKey: WalletKey;
advertRef: OutputReference;
request: OcrRequest;
payment_lovelace: bigint;
}
function sha256Utf8Hex(s: string): string {
return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(s, "utf8").digest("hex");
}
/** Hash function shared between buyer (here) and supplier (server.ts).
* Exported so unit tests on either side can pin the canonicalisation. */
export function ocrPromptHash(req: OcrRequest): string {
return sha256Utf8Hex(canonicalize({
image_b64: req.image_b64,
mime: req.mime,
output_format: req.output_format,
}));
}
/** Body validation shared conceptually with the supplier route. Throws
* TxConstructionError with a machine-readable reason. */
export function validateOcrRequest(request: OcrRequest): void {
if (typeof request?.image_b64 !== "string" || request.image_b64.length === 0) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image required",
"request.image_b64 must be a non-empty base64 string");
}
if (request.image_b64.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image too large",
`request.image_b64 exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} chars`);
}
if (!BASE64_RE.test(request.image_b64)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image not base64",
"request.image_b64 must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
}
if (!ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(request.mime)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("mime invalid",
`mime must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
}
if (!ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(request.output_format)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("output_format invalid",
`output_format must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`);
}
}
export async function buildPostOcrEscrowTx(
params: PostOcrEscrowParams,
): Promise<PostEscrowBuildResult> {
const { chain, buyerKey, advertRef, request, payment_lovelace } = params;
// 5–7. Body validation before any chain access.
validateOcrRequest(request);
// 1. Advert UTxO must exist.
const advertUtxo = await chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
if (advertUtxo === null) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert ref not on chain",
`no UTxO at ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index}`,
);
}
if (!advertUtxo.datumHex) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert datum missing",
`UTxO ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index} has no inline datum`,
);
}
const advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(advertUtxo.datumHex);
// 2. Advert must be Active.
if (advertDatum.status !== "Active") {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert is retired",
`advert.status is ${advertDatum.status}, expected Active`,
);
}
// 3. Payment must equal advertised price.
if (payment_lovelace !== advertDatum.price_lovelace) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"payment must equal advertised price",
`payment ${payment_lovelace} != advert.price ${advertDatum.price_lovelace}`,
);
}
// 4. Buyer cannot be supplier.
if (buyerKey.pubKeyHash === advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"buyer cannot be supplier",
`buyerKey pkh ${buyerKey.pubKeyHash} equals advert.supplier_pkh`,
);
}
// Time source: same convention as chat/TTS.
const tipSlot = await chain.tip();
const isLive = detectCborBackend(chain) === "live";
const postedAt = isLive ? Date.now() : mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot);
const deliverBy = postedAt + advertDatum.max_processing_ms + NETWORK_BUFFER_MS;
const requestSpecCanonical = canonicalize({
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
max_output_tokens: advertDatum.max_output_tokens,
model: advertDatum.model,
});
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
const escrowDatum: EscrowDatum = {
buyer_pkh: buyerKey.pubKeyHash,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
advert_ref: advertRef,
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
request_spec_hash: requestSpecHash,
prompt_hash: promptHash,
payment_lovelace: advertDatum.price_lovelace,
buyer_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace,
supplier_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace,
deliver_by: deliverBy,
posted_at: postedAt,
submitted_at: null,
result_receipt_hash: null,
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (2026-08-07 min-ada incident).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the capability-agnostic live builder (messages is
// void-marked there; the on-chain commitment is the escrowDatum, which
// carries our OCR prompt_hash).
if (isLive) {
const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";
const { buildLiveTxForEscrow } = await import(/* @vite-ignore */ liveCborPath);
return buildLiveTxForEscrow({
chain: chain as LiveOgmiosProvider,
buyerKey,
advertRef,
messages: [],
escrowDatum,
totalLocked,
deliverBy,
postedAt,
});
}
// Mock backend path (synthetic JSON-in-hex tx body).
const blueprint = loadBlueprint();
const escrowAddress = blueprint.escrowScriptAddress(0);
const body = {
type: "post-escrow",
inputs: [],
outputs: [
{
ref: { txHash: "$self", index: 0 },
address: escrowAddress,
lovelace: totalLocked,
assets: {},
datumHex: encodeEscrowDatum(escrowDatum),
scriptRef: null,
},
],
requiredSigners: [buyerKey.pubKeyHash],
validityRange: { lowerBoundMs: postedAt, upperBoundMs: deliverBy },
meta: { script_hash: blueprint.escrowScriptHash, advert_ref: advertRef },
};
const txCborHex = encodeTxBody(body);
const expectedTxHash = sha256Hex(txCborHex);
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return {
txCborHex,
expectedTxHash,
escrowOutputRef: { txHash: expectedTxHash, index: 0 },
};
}

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
/** TTS request envelope. The buyer-side hash and the supplier-side hash
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ export async function buildPostTtsEscrowTx(
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = ttsPromptHash(request);
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -171,6 +172,11 @@ export async function buildPostTtsEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the chat builder. The live cbor path is already
// capability-agnostic — `messages` is `void`-marked there. We pass an
// empty array so the type checker is satisfied; the actual on-chain

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ import type { WalletKey, BuildResult } from "../types.js";
import { TxConstructionError } from "../types.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { ACCEPT_WINDOW_MS, mockSlotToWallclockMs } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
export interface ReleaseParams {
chain: ChainProvider;
@@ -65,8 +67,10 @@ export async function buildReleaseTx(
}
// 4. Tip must be at or past submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW.
// Live backend uses real POSIX ms; mock backend keeps slot*1000.
const tipSlot = await chain.tip();
const tipMs = mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot);
const isLive = detectCborBackend(chain) === "live";
const tipMs = isLive ? Date.now() : mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot);
const threshold = datum.submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW_MS;
if (tipMs < threshold) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
@@ -75,6 +79,21 @@ export async function buildReleaseTx(
);
}
// Live path: real Cardano CBOR via lucid-evolution.
if (isLive) {
const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";
const { buildLiveTxForRelease } = await import(/* @vite-ignore */ liveCborPath);
return buildLiveTxForRelease({
chain: chain as LiveOgmiosProvider,
supplierKey,
escrowRef,
escrowUtxo: utxo,
datum,
tipMs,
});
}
// Mock path: synthetic testTxBody (preserves existing test behaviour).
const supplierDue =
datum.payment_lovelace + datum.supplier_bond_lovelace + datum.buyer_bond_lovelace;

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ export interface SubmitParams {
supplierKey: WalletKey;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
receiptHash: string;
/** Durable journal hook invoked with signed CBOR before broadcast. */
beforeSubmit?: (built: BuildResult) => Promise<void>;
}
function isHex32(s: string): boolean {
@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ export async function buildSubmitTx(
deliverBy: datum.deliver_by,
tipMs,
receiptHash: receiptHash.toLowerCase(),
beforeSubmit: params.beforeSubmit,
});
}
@@ -138,6 +141,7 @@ export async function buildSubmitTx(
const txCborHex = encodeTxBody(body);
const expectedTxHash = sha256Hex(txCborHex);
await params.beforeSubmit?.({ txCborHex, expectedTxHash });
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return { txCborHex, expectedTxHash };

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@
export type { ChatMessage, ToolCall, WalletKey, BuildResult, PostAdvertBuildResult, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "./types.js";
export { TxConstructionError } from "./types.js";
export { normalizeChatMessage, chatMessagesEquivalent, toolCallsEqual } from "./chatMessage.js";
export {
BOUNDED_INPUT_DETAIL_MARKER,
chatInputTokenUpperBound,
} from "./inputBound.js";
export { mockSlotToWallclockMs, mockWallclockMsToSlot, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "./internal/constants.js";
export { detectCborBackend, type CborBackend } from "./internal/cborBackend.js";
export { escrowLockFloor, minAdaForEscrowDatum } from "./internal/minAdaFloor.js";
export type { Signer } from "./signer.js";
export { MockSigner } from "./signer.js";
export type { Blueprint } from "./blueprint.js";
@@ -37,6 +42,15 @@ export {
} from "./escrow/postTtsEscrow.js";
export type { PostChatEscrowParams } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
export { buildPostChatEscrowTx, chatSessionPromptHash } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
export type { PostOcrEscrowParams, OcrRequest } from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
export {
buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
ocrPromptHash,
validateOcrRequest,
ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
} from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
export type { ClaimParams } from "./escrow/claim.js";
export { buildClaimTx } from "./escrow/claim.js";
export type { SubmitParams } from "./escrow/submit.js";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
import type { ChatMessage } from "./types.js";
import { canonicalize } from "../cbor/canonical.js";
/** Advert detail-URI marker for suppliers that require live input-cap preflight. */
export const BOUNDED_INPUT_DETAIL_MARKER = "#vector-bounded-input-v1";
const CHAT_MESSAGE_OVERHEAD = 8;
const CHAT_REPLY_PRIMER = 3;
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
/**
* Conservative, tokenizer-independent upper bound for text chat input.
*
* Every UTF-8 byte counts as one token unit. The fixed per-message and reply
* overhead covers role separators and the provider chat template. Major
* byte-fallback tokenizers cannot emit more content tokens than input bytes.
*/
export function chatInputTokenUpperBound(
messages: readonly ChatMessage[],
): number {
return (
CHAT_REPLY_PRIMER +
CHAT_MESSAGE_OVERHEAD * messages.length +
encoder.encode(canonicalize(messages)).byteLength
);
}

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
* for vkh enterprise). Input UTxOs may carry testnet-prefixed addresses — lucid
* does not validate address network for inputs (only for outputs).
*
* Deferred builders (postAdvert, updateAdvert, retireAdvert, reclaim, release)
* are NOT touched in M1-F-4. Those continue using the synthetic testTxBody path.
* Deferred builders: only updateAdvert remains on the synthetic testTxBody
* path. postAdvert, retireAdvert, reclaim, and release all have live builders.
*
* Catherine M1-F-4-green.
*/
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const REDEEMER_CLAIM = 121;
const REDEEMER_SUBMIT = 122;
const REDEEMER_ACCEPT = 123;
const REDEEMER_RECLAIM = 124;
const REDEEMER_RELEASE = 125;
// AdvertRedeemer Constr indices per lib/marketplace/types.ak:
// PostAdvert → Constr0 (tag 121, creation event — never seen by spend)
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ export interface LiveSubmitParams {
deliverBy: number;
tipMs: number;
receiptHash: string;
beforeSubmit?: (built: BuildResult) => Promise<void>;
}
export interface LiveAcceptParams {
@@ -121,11 +123,21 @@ export interface LiveReclaimParams {
tipMs: number;
}
export interface LiveReleaseParams {
chain: LiveOgmiosProvider;
supplierKey: WalletKey;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
escrowUtxo: Utxo;
datum: EscrowDatum;
tipMs: number;
}
export interface LivePostAdvertParams {
chain: LiveOgmiosProvider;
walletKey: WalletKey;
advertDatum: AdvertDatum;
deposit_lovelace: bigint;
beforeSubmit?: (built: PostAdvertBuildResult) => Promise<void>;
}
export interface LiveRetireAdvertParams {
@@ -489,6 +501,7 @@ async function buildSpendOpenOrClaimedTx(opts: {
validFromMs: number;
validToMs: number;
signerPkh: string;
beforeSubmit?: (built: BuildResult) => Promise<void>;
}): Promise<BuildResult> {
const provider = buildLucidProvider(opts.chain);
const { lucid } = await createLucidContext(provider, opts.walletKey, {
@@ -575,6 +588,7 @@ async function buildSpendOpenOrClaimedTx(opts: {
const txCborHex = signed.toCBOR();
const expectedTxHash = signed.toHash();
await opts.beforeSubmit?.({ txCborHex, expectedTxHash });
await opts.chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
@@ -640,6 +654,7 @@ export async function buildLiveTxForSubmit(params: LiveSubmitParams): Promise<Bu
validFromMs: tipMs,
validToMs: stampMs,
signerPkh: params.supplierKey.pubKeyHash,
beforeSubmit: params.beforeSubmit,
});
}
@@ -778,6 +793,77 @@ export async function buildLiveTxForReclaim(params: LiveReclaimParams): Promise<
return { txCborHex, expectedTxHash };
}
// ─── Release ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function buildLiveTxForRelease(params: LiveReleaseParams): Promise<BuildResult> {
const provider = buildLucidProvider(params.chain);
const { lucid } = await createLucidContext(provider, params.supplierKey, {
networkId: 1,
systemStartUnix: 0,
slotLengthMs: 1000,
}, { usePresetProtocolParameters: true });
const { script, address: escrowAddress } = loadEscrowScript();
const spendCtx = await resolveSpendCtx(lucid, "ESCROW_REF_UTXO", script);
const lucidInput = chainUtxoToLucidScriptInput(params.escrowUtxo, escrowAddress);
const releaseRedeemerHex = encodeNullaryConstrHex(REDEEMER_RELEASE);
if (params.datum.submitted_at === null) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"submitted_at missing",
"Submitted-state escrow must carry a submitted_at timestamp",
);
}
// Release pays everything to the supplier: payment + supplier_bond + buyer_bond.
const supplierDue =
params.datum.payment_lovelace +
params.datum.supplier_bond_lovelace +
params.datum.buyer_bond_lovelace;
const supplierLovelace = supplierDue < MIN_UTXO_LOVELACE ? MIN_UTXO_LOVELACE : supplierDue;
const supplierAddress = pkhToEnterpriseAddress(params.datum.supplier_pkh, MAINNET_ID);
const realWalletUtxos = await lucid.wallet().getUtxos();
assertCollateralCandidate(realWalletUtxos);
const presetWalletInputs = realWalletUtxos;
// escrow.ak:handle_release checks `lower_bound >= submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW`.
// Clamp validFrom to that threshold: the Reclaim-style tip-60s back-pad alone
// would violate the validator whenever the tip is less than 60s past the window.
const threshold = params.datum.submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW_MS;
const validFromMs = Math.max(threshold, params.tipMs - 60_000);
let signed;
try {
const txBuilder = (
spendCtx.kind === "ref"
? lucid.newTx().readFrom([spendCtx.refUtxo])
: lucid.newTx().attach.SpendingValidator(spendCtx.script)
)
.collectFrom([lucidInput], releaseRedeemerHex)
.pay.ToAddress(supplierAddress, { lovelace: supplierLovelace })
.addSignerKey(params.supplierKey.pubKeyHash)
.validFrom(validFromMs)
.validTo(params.tipMs + 60_000)
.setMinFee(500_000n);
// Same UPLC eval delegation as Accept/Reclaim — lucid's CML evaluator
// falsely rejects valid Plutus V3 spends; route to Ogmios.
const completed = await txBuilder.complete({
presetWalletInputs,
localUPLCEval: false,
});
signed = await completed.sign.withWallet().complete();
} catch (err) {
rethrowAsTxError(err, "release build failed");
}
const txCborHex = signed.toCBOR();
const expectedTxHash = signed.toHash();
await params.chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return { txCborHex, expectedTxHash };
}
// ─── PostAdvert ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function buildLiveTxForAdvert(
@@ -829,14 +915,16 @@ export async function buildLiveTxForAdvert(
const txCborHex = signed.toCBOR();
const expectedTxHash = signed.toHash();
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return {
const built: PostAdvertBuildResult = {
txCborHex,
expectedTxHash,
advertOutputRef: { txHash: expectedTxHash, index: 0 },
};
await params.beforeSubmit?.(built);
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return built;
}
// ─── RetireAdvert ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/**
* minAdaFloor.ts — min-ada floor for the escrow's LARGEST future datum.
*
* The escrow validator requires value_equal(continuing, in) on Claim and
* Submit, so the lovelace locked at POST time must already satisfy min-ada
* for every datum the output will ever carry. The largest is the Submitted
* state: submitted_at None -> Some(POSIX ms) and result_receipt_hash
* None -> Some(32 bytes) add ~43 bytes over Open/Claimed. If the posted
* lovelace sits below that state's min-ada, lucid bumps the Submit
* continuing output to min-ada, value_equal fails, and the validator
* errors with no traces (the 2026-08-07 mainnet incident: the 33-byte
* "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1" capability_id pushed the Submitted
* output 11,030 lovelace over a 2,200,000 lock; the 20-byte chat
* capability stayed 49,310 under, which is why only OCR Submits failed).
*
* escrowLockFloor() returns the lovelace to lock: the economic total
* (payment + both bonds), raised to the Submitted-state min-ada plus a
* safety margin when the total alone is too small.
*/
import type { EscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/types.js";
import { encodeEscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
/** Conway/Babbage utxoCostPerByte on Vector mainnet (protocol params). */
const UTXO_COST_PER_BYTE = 4310n;
/** Ledger constant: min-ada = (160 + serialized output bytes) * costPerByte. */
const OUTPUT_OVERHEAD_BYTES = 160n;
/** Covers CBOR framing drift between this estimate and the ledger's exact
* serialization (address, coin width, datum wrapper). Generous on purpose:
* 50k lovelace = 0.05 AP3X, dwarfed by per-leg tx fees. */
const SAFETY_MARGIN_LOVELACE = 50_000n;
/** Serialized-output byte estimate for an enterprise script address output
* carrying `lovelace` and an inline datum of `datumBytes`. Mirrors the
* arithmetic validated against mainnet on 2026-08-07 (minada-calc). */
function estimateOutputBytes(datumBytes: number, lovelace: bigint): bigint {
const addr = 1n + 29n;
const coin = 1n + (lovelace > 0xffffffffn ? 8n : 4n);
const datumField = 1n + 2n + 3n + BigInt(datumBytes);
const mapOverhead = 3n;
return addr + coin + datumField + mapOverhead;
}
/** Min-ada for the escrow output when it carries `datum`. */
export function minAdaForEscrowDatum(datum: EscrowDatum, lovelace: bigint): bigint {
const datumBytes = encodeEscrowDatum(datum).length / 2;
const size = estimateOutputBytes(datumBytes, lovelace);
return (OUTPUT_OVERHEAD_BYTES + size) * UTXO_COST_PER_BYTE;
}
/** The lovelace a POST must lock so the escrow output satisfies min-ada in
* every reachable state, including Submitted. `economicTotal` is
* payment + buyer_bond + supplier_bond. */
export function escrowLockFloor(openDatum: EscrowDatum, economicTotal: bigint): bigint {
const submittedShape: EscrowDatum = {
...openDatum,
// Representative worst-case Submit fields: a 13-digit POSIX ms stamp
// and a 32-byte receipt hash — sizes, not values, matter here.
submitted_at: openDatum.deliver_by,
result_receipt_hash: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
state: "Submitted",
};
const floor = minAdaForEscrowDatum(submittedShape, economicTotal) + SAFETY_MARGIN_LOVELACE;
return floor > economicTotal ? floor : economicTotal;
}

View File

@@ -45,3 +45,16 @@ export type {
WithdrawWalletBuildResult,
} from "./wallet/withdrawWallet.js";
export { buildWithdrawTx } from "./wallet/withdrawWallet.js";
// ── Surplus Merkle-batch anchor (live-only) ────────────────────────────
export type {
AnchorMetadataParams,
SurplusSaleProofAnchorMetadata,
} from "./wallet/anchorMetadata.js";
export {
MAX_TRANSACTION_METADATA_TEXT_BYTES,
SURPLUS_SALE_PROOF_METADATA_LABEL,
SURPLUS_SALE_PROOF_PROTOCOL,
buildAnchorMetadataTx,
validateSurplusSaleProofAnchorMetadata,
} from "./wallet/anchorMetadata.js";

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