6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
HalukG
47b3c4efcd feat(deploy): add HF-router Llama-3.3-70B mainnet supplier (hf-llama33)
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OpenAI-compatible supplier backed by the HuggingFace Inference Providers router
(meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, llm.text.generate.v1). Config only; mirrors
the glm one-off template with OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://router.huggingface.co.

- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-hf-llama33.yml
- register the supplier wallet in monitor-wallets OPERATOR_SOURCES

The env file (supplier/.env.hf-llama33) holds the wallet key + HF token and is
never committed; wallet-monitor/wallets.json is gitignored runtime data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 14:25:14 +03:00
dcejtlin-apex
7db4de1f75 Merge pull request #14 from Apex-Fusion/fix/release-tx-builder
feat(tx): live CBOR builder for Release - Submitted strays become resolvable
2026-08-17 09:53:46 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
133102bc31 Merge pull request #15 from Apex-Fusion/fix/gateway-mutex-deadline
fix(gateway): per-run deadline + queue bound on Mutex (08-12 freeze fix)
2026-08-17 09:45:15 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6fbf0d0f45 Merge pull request #16 from Apex-Fusion/fix/escrow-locked-overcount
fix(gateway): stop counting terminally-spent escrows as locked funds
2026-08-17 09:44:56 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
85ca58e4b2 fix(gateway): stop counting terminally-spent escrows as locked funds
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The indexer never updates escrow rows on terminal spends (Accept /
Reclaim / Release consume the UTxO without producing a new escrow
output), so /account summed rows whose funds had long moved and
locked_in_escrow_lovelace over-reported for 35+ minutes after
settlement.

The account handler now verifies each active-state row's UTxO is still
unspent (chain.queryUtxo) before counting it, capped at 32 lookups per
request with the tail counted unverified. Unparseable refs and failed
lookups count as live on purpose: errors inflate the figure rather than
hide locked funds. supplier_bond stays in the sum - the buyer fronts
all three legs at PostEscrow (see postEscrow.ts totalLocked), so it is
the key's money while the escrow lives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 12:33:34 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
b3b7d6b5e1 fix(gateway): per-run deadline + queue bound on Mutex - 08-12 freeze fix
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One chain call that never settled, run under the per-key Mutex with no
deadline, convoyed every subsequent request on that key silently while
/models and /account stayed healthy (2026-08-12 incident). The per-fetch
30s aborts in the Ogmios providers predate the freeze and did not prevent
it; the unbounded thing was the composition under the mutex.

Mutex.run() now races each fn against a deadline (default 180s): on
expiry the run rejects with MutexTimeoutError and the chain advances, so
queued work proceeds instead of freezing. A zombie that settles later can
at worst lose a UTxO-contention race with the run that replaced it -
strictly better than a permanent convoy. New work is refused with
MutexQueueFullError past a queue bound (default 64) instead of queueing
without limit. Serialization and rejection-tolerance semantics are
unchanged (covered by tests). Session locks in transcripts.ts construct
the same class and inherit both protections.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:56:41 +02:00
6 changed files with 457 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ interface OperatorSource {
}
const OPERATOR_SOURCES: OperatorSource[] = [
{
label: "supplier-hf-llama33@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.hf-llama33",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "buyer@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-hf-llama33.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (HuggingFace Inference Providers router / meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct
# — one-off `llm.text.generate.v1`)
#
# HF-router-backed supplier. LLM_BACKEND=openai pointed at the HuggingFace
# Inference Providers router (OpenAI-compatible at https://router.huggingface.co).
# No local proxy container — reachable over public HTTPS. Direct analogue of the
# OpenRouter/Hetzner-backed suppliers; the router is OpenAI-compatible so this is
# config only (V1 HF integration).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS: mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# (individual DNS-only A record → 91.98.147.172; NO wildcard exists —
# letsencrypt HTTP-01 issuance needs the unproxied direct record)
# 2. supplier/.env.hf-llama33 written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, SUPPLIER_ADDRESS, SUPPLIER_PKH,
# SUPPLIER_PUB_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY (hf_ token), OGMIOS_URL,
# NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# Advert posted with --capability-id llm.text.generate.v1.
# Do NOT set OPENAI_REASONING — the HF router rejects it (HTTP 400) and the
# supplier's config guard refuses to boot.
# 3. Networks already exist (created by the canonical supplier compose):
# docker network create marketplace-mainnet-net # one-shot
# # traefik-net is created by the Traefik project
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-hf-llama33
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-hf-llama33
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
# Self-contained env for this HF-router-backed variant. Holds this
# supplier's distinct SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX (+ derived wallet vars),
# ADVERT_REF, the HF OPENAI_API_KEY, and the shared mainnet plumbing
# duplicated in full (NETWORK_ID, OGMIOS_URL, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ref-script UTxOs, LIVE_CHAIN). No env_file ordering / override magic.
- path: ../../supplier/.env.hf-llama33
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions
# (HF router serves at https://router.huggingface.co/v1/...).
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://router.huggingface.co
# First-token latency across hosted providers can exceed local backends;
# kept ≤ the advert's max_processing_ms (300000) per fleet footgun #4.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS intentionally unset: no max_tokens forwarded upstream,
# the provider grants context − prompt. Advert cap = model context length.
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.hf-llama33 on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-hf-llama33.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-hf-llama33-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,26 @@ import { badRequest, forbidden } from "../openai/errors.js";
const ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES = new Set(["Open", "Claimed", "Submitted"]);
/** Bound on per-request escrow liveness lookups; rows past the cap count as
* locked unverified (a key with this many active escrows has bigger problems). */
const LIVENESS_CHECK_CAP = 32;
/** True when the escrow UTxO behind an indexer row is still unspent. The
* indexer never updates rows on terminal spends (Accept/Reclaim/Release
* consume the escrow without a new escrow output), so "active" rows can be
* long spent. Unparseable refs and failed lookups count as live so errors
* inflate the locked figure rather than hide funds. */
async function escrowUtxoIsLive(deps: GatewayDeps, utxoRef: string): Promise<boolean> {
const m = /^([0-9a-fA-F]{64})#(\d+)$/.exec(utxoRef);
if (!m) return true;
try {
const utxo = await deps.chain.queryUtxo({ txHash: m[1], index: Number(m[2]) });
return utxo !== null;
} catch {
return true;
}
}
function ap3x(lovelace: bigint): string {
return (Number(lovelace) / 1e6).toFixed(2);
}
@@ -74,8 +94,15 @@ export function makeAccountHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
if (r.ok) {
const rows = (await r.json()) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
if (Array.isArray(rows)) {
for (const row of rows) {
if (!ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES.has(String(row.state))) continue;
const active = rows.filter((row) => ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES.has(String(row.state)));
const liveness = await Promise.all(
active.map((row, i) =>
i < LIVENESS_CHECK_CAP ? escrowUtxoIsLive(deps, String(row.utxo_ref ?? "")) : Promise.resolve(true),
),
);
for (let i = 0; i < active.length; i++) {
if (!liveness[i]) continue;
const row = active[i];
lockedInEscrow +=
BigInt(String(row.payment_lovelace ?? "0")) +
BigInt(String(row.buyer_bond_lovelace ?? "0")) +

View File

@@ -15,19 +15,88 @@ import { open as unseal } from "../crypto/seal.js";
import { deriveWalletKey } from "../wallet.js";
import type { ApiKeyRow } from "../db/store.js";
/** Tiny promise-chain mutex: run(fn) executes fns strictly one at a time. */
/** Default per-run deadline. Chain reads and tx submits settle in seconds;
* anything past this is the 2026-08-12 freeze mode (a fetch that never
* settles), not a slow success. */
export const DEFAULT_MUTEX_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
/** Default queue bound per mutex. A healthy key drains its queue in seconds;
* a queue this deep means the head is stuck and callers should fail fast. */
export const DEFAULT_MUTEX_MAX_QUEUE = 64;
/** A run() exceeded its deadline and was abandoned so queued work can proceed. */
export class MutexTimeoutError extends Error {
constructor(label: string, timeoutMs: number) {
super(`mutex run '${label}' exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms and was abandoned; queued work proceeds`);
this.name = "MutexTimeoutError";
}
}
/** run() was refused because the queue is at its bound (head likely stuck). */
export class MutexQueueFullError extends Error {
constructor(label: string, depth: number) {
super(`mutex queue full (${depth} pending) — refusing '${label}'; the head of the queue is likely stuck`);
this.name = "MutexQueueFullError";
}
}
function runWithDeadline<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number, label: string): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolvePromise, rejectPromise) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => rejectPromise(new MutexTimeoutError(label, timeoutMs)), timeoutMs);
// Node-only nicety: don't hold the process open for a pending deadline.
timer.unref?.();
fn().then(
(v) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolvePromise(v);
},
(e) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
rejectPromise(e);
},
);
});
}
/**
* Tiny promise-chain mutex: run(fn) executes fns strictly one at a time —
* now with a per-run deadline and a queue bound (2026-08-12 freeze fix).
*
* On deadline the stuck fn is NOT cancelled (promises aren't); it is
* abandoned: its run() rejects with MutexTimeoutError and the chain advances.
* A zombie that settles later can at worst lose a UTxO-contention race with
* the run that replaced it — strictly better than the alternative, where one
* stuck chain call convoys every subsequent request on the key forever.
*/
export class Mutex {
private tail: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
private depth = 0;
run<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const result = this.tail.then(fn, fn);
// Keep the chain alive even if fn rejects; swallow here so the next
// run() isn't poisoned by a prior rejection.
this.tail = result.then(
constructor(private readonly opts: { timeoutMs?: number; maxQueue?: number } = {}) {}
run<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, label = "op"): Promise<T> {
const timeoutMs = this.opts.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_MUTEX_TIMEOUT_MS;
const maxQueue = this.opts.maxQueue ?? DEFAULT_MUTEX_MAX_QUEUE;
if (this.depth >= maxQueue) {
return Promise.reject(new MutexQueueFullError(label, this.depth));
}
this.depth++;
// Keep the chain alive even if fn rejects or times out; swallow here so
// the next run() isn't poisoned by a prior rejection.
const result = this.tail.then(
() => runWithDeadline(fn, timeoutMs, label),
() => runWithDeadline(fn, timeoutMs, label),
);
const settled = result.finally(() => {
this.depth--;
});
this.tail = settled.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
);
return result;
return settled;
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
/**
* gateway-account-locked.test.ts — /account locked_in_escrow_lovelace accuracy.
*
* The indexer never updates escrow rows on terminal spends (Accept/Reclaim/
* Release consume the UTxO without producing a new escrow output), so rows
* can sit in an "active" state long after the funds moved. The account
* handler must verify each active row's UTxO is still unspent on-chain
* before counting it as locked; a spent ref is a stale row, not locked funds.
*
* Note: supplier_bond stays in the sum on purpose — the buyer fronts
* payment + buyer_bond + supplier_bond at PostEscrow (see postEscrow.ts
* totalLocked), so all three legs are the key's money while the escrow lives.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import { makeAccountHandler } from "../../gateway/src/account/routes.js";
const LIVE_REF = "a".repeat(64) + "#0";
const STALE_REF = "b".repeat(64) + "#1";
function escrowRow(utxoRef: string, state: string) {
return {
utxo_ref: utxoRef,
state,
payment_lovelace: "2000000",
buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
};
}
function fakeKeyRow() {
return {
id: "key-1",
key_hash: "h",
key_prefix: "vk_live_abc",
label: null,
wallet_pkh: "c".repeat(56),
deposit_address: "addr1_deposit",
enc_priv_nonce: "",
enc_priv_ct: "",
enc_priv_tag: "",
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: 0,
disabled: 0,
demo: 0,
};
}
function makeDeps(rows: Array<Record<string, unknown>>, opts?: { queryUtxo?: (ref: { txHash: string; index: number }) => Promise<unknown> }) {
const queryUtxo =
opts?.queryUtxo ??
(async (ref: { txHash: string; index: number }) => {
const canonical = `${ref.txHash}#${ref.index}`;
return canonical === LIVE_REF ? { ref, lovelace: 4_000_000n } : null;
});
return {
config: { indexerUrl: "http://indexer.test", networkId: 1, masterKeyHex: "00" },
store: {
sumCostLovelace: () => 0n,
countUsage: () => 0,
listUsage: () => [],
},
chain: {
queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [],
queryUtxo: vi.fn(queryUtxo),
},
registry: {},
fetchFn: vi.fn(async () => ({
ok: true,
json: async () => rows,
})),
} as never;
}
/**
* asyncHandler returns a fire-and-forget (req, res) => void wrapper, so the
* test must await the res.json() call itself, not the handler invocation.
* Errors also surface through json() (sendError maps them to a JSON body).
*/
async function callAccount(deps: never): Promise<Record<string, never>> {
const handler = makeAccountHandler(deps);
const req = { gatewayKey: fakeKeyRow() } as unknown as Request;
const body = await new Promise<unknown>((resolveBody, rejectBody) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => rejectBody(new Error("handler never responded")), 2_000);
const res = {
status: (_code: number) => res,
json: (b: unknown) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolveBody(b);
return res;
},
} as unknown as Response;
handler(req, res);
});
if ((body as { error?: unknown }).error) {
throw new Error(`handler returned error body: ${JSON.stringify(body)}`);
}
return body as Record<string, never>;
}
describe("GET /account — locked_in_escrow_lovelace", () => {
it("counts payment + both bonds for an active escrow whose UTxO is live", async () => {
const body = await callAccount(makeDeps([escrowRow(LIVE_REF, "Open")]));
expect(body.balance.locked_in_escrow_lovelace).toBe("4000000");
});
it("excludes an active-state row whose UTxO is terminally spent (stale indexer row)", async () => {
const body = await callAccount(
makeDeps([escrowRow(LIVE_REF, "Open"), escrowRow(STALE_REF, "Submitted")]),
);
// Only the live escrow counts: 4_000_000, not 8_000_000.
expect(body.balance.locked_in_escrow_lovelace).toBe("4000000");
});
it("skips terminal-state rows without a chain lookup", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps([escrowRow(LIVE_REF, "Accepted"), escrowRow(STALE_REF, "Reclaimed")]);
const body = await callAccount(deps);
expect(body.balance.locked_in_escrow_lovelace).toBe("0");
expect((deps as { chain: { queryUtxo: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> } }).chain.queryUtxo).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("counts a row conservatively when the chain lookup fails (best-effort)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps([escrowRow(LIVE_REF, "Open")], {
queryUtxo: async () => {
throw new Error("ogmios unreachable");
},
});
const body = await callAccount(deps);
expect(body.balance.locked_in_escrow_lovelace).toBe("4000000");
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
/**
* gateway-mutex.test.ts — Mutex deadline + queue bound (2026-08-12 freeze fix).
*
* Incident: one chain call that never settled, run under a per-key Mutex with
* no deadline, convoyed every subsequent request on that key silently while
* /models and /account stayed healthy. The fix gives run() a deadline that
* abandons the stuck operation (advancing the chain) and a queue bound that
* rejects new work instead of queueing without limit.
*
* Serialization semantics of the original class must be preserved.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
import {
Mutex,
MutexTimeoutError,
MutexQueueFullError,
} from "../../gateway/src/sdk/registry.js";
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
});
// ─── Preserved semantics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("Mutex — serialization (preserved semantics)", () => {
it("runs fns strictly one at a time, in order", async () => {
const mutex = new Mutex();
const order: number[] = [];
let firstRunning = false;
const first = mutex.run(async () => {
firstRunning = true;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
order.push(1);
firstRunning = false;
});
const second = mutex.run(async () => {
expect(firstRunning).toBe(false);
order.push(2);
});
await Promise.all([first, second]);
expect(order).toEqual([1, 2]);
});
it("a rejecting fn does not poison the chain", async () => {
const mutex = new Mutex();
await expect(mutex.run(async () => Promise.reject(new Error("boom")))).rejects.toThrow("boom");
await expect(mutex.run(async () => "alive")).resolves.toBe("alive");
});
});
// ─── Deadline (the freeze fix) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("Mutex — per-run deadline", () => {
it("rejects a stuck run with MutexTimeoutError once the deadline passes", async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const mutex = new Mutex({ timeoutMs: 1_000 });
const stuck = mutex.run(() => new Promise<never>(() => {}), "stuck-chain-read");
// Attach the rejection expectation BEFORE advancing time so the rejection
// is not treated as unhandled.
const assertion = expect(stuck).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MutexTimeoutError);
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1_001);
await assertion;
});
it("queued work proceeds after a stuck run is abandoned (no convoy)", async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const mutex = new Mutex({ timeoutMs: 1_000 });
const stuck = mutex.run(() => new Promise<never>(() => {}), "stuck");
const stuckAssertion = expect(stuck).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MutexTimeoutError);
const queued = mutex.run(async () => "unblocked");
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1_001);
await stuckAssertion;
await expect(queued).resolves.toBe("unblocked");
});
it("a run that finishes in time is unaffected by the deadline", async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const mutex = new Mutex({ timeoutMs: 1_000 });
const quick = mutex.run(async () => "done");
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1);
await expect(quick).resolves.toBe("done");
});
});
// ─── Queue bound ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("Mutex — queue bound", () => {
it("rejects immediately with MutexQueueFullError when the queue is full", async () => {
const mutex = new Mutex({ maxQueue: 2 });
let releaseFirst!: () => void;
const gate = new Promise<void>((r) => {
releaseFirst = r;
});
const first = mutex.run(() => gate.then(() => "first"));
const second = mutex.run(async () => "second");
const third = mutex.run(async () => "third");
await expect(third).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MutexQueueFullError);
releaseFirst();
await expect(first).resolves.toBe("first");
await expect(second).resolves.toBe("second");
});
it("slots free up once runs settle", async () => {
const mutex = new Mutex({ maxQueue: 1 });
await mutex.run(async () => "a");
await expect(mutex.run(async () => "b")).resolves.toBe("b");
});
});