feat(desktop): instance-level agents nav with atomic workspace-scope capture

Add owner-consent archive/unarchive commands, workspace-epoch seqlock
protocol, NIP-IA ownership classifier, and Instances Sheet UI.

Rust (desktop/src-tauri):
- WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard (workspace_epoch.rs): RAII seqlock writer guard
  with SeqCst ordering, writer-mutex serialization, and guaranteed even
  restoration on every exit path including panic/unwind. All three production
  key writers (resolve_persisted_identity, commit_imported_identity,
  apply_workspace) participate; apply_workspace spans its compound
  override+keys mutation under one guard.
- AppState extended with workspace_epoch: AtomicU64 + workspace_write:
  Mutex<()> for the seqlock protocol.
- capture_archive_scope: bounded-retry reader that accepts only equal-and-even
  epoch samples, ensuring keys and relay_url_override come from one workspace
  generation.
- ArchiveScope { keys, actor, api_base_url, workspace_epoch }: immutable
  snapshot consumed by every fetch/classify/mint/sign/submit in the scoped
  archive operation.
- NipIaOwnerProof classifier: enum verified|missing_profile|missing_auth|
  multiple_auth_tags|invalid_auth|owner_mismatch. Reuses verify_auth_tag
  (syntax + signature only, no condition-clause evaluation per NIP-IA rule 6).
- scoped_archive_operation: single non-Tauri fn owning the full
  fetch→classify→mint→build/sign→submit pipeline for both 9035 (archive) and
  9036 (unarchive). Fresh empty-condition auth tag minted after Verified
  classification; never copies the profile tag.
- archive_agent / unarchive_agent: thin #[tauri::command] wrappers.
- Keyring helpers extracted to app_state_keyfile_ops.rs to stay under the
  file-size ratchet (app_state.rs: 998 gate lines, limit 1080).
- Relay acceptance tests (identity_archive/tests/identity_archive_relay_tests.rs):
  five #[ignore]d tests requiring live relay+Postgres, selected by the new
  desktop-tauri-relay-acceptance just recipe and the Backend Integration CI
  gate. Tenant fixture makes Self and Admin impossible; 9035 asserts
  consent_path='owner' in Postgres; 9036 asserts emitted delta.
- Deterministic epoch protocol tests (app_state_epoch_tests.rs): no infra,
  always-required in desktop-tauri-test/Desktop Core gate. Tests: initial
  capture, writer exclusion+capture retry, RAII restoration (drop/early-
  return/catch_unwind), poisoned-mutex error, mixed-generation barrier test.

TypeScript (desktop/src):
- tauriIdentityArchive.ts: archiveAgent/unarchiveAgent Tauri bindings.
- hooks.ts: useOwnedAgentInventoryQuery hook with additive cache invalidation.
- InstancesSheet.tsx: instances sheet opened from Instances (N) card action;
  shows tri-state archive status, start-control safeguard for 3rd instance.
- PersonaActionsMenu.tsx: onViewInstances prop wired to InstancesSheet.
- UnifiedAgentsSection.tsx: Instances button in agent card actions.
- relayQueryInvalidation.ts: ownedAgentInventoryQueryKey registration.

CI/Justfile:
- desktop-tauri-relay-acceptance just recipe: _ensure-sidecar-stubs +
  nextest selector for in-crate relay acceptance module.
- Backend Integration (relay e2e) job: new step just desktop-tauri-relay-
  acceptance after relay startup; job if extended to desktop-rust; Tauri Linux
  apt deps + rust-cache for desktop/src-tauri; timeout raised.

Thread: nostr:nevent1qqs0jp4fmfhaxcm7etlyq9csgwhg73j44f2akkhcnzfnk7s0w6rxptqpz24mxk
Plan: v9, APPROVE by Thufir (event 7dd99118), baseline 8342dfcc
Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Duncan
2026-08-05 14:01:32 -04:00
parent 4a2305170e
commit 664b679f8f
20 changed files with 1953 additions and 238 deletions

View File

@@ -574,14 +574,43 @@ jobs:
backend-integration:
name: Backend Integration (relay e2e)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
timeout-minutes: 35
needs: [changes, desktop-e2e-relay]
if: github.event_name == 'push' || needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true'
if: github.event_name == 'push' || needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true' || needs.changes.outputs.desktop-rust == 'true'
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
- uses: cashapp/activate-hermit@cea9af7913204a965fd488637a8d1811bba2e616 # v1
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@e18b497796c12c097a38f9edb9d0641fb99eee32 # v2
with:
workspaces: desktop/src-tauri
save-if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
- name: Install Tauri dependencies (Linux)
env:
DEBIAN_FRONTEND: noninteractive
run: |
sudo apt-get update \
-o Acquire::Retries=3 \
-o Acquire::http::Timeout=30 \
-o Acquire::https::Timeout=30
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-o Acquire::Retries=3 \
-o Acquire::http::Timeout=30 \
-o Acquire::https::Timeout=30 \
-o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=120 \
build-essential \
curl \
file \
libasound2-dev \
libayatana-appindicator3-dev \
libgtk-3-dev \
librsvg2-dev \
libssl-dev \
libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev \
libxdo-dev \
patchelf \
wget
- name: Install cargo-nextest
uses: taiki-e/install-action@0fd46367812ee04360509b4169d9f659d6892bb2 # v2.79.15
with:
@@ -684,6 +713,16 @@ jobs:
done
cat /tmp/buzz-relay.log
exit 1
- name: Desktop relay acceptance gate
# NIP-IA owner-consent proof: in-crate ignored tests under
# commands/identity_archive::relay_acceptance, exercised against the
# production build_router/POST /events path here (not in unit-test gate,
# which has no infra). Missing/unreachable infra panics — no skip, no
# silent Ok. See Plan v9 Amendment 6 for the fixture and assertion spec.
run: just desktop-tauri-relay-acceptance
env:
DATABASE_URL: postgres://buzz:${{ env.BUZZ_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}@localhost:5432/buzz
RELAY_API_URL: http://localhost:3000
- name: Invite security tests
run: |
cargo nextest run \

View File

@@ -206,6 +206,13 @@ desktop-tauri-check: _ensure-sidecar-stubs
desktop-tauri-test: _ensure-sidecar-stubs
cd desktop/src-tauri && cargo test --workspace
# Run the in-crate relay acceptance gate against a live relay + Postgres.
# Requires DATABASE_URL and RELAY_API_URL in the environment.
# CI mounts this step inside the Backend Integration (relay e2e) job which
# already provisions both; locally you can use the same docker-compose setup.
desktop-tauri-relay-acceptance: _ensure-sidecar-stubs
cargo nextest run --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml -p buzz-desktop --lib -E 'test(/relay_acceptance::/)' --run-ignored ignored-only
# Run the native terminal latency gate explicitly on a known-idle host.
# This is intentionally excluded from shared CI: scheduler contention makes a
# wall-clock assertion flaky, and the release profile is the shipped shape.

View File

@@ -1136,6 +1136,7 @@ dependencies = [
"tauri-utils",
"tempfile",
"tokio",
"tokio-postgres",
"tokio-tungstenite 0.29.0",
"tokio-util",
"toml 0.8.2",
@@ -2778,6 +2779,12 @@ version = "0.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "af9673d8203fcb076b19dfd17e38b3d4ae9f44959416ea532ce72415a6020365"
[[package]]
name = "fallible-iterator"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4443176a9f2c162692bd3d352d745ef9413eec5782a80d8fd6f8a1ac692a07f7"
[[package]]
name = "fallible-iterator"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -5087,6 +5094,16 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.118",
]
[[package]]
name = "md-5"
version = "0.11.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "69b6441f590336821bb897fb28fc622898ccceb1d6cea3fde5ea86b090c4de98"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.4",
"digest 0.11.3",
]
[[package]]
name = "md5"
version = "0.8.1"
@@ -7570,6 +7587,35 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.118",
]
[[package]]
name = "postgres-protocol"
version = "0.6.12"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "08808e3c483c46e999108051c78334f473d5adb59d78bb80a1268c7e6aa6c514"
dependencies = [
"base64 0.22.1",
"byteorder",
"bytes",
"fallible-iterator 0.2.0",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"md-5",
"memchr",
"rand 0.10.2",
"sha2 0.11.0",
"stringprep",
]
[[package]]
name = "postgres-types"
version = "0.2.14"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "851ca9db4932932d69f3ea811b1abe63087a0f740a47692619dd40d4899b68be"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"fallible-iterator 0.2.0",
"postgres-protocol",
]
[[package]]
name = "potential_utf"
version = "0.1.5"
@@ -8646,7 +8692,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "165ca6e57b20e1351573e3729b958bc62f0e48025386970b6e4d29e7a7e71f3f"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.13.0",
"fallible-iterator",
"fallible-iterator 0.3.0",
"fallible-streaming-iterator",
"hashlink",
"libsqlite3-sys",
@@ -9853,6 +9899,17 @@ dependencies = [
"quote",
]
[[package]]
name = "stringprep"
version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7b4df3d392d81bd458a8a621b8bffbd2302a12ffe288a9d931670948749463b1"
dependencies = [
"unicode-bidi",
"unicode-normalization",
"unicode-properties",
]
[[package]]
name = "strip-ansi-escapes"
version = "0.2.1"
@@ -10989,6 +11046,32 @@ dependencies = [
"tokio",
]
[[package]]
name = "tokio-postgres"
version = "0.7.18"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a528f7d280f6d5b9cd149635c8705b0dd049754bc67d81d31fa25169a93809d3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"byteorder",
"bytes",
"fallible-iterator 0.2.0",
"futures-channel",
"futures-util",
"log",
"parking_lot",
"percent-encoding",
"phf 0.13.1",
"pin-project-lite",
"postgres-protocol",
"postgres-types",
"rand 0.10.2",
"socket2",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"whoami",
]
[[package]]
name = "tokio-retry"
version = "0.3.2"
@@ -11621,6 +11704,12 @@ version = "2.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "dbc4bc3a9f746d862c45cb89d705aa10f187bb96c76001afab07a0d35ce60142"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-bidi"
version = "0.3.18"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5c1cb5db39152898a79168971543b1cb5020dff7fe43c8dc468b0885f5e29df5"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-ident"
version = "1.0.24"
@@ -11645,6 +11734,12 @@ dependencies = [
"smallvec",
]
[[package]]
name = "unicode-properties"
version = "0.1.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7df058c713841ad818f1dc5d3fd88063241cc61f49f5fbea4b951e8cf5a8d71d"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-segmentation"
version = "1.13.3"

View File

@@ -153,3 +153,6 @@ tokio = { version = "1", features = ["test-util"] }
# The relay's media validation, so the snapshot-sharing tests can prove the
# full export → sanitize → relay-accept → import contract end to end.
buzz_media_pkg = { package = "buzz-media", path = "../../crates/buzz-media" }
# Direct Postgres access for relay-acceptance tests that assert persisted
# consent_path rows (see commands/identity_archive relay_acceptance module).
tokio-postgres = { version = "0.7", features = [] }

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
io::Write,
sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU16, AtomicU8},
atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU16, AtomicU64, AtomicU8, Ordering},
Arc, Mutex,
},
};
@@ -118,6 +117,17 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// itself owns direct QUIC/iroh connection establishment.
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
pub mesh_coordinator: AsyncMutex<Option<crate::mesh_llm::MeshCoordinator>>,
// ── Workspace-epoch seqlock ───────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Epoch is even when stable, odd while a workspace transition is in
// progress. Readers capture (keys, relay_url_override) by sampling the
// epoch twice around the two field reads; they accept the pair only when
// both samples are identical AND even. This prevents consumers from
// observing an old actor with a new relay URL (or vice versa) during the
// brief overlap of `apply_workspace`. See [`WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard`].
pub(crate) workspace_epoch: AtomicU64,
pub(crate) workspace_write: Mutex<()>,
/// `(creator_pubkey_hex, channel_id)` pairs for channels the *named*
/// identity created via `create_channel` and has not yet observed its own
/// kind:39002 membership entry for. The relay provisions that entry
@@ -233,6 +243,8 @@ pub fn build_app_state() -> AppState {
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_coordinator: AsyncMutex::new(None),
pending_owned_channels: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()),
workspace_epoch: AtomicU64::new(0),
workspace_write: Mutex::new(()),
}
}
@@ -338,8 +350,70 @@ impl AppState {
};
crate::huddle::state::emit_huddle_state(&app, &snapshot);
}
/// Acquire the serialized workspace-write guard, transitioning the epoch
/// even → odd. `Drop` restores even on every exit path (SeqCst throughout).
/// Must be held outermost — never hold `keys` / `relay_url_override` first.
pub fn begin_workspace_write(&self) -> Result<WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard<'_>, String> {
let guard = self
.workspace_write
.lock()
.map_err(|e| format!("workspace write mutex poisoned: {e}"))?;
// Transition even → odd: we are about to start mutating.
let prev = self.workspace_epoch.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
debug_assert!(
prev.is_multiple_of(2),
"workspace_epoch should be even before write"
);
Ok(WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard {
epoch: &self.workspace_epoch,
_guard: guard,
})
}
/// Capture an atomic `(keys, relay_url_override)` pair via the seqlock
/// protocol. Returns `Err` after `max_retries` exhausted attempts.
pub fn capture_archive_scope(&self, max_retries: u32) -> Result<ArchiveScope, String> {
for _ in 0..=max_retries {
// Sample epoch before reads.
let epoch_before = self.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
// Odd → writer is mid-transition; yield and retry.
if !epoch_before.is_multiple_of(2) {
std::thread::yield_now();
continue;
}
let keys = self
.keys
.lock()
.map_err(|e| format!("keys mutex poisoned: {e}"))?
.clone();
let relay_url_override = self
.relay_url_override
.lock()
.map_err(|e| format!("relay_url_override mutex poisoned: {e}"))?
.clone();
// Sample epoch after reads.
let epoch_after = self.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
// Accept only when unchanged and even — both fields from one generation.
if epoch_after == epoch_before && epoch_after.is_multiple_of(2) {
let actor = keys.public_key().to_hex();
return Ok(ArchiveScope {
keys,
actor,
relay_url_override,
workspace_epoch: epoch_after,
});
}
// Epoch changed mid-read: retry.
}
Err("workspace is switching — please retry the archive operation in a moment".to_string())
}
}
pub use crate::workspace_epoch::{ArchiveScope, WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard};
/// Resolve the user's identity key from the app data directory and wire
/// the resulting [`RecoveryState`] into `AppState`.
///
@@ -373,6 +447,7 @@ pub fn resolve_persisted_identity(app: &AppHandle, state: &AppState) -> Result<(
// Write keys and storage before setting the recovery flags (Release) so
// any thread that reads a flag as false with Acquire sees consistent data.
{
let _epoch_guard = state.begin_workspace_write()?;
let mut active_keys = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*active_keys = resolved.keys;
state.set_identity_storage(resolved.storage);
@@ -899,181 +974,24 @@ pub(crate) fn persist_imported_identity(
persist_imported_identity_impl(store, keys, legacy_path, data_dir)
}
/// Path of the migration-completed marker within `data_dir`.
fn migration_marker_path(data_dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
data_dir.join(keyring_config::migration_marker_name(
keyring_service(),
MIGRATION_MARKER_NAME,
))
}
/// Atomically write (and fsync) the migration-completed marker. The content is
/// irrelevant — only the file's durable existence is the signal — so a single
/// byte keeps it minimal. Atomicity + fsync guarantee that once this returns
/// `Ok`, the marker survives a crash, which is what makes deleting the legacy
/// file afterward safe.
fn write_migration_marker(marker_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<(), String> {
use atomic_write_file::AtomicWriteFile;
let mut file = AtomicWriteFile::open(marker_path)
.map_err(|e| format!("open migration marker for atomic write: {e}"))?;
file.write_all(b"1")
.map_err(|e| format!("write migration marker: {e}"))?;
file.commit()
.map_err(|e| format!("commit migration marker: {e}"))
}
/// Generate a fresh identity, persist it through the store, return it.
///
/// On a keyring-backed persist no file is written, so a later
/// keyring-Unreachable boot would see "no file, no marker" (identical to a
/// fresh install) and silently rotate the identity. Writing the marker here
/// makes that boot fail closed. If the marker write fails, fall back to the
/// `0o600` file so the key is never keyring-only-without-marker.
fn generate_and_persist(
store: &impl IdentityKeyStore,
legacy_path: &std::path::Path,
data_dir: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<(Keys, IdentityStorage), String> {
let keys = Keys::generate();
let storage = store_key_preferring_keyring(store, &keys, legacy_path)?;
if storage == IdentityStorage::SystemKeyring {
let marker_path = migration_marker_path(data_dir);
if let Err(e) = write_migration_marker(&marker_path) {
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: stored identity in keyring but failed to write migration marker \
({e}); saving identity.key fallback so the key is not stranded"
);
save_key_file(legacy_path, &keys)?;
}
}
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: generated and saved identity pubkey {}",
keys.public_key().to_hex()
);
Ok((keys, storage))
}
/// Persist `keys` through the store, silently falling back to the `0o600` file
/// when the keyring write fails on an availability error. Reports which backend
/// held the key (no verify/marker/delete — those belong to callers that own the
/// full migration contract) so the caller can write the migration marker only on
/// keyring success.
fn store_key_preferring_keyring(
store: &impl IdentityKeyStore,
keys: &Keys,
legacy_path: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<IdentityStorage, String> {
let nsec = keys
.secret_key()
.to_bech32()
.map_err(|e| format!("encode nsec: {e}"))?;
match store.store(IDENTITY_KEY_NAME, &nsec) {
Ok(()) => Ok(IdentityStorage::SystemKeyring),
Err(keyring_err) => {
eprintln!("buzz-desktop: keyring write failed ({keyring_err}), using file fallback");
save_key_file(legacy_path, keys)?;
Ok(IdentityStorage::LocalFile)
}
}
}
/// Ensure the migration marker exists (writing it if absent), then remove the
/// leftover `identity.key`. Crash-safe ordering: the marker is written and
/// fsync-committed before the file is deleted, so a crash between the two
/// leaves the marker on disk and the file intact — the invariant "keyring-only
/// implies marker exists" is preserved. If the marker write fails, the file is
/// kept so a later keyring-unreachable boot can use it as a fallback.
fn ensure_marker_then_cleanup(data_dir: &std::path::Path, legacy_path: &std::path::Path) {
let marker_path = migration_marker_path(data_dir);
let marker_ok = marker_path.exists()
|| write_migration_marker(&marker_path)
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: keyring present but marker missing; \
failed to write marker ({e}), keeping identity.key"
);
})
.is_ok();
if marker_ok {
cleanup_leftover_identity_file(legacy_path);
}
}
/// Best-effort removal of a leftover `identity.key` once the keyring is the
/// authoritative store. Idempotent: a missing file is success. Logs but does
/// not error on failure — a delete failure must never block startup.
fn cleanup_leftover_identity_file(legacy_path: &std::path::Path) {
if !legacy_path.exists() {
return;
}
match std::fs::remove_file(legacy_path) {
Ok(()) => eprintln!("buzz-desktop: removed leftover identity.key (key is in keyring)"),
Err(e) => eprintln!("buzz-desktop: failed to remove leftover identity.key: {e}"),
}
}
/// Quarantine a corrupt `identity.key` with a timestamp so prior backups are
/// never overwritten.
fn quarantine_corrupt_key(key_path: &std::path::Path, data_dir: &std::path::Path, error: &str) {
if !key_path.exists() {
return;
}
let ts = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0);
let bad_name = format!("identity.key.bad.{ts}");
eprintln!("buzz-desktop: corrupt identity.key ({error}), quarantining to {bad_name}");
let bad_path = data_dir.join(bad_name);
if std::fs::rename(key_path, &bad_path).is_err() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(key_path);
}
}
fn load_key_file(path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Keys, String> {
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("read identity.key: {e}"))?;
let trimmed = content.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Err("empty identity.key".to_string());
}
Keys::parse(trimmed).map_err(|e| format!("parse identity.key: {e}"))
}
/// Atomically write the key to disk. Uses `atomic-write-file` which:
/// 1. Writes to a temp file in the same directory
/// 2. Calls fsync on the file
/// 3. Renames temp → target (atomic on POSIX, best-effort on Windows)
/// 4. Calls fsync on the parent directory
///
/// On Unix, the file is created with mode 0600 (owner read/write only).
/// On Windows, default ACLs apply — the app data directory is already
/// per-user, so the key is not world-readable in practice.
pub(crate) fn save_key_file(path: &std::path::Path, keys: &Keys) -> Result<(), String> {
use atomic_write_file::AtomicWriteFile;
let nsec = keys
.secret_key()
.to_bech32()
.map_err(|e| format!("encode nsec: {e}"))?;
let mut file = AtomicWriteFile::open(path)
.map_err(|e| format!("open identity.key for atomic write: {e}"))?;
// Set owner-only permissions before writing the secret.
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
file.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
.map_err(|e| format!("set identity.key permissions: {e}"))?;
}
file.write_all(nsec.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("write identity.key: {e}"))?;
file.commit()
.map_err(|e| format!("commit identity.key: {e}"))
}
// File-system and OS-keyring helpers extracted to keep this module under the
// file-size ratchet. The child module has full access to this module's private
// items via `super::`.
#[path = "app_state_keyfile_ops.rs"]
mod keyfile_ops;
use keyfile_ops::{
ensure_marker_then_cleanup, generate_and_persist, load_key_file, migration_marker_path,
quarantine_corrupt_key, write_migration_marker,
};
// Used by app_state_tests.rs via `use super::*`.
#[cfg(test)]
use keyfile_ops::cleanup_leftover_identity_file;
pub(crate) use keyfile_ops::save_key_file;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "app_state_tests.rs"]
mod tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "app_state_epoch_tests.rs"]
mod epoch_tests;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
// Workspace-epoch seqlock protocol tests.
// Colocated as a separate test module to satisfy the file-size ratchet.
// See app_state_tests.rs for the preamble note on the false-green guard.
// These tests pin the seqlock invariants using the production guard and capture
// helpers ONLY. Direct writes to `state.keys` or `state.relay_url_override`
// are intentionally absent here — using them would bypass the protocol under
// test and produce a false green. All writes go through `begin_workspace_write`.
use super::*;
/// Build a minimal AppState with known keys/override for epoch protocol tests.
/// Does NOT call `build_app_state` (avoids keyring/FS I/O). Only the fields
/// relevant to the seqlock protocol are initialized with non-default values;
/// everything else is zeroed/None to match `Default`.
fn make_epoch_test_state(keys: Keys) -> AppState {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU16, AtomicU8};
AppState {
keys: Mutex::new(keys),
identity_storage: AtomicU8::new(0),
http_client: reqwest::Client::new(),
media_fetch_client: reqwest::Client::new(),
relay_url_override: Mutex::new(None),
managed_agent_restore_pending: AtomicBool::new(false),
managed_agent_profile_reconcile_enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
shutdown_started: AtomicBool::new(false),
managed_agent_runtime_transition: Mutex::new(()),
managed_agents_store_lock: Mutex::new(()),
channel_templates_store_lock: Mutex::new(()),
managed_agent_processes: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
huddle_state: Mutex::new(crate::huddle::HuddleState::default()),
huddle_audio: Default::default(),
app_handle: Mutex::new(None),
media_proxy_port: AtomicU16::new(0),
keyring_locked: AtomicBool::new(false),
identity_lost: AtomicBool::new(false),
identity_mutation: Mutex::new(()),
reset_failed: AtomicBool::new(false),
session_config_cache: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
prevent_sleep: std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(
crate::prevent_sleep::PreventSleepState::default(),
)),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_llm_runtime: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_recovery: crate::mesh_llm::MeshRecoveryState::default(),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_coordinator: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None),
workspace_epoch: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0),
workspace_write: Mutex::new(()),
pending_owned_channels: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()),
}
}
/// Epoch begins even and a fresh capture succeeds.
#[test]
fn epoch_protocol_initial_capture_succeeds() {
let keys = Keys::generate();
let state = make_epoch_test_state(keys.clone());
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(4).expect("initial capture");
assert_eq!(scope.actor, keys.public_key().to_hex());
assert!(
scope.workspace_epoch.is_multiple_of(2),
"captured epoch must be even"
);
}
/// While a writer guard is held the epoch is odd; capture retries and only
/// succeeds after the guard is dropped (restoring even). Additionally asserts
/// that a second acquisition of the writer guard blocks until the first drops
/// (writer exclusion).
#[test]
fn epoch_protocol_writer_exclusion_and_capture_retry() {
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use std::sync::Arc;
let keys = Keys::generate();
let state = Arc::new(make_epoch_test_state(keys));
// Acquire write guard → epoch goes odd.
let guard = state.begin_workspace_write().expect("first write guard");
let odd = state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert_eq!(odd % 2, 1, "epoch must be odd while guard is held");
// With the guard held, mutate relay_url_override (simulating apply_workspace).
{
let mut ovr = state.relay_url_override.lock().unwrap();
*ovr = Some("wss://test.relay".to_string());
}
// Spawn a thread that tries to acquire a second write guard; it must block
// until we drop the first one.
let state2 = Arc::clone(&state);
let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
// This blocks until the outer guard is dropped.
let _g = state2.begin_workspace_write().expect("second write guard");
// Confirm the second guard restores to even after it drops.
});
// A capture attempt while odd must not return a mixed-gen scope.
// With max_retries=0 it fails fast rather than spinning.
let result = state.capture_archive_scope(0);
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"capture with max_retries=0 while epoch odd must fail"
);
// Drop the first guard → epoch goes even, unblocks the second thread,
// and subsequent captures succeed.
drop(guard);
let even = state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert_eq!(even % 2, 0, "epoch must be even after guard drop");
// Wait for the second thread to finish.
handle.join().expect("second guard thread panicked");
// Now capture succeeds.
let scope = state
.capture_archive_scope(4)
.expect("capture after release");
assert!(scope.workspace_epoch.is_multiple_of(2));
}
/// Drop (RAII restoration) on explicit drop and via `?` early return restores
/// an even epoch on every exit path.
#[test]
fn epoch_protocol_raii_always_restores_even() {
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
let state = make_epoch_test_state(Keys::generate());
// Normal drop.
{
let _g = state.begin_workspace_write().expect("guard");
assert_eq!(
state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst) % 2,
1,
"odd while held"
);
}
assert_eq!(
state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst) % 2,
0,
"even after normal drop"
);
// Simulated early-return via a closure that acquires and immediately drops
// the guard when an error is returned.
let result: Result<(), String> = (|| {
let _g = state.begin_workspace_write()?;
// Return early before the closure completes.
return Err("early return".to_string());
#[allow(unreachable_code)]
Ok(())
})();
assert!(result.is_err());
assert_eq!(
state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst) % 2,
0,
"even after early-return drop"
);
// Simulated panic / catch_unwind.
// AppState contains non-UnwindSafe fields (reqwest::Client, etc.) so we
// assert the safety boundary explicitly — this test only exercises the
// epoch AtomicU64 and the Mutex<()> guard, both of which are panic-safe.
let state_ref = std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(&state);
let panic_result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
let _g = state_ref.begin_workspace_write().expect("guard for panic");
panic!("simulated panic");
});
assert!(panic_result.is_err(), "panic must be caught");
assert_eq!(
state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst) % 2,
0,
"even after panic/catch_unwind"
);
}
/// A poisoned `relay_url_override` mutex causes `capture_archive_scope` to
/// return `Err` rather than accepting potentially torn state.
#[test]
fn epoch_protocol_poisoned_mutex_causes_capture_error() {
use std::sync::Arc;
let state = Arc::new(make_epoch_test_state(Keys::generate()));
let state2 = Arc::clone(&state);
// Poison `relay_url_override` by panicking while holding the lock.
let _r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(move || {
let _lock = state2.relay_url_override.lock().unwrap();
panic!("poison the mutex");
}));
// After poisoning, capture_archive_scope must return Err.
let result = state.capture_archive_scope(1);
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"capture must fail when relay_url_override is poisoned"
);
}
/// Mixed-generation barrier test: a writer is stalled mid-mutation (after
/// writing relay_url_override but before writing keys). A concurrent capture
/// with max_retries > 0 must never return a mixed-generation scope; it must
/// only succeed after the writer completes and produces a co-generational pair.
#[test]
fn epoch_protocol_mixed_generation_rejected_while_mid_transition() {
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use std::sync::{Arc, Barrier};
let initial_keys = Keys::generate();
let new_keys = Keys::generate();
let state = Arc::new(make_epoch_test_state(initial_keys.clone()));
// Two-phase barrier: first rendezvous lets the writer signal it has
// written the relay override but not yet the keys; second rendezvous lets
// the test confirm the capture it received (if any) before the writer
// proceeds to update keys.
let barrier_after_override = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
let barrier_after_keys = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
let state_writer = Arc::clone(&state);
let barrier1 = Arc::clone(&barrier_after_override);
let barrier2 = Arc::clone(&barrier_after_keys);
let new_keys_clone = new_keys.clone();
let writer_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || {
// Acquire the write guard → epoch goes odd.
let _guard = state_writer.begin_workspace_write().expect("write guard");
// Write override but NOT keys yet.
{
let mut ovr = state_writer.relay_url_override.lock().unwrap();
*ovr = Some("wss://new.relay".to_string());
}
// Signal: override written, keys not yet updated.
barrier1.wait();
// Wait for reader to attempt capture.
barrier2.wait();
// Now write keys (completing the compound mutation).
{
let mut k = state_writer.keys.lock().unwrap();
*k = new_keys_clone;
}
// Guard drops here → epoch goes even.
});
// Wait until the writer is mid-mutation (override written, keys old, epoch odd).
barrier_after_override.wait();
// Epoch must be odd at this point.
assert_eq!(
state.workspace_epoch.load(Ordering::SeqCst) % 2,
1,
"epoch must be odd while writer is mid-transition"
);
// Attempt capture with 0 retries — must fail because epoch is odd.
let result_during_mutation = state.capture_archive_scope(0);
assert!(
result_during_mutation.is_err(),
"capture must fail when epoch is odd (mid-transition)"
);
// Release writer to complete the mutation.
barrier_after_keys.wait();
writer_thread.join().expect("writer thread panicked");
// Epoch is now even; capture must succeed and return the NEW generation.
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8).expect("capture after write");
assert_eq!(scope.relay_url_override.as_deref(), Some("wss://new.relay"));
assert_eq!(scope.actor, new_keys.public_key().to_hex());
assert!(
scope.workspace_epoch.is_multiple_of(2),
"captured epoch must be even"
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
//! File-system and OS-keyring helpers extracted from `app_state` to keep that
//! module under the file-size ratchet. Included as a child module of
//! `app_state` so every item here has unrestricted access to the parent's
//! private items (constants, trait, types) via `super::`.
use std::io::Write;
use nostr::ToBech32;
use super::{
keyring_config, keyring_service, IdentityKeyStore, IdentityStorage, Keys, IDENTITY_KEY_NAME,
MIGRATION_MARKER_NAME,
};
/// Path of the migration-completed marker within `data_dir`.
pub(super) fn migration_marker_path(data_dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
data_dir.join(keyring_config::migration_marker_name(
keyring_service(),
MIGRATION_MARKER_NAME,
))
}
/// Atomically write (and fsync) the migration-completed marker. The content is
/// irrelevant — only the file's durable existence is the signal — so a single
/// byte keeps it minimal. Atomicity + fsync guarantee that once this returns
/// `Ok`, the marker survives a crash, which is what makes deleting the legacy
/// file afterward safe.
pub(super) fn write_migration_marker(marker_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<(), String> {
use atomic_write_file::AtomicWriteFile;
let mut file = AtomicWriteFile::open(marker_path)
.map_err(|e| format!("open migration marker for atomic write: {e}"))?;
file.write_all(b"1")
.map_err(|e| format!("write migration marker: {e}"))?;
file.commit()
.map_err(|e| format!("commit migration marker: {e}"))
}
/// Generate a fresh identity, persist it through the store, return it.
///
/// On a keyring-backed persist no file is written, so a later
/// keyring-Unreachable boot would see "no file, no marker" (identical to a
/// fresh install) and silently rotate the identity. Writing the marker here
/// makes that boot fail closed. If the marker write fails, fall back to the
/// `0o600` file so the key is never keyring-only-without-marker.
pub(super) fn generate_and_persist(
store: &impl IdentityKeyStore,
legacy_path: &std::path::Path,
data_dir: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<(Keys, IdentityStorage), String> {
let keys = Keys::generate();
let storage = store_key_preferring_keyring(store, &keys, legacy_path)?;
if storage == IdentityStorage::SystemKeyring {
let marker_path = migration_marker_path(data_dir);
if let Err(e) = write_migration_marker(&marker_path) {
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: stored identity in keyring but failed to write migration marker \
({e}); saving identity.key fallback so the key is not stranded"
);
save_key_file(legacy_path, &keys)?;
}
}
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: generated and saved identity pubkey {}",
keys.public_key().to_hex()
);
Ok((keys, storage))
}
/// Persist `keys` through the store, silently falling back to the `0o600` file
/// when the keyring write fails on an availability error. Reports which backend
/// held the key (no verify/marker/delete — those belong to callers that own the
/// full migration contract) so the caller can write the migration marker only on
/// keyring success.
pub(super) fn store_key_preferring_keyring(
store: &impl IdentityKeyStore,
keys: &Keys,
legacy_path: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<IdentityStorage, String> {
let nsec = keys
.secret_key()
.to_bech32()
.map_err(|e| format!("encode nsec: {e}"))?;
match store.store(IDENTITY_KEY_NAME, &nsec) {
Ok(()) => Ok(IdentityStorage::SystemKeyring),
Err(keyring_err) => {
eprintln!("buzz-desktop: keyring write failed ({keyring_err}), using file fallback");
save_key_file(legacy_path, keys)?;
Ok(IdentityStorage::LocalFile)
}
}
}
/// Ensure the migration marker exists (writing it if absent), then remove the
/// leftover `identity.key`. Crash-safe ordering: the marker is written and
/// fsync-committed before the file is deleted, so a crash between the two
/// leaves the marker on disk and the file intact — the invariant "keyring-only
/// implies marker exists" is preserved. If the marker write fails, the file is
/// kept so a later keyring-unreachable boot can use it as a fallback.
pub(super) fn ensure_marker_then_cleanup(
data_dir: &std::path::Path,
legacy_path: &std::path::Path,
) {
let marker_path = migration_marker_path(data_dir);
let marker_ok = marker_path.exists()
|| write_migration_marker(&marker_path)
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!(
"buzz-desktop: keyring present but marker missing; \
failed to write marker ({e}), keeping identity.key"
);
})
.is_ok();
if marker_ok {
cleanup_leftover_identity_file(legacy_path);
}
}
/// Best-effort removal of a leftover `identity.key` once the keyring is the
/// authoritative store. Idempotent: a missing file is success. Logs but does
/// not error on failure — a delete failure must never block startup.
pub(super) fn cleanup_leftover_identity_file(legacy_path: &std::path::Path) {
if !legacy_path.exists() {
return;
}
match std::fs::remove_file(legacy_path) {
Ok(()) => eprintln!("buzz-desktop: removed leftover identity.key (key is in keyring)"),
Err(e) => eprintln!("buzz-desktop: failed to remove leftover identity.key: {e}"),
}
}
/// Quarantine a corrupt `identity.key` with a timestamp so prior backups are
/// never overwritten.
pub(super) fn quarantine_corrupt_key(
key_path: &std::path::Path,
data_dir: &std::path::Path,
error: &str,
) {
if !key_path.exists() {
return;
}
let ts = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0);
let bad_name = format!("identity.key.bad.{ts}");
eprintln!("buzz-desktop: corrupt identity.key ({error}), quarantining to {bad_name}");
let bad_path = data_dir.join(bad_name);
if std::fs::rename(key_path, &bad_path).is_err() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(key_path);
}
}
pub(super) fn load_key_file(path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Keys, String> {
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("read identity.key: {e}"))?;
let trimmed = content.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Err("empty identity.key".to_string());
}
Keys::parse(trimmed).map_err(|e| format!("parse identity.key: {e}"))
}
/// Atomically write the key to disk. Uses `atomic-write-file` which:
/// 1. Writes to a temp file in the same directory
/// 2. Calls fsync on the file
/// 3. Renames temp → target (atomic on POSIX, best-effort on Windows)
/// 4. Calls fsync on the parent directory
///
/// On Unix, the file is created with mode 0600 (owner read/write only).
/// On Windows, default ACLs apply — the app data directory is already
/// per-user, so the key is not world-readable in practice.
pub(crate) fn save_key_file(path: &std::path::Path, keys: &Keys) -> Result<(), String> {
use atomic_write_file::AtomicWriteFile;
let nsec = keys
.secret_key()
.to_bech32()
.map_err(|e| format!("encode nsec: {e}"))?;
let mut file = AtomicWriteFile::open(path)
.map_err(|e| format!("open identity.key for atomic write: {e}"))?;
// Set owner-only permissions before writing the secret.
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
file.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
.map_err(|e| format!("set identity.key permissions: {e}"))?;
}
file.write_all(nsec.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("write identity.key: {e}"))?;
file.commit()
.map_err(|e| format!("commit identity.key: {e}"))
}

View File

@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ fn commit_imported_identity(
// observing false is guaranteed to see the updated keys.
let pubkey = keys.public_key();
{
let _epoch_guard = state.begin_workspace_write()?;
let mut active_keys = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*active_keys = keys;
state.set_identity_storage(storage);

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
//! "Archive" button when the current user is the owner-of-agent),
//! - submit `kind:9035` archive and `kind:9036` unarchive requests (consent
//! path is selected by the relay; we just build the wire form),
//! - read the relay's `kind:13535` archive snapshot to drive UI flair.
//! - read the relay's `kind:13535` archive snapshot to drive UI flair,
//! - query the owner's `kind:30177` relay inventory for the Instances sheet.
//!
//! Spec: `docs/nips/NIP-IA.md`. The relay performs full authorization —
//! see §Owner-of-Agent Requests and §Relay Processing Algorithm.
@@ -15,11 +16,11 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tauri::State;
use crate::{
app_state::AppState,
app_state::{AppState, ArchiveScope},
events,
relay::{
classify_request_error, query_relay, relay_http_base_url, relay_ws_url_with_override,
submit_event, SubmitEventResponse,
classify_request_error, query_relay, query_relay_at_with_keys, relay_http_base_url,
relay_ws_url_with_override, submit_event_at_with_keys, SubmitEventResponse,
},
};
@@ -74,6 +75,82 @@ pub(crate) async fn fetch_kind0(
Ok(events.into_iter().next())
}
// ── NipIaOwnerProof classifier ───────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Result of verifying NIP-OA ownership of `target` by a candidate owner.
///
/// Reuses `verify_auth_tag` (syntax + Schnorr signature). Condition-clause
/// evaluation is deliberately skipped — per NIP-IA published-profile rule 6
/// the relay verifies the condition; the client only checks the structural
/// validity and signature.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case", tag = "result")]
pub enum NipIaOwnerProof {
/// Valid NIP-OA auth tag present, signature checks out, owner matches caller.
Verified,
/// Target kind:0 has no `auth` tag at all.
// Constructed when the kind:0 fetch returns nothing; present for API completeness
// and future callers that distinguish "no profile" from "no auth tag".
#[allow(dead_code)]
MissingProfile,
/// Kind:0 present but no `auth` tag found.
MissingAuth,
/// More than one `auth` tag in the kind:0 — ambiguous, cannot select canonical.
MultipleAuthTags,
/// Auth tag present but signature or format is invalid.
InvalidAuth,
/// Auth tag verifies but the declared owner does not match the caller.
OwnerMismatch { declared_owner: String },
}
/// Classify the NIP-OA ownership of `target_kind0` for `candidate_owner_hex`.
///
/// Called after a kind:0 fetch; `candidate_owner_hex` is the caller's pubkey.
/// No condition-clause evaluation — only syntax + Schnorr signature check.
pub(crate) fn classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(
target_kind0: &nostr::Event,
candidate_owner_hex: &str,
) -> NipIaOwnerProof {
let target_hex = target_kind0.pubkey.to_hex();
let target_compat = match nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&target_hex) {
Ok(pk) => pk,
Err(_) => return NipIaOwnerProof::InvalidAuth,
};
let auth_tags: Vec<&[String]> = target_kind0
.tags
.iter()
.map(|t| t.as_slice())
.filter(|s| s.first().map(String::as_str) == Some("auth") && s.len() == 4)
.collect();
if auth_tags.is_empty() {
return NipIaOwnerProof::MissingAuth;
}
if auth_tags.len() > 1 {
return NipIaOwnerProof::MultipleAuthTags;
}
let tag_slice = auth_tags[0];
let json = match serde_json::to_string(tag_slice) {
Ok(j) => j,
Err(_) => return NipIaOwnerProof::InvalidAuth,
};
match buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::verify_auth_tag(&json, &target_compat) {
Ok(owner_pk) => {
let owner_hex = owner_pk.to_hex();
if owner_hex.eq_ignore_ascii_case(candidate_owner_hex) {
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified
} else {
NipIaOwnerProof::OwnerMismatch {
declared_owner: owner_hex,
}
}
}
Err(_) => NipIaOwnerProof::InvalidAuth,
}
}
// ── Owner-of-agent resolution ───────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
@@ -115,6 +192,15 @@ pub async fn resolve_oa_owner(
}))
}
// ── Archive kind enum ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Discriminant for the scoped archive operation — which NIP-IA request kind.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum ArchiveKind {
Archive, // kind:9035
Unarchive, // kind:9036
}
// ── Archive / unarchive requests ────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -148,17 +234,17 @@ pub async fn archive_identity(
req: ArchiveRequest,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<SubmitEventResponse, String> {
let auth_tag = maybe_owner_auth_tag(&state, &req.target_pubkey).await?;
let auth_ref = auth_tag.as_ref();
let builder = events::build_archive_identity_request(
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8)?;
scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&req.target_pubkey,
&req.content,
req.reason.as_deref(),
req.replaced_by.as_deref(),
auth_ref,
)?;
submit_event(builder, &state).await
)
.await
}
/// Submit a `kind:9036` unarchive request to the relay.
@@ -167,50 +253,122 @@ pub async fn unarchive_identity(
req: UnarchiveRequest,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<SubmitEventResponse, String> {
let auth_tag = maybe_owner_auth_tag(&state, &req.target_pubkey).await?;
let auth_ref = auth_tag.as_ref();
let builder = events::build_unarchive_identity_request(
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8)?;
scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Unarchive,
&req.target_pubkey,
&req.content,
req.reason.as_deref(),
auth_ref,
)?;
submit_event(builder, &state).await
None,
)
.await
}
/// If the current user is the verified NIP-OA owner of `target`, return the
/// `auth` tag elements (label, owner, conditions, sig) for attachment to a
/// 9035/9036 request. Otherwise return `None` (self / admin / no-path).
/// Core non-Tauri implementation: fetch → classify → mint → build/sign → submit.
///
/// The relay independently re-fetches the target's live `kind:0` and verifies
/// against it; this tag is intent + freshness evidence, not the authority.
async fn maybe_owner_auth_tag(
/// Consumes only the immutable `scope` — no `AppState` guard is held across
/// any await. Parameterized for both 9035 and 9036 so both directions inherit
/// identical scope and credential guarantees.
///
/// Owner-proof semantics (`maybe_` rule):
/// - Self path: no fetch, no auth tag.
/// - `NipIaOwnerProof::Verified`: mint a fresh empty-condition auth tag from
/// owner keys. Never copies the profile tag.
/// - Any other classifier result: no auth tag, NOT a local error — the relay
/// picks Admin or rejects; relay rejection is surfaced directly without retry
/// or consent-path reinterpretation.
pub(crate) async fn scoped_archive_operation(
state: &AppState,
scope: &ArchiveScope,
kind: ArchiveKind,
target_pubkey: &str,
) -> Result<Option<[String; 4]>, String> {
let my_pubkey = {
let keys = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
keys.public_key().to_hex()
content: &str,
reason: Option<&str>,
replaced_by: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SubmitEventResponse, String> {
let api_base_url = match &scope.relay_url_override {
Some(url) => relay_http_base_url(url),
None => crate::relay::relay_api_base_url(),
};
// Self path: never attach auth (spec §Self Requests: if actor==target and
// an `auth` tag is also present, relay MUST treat it as self).
if my_pubkey.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target_pubkey) {
return Ok(None);
}
// Self path: no fetch, no auth tag (spec §Self Requests).
let auth_tag: Option<[String; 4]> = if scope.actor.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target_pubkey) {
None
} else {
// Fetch target's live kind:0 using owner keys for NIP-98 auth.
let kind0_events = query_relay_at_with_keys(
state,
&api_base_url,
&[serde_json::json!({
"kinds": [0],
"authors": [target_pubkey.to_ascii_lowercase()],
"limit": 1,
})],
&scope.keys,
None,
)
.await?;
let Some(kind0) = fetch_kind0(state, target_pubkey).await? else {
return Ok(None);
};
let Some((owner_hex, raw_tag)) = extract_oa_owner(&kind0) else {
return Ok(None);
match kind0_events.into_iter().next() {
None => None, // No kind:0 → classifier-negative → no auth tag
Some(kind0) => {
match classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &scope.actor) {
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified => {
// Mint a fresh empty-condition auth tag from owner keys.
// Never copy the profile tag — the fresh tag passes the
// relay's request-time checks while the profile attestation
// is verified without evaluating its condition clauses.
let target_compat = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&kind0.pubkey.to_hex())
.map_err(|e| format!("convert target pubkey: {e}"))?;
let owner_secret = scope.keys.secret_key();
let owner_compat =
nostr::SecretKey::from_slice(owner_secret.as_secret_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("convert owner secret key: {e}"))?;
let owner_compat_keys = nostr::Keys::new(owner_compat);
let tag_json = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(
&owner_compat_keys,
&target_compat,
"",
)
.map_err(|e| format!("compute_auth_tag: {e}"))?;
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&tag_json)
.map_err(|e| format!("parse_auth_tag: {e}"))?;
let raw: [String; 4] = [
compat_tag.as_slice()[0].clone(),
compat_tag.as_slice()[1].clone(),
compat_tag.as_slice()[2].clone(),
compat_tag.as_slice()[3].clone(),
];
Some(raw)
}
// Classifier-negative → maybe_ semantics: no auth tag,
// not a local error. Relay picks Admin or rejects.
_ => None,
}
}
}
};
if !owner_hex.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&my_pubkey) {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(raw_tag))
// Build the event builder with the (possibly-None) auth tag.
let auth_ref = auth_tag.as_ref();
let builder = match kind {
ArchiveKind::Archive => events::build_archive_identity_request(
target_pubkey,
content,
reason,
replaced_by,
auth_ref,
)?,
ArchiveKind::Unarchive => {
events::build_unarchive_identity_request(target_pubkey, content, reason, auth_ref)?
}
};
// Sign with scope keys and submit using explicit keys/URL — no AppState
// guard held across this await.
submit_event_at_with_keys(builder, state, &api_base_url, &scope.keys).await
}
// ── Archive snapshot ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -275,6 +433,18 @@ fn archived_pubkeys_from_snapshot(snapshot: &nostr::Event) -> Vec<String> {
.collect()
}
/// Read the active relay's NIP-11 `self` pubkey (its own signing key, hex).
///
/// A public, unauthenticated document read reused by the moderation UI to tell
/// whether a DM peer is the relay identity (a moderation DM). Fails open: an
/// unreachable relay, a document without `self`, or a malformed value all
/// return `None`, and callers must treat that as "not the relay" — the disable
/// is an affordance, not enforcement, so a false negative is the safe failure.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn get_relay_self(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
fetch_relay_self(&state).await
}
/// Read the relay's latest valid `kind:13535` archive snapshot. The frontend
/// caches this and tests membership client-side to drive the "Archived" flair.
///
@@ -318,16 +488,184 @@ pub async fn list_archived_identities(
})
}
/// Read the active relay's NIP-11 `self` pubkey (its own signing key, hex).
// ── Owned-agent relay inventory ──────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Archive state of a single agent instance as known from the relay snapshot
/// and local records. `None` means the snapshot was not yet loaded (UI should
/// defer the tri-state badge).
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct OwnedAgentArchiveState {
/// Whether the relay's `kind:13535` snapshot lists this pubkey as archived.
/// `None` if the snapshot was not loaded (caller may treat as unknown).
pub is_archived: Option<bool>,
}
/// A single owned-agent instance from the relay inventory.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct OwnedAgentInstance {
/// Agent pubkey (hex).
pub pubkey: String,
/// Display name from kind:0.
pub display_name: Option<String>,
/// Avatar URL from kind:0.
pub picture: Option<String>,
/// Relay URL at which this agent has a kind:30177 listing.
pub relay_url: String,
/// Archive tri-state.
pub archive_state: OwnedAgentArchiveState,
}
/// Snapshot returned by `get_owned_agent_inventory`.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot {
/// Whether the archive snapshot was loaded and trusted (relay has a valid
/// `self` and the snapshot verified). When `false`, `archive_state` on
/// each instance will carry `is_archived: None`.
pub archive_state_trusted: bool,
pub instances: Vec<OwnedAgentInstance>,
}
/// Query the relay's `kind:30177` inventory for agents owned by the current
/// user, applying NIP-33 dedup (latest per `d` tag), NIP-OA reciprocal
/// verification, and an archive-state join from the `kind:13535` snapshot.
///
/// A public, unauthenticated document read reused by the moderation UI to tell
/// whether a DM peer is the relay identity (a moderation DM). Fails open: an
/// unreachable relay, a document without `self`, or a malformed value all
/// return `None`, and callers must treat that as "not the relay" — the disable
/// is an affordance, not enforcement, so a false negative is the safe failure.
/// `cursor` is an optional last-seen `created_at` timestamp for keyset
/// pagination (oldest-first within a page). `page_size` defaults to 50.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn get_relay_self(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
fetch_relay_self(&state).await
pub async fn get_owned_agent_inventory(
cursor: Option<u64>,
page_size: Option<u64>,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot, String> {
let limit = page_size.unwrap_or(50).min(200);
let my_pubkey = {
let keys = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
keys.public_key().to_hex()
};
let relay_url = relay_ws_url_with_override(&state);
let api_base_url = relay_http_base_url(&relay_url);
// Fetch kind:30177 events authored by the owner.
let mut filter = serde_json::json!({
"kinds": [30177],
"authors": [my_pubkey.clone()],
"limit": limit,
});
if let Some(ts) = cursor {
filter["until"] = serde_json::json!(ts);
}
let raw_events = query_relay(&state, &[filter]).await?;
// NIP-33 dedup: keep latest event per `d` tag.
let mut deduped: std::collections::HashMap<String, nostr::Event> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for ev in raw_events {
let d = ev
.tags
.iter()
.find(|t| t.as_slice().first().map(String::as_str) == Some("d"))
.and_then(|t| t.as_slice().get(1).cloned())
.unwrap_or_default();
let entry = deduped.entry(d).or_insert_with(|| ev.clone());
if ev.created_at > entry.created_at {
*entry = ev;
}
}
// Try to load the archive snapshot for the tri-state join.
let (archive_state_trusted, archived_set) = match fetch_relay_self(&state).await? {
None => (false, std::collections::HashSet::new()),
Some(relay_self) => {
let snap_events = query_relay(
&state,
&[serde_json::json!({
"authors": [relay_self.clone()],
"kinds": [13535],
"limit": 1,
})],
)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
match snap_events.into_iter().next() {
None => (true, std::collections::HashSet::new()),
Some(snap) => {
if !snap.verify_id()
|| !snap.verify_signature()
|| !snap.pubkey.to_hex().eq_ignore_ascii_case(&relay_self)
{
(false, std::collections::HashSet::new())
} else {
let set: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
archived_pubkeys_from_snapshot(&snap).into_iter().collect();
(true, set)
}
}
}
}
};
// Build instances with NIP-OA reciprocal verification.
let mut instances = Vec::new();
for (_d, ev) in deduped {
// Each kind:30177 event's pubkey is the agent pubkey. Verify the
// NIP-OA auth tag: only include if verified owner == my_pubkey.
let proof = classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&ev, &my_pubkey);
// We only list agents we can verify ownership of; skip unverifiable.
match proof {
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified => {}
// MissingAuth is common for agents without an auth tag (non-OA
// agents). We still list them — the relay already scoped by
// author:my_pubkey so this is still the owner's inventory.
NipIaOwnerProof::MissingAuth => {}
_ => continue,
}
let agent_pubkey = ev.pubkey.to_hex();
// Parse display_name and picture from the kind:30177 content field.
let (display_name, picture) =
if let Ok(content) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&ev.content) {
(
content
.get("display_name")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::to_string),
content
.get("picture")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::to_string),
)
} else {
(None, None)
};
let is_archived = if archive_state_trusted {
Some(archived_set.contains(&agent_pubkey.to_ascii_lowercase()))
} else {
None
};
instances.push(OwnedAgentInstance {
pubkey: agent_pubkey,
display_name,
picture,
relay_url: api_base_url.clone(),
archive_state: OwnedAgentArchiveState { is_archived },
});
}
// Sort by pubkey for stable ordering.
instances.sort_by(|a, b| a.pubkey.cmp(&b.pubkey));
Ok(OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot {
archive_state_trusted,
instances,
})
}
// ── Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -478,4 +816,146 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(minimal.content, "");
assert!(minimal.reason.is_none());
}
// ── NipIaOwnerProof classifier tests ─────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn classifier_verified_for_valid_owner() {
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
let kind0 = kind0_with_auth(&agent, &owner);
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified
);
}
#[test]
fn classifier_owner_mismatch_when_wrong_caller() {
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
let wrong_caller = Keys::generate();
let kind0 = kind0_with_auth(&agent, &owner);
let result = classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &wrong_caller.public_key().to_hex());
match result {
NipIaOwnerProof::OwnerMismatch { declared_owner } => {
assert_eq!(declared_owner, owner.public_key().to_hex());
}
other => panic!("expected OwnerMismatch, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[test]
fn classifier_missing_auth_for_kind0_without_tag() {
let agent = Keys::generate();
let kind0 = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
.unwrap();
let owner = Keys::generate();
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::MissingAuth
);
}
#[test]
fn classifier_multiple_auth_tags() {
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
let kind0_one = kind0_with_auth(&agent, &owner);
// Extract the auth tag from the first kind0 and add a second copy.
let auth_tag = kind0_one
.tags
.iter()
.find(|t| t.as_slice().first().map(String::as_str) == Some("auth"))
.cloned()
.unwrap();
let kind0_two = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([auth_tag.clone(), auth_tag])
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0_two, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::MultipleAuthTags
);
}
#[test]
fn classifier_invalid_auth_for_bad_signature() {
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
// Craft an auth tag with a corrupted (all-zeros) signature.
let bad_sig = "0".repeat(128);
let auth_tag = Tag::parse(["auth", &owner.public_key().to_hex(), "", &bad_sig]).unwrap();
let kind0 = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([auth_tag])
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::InvalidAuth
);
}
#[test]
fn classifier_verified_for_valid_tag_with_kind1_condition() {
// A tag with condition clauses is still `Verified` — we do NOT evaluate
// conditions (NIP-IA published-profile rule 6: relay verifies them).
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
let agent_hex = agent.public_key().to_hex();
let agent_compat = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&agent_hex).unwrap();
let owner_compat_secret =
nostr::SecretKey::from_slice(owner.secret_key().as_secret_bytes()).unwrap();
let owner_compat_keys = nostr::Keys::new(owner_compat_secret);
// Compute with a non-empty condition string.
let tag_json =
buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(&owner_compat_keys, &agent_compat, "kind=1")
.expect("compute_auth_tag with kind=1");
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&tag_json).unwrap();
let tag = Tag::parse(compat_tag.as_slice()).unwrap();
let kind0 = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([tag])
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified
);
}
#[test]
fn classifier_verified_for_expired_bound_profile() {
// An expired-bound tag is structurally valid (Verified by the classifier)
// so Archive is offered; the relay will reject if it evaluates the
// condition clause — but that is the relay's job.
let owner = Keys::generate();
let agent = Keys::generate();
let agent_hex = agent.public_key().to_hex();
let agent_compat = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&agent_hex).unwrap();
let owner_compat_secret =
nostr::SecretKey::from_slice(owner.secret_key().as_secret_bytes()).unwrap();
let owner_compat_keys = nostr::Keys::new(owner_compat_secret);
let past = "created_at<1000000000"; // far in the past — already expired
let tag_json =
buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(&owner_compat_keys, &agent_compat, past)
.expect("compute_auth_tag with past condition");
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&tag_json).unwrap();
let tag = Tag::parse(compat_tag.as_slice()).unwrap();
let kind0 = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([tag])
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
.unwrap();
// Still Verified (structural + sig ok; expired condition is relay's concern).
assert_eq!(
classify_nip_ia_owner_proof(&kind0, &owner.public_key().to_hex()),
NipIaOwnerProof::Verified
);
}
// ── Relay acceptance gate (ignored, requires live relay + Postgres) ───────
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "identity_archive_relay_tests.rs"]
mod relay_acceptance;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
// These tests require a running relay + Postgres provisioned by the
// Backend Integration CI job. They are #[ignore]d so they never run in
// the unit-test gate (no infra) but are selected by the CI acceptance
// step: `cargo nextest run ... -E 'test(/relay_acceptance::/)' --run-ignored ignored-only`.
//
// Hard-fail semantics: missing env vars panic (no skip, no silent Ok).
use super::*;
fn require_env(name: &str) -> String {
std::env::var(name).unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("{name} must be set for relay acceptance tests"))
}
/// Build a minimal AppState wired to the test relay URL and with
/// deterministic test keys. Does NOT use `build_app_state` to avoid
/// touching keyring / file-system side effects.
fn make_test_state(owner_keys: &nostr::Keys, relay_api_base_url: &str) -> AppState {
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU16;
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU8;
let http_client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.resolve("localhost", std::net::SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 0)))
.pool_idle_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.pool_max_idle_per_host(1)
.build()
.unwrap();
// Convert ws:// → http:// for the relay_url_override field.
// The field stores the WS URL; relay_http_base_url converts it.
// We store it as-is and let relay_http_base_url handle conversion.
let ws_url = relay_api_base_url
.replacen("http://", "ws://", 1)
.replacen("https://", "wss://", 1);
AppState {
keys: std::sync::Mutex::new(owner_keys.clone()),
identity_storage: AtomicU8::new(0),
http_client: http_client.clone(),
media_fetch_client: crate::app_state::build_media_fetch_client().unwrap(),
relay_url_override: std::sync::Mutex::new(Some(ws_url)),
managed_agent_restore_pending: AtomicBool::new(false),
managed_agent_profile_reconcile_enabled: AtomicBool::new(true),
shutdown_started: AtomicBool::new(false),
managed_agent_runtime_transition: std::sync::Mutex::new(()),
identity_mutation: std::sync::Mutex::new(()),
managed_agents_store_lock: std::sync::Mutex::new(()),
channel_templates_store_lock: std::sync::Mutex::new(()),
managed_agent_processes: std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
session_config_cache: std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
huddle_state: std::sync::Mutex::new(crate::huddle::HuddleState::default()),
huddle_audio: Default::default(),
app_handle: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
media_proxy_port: AtomicU16::new(0),
keyring_locked: AtomicBool::new(false),
identity_lost: AtomicBool::new(false),
reset_failed: AtomicBool::new(false),
prevent_sleep: std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(
crate::prevent_sleep::PreventSleepState::default(),
)),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_llm_runtime: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_recovery: crate::mesh_llm::MeshRecoveryState::default(),
#[cfg(feature = "mesh-llm")]
mesh_coordinator: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None),
pending_owned_channels: std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()),
workspace_epoch: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0),
workspace_write: std::sync::Mutex::new(()),
}
}
/// Provision a test agent on the relay: register a kind:0 profile with
/// a valid NIP-OA auth tag and optionally a relay_members row for the
/// owner.
async fn provision_test_agent(
state: &AppState,
owner_keys: &nostr::Keys,
agent_keys: &nostr::Keys,
relay_api_base_url: &str,
) -> Result<(), String> {
// Compute a fresh NIP-OA auth tag.
let agent_hex = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let agent_compat =
nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&agent_hex).map_err(|e| format!("agent pubkey: {e}"))?;
let owner_secret = owner_keys.secret_key();
let owner_compat = nostr::SecretKey::from_slice(owner_secret.as_secret_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("owner secret convert: {e}"))?;
let owner_compat_keys = nostr::Keys::new(owner_compat);
let tag_json = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(&owner_compat_keys, &agent_compat, "")
.map_err(|e| format!("compute_auth_tag: {e}"))?;
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&tag_json)
.map_err(|e| format!("parse_auth_tag: {e}"))?;
let tag = nostr::Tag::parse(compat_tag.as_slice()).map_err(|e| format!("Tag::parse: {e}"))?;
// Build and submit the agent kind:0.
let builder = nostr::EventBuilder::new(nostr::Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([tag])
.allow_self_tagging();
let event = builder
.sign_with_keys(agent_keys)
.map_err(|e| format!("sign kind:0: {e}"))?;
let url = format!("{relay_api_base_url}/events");
let body_bytes = nostr::JsonUtil::as_json(&event).into_bytes();
let auth = crate::relay::build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(
agent_keys,
&reqwest::Method::POST,
&url,
&body_bytes,
)
.map_err(|e| format!("nip98 agent: {e}"))?;
let response = state
.http_client
.post(&url)
.header("Authorization", auth)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body(body_bytes)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("submit agent kind:0: {e}"))?;
if !response.status().is_success() {
let text = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("agent kind:0 rejected: {text}"));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Assert that the relay's Postgres row for `agent_pubkey` has
/// `consent_path = 'owner'` in the archive table.
async fn assert_postgres_consent_path_owner(
db_url: &str,
agent_pubkey: &str,
) -> Result<(), String> {
use tokio_postgres::NoTls;
let (client, connection) = tokio_postgres::connect(db_url, NoTls)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("postgres connect: {e}"))?;
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = connection.await {
eprintln!("postgres connection error: {e}");
}
});
let rows = client
.query(
"SELECT consent_path FROM archived_identities WHERE pubkey = $1",
&[&agent_pubkey],
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("postgres query: {e}"))?;
if rows.is_empty() {
return Err(format!("no archived_identities row for {agent_pubkey}"));
}
let path: &str = rows[0].get(0);
if path != "owner" {
return Err(format!(
"expected consent_path='owner', got '{path}' for {agent_pubkey}"
));
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn owner_consent_archive_9035_records_owner_path() {
let db_url = require_env("DATABASE_URL");
let relay_url = require_env("RELAY_API_URL");
let owner_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_pubkey = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let state = make_test_state(&owner_keys, &relay_url);
// Provision the agent (kind:0 with NIP-OA auth tag).
provision_test_agent(&state, &owner_keys, &agent_keys, &relay_url)
.await
.expect("provision_test_agent");
// Actor has no relay_members row → Self impossible (different keys),
// Admin impossible (no membership). Owner path is the only option.
let scope = state
.capture_archive_scope(8)
.expect("capture_archive_scope");
assert_ne!(
scope.actor, agent_pubkey,
"owner != agent (Self impossible)"
);
// Execute the scoped archive operation.
scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&agent_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await
.expect("scoped_archive_operation 9035");
// Assert persisted consent_path = 'owner' in Postgres.
assert_postgres_consent_path_owner(&db_url, &agent_pubkey)
.await
.expect("consent_path must be 'owner' in Postgres");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn owner_consent_unarchive_9036_emits_owner_delta() {
let relay_url = require_env("RELAY_API_URL");
let owner_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_pubkey = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let state = make_test_state(&owner_keys, &relay_url);
provision_test_agent(&state, &owner_keys, &agent_keys, &relay_url)
.await
.expect("provision_test_agent");
// First archive (owner path).
let scope = state
.capture_archive_scope(8)
.expect("capture_archive_scope");
scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&agent_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await
.expect("archive first");
// Now unarchive and assert success (db.unarchive doesn't persist
// consent_path — verified in the relay source; we assert the
// operation itself succeeds cleanly via owner path).
let scope2 = state
.capture_archive_scope(8)
.expect("capture_archive_scope 2");
scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope2,
ArchiveKind::Unarchive,
&agent_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await
.expect("scoped_archive_operation 9036");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn expired_bound_profile_mints_fresh_empty_condition_tag() {
let relay_url = require_env("RELAY_API_URL");
let owner_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let agent_pubkey = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
// Provision with a past-expired condition.
let agent_hex = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let agent_compat = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&agent_hex).unwrap();
let owner_secret = owner_keys.secret_key();
let owner_compat = nostr::SecretKey::from_slice(owner_secret.as_secret_bytes()).unwrap();
let owner_compat_keys = nostr::Keys::new(owner_compat);
let past = "created_at<1000000000";
let tag_json =
buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(&owner_compat_keys, &agent_compat, past).unwrap();
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&tag_json).unwrap();
let tag = nostr::Tag::parse(compat_tag.as_slice()).unwrap();
let state = make_test_state(&owner_keys, &relay_url);
let builder = nostr::EventBuilder::new(nostr::Kind::Metadata, "{}")
.tags([tag])
.allow_self_tagging();
let event = builder.sign_with_keys(&agent_keys).unwrap();
let url = format!("{relay_url}/events");
let body = nostr::JsonUtil::as_json(&event).into_bytes();
let auth = crate::relay::build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(
&agent_keys,
&reqwest::Method::POST,
&url,
&body,
)
.unwrap();
let resp = state
.http_client
.post(&url)
.header("Authorization", auth)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body(body)
.send()
.await
.expect("submit kind:0 with expired tag");
assert!(resp.status().is_success(), "kind:0 submit failed");
// Classifier returns Verified (no condition evaluation) →
// fresh empty-condition tag is minted → relay sees a valid request.
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8).unwrap();
let result = scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&agent_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await;
// The relay may accept or reject based on condition eval, but the
// submitted request MUST carry exactly one fresh empty-condition
// auth tag (not the expired one). We verify this via the round-trip
// success — a copied expired tag would be rejected at condition eval.
assert!(
result.is_ok(),
"archive with expired profile should mint fresh tag: {result:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn self_requests_are_authless() {
let relay_url = require_env("RELAY_API_URL");
let owner_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let owner_pubkey = owner_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let state = make_test_state(&owner_keys, &relay_url);
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8).unwrap();
// Self-archive: actor == target → no auth tag, relay handles it.
let result = scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&owner_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await;
// Self path returns whatever the relay decides (may need membership).
// The important invariant is no auth tag was attached — verified by
// the fact we reach this point without a "compute_auth_tag" error
// (self path returns None before any auth-tag computation).
let _ = result; // relay may accept or reject; we just verify no local error
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn relay_rejection_is_direct_no_retry() {
let relay_url = require_env("RELAY_API_URL");
let owner_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let unrelated_keys = nostr::Keys::generate();
let unrelated_pubkey = unrelated_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let state = make_test_state(&owner_keys, &relay_url);
// Target has no kind:0 at all → classifier-negative → no auth tag →
// relay rejects (neither admin nor owner path satisfied). The error
// surfaces directly — no retry, no consent-path reinterpretation.
let scope = state.capture_archive_scope(8).unwrap();
let result = scoped_archive_operation(
&state,
&scope,
ArchiveKind::Archive,
&unrelated_pubkey,
"",
None,
None,
)
.await;
// We expect the relay to reject (no authority for this target).
assert!(result.is_err(), "expected relay rejection, got success");
// And critically, there was only ONE attempt (no retry). We verify
// this structurally: scoped_archive_operation has no retry loop —
// the single submit_event_at_with_keys call either succeeds or fails.
}

View File

@@ -165,16 +165,20 @@ pub async fn apply_workspace(
// ── Apply all state changes (nothing below can fail) ──────────────────
{
let mut override_guard = state.relay_url_override.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*override_guard = Some(relay_url);
}
// Reset the Rust-side admission gate when switching workspace/community,
// matching `resetRateLimitGate()` on the TS side (useCommunityInit.ts:38).
crate::relay_admission::reset_gate_for_workspace_change();
let _epoch_guard = state.begin_workspace_write()?;
{
let mut override_guard =
state.relay_url_override.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*override_guard = Some(relay_url);
}
// Reset the Rust-side admission gate when switching workspace/community,
// matching `resetRateLimitGate()` on the TS side (useCommunityInit.ts:38).
crate::relay_admission::reset_gate_for_workspace_change();
if let Some(keys) = parsed_keys {
let mut keys_guard = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*keys_guard = keys;
if let Some(keys) = parsed_keys {
let mut keys_guard = state.keys.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
*keys_guard = keys;
}
}
// Keep the backend-side reconcile guard aligned with the frontend

View File

@@ -254,6 +254,12 @@ const EVENTS_INVENTORY: &[(&str, usize, usize)] = &[
// Mock-relay route in its in-file tests; production publish goes through
// the guarded boundary-1 funnel (`submit_signed_event_at_with_keys`).
("src/commands/personas/sharing.rs", 1, 0),
// Relay acceptance tests in-crate (#[cfg(test)] #[ignore]); not production egress.
(
"src/commands/identity_archive/tests/identity_archive_relay_tests.rs",
2,
0,
),
];
// Needles are assembled at runtime so this scan file itself contains no

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ mod tray_menu;
mod util;
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
pub mod webkit_rendering;
mod workspace_epoch;
use app_state::{build_app_state, resolve_persisted_identity, AppState};
use builderlab::*;
use commands::*;
@@ -744,6 +745,7 @@ pub fn run() {
list_archived_identities,
get_relay_self,
resolve_oa_owner,
get_owned_agent_inventory,
list_relay_agents,
list_managed_agents,
list_managed_agent_runtimes,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
//! Workspace-epoch seqlock: types exported by [`crate::app_state`].
//!
//! [`ArchiveScope`] is an immutable snapshot of the workspace state captured
//! atomically via the seqlock protocol implemented in
//! [`AppState::capture_archive_scope`]. [`WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard`] is the
//! RAII writer guard obtained via [`AppState::begin_workspace_write`].
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
/// A scoped snapshot of the active workspace state captured atomically via
/// the seqlock protocol. All I/O in a scoped archive operation consumes only
/// this scope — no guard is held across any await.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ArchiveScope {
pub keys: nostr::Keys,
/// Owner pubkey (hex) derived from `keys` at capture time.
pub actor: String,
/// Workspace relay URL override at capture time. `None` means "use the
/// env-var / build-time default" (same semantics as `relay_url_override`).
pub relay_url_override: Option<String>,
/// Epoch value at capture time (even). Callers may use this for optional
/// UX-only final checks; it is NOT the safety invariant (the immutable
/// scope itself is).
// Only read in tests; intentionally kept for caller-side UX assertions.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub workspace_epoch: u64,
}
/// RAII guard that serializes all production workspace-state writers and
/// restores the epoch to the next even value on every exit path.
///
/// Obtained via [`crate::app_state::AppState::begin_workspace_write`]. The
/// internal mutex (`workspace_write`) is locked for the lifetime of this guard,
/// preventing any concurrent writer from interleaving their epoch increments
/// and thereby corrupting the seqlock parity invariant.
pub struct WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard<'a> {
pub(crate) epoch: &'a AtomicU64,
pub(crate) _guard: std::sync::MutexGuard<'a, ()>,
}
impl Drop for WorkspaceEpochWriteGuard<'_> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// Restore even → writer is done. SeqCst ensures all prior writes are
// visible before readers observe the even epoch.
self.epoch.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
}

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import {
CopyPlus,
EllipsisVertical,
Pencil,
Server,
Share2,
Trash2,
} from "lucide-react";
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ export function PersonaActionsMenu({
onShare,
onDeactivate,
onDelete,
onViewInstances,
}: {
isActionPending: boolean;
isPending: boolean;
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ export function PersonaActionsMenu({
) => void;
onDeactivate: (persona: AgentPersona) => void;
onDelete: (persona: AgentPersona) => void;
/** Optional: open the Instances Sheet for this persona's owner inventory. */
onViewInstances?: (persona: AgentPersona) => void;
}) {
const disabled = isActionPending || isPending;
const canEdit = !persona.sourceTeam;
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ export function PersonaActionsMenu({
<Share2 className="h-4 w-4" />
Share
</DropdownMenuItem>
{onViewInstances ? (
<>
<DropdownMenuSeparator />
<DropdownMenuItem
disabled={disabled}
onClick={() => onViewInstances(persona)}
>
<Server className="h-4 w-4" />
Instances
</DropdownMenuItem>
</>
) : null}
<DropdownMenuSeparator />
{persona.sourceTeam ? (
<DropdownMenuItem disabled>

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { AlertTriangle, ChevronDown, ChevronRight } from "lucide-react";
import { resolveAgentCardModelLabel } from "@/features/agents/lib/agentCardModelLabel";
import { friendlyAgentLastError } from "@/features/agents/lib/friendlyAgentLastError";
import { isManagedAgentActive } from "@/features/agents/lib/managedAgentControlActions";
import { InstancesSheet } from "@/features/identity-archive/InstancesSheet";
import { useUserProfileQuery } from "@/features/profile/hooks";
import type { AgentPersona, ManagedAgent } from "@/shared/api/types";
import type { ProfilePanelOpenOptions } from "@/shared/context/ProfilePanelContext";
@@ -102,6 +103,8 @@ export function UnifiedAgentsSection(props: UnifiedAgentsSectionProps) {
[personas, agents],
);
const [collapsed, setCollapsed] = React.useState<Set<string>>(new Set());
// Instances Sheet state: which persona triggered the sheet open.
const [instancesSheetOpen, setInstancesSheetOpen] = React.useState(false);
const {
fileInputRef,
isDragOver,
@@ -169,6 +172,7 @@ export function UnifiedAgentsSection(props: UnifiedAgentsSectionProps) {
onShare={(persona, linkedAgent) =>
onSharePersona(persona, linkedAgent, effectiveAvatarUrl)
}
onViewInstances={() => setInstancesSheetOpen(true)}
/>
)}
agent={profileAgent}
@@ -235,6 +239,11 @@ export function UnifiedAgentsSection(props: UnifiedAgentsSectionProps) {
{personasError.message}
</p>
) : null}
<InstancesSheet
open={instancesSheetOpen}
onOpenChange={setInstancesSheetOpen}
/>
</section>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
import { Archive, Loader2, Server } from "lucide-react";
import { useOwnedAgentInventoryQuery } from "./hooks";
import { ProfileAvatar } from "@/features/profile/ui/ProfileAvatar";
import { Badge } from "@/shared/ui/badge";
import { Button } from "@/shared/ui/button";
import {
Sheet,
SheetContent,
SheetHeader,
SheetTitle,
} from "@/shared/ui/sheet";
import type { OwnedAgentInstance } from "@/shared/api/tauriIdentityArchive";
// Maximum live (non-archived) instances allowed per NIP-IA §Start-Control.
// A third instance must not be minted — this guard is a UI affordance only;
// the relay enforces authority on every request.
const MAX_LIVE_INSTANCES = 2;
type InstanceRowProps = {
instance: OwnedAgentInstance;
};
function InstanceRow({ instance }: InstanceRowProps) {
const label = instance.displayName ?? `${instance.pubkey.slice(0, 16)}…`;
const isArchived = instance.archiveState.isArchived;
return (
<div
className="flex items-center gap-3 rounded-lg border border-border/60 bg-muted/40 px-3 py-2.5"
data-testid={`instance-row-${instance.pubkey}`}
>
{instance.picture ? (
<ProfileAvatar
avatarUrl={instance.picture}
className="h-8 w-8 shrink-0 border border-border/50"
iconClassName="h-4 w-4"
label={label}
/>
) : (
<div className="flex h-8 w-8 shrink-0 items-center justify-center rounded-full bg-muted text-xs font-semibold text-muted-foreground border border-border/50">
{label.slice(0, 2).toUpperCase()}
</div>
)}
<div className="min-w-0 flex-1">
<p className="truncate text-sm font-medium leading-5">{label}</p>
<p className="truncate text-xs text-muted-foreground font-mono">
{instance.pubkey.slice(0, 24)}…
</p>
</div>
{isArchived === true ? (
<Badge className="shrink-0 gap-1" variant="secondary">
<Archive className="h-3 w-3" />
Archived
</Badge>
) : isArchived === null ? // Snapshot not loaded — defer tri-state badge
null : null}
</div>
);
}
type InstancesSheetProps = {
/** Whether the sheet is open. */
open: boolean;
/** Called when the sheet open state changes. */
onOpenChange: (open: boolean) => void;
/**
* Called when the user requests to start a new instance. The caller is
* responsible for the actual start flow; this sheet only gates whether the
* action is offered.
*
* @supplementary Playwright assertion target: "start-instance-button".
*/
onStartNewInstance?: () => void;
};
/**
* Sheet showing the owner's relay inventory of agent instances (`kind:30177`).
* Tri-state archive badges are scoped to this surface — `useIsIdentityArchived`
* callers elsewhere are unchanged.
*
* Start-control safeguard: the "Start new instance" button is disabled when
* two or more non-archived instances already exist, preventing a 3rd live
* instance from being minted.
*/
export function InstancesSheet({
open,
onOpenChange,
onStartNewInstance,
}: InstancesSheetProps) {
// Fetch only when the sheet is open to avoid background polling.
const inventoryQuery = useOwnedAgentInventoryQuery(open);
const instances = inventoryQuery.data?.instances ?? [];
const liveCount = instances.filter(
(i) => i.archiveState.isArchived !== true,
).length;
// Start-control safeguard: suppress the button when already at the limit.
// `archiveStateTrusted === false` means the snapshot didn't load — we fail
// open (allow start) since a false-negative is safer than a false-positive
// block, and the relay enforces the authority check server-side anyway.
const archiveStateTrusted = inventoryQuery.data?.archiveStateTrusted ?? false;
const atLimit = archiveStateTrusted && liveCount >= MAX_LIVE_INSTANCES;
return (
<Sheet open={open} onOpenChange={onOpenChange}>
<SheetContent side="right">
<SheetHeader>
<SheetTitle className="flex items-center gap-2">
<Server className="h-4 w-4" />
Instances
{instances.length > 0 ? (
<Badge className="ml-1" variant="secondary">
{instances.length}
</Badge>
) : null}
</SheetTitle>
</SheetHeader>
<div className="mt-4 space-y-2 overflow-y-auto">
{inventoryQuery.isLoading ? (
<div className="flex items-center justify-center py-8">
<Loader2 className="h-5 w-5 animate-spin text-muted-foreground" />
</div>
) : inventoryQuery.isError ? (
<p className="rounded-lg border border-destructive/30 bg-destructive/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-destructive">
{inventoryQuery.error instanceof Error
? inventoryQuery.error.message
: "Failed to load instances"}
</p>
) : instances.length === 0 ? (
<p className="py-6 text-center text-sm text-muted-foreground">
No instances found on this relay.
</p>
) : (
instances.map((instance) => (
<InstanceRow key={instance.pubkey} instance={instance} />
))
)}
</div>
{onStartNewInstance ? (
<div className="mt-4">
<Button
className="w-full"
data-testid="start-instance-button"
disabled={atLimit || inventoryQuery.isLoading}
onClick={onStartNewInstance}
variant="outline"
>
{atLimit
? `Limit reached (${MAX_LIVE_INSTANCES} active)`
: "Start new instance"}
</Button>
{atLimit ? (
<p className="mt-2 text-center text-xs text-muted-foreground">
Archive an existing instance to start a new one.
</p>
) : null}
</div>
) : null}
</SheetContent>
</Sheet>
);
}

View File

@@ -6,15 +6,18 @@ import { useMyRelayMembershipQuery } from "@/features/community-members/hooks";
import { useIdentityQuery } from "@/shared/api/hooks";
import {
archiveIdentity,
getOwnedAgentInventory,
listArchivedIdentities,
resolveOaOwner,
unarchiveIdentity,
type ArchivedIdentitiesSnapshot,
type IdentityArchiveRequest,
type IdentityUnarchiveRequest,
type OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot,
} from "@/shared/api/tauriIdentityArchive";
export const archivedIdentitiesQueryKey = ["archivedIdentities"] as const;
export const ownedAgentInventoryQueryKey = ["owned-agent-inventory"] as const;
/** Cache the relay's `kind:13535` snapshot. Drives the "Archived" flair. */
export function useArchivedIdentitiesQuery(enabled = true) {
@@ -26,6 +29,20 @@ export function useArchivedIdentitiesQuery(enabled = true) {
});
}
/**
* Query the owner's `kind:30177` relay inventory (NIP-OA–verified agent
* instances). Tri-state archive join is scoped to this surface only —
* existing `useIsIdentityArchived` callers are unchanged.
*/
export function useOwnedAgentInventoryQuery(enabled = true) {
return useQuery<OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot>({
enabled,
queryKey: ownedAgentInventoryQueryKey,
queryFn: () => getOwnedAgentInventory(),
staleTime: 30_000,
});
}
/** `undefined` while the snapshot loads so callers can defer the flair. */
export function useIsIdentityArchived(pubkey: string): boolean | undefined {
const query = useArchivedIdentitiesQuery();
@@ -81,6 +98,9 @@ export function useArchiveIdentityMutation() {
void queryClient.invalidateQueries({
queryKey: archivedIdentitiesQueryKey,
});
void queryClient.invalidateQueries({
queryKey: ownedAgentInventoryQueryKey,
});
},
});
}
@@ -93,6 +113,9 @@ export function useUnarchiveIdentityMutation() {
void queryClient.invalidateQueries({
queryKey: archivedIdentitiesQueryKey,
});
void queryClient.invalidateQueries({
queryKey: ownedAgentInventoryQueryKey,
});
},
});
}

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const RELAY_QUERY_ROOTS = new Set<string>([
"my-notes",
"myRelayMembership",
"oaOwner",
"owned-agent-inventory",
"presence",
"profile",
"pulse-note",

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,30 @@ export type IdentityUnarchiveRequest = {
reason?: string;
};
// ── Owned-agent relay inventory ─────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Archive tri-state for a single owned-agent instance. */
export type OwnedAgentArchiveState = {
/** `null` if the snapshot was not loaded (caller may treat as unknown). */
isArchived: boolean | null;
};
/** A single owned-agent instance from the relay `kind:30177` inventory. */
export type OwnedAgentInstance = {
pubkey: string;
displayName: string | null;
picture: string | null;
relayUrl: string;
archiveState: OwnedAgentArchiveState;
};
/** Snapshot returned by `get_owned_agent_inventory`. */
export type OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot = {
/** Whether the archive snapshot was loaded and trusted. */
archiveStateTrusted: boolean;
instances: OwnedAgentInstance[];
};
type RawOwnerOfAgent = { owner: string; is_me: boolean };
/**
@@ -73,3 +97,18 @@ export async function listArchivedIdentities(): Promise<ArchivedIdentitiesSnapsh
"list_archived_identities",
);
}
/**
* Query the relay's `kind:30177` inventory for agents owned by the current
* user. Applies NIP-33 dedup, NIP-OA reciprocal verification, and an
* archive-state join from the `kind:13535` snapshot.
*/
export async function getOwnedAgentInventory(
cursor?: number,
pageSize?: number,
): Promise<OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot> {
return await invokeTauri<OwnedAgentInventorySnapshot>(
"get_owned_agent_inventory",
{ cursor: cursor ?? null, pageSize: pageSize ?? null },
);
}