feat(db): add NIP-FI identity + final-admission schema foundation

Introduce the Phase-A NIP-FI schema as two internally-ordered migrations:
0040 lays down the core identity and base-lifecycle relations, and 0041
applies to 0040's resulting state to add the final-admission surface
(replay/receipt, audit events, invalidation, capacity, protected-object
authority, restore version deltas, and the closed admission result).

Identity is issuer-qualified (iss, sub) with no hardcoded issuer. All 15
NIP-FI relations are a durable, immutable, append-only security ledger:
both migrations widen the single SQL source of truth
community_write_fence_excluded_table so the relations are never
fence-attached, purged on community deletion, nor counted as tenant-scoped
drift by the deletion control plane's exact-set catalog check — the same
posture as product_feedback and rate_limit_violations. schema.sql keeps one
consolidated definition of that function whose body byte-matches 0041.

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <261786559+cea@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Will Pfleger
2026-08-28 12:01:28 -04:00
committed by Hayt
parent 2c99ee7af5
commit afed8a8845
4 changed files with 3429 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut migrations: Vec<_> = MIGRATOR.iter().collect();
migrations.sort_by_key(|migration| migration.version);
assert_eq!(migrations.len(), 40);
assert_eq!(migrations.len(), 42);
assert_eq!(migrations[0].version, 1);
assert_eq!(&*migrations[0].description, "initial schema");
assert!(migrations[0]
@@ -1232,6 +1232,45 @@ mod tests {
operator_audit.contains("_operator_global_tables"),
"migration 39 must register relay_operator_audit in _operator_global_tables"
);
// NIP-FI core identity + base-lifecycle foundation (migration 0041) and
// final-admission foundation (0042). Both widen the single SQL source of
// truth `community_write_fence_excluded_table` so their durable,
// immutable ledger relations are never fence-attached, purged, or
// counted as tenant-scoped drift. schema.sql keeps one consolidated
// definition of that function whose body must match 0042's exactly.
assert_eq!(migrations[40].version, 41);
let identity_foundation = migrations[40].sql.as_str();
assert!(identity_foundation.contains("CREATE TABLE identity_bindings"));
assert!(identity_foundation.contains("CREATE TABLE identity_lifecycle_history"));
assert!(identity_foundation
.contains("CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION community_write_fence_excluded_table"));
assert!(identity_foundation.contains("'identity_bindings'"));
assert_eq!(migrations[41].version, 42);
let authorization_foundation = migrations[41].sql.as_str();
assert!(authorization_foundation.contains("CREATE TABLE authorization_events"));
assert!(authorization_foundation.contains("CREATE TABLE protected_object_authority"));
assert!(authorization_foundation.contains("CREATE TABLE authorization_admission_results"));
// The consolidated desired-state exclusion function must byte-match
// migration 0042's CREATE OR REPLACE body, or a future schema
// consolidation would silently drop NIP-FI relations from the ledger.
fn extract_excluded_table_array(sql: &str) -> &str {
let anchor = "community_write_fence_excluded_table(target NAME) RETURNS BOOLEAN";
let start = sql.find(anchor).expect("exclusion function definition");
let array_start = sql[start..].find("ARRAY[").expect("exclusion array") + start;
let array_end = sql[array_start..]
.find("]::TEXT[]")
.expect("exclusion array end")
+ array_start;
&sql[array_start..array_end]
}
assert_eq!(
extract_excluded_table_array(authorization_foundation),
extract_excluded_table_array(desired_schema),
"schema.sql exclusion list drifted from migration 0042"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -2609,4 +2648,194 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("drop late-table fixtures");
}
/// NIP-FI intermediate state: migration 0041 (identity + base lifecycle)
/// alone must present a coherent catalog. Its five community-scoped ledger
/// relations are immutable and durable, so they are registered in the
/// write-fence exclusion — never counted as tenant-scoped drift, never
/// fence-attached — and the exact deletion catalog must still validate.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]
async fn migration_0041_identity_foundation_is_durable_ledger_after_migration_a() {
let pool = connect_test_pool().await;
reset_public_schema(&pool).await;
MIGRATOR
.run_to(41, &pool)
.await
.expect("apply migrations 1-41");
// The five identity relations exist.
let identity_tables = [
"authorization_operation_receipts",
"identity_enrollment_policies",
"identity_bindings",
"identity_lifecycle_history",
"identity_lifecycle_selectors",
];
for table in identity_tables {
let exists = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>(
"SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables \
WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND table_name = $1)",
)
.bind(table)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("check table {table}: {err}"));
assert!(exists, "migration 0041 must create {table}");
}
// Migration B's relations must NOT exist yet.
for table in ["authorization_events", "protected_object_authority"] {
let exists = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>(
"SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables \
WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND table_name = $1)",
)
.bind(table)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("check table {table}: {err}"));
assert!(!exists, "{table} belongs to migration 0042, not 0041");
}
// Every identity relation is excluded from the write fence: none may
// appear as tenant-scoped drift or carry the fence trigger.
let scoped_or_fenced: Vec<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
"WITH scoped AS ( \
SELECT c.relname FROM pg_class c \
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = c.oid \
WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relkind IN ('r','p') \
AND NOT c.relispartition AND a.attname = 'community_id' \
AND NOT a.attisdropped \
AND NOT community_write_fence_excluded_table(c.relname) \
) \
SELECT relname FROM scoped \
WHERE relname = ANY($1) ORDER BY relname",
)
.bind(&identity_tables[..])
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
.expect("read scoped identity relations");
assert!(
scoped_or_fenced.is_empty(),
"identity ledger relations must be write-fence excluded, not scoped: {scoped_or_fenced:?}"
);
// The exact deletion catalog validates: the excluded ledger relations
// do not perturb the scoped-table/fence equality check.
crate::deletion::DeletionStore::new(pool.clone())
.validate_catalog()
.await
.expect("deletion catalog validates after migration 0041");
// The immutability contract is enforced, not merely declared. TRUNCATE
// fires the statement-level guard unconditionally, so this proves the
// rejection without constructing a fully valid ledger row.
let rejected = sqlx::query("TRUNCATE identity_lifecycle_selectors")
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect_err("identity_lifecycle_selectors truncation must be rejected");
assert!(
rejected.to_string().contains("cannot be truncated"),
"expected immutability rejection, got: {rejected}"
);
}
/// NIP-FI full state: migrations 0041 + 0042 together must present a
/// coherent 15-relation catalog with zero dangling foreign keys, all
/// relations write-fence excluded, and an intact exact deletion catalog.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]
async fn nip_fi_foundation_is_a_closed_durable_ledger_after_migrations_a_and_b() {
let pool = connect_test_pool().await;
reset_public_schema(&pool).await;
MIGRATOR
.run_to(42, &pool)
.await
.expect("apply migrations 1-42");
let nip_fi_tables = [
"authorization_admission_results",
"authorization_authentication_denial_attempts",
"authorization_authority_epochs",
"authorization_event_capacity",
"authorization_events",
"authorization_invalidation_domains",
"authorization_invalidation_floors",
"authorization_operation_receipts",
"authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests",
"authorization_operation_version_deltas",
"identity_bindings",
"identity_enrollment_policies",
"identity_lifecycle_history",
"identity_lifecycle_selectors",
"protected_object_authority",
];
// All fifteen relations exist.
let present: Vec<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables \
WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND table_name = ANY($1) ORDER BY table_name",
)
.bind(&nip_fi_tables[..])
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
.expect("read NIP-FI table catalog");
let mut expected: Vec<String> = nip_fi_tables.iter().map(|t| t.to_string()).collect();
expected.sort();
assert_eq!(
present, expected,
"all NIP-FI relations must exist after 0042"
);
// Zero dangling foreign keys: every FK target is a live relation.
let invalid_fks: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT count(*)::BIGINT FROM pg_constraint \
WHERE contype = 'f' AND NOT convalidated",
)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.expect("read FK validity");
assert_eq!(
invalid_fks, 0,
"no NIP-FI foreign key may be left unvalidated"
);
// None of the fifteen appear as tenant-scoped drift; all are excluded.
let scoped: Vec<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT c.relname FROM pg_class c \
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = c.oid \
WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relkind IN ('r','p') \
AND NOT c.relispartition AND a.attname = 'community_id' \
AND NOT a.attisdropped \
AND NOT community_write_fence_excluded_table(c.relname) \
AND c.relname = ANY($1) ORDER BY c.relname",
)
.bind(&nip_fi_tables[..])
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
.expect("read scoped NIP-FI relations");
assert!(
scoped.is_empty(),
"all NIP-FI ledger relations must be write-fence excluded: {scoped:?}"
);
// The exact deletion catalog validates with the full ledger present.
crate::deletion::DeletionStore::new(pool.clone())
.validate_catalog()
.await
.expect("deletion catalog validates after migrations 0041 + 0042");
// A migration-B relation is immutable too. TRUNCATE fires the
// statement-level guard unconditionally.
let rejected = sqlx::query("TRUNCATE authorization_admission_results")
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect_err("authorization_admission_results truncation must be rejected");
assert!(
rejected.to_string().contains("cannot be truncated"),
"expected immutability rejection, got: {rejected}"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,879 @@
-- Provider-free NIP-FI core identity and base-lifecycle foundation.
--
-- This is direct-final fresh-schema DDL. It intentionally does not replay a
-- historical uid/backfill/ALTER sequence.
--
-- Scope is NIP-FI *core* only. Base lifecycle is exactly retire, revoke, and
-- rotate (NIP-FI.md "Base lifecycle"). The extended NIP-FI-LIFECYCLE surface
-- (disabled identities, pending-replacement lineage, and their provision,
-- disable, recover, enable, and admission-loss transitions) is deferred to a
-- later migration owned by the FI-LIFECYCLE PR, per NIP-FI-MODEL.md: "NIP-FI-
-- LIFECYCLE adds disabled identities and pending replacement lineage." So the
-- closed vocabularies below are the core subset:
-- transition/operation kinds: 1 enroll, 3 retire, 5 revoke, 6 rotate;
-- lifecycle selector kinds: 1 retired pair (P), 3 revoked key (Y).
-- A later migration widens these vocabularies additively; nothing here presumes
-- a single global issuer — identity is issuer-qualified (iss, sub).
-- The sole idempotency/result root shared by identity base lifecycle,
-- protected operations, and invalidation. Pre-authentication denials never
-- write this table. ExactReplay and IntentConflict are read-time observations,
-- not persisted outcomes.
CREATE TABLE authorization_operation_receipts (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
-- Core operation kinds: 1 enroll, 3 retire, 5 revoke, 6 rotate,
-- 11 protected mutation, 12 invalidation. Extended lifecycle kinds
-- (2 provision, 4 disable, 7 recover, 8 enable, 9 admission loss) and
-- 10 operator are introduced by their owning later migrations.
operation_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
operation_kind IN (1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 12)
),
actor_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(actor_fingerprint) = 32),
-- 1 applied, 2 denied, 3 no-op.
outcome_code SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (outcome_code IN (1, 2, 3)),
result_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(result_digest) = 32),
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, operation_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint),
UNIQUE (
community_id,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint,
operation_kind,
outcome_code
),
CHECK (operation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid)
);
-- Immutable monotonic local policy revisions. Enrollment modes are the closed
-- provider-free V1 set: 1 attested-key, 2 provisioned, 3 risk-labelled TOFU.
CREATE TABLE identity_enrollment_policies (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
policy_revision BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (policy_revision > 0),
enrollment_mode SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (enrollment_mode IN (1, 2, 3)),
policy_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(policy_digest) = 32),
effective_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-- Optional local binding-policy expiry. Federated token `exp` MUST NOT be
-- copied here: token lifetime bounds an authorization lease, not this
-- durable binding generation.
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, policy_revision),
UNIQUE (community_id, policy_revision, enrollment_mode),
CHECK (expires_at IS NULL OR effective_at < expires_at)
);
-- One row is one immutable binding generation. binding_version is allocated
-- from one non-cycling PostgreSQL identity sequence and is never changed or
-- reused. Explicit lifecycle may only retire the generation; X/Y denial
-- semantics live in immutable selector facts below, not alternate row states.
CREATE TABLE identity_bindings (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
binding_id UUID NOT NULL,
binding_version BIGINT GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY (
START WITH 1 INCREMENT BY 1 NO MINVALUE NO MAXVALUE CACHE 1 NO CYCLE
),
issuer TEXT COLLATE "C" NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(issuer) BETWEEN 1 AND 2048),
subject TEXT COLLATE "C" NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(subject) BETWEEN 1 AND 2048),
principal_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(principal_fingerprint) = 32),
event_author_pubkey BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(event_author_pubkey) = 32),
-- 1 active, 2 retired.
binding_state SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (binding_state IN (1, 2)),
lifecycle_revision BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (lifecycle_revision IN (1, 2)),
-- 1 attested-key, 2 provisioned, 3 risk-labelled TOFU.
binding_provenance SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (binding_provenance IN (1, 2, 3)),
policy_revision BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (policy_revision > 0),
-- Canonical evidence for the selected provenance. This is an assertion
-- digest for attested/TOFU admission and a provisioning receipt digest for
-- separately provisioned admission; it never stores credential bytes.
enrollment_evidence_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(enrollment_evidence_digest) = 32
),
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
birth_history_id UUID NOT NULL,
creation_operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
creation_request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(creation_request_fingerprint) = 32
),
retirement_history_id UUID,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, binding_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, binding_version),
UNIQUE (community_id, binding_id, binding_version),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, policy_revision, binding_provenance)
REFERENCES identity_enrollment_policies
(community_id, policy_revision, enrollment_mode),
CHECK (binding_version > 0),
CHECK (binding_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (birth_history_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (creation_operation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (expires_at IS NULL OR created_at < expires_at),
CHECK (
(binding_state = 1 AND lifecycle_revision = 1 AND retirement_history_id IS NULL)
OR (binding_state = 2 AND lifecycle_revision = 2 AND retirement_history_id IS NOT NULL)
)
);
-- State 1 is Active. Expiry is evaluated with authoritative PostgreSQL time
-- at read/finalization and is exclusive; it cannot appear in an index predicate.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX identity_bindings_active_principal
ON identity_bindings (community_id, issuer, subject)
WHERE binding_state = 1;
CREATE INDEX identity_bindings_principal_fingerprint_lookup
ON identity_bindings (community_id, principal_fingerprint)
WHERE binding_state = 1;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX identity_bindings_active_event_author
ON identity_bindings (community_id, event_author_pubkey)
WHERE binding_state = 1;
CREATE INDEX identity_bindings_current_lookup
ON identity_bindings (community_id, event_author_pubkey, binding_state, expires_at);
-- The one canonical immutable lifecycle transition row for a successful or
-- no-op lifecycle operation. A transition can name an old generation, a new
-- successor generation, both (Rotate), or neither (a semantic no-op). It is not
-- a second result/effect engine: the shared receipt remains the sole persisted
-- operation outcome. Core transition kinds only: 1 enroll, 3 retire, 5 revoke,
-- 6 rotate.
CREATE TABLE identity_lifecycle_history (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
history_id UUID NOT NULL,
transition_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
transition_kind IN (1, 3, 5, 6)
),
-- Matches the shared receipt: 1 applied, 3 no-op.
outcome_code SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (outcome_code IN (1, 3)),
old_binding_id UUID,
old_binding_version BIGINT CHECK (old_binding_version IS NULL OR old_binding_version > 0),
old_prior_lifecycle_revision BIGINT CHECK (
old_prior_lifecycle_revision IS NULL OR old_prior_lifecycle_revision IN (1, 2)
),
old_prior_state SMALLINT CHECK (old_prior_state IS NULL OR old_prior_state IN (1, 2)),
old_resulting_lifecycle_revision BIGINT CHECK (
old_resulting_lifecycle_revision IS NULL OR old_resulting_lifecycle_revision IN (1, 2)
),
old_resulting_state SMALLINT CHECK (
old_resulting_state IS NULL OR old_resulting_state IN (1, 2)
),
successor_binding_id UUID,
successor_binding_version BIGINT CHECK (
successor_binding_version IS NULL OR successor_binding_version > 0
),
successor_lifecycle_revision BIGINT CHECK (
successor_lifecycle_revision IS NULL OR successor_lifecycle_revision = 1
),
successor_state SMALLINT CHECK (successor_state IS NULL OR successor_state = 1),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
transition_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(transition_digest) = 32),
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, history_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, operation_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, history_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint),
UNIQUE (
community_id,
history_id,
successor_binding_id,
successor_binding_version,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
),
UNIQUE (
community_id,
history_id,
old_binding_id,
old_binding_version,
old_resulting_lifecycle_revision,
old_resulting_state
),
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint,
transition_kind,
outcome_code
) REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts (
community_id,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint,
operation_kind,
outcome_code
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, old_binding_id, old_binding_version)
REFERENCES identity_bindings (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, successor_binding_id, successor_binding_version)
REFERENCES identity_bindings (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (history_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (operation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (
(old_binding_id IS NULL
AND old_binding_version IS NULL
AND old_prior_lifecycle_revision IS NULL
AND old_prior_state IS NULL
AND old_resulting_lifecycle_revision IS NULL
AND old_resulting_state IS NULL)
OR (old_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND old_binding_version IS NOT NULL
AND old_prior_lifecycle_revision IS NOT NULL
AND old_prior_state IS NOT NULL
AND old_resulting_lifecycle_revision IS NOT NULL
AND old_resulting_state IS NOT NULL)
),
CHECK (
(successor_binding_id IS NULL
AND successor_binding_version IS NULL
AND successor_lifecycle_revision IS NULL
AND successor_state IS NULL)
OR (successor_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND successor_binding_version IS NOT NULL
AND successor_lifecycle_revision = 1
AND successor_state = 1)
),
CHECK (
old_binding_id IS NULL
OR successor_binding_id IS NULL
OR old_binding_id <> successor_binding_id
),
CHECK (
old_binding_version IS NULL
OR successor_binding_version IS NULL
OR old_binding_version <> successor_binding_version
),
-- Core lifecycle only ever moves Active/r1 to Retired/r2 for a named old
-- generation. Extended re-enablement (recover/enable from Retired/r2) is a
-- later migration's concern.
CHECK (
old_binding_id IS NULL
OR (old_prior_lifecycle_revision = 1
AND old_prior_state = 1
AND old_resulting_lifecycle_revision = 2
AND old_resulting_state = 2)
),
CHECK (
(outcome_code = 3
AND old_binding_id IS NULL
AND successor_binding_id IS NULL)
OR (outcome_code = 1 AND (
(transition_kind = 1
AND old_binding_id IS NULL
AND successor_binding_id IS NOT NULL)
OR (transition_kind = 3
AND old_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND successor_binding_id IS NULL)
OR (transition_kind = 5
AND successor_binding_id IS NULL)
OR (transition_kind = 6
AND old_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND successor_binding_id IS NOT NULL)
))
)
);
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_history_old_binding
ON identity_lifecycle_history (community_id, old_binding_id, old_binding_version, recorded_at);
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_history_successor_binding
ON identity_lifecycle_history (
community_id,
successor_binding_id,
successor_binding_version,
recorded_at
);
-- Circular birth/transition ordering is deliberate and fully deferred. Every
-- generation must commit with its exact birth transition, and a retired row
-- must commit with the exact transition that changed Active/r1 to Retired/r2.
ALTER TABLE identity_bindings
ADD CONSTRAINT identity_bindings_exact_birth_history_fk
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
birth_history_id,
binding_id,
binding_version,
creation_operation_id,
creation_request_fingerprint
) REFERENCES identity_lifecycle_history (
community_id,
history_id,
successor_binding_id,
successor_binding_version,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED;
ALTER TABLE identity_bindings
ADD CONSTRAINT identity_bindings_exact_retirement_history_fk
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
retirement_history_id,
binding_id,
binding_version,
lifecycle_revision,
binding_state
) REFERENCES identity_lifecycle_history (
community_id,
history_id,
old_binding_id,
old_binding_version,
old_resulting_lifecycle_revision,
old_resulting_state
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED;
-- One immutable closed-scope fact table. Core selector kinds only:
-- 1 retired pair (P), 3 revoked key (Y). Both are permanent. The extended
-- disabled-identity (X) and pending-replacement (Q) selectors, and their
-- one-shot consumption, are introduced by the FI-LIFECYCLE migration.
CREATE TABLE identity_lifecycle_selectors (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
selector_id UUID NOT NULL,
selector_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (selector_kind IN (1, 3)),
selector_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(selector_fingerprint) = 32),
fact_generation BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (fact_generation > 0),
principal_fingerprint BYTEA CHECK (
principal_fingerprint IS NULL OR octet_length(principal_fingerprint) = 32
),
event_author_pubkey BYTEA CHECK (
event_author_pubkey IS NULL OR octet_length(event_author_pubkey) = 32
),
binding_id UUID,
binding_version BIGINT CHECK (binding_version IS NULL OR binding_version > 0),
asserted_history_id UUID NOT NULL,
selected_by_operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
selected_by_request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(selected_by_request_fingerprint) = 32
),
selected_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, selector_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, selector_id, selector_kind),
UNIQUE (community_id, selector_kind, selector_fingerprint, fact_generation),
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
asserted_history_id,
selected_by_operation_id,
selected_by_request_fingerprint
) REFERENCES identity_lifecycle_history (
community_id,
history_id,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
selected_by_operation_id,
selected_by_request_fingerprint
) REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts (
community_id,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
REFERENCES identity_bindings (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (selector_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (
(selector_kind = 1
AND fact_generation = 1
AND principal_fingerprint IS NOT NULL
AND event_author_pubkey IS NOT NULL
AND binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND binding_version IS NOT NULL)
OR (selector_kind = 3
AND fact_generation = 1
AND principal_fingerprint IS NULL
AND event_author_pubkey IS NOT NULL
AND binding_id IS NULL
AND binding_version IS NULL)
)
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_permanent_pair
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
WHERE selector_kind = 1;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_permanent_principal_key
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors (
community_id,
principal_fingerprint,
event_author_pubkey
) WHERE selector_kind = 1;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_permanent_key
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors (community_id, event_author_pubkey)
WHERE selector_kind = 3;
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_principal_lookup
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
(community_id, selector_kind, principal_fingerprint, fact_generation);
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_key_lookup
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
(community_id, selector_kind, event_author_pubkey, fact_generation);
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_binding_lookup
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
(community_id, selector_kind, binding_id, binding_version, fact_generation);
CREATE INDEX identity_lifecycle_selectors_asserted_history
ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
(community_id, asserted_history_id, selector_kind);
CREATE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
RAISE EXCEPTION '% is immutable', TG_TABLE_NAME
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
RAISE EXCEPTION '% cannot be truncated', TG_TABLE_NAME
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
-- Every binding/selector path derives the same domain-scoped coordinates and
-- takes their signed BIGINT advisory keys in numeric order. Typed transaction
-- APIs take these locks before row mutation; the triggers are the fail-closed
-- backstop for direct SQL.
CREATE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_lock_coordinates_v1(
locked_community_id UUID,
locked_principal_fingerprint BYTEA,
locked_event_author_pubkey BYTEA
) RETURNS VOID AS $$
DECLARE
principal_lock_key BIGINT;
event_author_lock_key BIGINT;
BEGIN
IF locked_principal_fingerprint IS NOT NULL THEN
principal_lock_key := hashtextextended(
'buzz:identity-lifecycle-coordinate:v1:principal:'
|| locked_community_id::text || ':'
|| encode(locked_principal_fingerprint, 'hex'),
0
);
END IF;
IF locked_event_author_pubkey IS NOT NULL THEN
event_author_lock_key := hashtextextended(
'buzz:identity-lifecycle-coordinate:v1:key:'
|| locked_community_id::text || ':'
|| encode(locked_event_author_pubkey, 'hex'),
0
);
END IF;
IF principal_lock_key IS NOT NULL AND event_author_lock_key IS NOT NULL THEN
PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(LEAST(principal_lock_key, event_author_lock_key));
IF principal_lock_key <> event_author_lock_key THEN
PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(GREATEST(principal_lock_key, event_author_lock_key));
END IF;
ELSIF principal_lock_key IS NOT NULL THEN
PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(principal_lock_key);
ELSIF event_author_lock_key IS NOT NULL THEN
PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(event_author_lock_key);
END IF;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_bindings_insert_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
PERFORM identity_lifecycle_lock_coordinates_v1(
NEW.community_id,
NEW.principal_fingerprint,
NEW.event_author_pubkey
);
IF NEW.binding_state <> 1
OR NEW.lifecycle_revision <> 1
OR NEW.retirement_history_id IS NOT NULL
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'identity binding birth must be Active at lifecycle revision 1'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_bindings_birth_state';
END IF;
NEW.created_at := transaction_timestamp();
NEW.updated_at := transaction_timestamp();
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_bindings_transition_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
PERFORM identity_lifecycle_lock_coordinates_v1(
OLD.community_id,
OLD.principal_fingerprint,
OLD.event_author_pubkey
);
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.binding_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.binding_id
OR NEW.binding_version IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.binding_version
OR NEW.issuer IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.issuer
OR NEW.subject IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.subject
OR NEW.principal_fingerprint IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.principal_fingerprint
OR NEW.event_author_pubkey IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.event_author_pubkey
OR NEW.binding_provenance IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.binding_provenance
OR NEW.policy_revision IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.policy_revision
OR NEW.enrollment_evidence_digest IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.enrollment_evidence_digest
OR NEW.expires_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.expires_at
OR NEW.birth_history_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.birth_history_id
OR NEW.creation_operation_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.creation_operation_id
OR NEW.creation_request_fingerprint IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.creation_request_fingerprint
OR NEW.created_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.created_at
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'identity binding generation coordinates are immutable'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_bindings_immutable_generation';
END IF;
IF OLD.binding_state <> 1
OR OLD.lifecycle_revision <> 1
OR OLD.retirement_history_id IS NOT NULL
OR NEW.binding_state <> 2
OR NEW.lifecycle_revision <> 2
OR NEW.retirement_history_id IS NULL
OR NEW.retirement_history_id = OLD.birth_history_id
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'identity binding permits only Active/r1 to Retired/r2'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_bindings_active_to_retired';
END IF;
NEW.updated_at := transaction_timestamp();
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_history_insert_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
NEW.recorded_at := transaction_timestamp();
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_binding_history_semantics_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
retirement identity_lifecycle_history%ROWTYPE;
BEGIN
IF NEW.binding_state = 2 THEN
SELECT * INTO STRICT retirement
FROM identity_lifecycle_history
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND history_id = NEW.retirement_history_id
AND old_binding_id = NEW.binding_id
AND old_binding_version = NEW.binding_version;
IF retirement.outcome_code <> 1
OR retirement.old_prior_lifecycle_revision <> 1
OR retirement.old_prior_state <> 1
OR retirement.old_resulting_lifecycle_revision <> 2
OR retirement.old_resulting_state <> 2
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'retired binding must reference its exact Active-to-Retired transition'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_bindings_retirement_history_semantics';
END IF;
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_binding_birth_eligibility_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM identity_lifecycle_selectors selector
WHERE selector.community_id = NEW.community_id
AND (
(selector.selector_kind = 1
AND selector.principal_fingerprint = NEW.principal_fingerprint
AND selector.event_author_pubkey = NEW.event_author_pubkey)
OR (selector.selector_kind = 3
AND selector.event_author_pubkey = NEW.event_author_pubkey)
)
) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'binding birth conflicts with an effective lifecycle selector'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_bindings_birth_eligibility';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_operation_receipt_history_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
history_count BIGINT;
expected_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT count(*) INTO history_count
FROM identity_lifecycle_history history
WHERE history.community_id = NEW.community_id
AND history.operation_id = NEW.operation_id;
-- Core lifecycle receipts (enroll, retire, revoke, rotate) each require
-- exactly one lifecycle-history row. Non-lifecycle receipts (protected
-- mutation, invalidation) require none.
expected_count := CASE
WHEN NEW.operation_kind IN (1, 3, 5, 6) AND NEW.outcome_code IN (1, 3) THEN 1
ELSE 0
END;
IF history_count <> expected_count THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'operation receipt requires % lifecycle history row, found %',
expected_count, history_count
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_operation_receipt_history_cardinality';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_selector_insert_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
NEW.selected_at := transaction_timestamp();
PERFORM identity_lifecycle_lock_coordinates_v1(
NEW.community_id,
CASE WHEN NEW.selector_kind = 1 THEN NEW.principal_fingerprint END,
NEW.event_author_pubkey
);
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_selector_history_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
history identity_lifecycle_history%ROWTYPE;
old_binding identity_bindings%ROWTYPE;
BEGIN
SELECT * INTO STRICT history
FROM identity_lifecycle_history
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND history_id = NEW.asserted_history_id
AND operation_id = NEW.selected_by_operation_id
AND request_fingerprint = NEW.selected_by_request_fingerprint;
IF history.old_binding_id IS NOT NULL THEN
SELECT * INTO STRICT old_binding
FROM identity_bindings
WHERE community_id = history.community_id
AND binding_id = history.old_binding_id
AND binding_version = history.old_binding_version;
END IF;
-- A retired-pair (P) selector is asserted by retire, revoke, or rotate of a
-- named old generation; a revoked-key (Y) selector by revoke.
IF history.outcome_code <> 1
OR (NEW.selector_kind = 1 AND (
history.transition_kind NOT IN (3, 5, 6)
OR history.old_binding_id IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.binding_id
OR history.old_binding_version IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.binding_version
OR old_binding.principal_fingerprint IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.principal_fingerprint
OR old_binding.event_author_pubkey IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.event_author_pubkey
))
OR (NEW.selector_kind = 3 AND (
history.transition_kind <> 5
OR (history.old_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND old_binding.event_author_pubkey
IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.event_author_pubkey)
))
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'selector does not match its lifecycle transition'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_lifecycle_selector_history_semantics';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
transition identity_lifecycle_history%ROWTYPE;
old_binding_state SMALLINT;
asserted_p BIGINT;
asserted_y BIGINT;
BEGIN
IF TG_TABLE_NAME = 'identity_lifecycle_history' THEN
transition := NEW;
ELSIF TG_TABLE_NAME = 'identity_lifecycle_selectors' THEN
SELECT * INTO STRICT transition
FROM identity_lifecycle_history
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND history_id = NEW.asserted_history_id;
ELSE
SELECT * INTO STRICT transition
FROM identity_lifecycle_history
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND history_id = CASE
WHEN NEW.binding_state = 2 THEN NEW.retirement_history_id
ELSE NEW.birth_history_id
END;
END IF;
SELECT
count(*) FILTER (WHERE selector_kind = 1),
count(*) FILTER (WHERE selector_kind = 3)
INTO asserted_p, asserted_y
FROM identity_lifecycle_selectors
WHERE community_id = transition.community_id
AND asserted_history_id = transition.history_id;
IF transition.old_binding_id IS NOT NULL THEN
SELECT binding_state INTO STRICT old_binding_state
FROM identity_bindings
WHERE community_id = transition.community_id
AND binding_id = transition.old_binding_id
AND binding_version = transition.old_binding_version;
IF old_binding_state <> 2 THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'lifecycle transition old binding must be retired at commit'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity';
END IF;
END IF;
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM identity_lifecycle_selectors selector
JOIN identity_bindings active
ON active.community_id = selector.community_id
AND active.binding_state = 1
AND (
(selector.selector_kind = 1
AND active.principal_fingerprint = selector.principal_fingerprint
AND active.event_author_pubkey = selector.event_author_pubkey)
OR (selector.selector_kind = 3
AND active.event_author_pubkey = selector.event_author_pubkey)
)
WHERE selector.community_id = transition.community_id
) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'effective lifecycle selector conflicts with an active binding'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity';
END IF;
IF transition.outcome_code = 3 THEN
IF asserted_p + asserted_y <> 0 THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'no-op lifecycle transition cannot create selector facts'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END IF;
-- Core selector companions per transition:
-- enroll (1): none
-- retire (3): exactly one P
-- revoke (5): one Y always; one P when a named old generation is removed
-- rotate (6): exactly one P (old generation retired)
IF (transition.transition_kind = 1
AND (asserted_p, asserted_y) <> (0, 0))
OR (transition.transition_kind = 3
AND (asserted_p, asserted_y) <> (1, 0))
OR (transition.transition_kind = 5 AND (
(transition.old_binding_id IS NOT NULL
AND (asserted_p, asserted_y) <> (1, 1))
OR (transition.old_binding_id IS NULL
AND (asserted_p, asserted_y) <> (0, 1))
))
OR (transition.transition_kind = 6
AND (asserted_p, asserted_y) <> (1, 0))
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'lifecycle transition has incomplete or forbidden selector companions'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER identity_bindings_insert_guard
BEFORE INSERT ON identity_bindings
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_bindings_insert_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_bindings_transition_guard
BEFORE UPDATE ON identity_bindings
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_bindings_transition_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_bindings_history_semantics
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE ON identity_bindings
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_binding_history_semantics_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_bindings_birth_eligibility
AFTER INSERT ON identity_bindings
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_binding_birth_eligibility_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_bindings_transition_integrity
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE ON identity_bindings
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_bindings_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON identity_bindings
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_bindings_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON identity_bindings
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_history_insert_guard
BEFORE INSERT ON identity_lifecycle_history
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_history_insert_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER authorization_operation_receipt_history_cardinality
AFTER INSERT ON authorization_operation_receipts
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_operation_receipt_history_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity
AFTER INSERT ON identity_lifecycle_history
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_selector_insert_guard
BEFORE INSERT ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_selector_insert_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_selector_history_semantics
AFTER INSERT ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_selector_history_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_selector_transition_integrity
AFTER INSERT ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION identity_lifecycle_transition_integrity_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_receipts_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_operation_receipts
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_receipts_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_operation_receipts
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_enrollment_policies_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON identity_enrollment_policies
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_enrollment_policies_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON identity_enrollment_policies
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_history_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON identity_lifecycle_history
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_history_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON identity_lifecycle_history
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_selectors_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER identity_lifecycle_selectors_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON identity_lifecycle_selectors
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
-- These identity relations are a durable, tamper-evident authorization ledger:
-- FI-INV-02 (durable binding) and FI-INV-03 (tombstone monotonicity) require
-- their denial facts to outlive any single tenant lifecycle, and the immutable
-- no_delete/no_truncate triggers above enforce exactly that. They therefore
-- carry community_id as provenance, not as deletable ownership — the same
-- posture migration 0030 took for product_feedback and rate_limit_violations.
-- Widen the single SQL source of truth so the universal write fence and the
-- deletion catalog treat them as ledger: never fence-attached, never purged,
-- never counted as tenant-scoped drift. community rows are permanent tombstones
-- (never hard-deleted), so their NOT NULL community_id references never dangle.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION community_write_fence_excluded_table(target NAME) RETURNS BOOLEAN
LANGUAGE SQL IMMUTABLE STRICT PARALLEL SAFE AS $$
SELECT target::TEXT = ANY (ARRAY[
'community_deletion_requests', 'community_deletion_approvals',
'community_deletion_checkpoints', 'community_serving_write_leases',
'community_deletion_executor_heartbeats', 'product_feedback',
'rate_limit_violations',
'authorization_operation_receipts', 'identity_enrollment_policies',
'identity_bindings', 'identity_lifecycle_history',
'identity_lifecycle_selectors'
]::TEXT[])
$$;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,749 @@
-- Provider-free NIP-FI authorization, audit, fencing, and restore foundation.
--
-- There is no provider registry/SPI/profile/evidence table, durable lease or
-- audio admission ledger, 30382 projection, delivery queue, exporter claim,
-- acknowledgement, retry scheduler, or online retention/compaction workflow.
--
-- This migration applies to migration 0040's resulting state. Its scope is the
-- NIP-FI *final-admission* surface: replay/receipt, audit events, invalidation,
-- capacity, protected-object authority, restore version deltas, and the closed
-- admission result. Closed vocabularies below carry only the core subset;
-- delegation coordinates (owner/relationship columns, invalidation selector 7,
-- version-delta component kind 6) are deferred to the FI-DELEG migration and
-- extended-lifecycle audit kinds (recover, enable, disable, admission-loss;
-- version-delta component kind 7) to the FI-LIFECYCLE migration, matching
-- 0040's carve. A later migration widens these additively; nothing here
-- presumes a single global issuer.
-- Durable one-way activation marker and current domain invalidation generation.
CREATE TABLE authorization_invalidation_domains (
community_id UUID NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES communities(id),
current_generation BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (current_generation >= 0),
activated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp()
);
-- Closed selectors: 1 principal, 2 Nostr key, 3 binding, 4 session, 5 domain,
-- 6 configuration revision. Selector 7 (delegated relationship) and its
-- relationship-revision floor are deferred to the FI-DELEG migration.
CREATE TABLE authorization_invalidation_floors (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
selector_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (selector_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)),
selector_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(selector_fingerprint) = 32),
floor_generation BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (floor_generation > 0),
binding_version_floor BIGINT CHECK (binding_version_floor IS NULL OR binding_version_floor > 0),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, selector_kind, selector_fingerprint),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (
(selector_kind = 3 AND binding_version_floor IS NOT NULL)
OR (selector_kind <> 3 AND binding_version_floor IS NULL)
)
);
-- Protected-object kinds: 1 domain, 2 channel, 3 repository, 4 media,
-- 5 moderation target, 6 audio session. Kind 7 is retired: current binding
-- status is connection-local evidence and never a durable protected object.
CREATE TABLE authorization_authority_epochs (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
object_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (object_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)),
object_key BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(object_key) = 32),
authority_epoch BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (authority_epoch > 0),
fence BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(fence) = 32 AND fence <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex')
),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, object_kind, object_key),
UNIQUE (
community_id,
object_kind,
object_key,
authority_epoch,
fence,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
);
-- Direct-final current authority for a protected object. The authorization
-- lease itself is sealed in memory and dies on restart; this durable row is the
-- exact source re-fenced immediately before a protected mutation or emission.
CREATE TABLE protected_object_authority (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
object_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (object_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)),
object_key BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(object_key) = 32),
capability SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
capability IN (
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29
)
),
actor_pubkey BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(actor_pubkey) = 32),
binding_id UUID NOT NULL,
binding_version BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (binding_version > 0),
policy_revision BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (policy_revision > 0),
invalidation_generation BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (invalidation_generation >= 0),
authority_epoch BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (authority_epoch > 0),
fence BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(fence) = 32 AND fence <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex')
),
issued_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, object_kind, object_key),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
REFERENCES identity_bindings (community_id, binding_id, binding_version)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (
community_id,
object_kind,
object_key,
authority_epoch,
fence,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
) REFERENCES authorization_authority_epochs (
community_id,
object_kind,
object_key,
authority_epoch,
fence,
operation_id,
request_fingerprint
) DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (issued_at < expires_at)
);
-- Explicit immutable-capacity policy required by Enforce mode. Hard ceilings
-- match buzz-auth; installation limits must be sized explicitly below them.
-- V1 has no online pruning/export/reset workflow.
CREATE TABLE authorization_event_capacity (
community_id UUID NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES communities(id),
max_events_per_domain BIGINT NOT NULL CONSTRAINT authorization_event_capacity_max_events CHECK (
max_events_per_domain BETWEEN 1 AND 10000
),
max_bytes_per_domain BIGINT NOT NULL CONSTRAINT authorization_event_capacity_max_bytes CHECK (
max_bytes_per_domain BETWEEN 1 AND 16777216
),
max_envelope_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL CONSTRAINT authorization_event_capacity_max_envelope CHECK (
max_envelope_bytes BETWEEN 1 AND 16384
),
retained_event_count BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (retained_event_count >= 0),
retained_envelope_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (retained_envelope_bytes >= 0),
-- 1 healthy, 2 audit unavailable/exhausted. Recovery/reset is not a V1
-- online workflow; enabled runtime latches failure when insertion aborts.
health_state SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (health_state IN (1, 2)),
failure_code SMALLINT CHECK (failure_code IS NULL OR failure_code IN (1, 2, 3)),
failure_observed_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
configured_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
CHECK (max_envelope_bytes <= max_bytes_per_domain),
CHECK (retained_event_count <= max_events_per_domain),
CHECK (retained_envelope_bytes <= max_bytes_per_domain),
CHECK (
(health_state = 1 AND failure_code IS NULL AND failure_observed_at IS NULL)
OR (health_state = 2 AND failure_code IS NOT NULL AND failure_observed_at IS NOT NULL)
)
);
-- Durable versioned pseudonymous authorization envelope. event_kind:
-- 1 enrolled, 2 revoked, 3 rotated, 6 retired, 9 operator denied,
-- 10 protected allowed, 11 protected denied, 14 invalidation advanced.
-- The extended-lifecycle audit kinds (4 recovered, 5 principal enabled,
-- 7 principal disabled, 8 admission lost) are deferred to the FI-LIFECYCLE
-- migration, matching 0040's core lifecycle carve. Kinds 12 and 13 are
-- retired: kind 24244 publication/withdrawal is ephemeral connection state and
-- never a durable authorization event.
CREATE TABLE authorization_events (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
event_id UUID NOT NULL,
schema_version SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (schema_version = 1),
event_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
event_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14)
),
outcome_code SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (outcome_code IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)),
reason_code SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
reason_code IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)
),
actor_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 4)),
actor_fingerprint BYTEA CHECK (
actor_fingerprint IS NULL OR octet_length(actor_fingerprint) = 32
),
subject_fingerprint BYTEA CHECK (
subject_fingerprint IS NULL OR octet_length(subject_fingerprint) = 32
),
-- Always retains attempted operation identity. Only unresolved pre-auth
-- event kind 9 omits the canonical receipt fingerprint; authenticated
-- OperatorDenied events remain linked to their exact canonical receipt.
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA CHECK (
request_fingerprint IS NULL OR octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32
),
correlation_id UUID NOT NULL,
attempt_id UUID NOT NULL,
occurred_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
accepted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
canonical_envelope BYTEA NOT NULL CONSTRAINT authorization_events_envelope_size CHECK (
octet_length(canonical_envelope) BETWEEN 1 AND 16384
),
envelope_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(envelope_digest) = 32),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, event_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, event_id, operation_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, event_id, event_kind, operation_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, operation_id, event_kind, attempt_id),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (event_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (operation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (correlation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (attempt_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (
(actor_kind = 4 AND event_kind = 9 AND request_fingerprint IS NULL)
OR (actor_kind IN (1, 2, 3) AND request_fingerprint IS NOT NULL)
),
CHECK (
(actor_kind = 4 AND actor_fingerprint IS NULL AND subject_fingerprint IS NULL)
OR (actor_kind IN (1, 2, 3) AND actor_fingerprint IS NOT NULL)
)
);
-- Credential-free pre-authentication denial attempts. The five-column key is
-- exact replay identity; no row or FK occupies canonical operation/result,
-- effect, authority, approval, or consumption state.
CREATE TABLE authorization_authentication_denial_attempts (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
correlation_id UUID NOT NULL,
semantic_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(semantic_fingerprint) = 32),
denial_reason SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (denial_reason IN (1, 2, 3)),
expected_revision BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (expected_revision > 0),
action SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)),
reason_code SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (
reason_code IN (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)
),
audit_event_id UUID NOT NULL,
audit_event_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 9 CHECK (audit_event_kind = 9),
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (
community_id,
operation_id,
correlation_id,
semantic_fingerprint,
denial_reason
),
UNIQUE (community_id, audit_event_id),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, audit_event_id, audit_event_kind, operation_id)
REFERENCES authorization_events (community_id, event_id, event_kind, operation_id)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
CHECK (operation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid),
CHECK (correlation_id <> '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'::uuid)
);
-- Exact per-operation authority-version attribution for restore. Empty
-- manifests are valid; every stored component must advance strictly.
CREATE TABLE authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
component_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (component_count BETWEEN 0 AND 1024),
before_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(before_digest) = 32),
after_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(after_digest) = 32),
manifest_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(manifest_digest) = 32),
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, operation_id),
UNIQUE (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
);
-- component_kind: 1 binding version, 2 policy revision,
-- 3 invalidation generation, 4 authority epoch. Kind 6 (delegated-relationship
-- revision) is deferred to the FI-DELEG migration and kind 7 (lifecycle-selector
-- generation) to the FI-LIFECYCLE migration. Kind 5 is retired with durable
-- client-status revisions; retained kinds keep their original identities.
CREATE TABLE authorization_operation_version_deltas (
community_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
component_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (component_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 4)),
component_key BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(component_key) = 32),
before_version BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (before_version >= 0),
after_version BIGINT NOT NULL,
component_digest BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(component_digest) = 32),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, operation_id, component_kind, component_key),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests
(community_id, operation_id),
CHECK (after_version > before_version)
);
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_event_capacity_before_insert_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
policy authorization_event_capacity%ROWTYPE;
envelope_bytes BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT * INTO policy
FROM authorization_event_capacity
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization event capacity policy missing'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_event_capacity_policy_required';
END IF;
IF policy.health_state <> 1 THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization audit is unavailable'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_event_capacity_health';
END IF;
envelope_bytes := octet_length(NEW.canonical_envelope);
IF envelope_bytes > policy.max_envelope_bytes
OR policy.retained_event_count + 1 > policy.max_events_per_domain
OR policy.retained_envelope_bytes + envelope_bytes > policy.max_bytes_per_domain
THEN
-- The INSERT and protected mutation abort together. The runtime maps
-- this stable constraint to typed CapacityExhausted and latches audit
-- health outside the rolled-back transaction.
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization event capacity exhausted'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_event_capacity_exhausted';
END IF;
UPDATE authorization_event_capacity
SET retained_event_count = retained_event_count + 1,
retained_envelope_bytes = retained_envelope_bytes + envelope_bytes,
updated_at = transaction_timestamp()
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_events_capacity
BEFORE INSERT ON authorization_events
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_event_capacity_before_insert_v1();
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_invalidation_domain_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.activated_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.activated_at
OR NEW.current_generation <= OLD.current_generation
OR NEW.updated_at <= OLD.updated_at
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization invalidation activation/generation cannot move backward'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_domains_monotonic
BEFORE UPDATE ON authorization_invalidation_domains
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_invalidation_domain_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_domains_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON authorization_invalidation_domains
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_domains_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_invalidation_domains
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_invalidation_floor_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.selector_kind IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.selector_kind
OR NEW.selector_fingerprint IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.selector_fingerprint
OR NEW.floor_generation < OLD.floor_generation
OR COALESCE(NEW.binding_version_floor, 0) < COALESCE(OLD.binding_version_floor, 0)
OR COALESCE(NEW.relationship_revision_floor, 0)
< COALESCE(OLD.relationship_revision_floor, 0)
OR (
NEW.floor_generation = OLD.floor_generation
AND COALESCE(NEW.binding_version_floor, 0)
= COALESCE(OLD.binding_version_floor, 0)
AND COALESCE(NEW.relationship_revision_floor, 0)
= COALESCE(OLD.relationship_revision_floor, 0)
)
OR NEW.operation_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD.operation_id
OR NEW.updated_at <= OLD.updated_at
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization invalidation floor cannot move backward'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_floors_monotonic
BEFORE UPDATE ON authorization_invalidation_floors
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_invalidation_floor_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_floors_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON authorization_invalidation_floors
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_invalidation_floors_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_invalidation_floors
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_authority_epoch_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.object_kind IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.object_kind
OR NEW.object_key IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.object_key
OR NEW.authority_epoch <= OLD.authority_epoch
OR NEW.fence IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD.fence
OR NEW.operation_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD.operation_id
OR NEW.updated_at <= OLD.updated_at
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization authority epoch cannot move backward'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_authority_epochs_monotonic
BEFORE UPDATE ON authorization_authority_epochs
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_authority_epoch_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_authority_epochs_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON authorization_authority_epochs
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_authority_epochs_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_authority_epochs
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_event_capacity_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.max_events_per_domain IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.max_events_per_domain
OR NEW.max_bytes_per_domain IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.max_bytes_per_domain
OR NEW.max_envelope_bytes IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.max_envelope_bytes
OR NEW.configured_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.configured_at
OR NEW.retained_event_count < OLD.retained_event_count
OR NEW.retained_envelope_bytes < OLD.retained_envelope_bytes
OR NEW.updated_at < OLD.updated_at
OR (OLD.health_state = 2 AND (
NEW.health_state <> 2
OR NEW.failure_code IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.failure_code
OR NEW.failure_observed_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.failure_observed_at
))
OR (OLD.health_state = 1 AND NEW.health_state = 1 AND (
NEW.failure_code IS NOT NULL OR NEW.failure_observed_at IS NOT NULL
))
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'authorization event capacity cannot be reset online'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION protected_object_authority_guard_v1() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
IF NEW IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.community_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.community_id
OR NEW.object_kind IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.object_kind
OR NEW.object_key IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.object_key
OR NEW.authority_epoch <= OLD.authority_epoch
OR NEW.fence IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD.fence
OR NEW.operation_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM OLD.operation_id
OR NEW.issued_at <= OLD.issued_at
THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'protected authority replacement requires a new operation and epoch'
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_event_capacity_monotonic
BEFORE UPDATE ON authorization_event_capacity
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_event_capacity_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_event_capacity_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON authorization_event_capacity
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_event_capacity_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_event_capacity
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_events_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_events
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_events_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_events
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_authentication_denial_attempts_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_authentication_denial_attempts
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_authentication_denial_attempts_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_authentication_denial_attempts
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_operation_version_delta_cardinality_guard_v1()
RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
manifest authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests%ROWTYPE;
actual_component_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
IF TG_TABLE_NAME = 'authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests' THEN
manifest := NEW;
ELSE
SELECT * INTO STRICT manifest
FROM authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND operation_id = NEW.operation_id
FOR NO KEY UPDATE;
END IF;
SELECT count(*) INTO actual_component_count
FROM authorization_operation_version_deltas
WHERE community_id = manifest.community_id
AND operation_id = manifest.operation_id;
IF actual_component_count <> manifest.component_count THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'operation version manifest declares % components, found %',
manifest.component_count, actual_component_count
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_operation_version_delta_cardinality';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_delta_manifest_cardinality
AFTER INSERT ON authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_operation_version_delta_cardinality_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_delta_component_cardinality
AFTER INSERT ON authorization_operation_version_deltas
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_operation_version_delta_cardinality_guard_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_deltas_immutable
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_operation_version_deltas
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_operation_version_deltas_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_operation_version_deltas
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER protected_object_authority_no_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON protected_object_authority
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER protected_object_authority_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON protected_object_authority
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER protected_object_authority_strict_replacement
BEFORE UPDATE ON protected_object_authority
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION protected_object_authority_guard_v1();
-- Canonical admission keeps its complete logical intent and the closed,
-- credential-free application result beside the immutable receipt. This is
-- what lets an identical request replay reconstruct the same typed result
-- without repeating membership or other application DML. Object kinds match
-- protected_object_authority: 1 domain, 2 channel, 3 repository, 4 media,
-- 5 moderation target, 6 audio session.
CREATE TABLE authorization_admission_results (
community_id UUID NOT NULL,
operation_id UUID NOT NULL,
request_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(request_fingerprint) = 32),
semantic_fingerprint BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(semantic_fingerprint) = 32
AND semantic_fingerprint <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex')
),
object_kind SMALLINT NOT NULL CHECK (object_kind BETWEEN 1 AND 6),
object_key BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (
octet_length(object_key) = 32
AND object_key <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex')
),
application_type BYTEA CHECK (
application_type IS NULL
OR (octet_length(application_type) = 32
AND application_type <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex'))
),
application_version SMALLINT CHECK (application_version > 0),
application_code SMALLINT CHECK (application_code > 0),
application_payload BYTEA CHECK (
application_payload IS NULL OR octet_length(application_payload) <= 4096
),
application_intent_digest BYTEA CHECK (
application_intent_digest IS NULL
OR (octet_length(application_intent_digest) = 32
AND application_intent_digest <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex'))
),
application_effect_digest BYTEA CHECK (
application_effect_digest IS NULL
OR (octet_length(application_effect_digest) = 32
AND application_effect_digest <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex'))
),
application_result_digest BYTEA CHECK (
application_result_digest IS NULL
OR (octet_length(application_result_digest) = 32
AND application_result_digest <> decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex'))
),
recorded_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT transaction_timestamp(),
PRIMARY KEY (community_id, operation_id),
FOREIGN KEY (community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint)
REFERENCES authorization_operation_receipts
(community_id, operation_id, request_fingerprint),
CHECK (
(application_type IS NULL
AND application_version IS NULL
AND application_code IS NULL
AND application_payload IS NULL
AND application_intent_digest IS NULL
AND application_effect_digest IS NULL
AND application_result_digest IS NULL)
OR (application_type IS NOT NULL
AND application_version IS NOT NULL
AND application_code IS NOT NULL
AND application_payload IS NOT NULL
AND application_intent_digest IS NOT NULL
AND application_effect_digest IS NOT NULL
AND application_result_digest IS NOT NULL)
)
);
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_admission_results_no_update
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON authorization_admission_results
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_row_mutation_v1();
CREATE TRIGGER authorization_admission_results_no_truncate
BEFORE TRUNCATE ON authorization_admission_results
FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION nip_fi_reject_truncate_v1();
-- Every successful/no-op core lifecycle receipt has exactly one privacy-safe
-- audit event with the closed transition-kind mapping. Both directions are
-- deferred so receipt, history, event, selectors, and binding may be inserted
-- in any order inside one transaction but can never commit partially. The
-- extended-lifecycle operation kinds (2 provision, 4 disable, 7 recover,
-- 8 enable, 9 admission loss) and their event kinds arrive with the
-- FI-LIFECYCLE migration; here the mapping covers only enroll/retire/revoke/
-- rotate. Non-lifecycle receipts (protected mutation, invalidation) carry no
-- audit-event cardinality requirement.
CREATE FUNCTION authorization_operation_receipt_event_guard_v1()
RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
DECLARE
receipt authorization_operation_receipts%ROWTYPE;
expected_event_kind SMALLINT;
matching_event_count BIGINT;
expected_event_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
IF TG_TABLE_NAME = 'authorization_operation_receipts' THEN
receipt := NEW;
ELSE
SELECT * INTO receipt
FROM authorization_operation_receipts
WHERE community_id = NEW.community_id
AND operation_id = NEW.operation_id;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
-- Credential-free pre-authentication denials intentionally have no
-- canonical receipt. Their separate FK/shape guards still run.
RETURN NULL;
END IF;
END IF;
expected_event_kind := CASE receipt.operation_kind
WHEN 1 THEN 1 -- enroll
WHEN 3 THEN 6 -- retire
WHEN 5 THEN 2 -- revoke
WHEN 6 THEN 3 -- rotate
ELSE NULL
END;
IF expected_event_kind IS NULL THEN
RETURN NULL;
END IF;
SELECT
count(*),
count(*) FILTER (WHERE event_kind = expected_event_kind)
INTO matching_event_count, expected_event_count
FROM authorization_events
WHERE community_id = receipt.community_id
AND operation_id = receipt.operation_id
AND request_fingerprint = receipt.request_fingerprint;
IF matching_event_count <> 1 OR expected_event_count <> 1 THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION
'lifecycle receipt requires exactly one event kind %, found % total and % expected',
expected_event_kind, matching_event_count, expected_event_count
USING ERRCODE = 'check_violation',
CONSTRAINT = 'authorization_operation_receipt_event_cardinality';
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER authorization_operation_receipt_event_cardinality
AFTER INSERT ON authorization_operation_receipts
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_operation_receipt_event_guard_v1();
CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER authorization_event_receipt_cardinality
AFTER INSERT ON authorization_events
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION authorization_operation_receipt_event_guard_v1();
-- Same ledger posture as migration 0040's identity relations: the admission,
-- replay, audit, and invalidation relations below are append-only denial and
-- authority facts protected by immutable no_delete/no_truncate triggers, so
-- they carry community_id as provenance rather than deletable ownership. Widen
-- the single SQL source of truth so the universal write fence and the deletion
-- catalog treat all NIP-FI relations as ledger — never fence-attached, never
-- purged, never counted as tenant-scoped drift. This re-declares the full set
-- (0040's identity relations plus these) because CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION
-- replaces the whole body.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION community_write_fence_excluded_table(target NAME) RETURNS BOOLEAN
LANGUAGE SQL IMMUTABLE STRICT PARALLEL SAFE AS $$
SELECT target::TEXT = ANY (ARRAY[
'community_deletion_requests', 'community_deletion_approvals',
'community_deletion_checkpoints', 'community_serving_write_leases',
'community_deletion_executor_heartbeats', 'product_feedback',
'rate_limit_violations',
'authorization_operation_receipts', 'identity_enrollment_policies',
'identity_bindings', 'identity_lifecycle_history',
'identity_lifecycle_selectors',
'authorization_invalidation_domains', 'authorization_invalidation_floors',
'authorization_authority_epochs', 'protected_object_authority',
'authorization_event_capacity', 'authorization_events',
'authorization_authentication_denial_attempts',
'authorization_operation_version_delta_manifests',
'authorization_operation_version_deltas', 'authorization_admission_results'
]::TEXT[])
$$;

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