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| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Wes
|
b6aa5539e3 |
feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery, community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing, links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is retained for later opt-in. `--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz` opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup. The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission, and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features; `BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory. `BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines. Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection. Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET /operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership endpoint. ## Validation - Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse, duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh GitHub CI is pending. - Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed; default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed (mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub CI remains pending. - Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at `fb15d5b82`. - Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. - Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the default-build suite. - Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and file-size checks). - Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too (hosted-only cases intentionally skip there). - Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping, reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean and restored controls pass. - Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At `24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches, matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account round trip. - Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default: 31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover. - Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch, preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical QR acceptance. - Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain. Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit. - Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls. Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed. - Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass. - Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR / pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in this check. - Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push snapshot. ## Review disposition | Feedback | Disposition | | --- | --- | | Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding ([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622), [queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640), [reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512)) | Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. | | Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue, transient HTTP retry classification ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143)) | All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated mutation evidence above. | | Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. | | iOS interrupted key export ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252)) | Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented. Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains pending. | | Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556)) | Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. | | Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported community mappings. | | Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app recovery/reset and remains deferred. | | Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains here. | | Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied. Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. | | Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. | | Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not demonstrated defects. | ## Remaining draft gates Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human acceptance and current CI are still required before merge. Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented capability. Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` (including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS, exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record results before marking review complete. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz> |
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|
Logan Johnson
|
cc6336d985 |
feat(relay): tag every membership notice with its channel type (#8406)
🤖
## Summary
- When someone is added to or removed from a system channel, the relay
now sends them the usual "you were added / removed" notice. Before, it
sent nothing, so a client could learn about a new system channel only by
rereading every channel.
- **A client sees a notice only if it knows the channel's type.** Every
membership notice now carries its channel type. Clients that do not send
`#t` (every client today) see only the types that existed before system
channels, so they see no change. A type that Buzz adds later is hidden
from them by default.
- The notices are stored like every other membership notice, so a client
that was offline can catch up with `since` instead of rereading all its
channels.
## Details
- Every kind:44100 (added) and kind:44101 (removed) notice now carries
`["t", <channel_type>]`, for example `["t","stream"]` or
`["t","system"]`.
- **One place reads the channel type:** `emit_membership_notification`
in `side_effects.rs`, where the relay signs the notice. A channel's type
is set when it is created and no code path changes it, so the tag stays
correct. If the channel row is missing, the relay sends no notice rather
than an untagged one.
- **The rule (NIP-CL):**
- a filter with `#t` matches a notice only when the notice's type is one
of its `#t` values;
- a filter without `#t` matches only the **legacy types**: `stream`,
`forum`, `dm`, `workflow`. This list is frozen
(`LEGACY_NOTICE_CHANNEL_TYPES`), so a new type never joins it;
- a notice without a `t` tag was stored before this change. It is always
a legacy type, so the relay treats it as one, and replay across the
upgrade stays complete.
- **Fails closed.** The rule lives in two shared places, and both
default to the legacy types. A read path that is not updated behaves as
it does today:
- `filters_match` / `notice_visible` (buzz-core). Live fan-out, the REQ
history post-filter, COUNT, the HTTP bridge and push all match through
it.
- `EventQuery::notice_channel_types` (buzz-db). Its SQL keeps only
visible notices before `LIMIT`, so page limits and COUNT stay exact.
`None` means legacy types. Only `filter_to_query_params` sets it, from
the filter's `#t`.
- A client that knows every current type sends one filter:
`{"kinds":[44100,44101],"#p":[<me>],"#t":["stream","forum","dm","workflow","system"]}`.
NIP-CL and NOSTR.md describe this.
- **Only the target receives a notice.** A notice names the target, the
channel and who made the change, and the relay signs it, so knowing its
id is not permission to read it. 44100/44101 are now in
`RESULT_GATED_KINDS`, the one list used by the `ids` exemption check,
the per-result reader check (WS and HTTP history, push), live fan-out
(same pod and Redis) and COUNT. This also closes the same id lookup for
ordinary channels' notices.
- No migration: 44100/44101 are already excluded from search indexing.
## Testing
- `buzz-core`: a table test covers untagged, `stream`, `system` and a
future type against filters without `#t`, with `#t` for one type, and
with `#t` for every type. Other kinds keep the plain `#t` match.
- Postgres tests (`system_channel_postgres_tests.rs`): live fan-out, REQ
history, COUNT and the HTTP bridge, for a filter without `#t`, a
`#t:["system"]` filter and an all-types filter; an untagged legacy
notice; a non-target with an `ids` filter on each path; and a raw
`EventQuery` that does not set the field.
- I broke each part on purpose and the tests failed: no type tag on the
notice, no rule in `filters_match`, no SQL rule, and no untagged clause
in the SQL.
- End to end: I built a relay container from
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
91e7b469b8 |
fix(relay): wait for the peer's Close before dropping any WebSocket (#8426)
🤖 A NIP-42 login refused for a NIP-FI key mismatch could reach the client as an abnormal close (`1006`, no reason) instead of the `NOTICE "restricted: authorization denied"` followed by close `1008` that every other authorization denial produces. The relay did write the NOTICE and the `1008` Close, but the connection task dropped TCP as soon as the writer finished, before the peer finished the close handshake. The client could then lose frames it hadn't read yet. It depends on timing, so it showed up intermittently and is not specific to key pairing. ## Relay route - `recv_loop` now hands back the read half even while a frame handler is still running. Frames are handled one at a time while the connection is live. Once it is cancelled, an in-flight handler (for example a Nostr `CLOSE` waiting on the subscription lock behind a REQ stuck in Redis) is spawned to finish instead of holding the reader. It is never dropped partway, so subscription retirement stays atomic, and cleanup joins it before the expiry barrier and application cleanup. - As soon as the writer finishes, `await_client_close` keeps the transport open until the client's Close arrives or the stream ends. It runs concurrently with joining the heartbeat, auth-timeout, expiry and auth-cancel tasks and the connection's application cleanup (subscriptions released, registry entry removed, presence cleared). Cleanup never waits on the peer, so a nonresponsive client cannot delay registry counts, presence or `has_admitted_connection`. The socket never waits on cleanup, so a stalled Redis (the pool has no wait timeout) or an expiry join blocked on its quiescence barrier cannot hold the socket and its file descriptor open past the bounded wait. The active-connection gauge and the connection permit are released after both finish. - The connection permit (`BUZZ_MAX_CONNECTIONS`) is now taken at the start of `handle_connection`, before the NIP-FI gate and the community-active bootstrap check, and held through the active handler or the refusal drain and its bounded wait. Previously a socket in bootstrap, or refused there, held no permit, so a burst of refusals could open sockets beyond the limit. Over the limit, the socket is still dropped with no frames. `buzz_ws_connections_active` still counts only connections that reached the active handler. ## Huddle-audio route - The relay and audio bootstrap drains share one bounded helper. A socket refused before admission waits after its community registry entry is released. - Every exit of the audio handler gets the bounded peer wait. Exits whose cleanup follows their terminal frames (`room_full`, `room_ended`, version mismatch, archived channel, owner rejection or unreachable, failed commit confirmation) and the normal teardown hand the socket to a background task that waits for the client's Close, so lease releases, `48102` writes and room archiving on Postgres and Redis never hold the socket open. The remaining exits send their frames last, and `handle_active_audio_connection` waits once they return. The wrapper joins the background task before returning, so the audio connection permit is held until the socket ends, as on the relay route. - Audio error exits now follow their existing JSON error with a Close frame: | Exit | Close code | | --- | --- | | `huddle_relay_draining` | `1012` service restart | | `join_rejected` (owner resolution failed), `huddle_owner_unreachable`, failed channel lookup | `1011` internal error | | `huddle_audio_unavailable`, `unsupported_version`, `upgrade_required`, `room_full`, `room_ended`, archived channel, owner rejection, NIP-FI authorization denial | `1008` policy | Audio login failures and authorization refusals outside NIP-FI `authorization_denied` still send only their existing error frame, then get the bounded wait. - The audio read half is an enum, so the hand-off has no `expect()` that can panic. ## Timing - The peer wait is bounded by `WS_TERMINAL_FLUSH_TIMEOUT` (1s), and drains to end-of-stream so a client-initiated Close gets its reply. The terminal writer flush has its own 1s budget, so the worst case for terminal transport work is about 2s per refused or closed socket. - Terminal frame writes (`flush_terminal_frames`, `send_exit_frames_bounded`) still give up on the first failure, but a failed or timed-out send is now logged at `debug` instead of being discarded. - The graceful-shutdown comment in `main.rs` now describes per-stage budgets (restart jitter, restart-Close acknowledgement, terminal flush, peer wait) rather than a per-socket total. The 30s hard drain bounds every socket, and the 35s process shutdown budget fits within the chart's 60s `terminationGracePeriodSeconds`. ## Tests Real-socket tests in the infra-free relay lane of `just test-unit` and `scripts/run-tests.sh` unless marked PostgreSQL: - The key-mismatch login and a session-expiry denial (as a control) both assert NOTICE then `1008` / `authorization denied` on the wire. - A raw-TCP client that never answers Close: the relay holds the socket for at least the bounded wait, has deregistered the connection by the time the socket ends, and ends it on its own under a 10s watchdog. - A raw-TCP client that withholds its Close until the connection has deregistered: the relay ends the socket in under the 1s cap, which fails if cleanup waits on the peer. - A raw-TCP client that never answers while final cleanup is stalled at a test pause point: the socket still ends after the bounded wait. - A raw-TCP client that never answers Close on the relay bootstrap drain, the audio bootstrap drain and an early audio-handler exit: the relay holds each socket for the bounded wait. - On the relay route with a one-slot budget through the real `handle_connection`: a refused bootstrap holds the slot until its socket ends, and a bootstrap stalled on the community check already holds the slot before the AUTH challenge is sent. - An established relay session whose reader is blocked in a Nostr `CLOSE` handler on a held subscription lock when the session expires: the socket ends within the bounded wait while the lock is held, and cleanup completes with the subscription retired once it is released. - An established relay session whose expiry task is stalled behind a held session effect permit: the socket still ends within the bounded wait. - PostgreSQL: an established audio session whose teardown is stalled after its Close, and a stalled archived-channel exit, both end within the bounded wait from the hand-off. - PostgreSQL: a fast refusal (unsupported protocol version) through the real `handle_audio_connection` with a one-slot permit budget keeps the permit taken until that socket ends. - PostgreSQL: `huddle_audio_unavailable` sends its error and then Close `1008` as the very next frame. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
|
af7979e1ca |
test(auth): read the clock once in NIP-FI until test (#8457)
🤖 The exact NIP-FI assertion-lifetime boundary test could fail when its JWT helper read the clock, then ES256 signing crossed a whole-second boundary. The token's `until` claim could land one second beyond the verifier's `now + skew + maximum_age` ceiling even though both were intended to use the same test instant. This changes the test helper to accept a captured instant and uses that instant for both the JWT time claims and `verify_at`. The boundary remains strict: `now + 3630s` is accepted and `now + 3631s` is rejected. No production code changes. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
|
5b433d9292 |
feat(relay): resolve NIP-FI issuer bindings from the database (#8377)
Stack: #8372 (merged) → this PR → #8399 → #8401 Makes relay login checks read the per-community NIP-FI issuer bindings that #8372 stores. Without this, the relay can't keep up with bb-public, where new communities are created at every signup and a static `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES` list won't do. **Source switch.** `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database` resolves each community's trusted issuers from `community_nip_fi_issuers`, filtered by the issuer registry, instead of the static list. Each community gets its own policy ID: the base ID no longer hashes every community audience, and the final ID hashes the base plus this community's audience, so policy IDs change once (see `docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md`). `Config::from_env` refuses to start, in every mode, on an unknown source, on `database` together with `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`, and on `database` without `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING`. `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_*` and `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_*` are validated in every mode, so a bad value fails the deploy that sets it. In `off` mode no resolver is built and no snapshot is loaded. **Resolver (`nip_fi_resolver.rs`).** - **Snapshot:** each pod loads every binding into memory, capped at `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS` (going over is a failed load). It refreshes every 30 s, start to start, with jitter that only shortens the delay and backoff after failures. Each attempt is limited by `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS`, which must be shorter than the interval. A refresh whose deadline passes before it publishes publishes nothing. The old snapshot is dropped off the runtime. - **Freshness:** a host in a snapshot loaded under two minutes ago is answered from memory. Any other host, and every host once the snapshot is stale, goes to a live lookup. Every answer carries a deadline two minutes after the read behind it started, and WS, HTTP and audio recheck it just before admitting. - **Live lookups:** bounded and single-flight. In-flight lookups are capped by `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT` (default 8, clamped below the database pool size), and the pending hosts and their waiters have fixed caps. Positive answers are used for that admission only. A "not found" is cached for 5 s, up to `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MAX` hosts, and only when no snapshot was published and no binding was created while it ran. A lookup that panics still leaves the pending map. - **Removal:** a removed binding stops admitting new connections within 30 s plus the refresh timeout (40 s by default) while refreshes succeed, and within two minutes of the last good load while they fail. Open WebSocket sessions are not rechecked when a binding is removed; they end at their own session deadline. **Shadow mode** resolves through the same path as enforce, including the database lookup and the freshness rules. It keeps the resolved binding's deadline and checks it at the same point as enforce; a binding that goes stale during the tenant lookup is recorded as `stage=deadline, outcome=unavailable`, without changing the legacy response or closing the socket. With `source=database` its `community` metric label is only `bound` or `unmapped`; with `source=env` it keeps the existing per-community audience label, so current shadow dashboards are unchanged. Each request resolves its Host once: the router guard's resolution, failures included, is reused by shadow recording and admission. **Provisioning.** Both operator provisioning paths drop this pod's cached "not found" for the new host after a commit that bound issuers, so the creator's first login looks it up. **Startup and readiness.** With `source=database` and a mode other than `off`, the first snapshot loads before any listener binds, under its own startup phase `nip_fi_snapshot_load`. A failed load exits non-zero, so a pod is never ready without a snapshot. **Operational consequence:** boot already fails when the database is unreachable; what is new is that a snapshot over `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS` or a load past its timeout also crash-loops new pods. After two minutes the old pods' snapshots go stale and most logins fall through to the 8-slot live lookup, which sheds the rest with 503. The way out is raising the cap or timeout, or `mode=off`. **Metrics.** `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_*` covers loads, failures, rows and freshness. `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds` is written on every refresh attempt, so alert on `time() - x > 120` together with `absent(x)`. `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows` against `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rows` gives the headroom to the row cap. `buzz_nip_fi_resolver_*` covers live lookups and the negative cache. The env vars and alerts are documented in `.env.example`, the chart README and `docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md`, which also has the staged off → shadow → enforce rollout for `source=database` with go/no-go signals at each step, and the over-cap and load-timeout failure modes with their ways out. **Regression coverage.** Router-level tests run the database resolver through the real `build_router` for root WS, audio and protected HTTP, in enforce and shadow mode. Over PostgreSQL and Redis, two pods using the env community source (two exact bindings) replay assertions retained from before a disconnect through a real root NIP-42 session, the audio deny-set check and signed NIP-98 requests: they are denied on both pods, and a root session upgraded before the disconnect is refused by the post-registration deny-set check. Postgres tests in `buzz-db` check that archived and quiescing communities, and issuers missing from the registry, never reach the snapshot or the live lookup. Process-level `boot_lifecycle` tests spawn the real relay with `source=database`: an over-cap or timed-out startup load exits non-zero with no health listener bound, and a loadable snapshot lets readiness turn ready. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tom Brow
|
305fb7b5cd |
fix(push-gateway): request default notification sound (#8431)
Push banners arrive silently because the gateway's fixed APNs body never requests a sound, even though the iOS app requests sound permission. Add `aps.sound: "default"` to that constant so ordinary alerts request the system sound even if the notification extension is not invoked. Preserve the existing alert text, mutable-content flag, and class-blind, content-free delivery contract; synchronize its normative specification and executable models. Companion client workaround: [#8429](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8429). This gateway change also covers the original-payload fallback and requires no mobile source change. Sound remains subject to iOS settings and authorization. It does not bypass Focus or Silent Mode, select critical alerts, or guarantee vibration. Every public-profile wake requests the same sound, including generic/restricted fallback banners. ### Validation - Extended the real HTTP transport test: reproduced missing sound (`null` versus `default`) before the fix, then passed with the fix. All 79 runnable gateway library tests pass; 17 infrastructure/manual tests remain ignored. - Added a guard against drift between the emitted bytes, NIP-PL, and both formal models. Fixed-payload and stateful-delivery models and mutation checks pass. - Inspected the 0.24.0 (7) iOS source: sound permission is requested; ordinary enrichment and restricted fallback copy incoming content. A macOS UserNotifications probe confirms copy retention, but does not test iOS Intents or audible device delivery. - Focused existing native resolver/handoff tests pass (35 tests on macOS). These cover resolution and fallback behavior, not iOS sound playback. - Deployed exact head [ |
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Bradley Axen
|
3ffbfa693c |
feat(relay): start a channel with its members in one create (#8421)
## What
A kind:9007 can now name the channel's first members with `p` tags.
Those members are added in the same database transaction that creates
the channel. Resending a create whose OK was lost is now accepted
instead of refused.
## Why
Starting a new Solo chat today takes about 6–8 sequential relay round
trips before the first message goes out: create, read, add each agent
(kind:9000), read the roster, then send. With members in the create, a
client can start a chat with its agents as two writes: the create, then
the message as soon as the create is OK.
The resend fix makes the create safe for an outbox to retry. Today an
identical resend after a lost OK is refused with `duplicate: channel
already exists`, so the client can't tell success from a real UUID
collision.
## How
- **buzz-db:** `Db::create_channel_with_event` writes the channel, its
owner, its members (role `member`, `invited_by` = creator) and the 9007
event itself in one transaction. A channel row therefore never exists
without its create event. `create_channel_with_id` is unchanged for its
other callers.
- **Validation** (`side_effects::initial_members` and the
`validate_admin_event` 9007 branch):
- Each `p` must be a 32-byte hex pubkey.
- Duplicates and the creator are dropped.
- At most 32 members.
- An `h` tag is required when there are members.
- Each member goes through the same `decide_channel_add_policy` check a
kind:9000 uses, so an agent that refuses third-party adds keeps the
whole create out.
- **Side effects:** each initial member gets the same `member_joined`
system message and member-added notification a kind:9000 would post. The
fallback in `handle_create_group` creates a bare channel when the
pre-created row is missing; it announces no members, because it added
none.
- **Resend:** when the UUID is already taken, the same transaction
checks whether this exact event is the stored create.
- If it is, the create is OK'd as `duplicate:` (it is the same signed
create).
- Anything else, including a changed create from the same author, is
refused and writes nothing, so it can never re-run side effects or
announce members.
- A resend that arrives while the first create is still uncommitted
waits on its channel insert. It is confirmed once the first commits, or
creates the channel itself if the first rolled back. Before this, a
resend in that window was refused, and the app then withdrew a chat that
existed.
- **No compensation:** ingest no longer soft-deletes a pre-created
channel when the event insert fails. The rollback covers it.
- **Announcements:** a failed `member_joined` notice for one initial
member is logged at `error` and the loop continues, so the members after
it still get theirs. A resend writes nothing, so nothing would retry
them.
## Compatibility
A 9007 with malformed `p` tags, or more than 32 of them, used to be
accepted with the tags ignored. It is now rejected with `invalid:`. The
relay's own SDK and CLI builders send no `p` tags on 9007.
## Out of scope
- The kind:9000 OK still doesn't prove the membership change committed:
side-effect failures are logged and OK'd, and a duplicate replay skips
side effects. The new path doesn't depend on kind:9000.
- Events in separate HTTP requests are still unordered. Clients send the
first message after the create's OK.
## Tests
`store::channel::postgres_tests` (buzz-db):
- `a_resend_beside_an_open_create_confirms_it_once_committed`: holds a
create open, checks that the resend waits, commits, and expects `Exists
{ resent: true }` with one owner and one member.
- `a_resend_beside_a_failed_create_creates_the_channel`: the same, but
the first create rolls back.
- `a_create_whose_event_fails_leaves_no_channel`: an event the insert
refuses leaves no channel row, and a retry creates the channel.
- `another_create_for_a_taken_channel_writes_nothing`.
Two mutations, each caught: committing the channel before its event
fails the "leaves no channel" test, and looking up the event before the
channel insert waits fails the "confirmed once committed" test.
`handlers/create_with_members_postgres_tests.rs`, all through the real
ingest path:
- `create_adds_its_p_tags_as_members` checks:
- the roles and the 39002 roster
- exactly one `member_joined` notice
- that the agent can post with no separate add
- `create_respects_the_members_add_policy`: an agent with policy
`nobody` gets an `invalid:` rejection, and no channel is created.
- `resending_a_create_confirms_it`:
- an identical resend is accepted
- a changed create (from the creator or from someone else) is refused
- the roster is unchanged and nobody new is announced
- Unit tests for `initial_members`: dedupe, creator excluded, bad hex,
the 32-member cap, and the missing `h` tag.
Each new test was mutation-checked against the change it covers: no
members, no policy check, refuse every resend, and let a changed creator
create through. Each mutation turns its test red.
Agent exercise on a local relay, over `POST /events` the way the app
sends:
- The 9007 with `p` = agent was accepted in 54–97ms (debug build).
- The kind 9 was accepted 12–15ms after the create's OK.
- The agent was in the 39002 roster, and the operator listener delivered
the mention.
- An identical resend came back `duplicate:` (accepted), and a changed
create was refused.
Local suite runs at
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|
Will Pfleger
|
6286a54321 |
feat(relay): store per-community NIP-FI issuer bindings (#8372)
Stack: this PR → #8377 → #8399 → #8401 bb-public creates communities all the time, so a hand-edited `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES` map can't list them. This PR stores an explicit NIP-FI issuer allowlist for each community in the database and writes it when the community is created. Login checks don't read the table yet; that comes in #8377 together with the database-backed resolver. Operator steps are in [`docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md`](docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md). **Storage.** Migration `0066_community_nip_fi_issuers` adds `community_nip_fi_issuers (community_id, issuer, created_at)`, with primary key `(community_id, issuer)` and the community write fence attached. The assertion audience is `https://<communities.host>`, so the table has no `aud` column. Zero rows means no binding. The table is included in whole-community deletion and purge. **One bindable rule.** `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` (`{"host_suffix": ..., "authorized_issuers": [...]}`) is parsed in `buzz-auth` with `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`, whatever `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE` is set to, and both the relay and `buzz-admin` use the same parser. Each authorized issuer must be a configured issuer (1 to 2048 bytes), and the suffix must not cover any host declared in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`; an unreadable declaration refuses startup even in mode `off`. `ProvisionBindingPolicy::is_bindable(host)` is true for a host exactly one label under the suffix that is not reserved. It decides creation-time binding, explicit `bind`, and what the lookup route reports. **Binding on creation.** Rows are written in the same transaction as the community insert on all three creation paths (`POST /operator/communities` `create_only`, its legacy convergence branch, and startup bootstrap), and only when the call actually created the community, so existing rows are never rewritten. **Reserved host.** A host whose `https://<host>` equals a configured `command_audiences` value never holds a binding. Operator provisioning of it is rejected with a 400 and the `reserved_host` error code, bootstrap creates it unbound, and the availability route reports it unavailable with an error code. `main.rs` calls `verify_reserved_hosts_unbound` at startup; if a reserved host has rows the relay refuses to start and names the fix (`buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host <h> --issuer <i>`, or revert the command audience). A database failure during that check is a separate `Check` error. **Operator commands.** - `buzz-admin nip-fi backfill` pages unbound communities by host (1000 per page) and binds each page with one `INSERT ... SELECT` limited to active communities. It skips communities being deleted, always prints `{rows_bound, unbound, unbound_hosts, truncated}`, and exits non-zero while any bindable community is still unbound. Archived communities are bound on purpose. Both bind paths take the shared deletion lock and then lock the community row (`FOR NO KEY UPDATE`, in id order for a batch), the same order deletion uses, and the backfill insert also requires the community to still have no binding, so an operator `bind` that lands after the backfill listed a community wins and the default issuer is not added beside it. - `buzz-admin nip-fi bind --host --issuer` refuses a reserved host, a host outside the suffix, or an unconfigured issuer. - `buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host --issuer` refuses to remove a community's last issuer (archive or delete the community instead), with one exception: when a valid provisioning policy shows that backfill can't bind the host (it's reserved, or outside the suffix), the last issuer can be removed. That is the reserved-host recovery path in the runbook. A missing or malformed policy doesn't block `unbind`; it just means the exception never applies. **Lookup route.** `GET /operator/communities/nip-fi-binding?host=` (NIP-98, `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS`) reads the database and returns `{host, active, issuers[]}`. `host` is the stored host. It returns 404 for an unknown host, 200 with `active:false` for an archived or quiescing community, and `issuers:[]` when no provisioning policy is set. It lists only issuers that are configured and on a bindable host. kgoose depends on this contract; it is also documented in the runbook. **NIP-FA.** The `relay_url` bullet now also says: "An adapter MAY obtain its exact relay list from a configured, authenticated source; it MUST still compare `relay_url` exactly." **Deployment dependency.** The kgoose config side is already handled by [cash-server#137671](https://github.com/squareup/cash-server/pull/137671). In public-community mode it requires the command audience not to be a community audience. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Luke Tornquist
|
97e1f6a082 |
fix(db): validate channel roster snapshots in the app writer (#8316)
## Summary Phase 1 of retiring the channel roster snapshot trigger (`trg_events_guard_channel_roster_snapshot`, migration 0032). Every admitted writer that can store a kind 39002 roster snapshot now runs the same check the trigger runs, on the same transaction and under the same lock: - `LockedMemberSnapshot::replace_member_event` (relay's live roster publisher) validates the snapshot it already holds the membership lock for, before soft-deleting the old head. - `insert_event_on` and `insert_event_with_thread_metadata_tx` (generic event writes). - `replace_parameterized_event_in_transaction_impl` (inside its existing savepoint) and `Db::replace_addressable_event` (admin reconciliation path), after dominance checks and before the old head is deleted. The validator (`validate_channel_roster_snapshot`) is a direct port of `guard_channel_roster_snapshot()`: four-field `p` tags, 64-char hex pubkey, empty relay field, valid role, and an exact match against active `channel_members` rows. It raises the same `23514` messages, so callers still see `DbError::Sqlx(sqlx::Error::Database(..))` with the same code and text. **Lock order:** replacement key, then channel-membership key, then the canonical read, then the old-head `UPDATE` and the write. Legacy writers took the membership key later, at the trigger's INSERT, after the old-head row locks. Taking it before the `UPDATE` is not the same order, but it is strictly safer: it removes the row-lock/membership-key cycle. The membership writers in `channel_members.rs` take the same membership key before they change rows. Not every membership writer does yet: `execute_kick_with_marker` (reached from report enforcement) and `deploy_kick_member` in `relay_admin_actions.rs` set `removed_at` without the key, so a kick can commit after a roster passes validation and before that roster commits, leaving the removed member listed. The retained trigger has the same gap, so this PR neither causes nor closes it. When the trigger also runs it re-takes a key this transaction already holds; transaction advisory locks are re-entrant, so this adds no wait. The validator is one verdict query on the happy path. On failure it raises the trigger's exact error via a `DO` block, so mixed-version behavior is identical; phase 2 can switch to a typed `DbError`. **Unchanged on purpose:** the trigger, its function, migration 0032, and the startup probe `verify_channel_roster_fence_behavior`. Pods still on the old version depend on them. Phase 2 drops them once this version is running everywhere. ## Tests New PG tests in `channel_members.rs` `postgres_tests`, each with only the roster trigger disabled (the helper asserts the catalog check then fails): - `app_roster_guard_matches_trigger_for_roster_input_table`: 19 shape and membership cases (3/5-field tags, short and non-hex pubkeys, relay field, unknown role, duplicate, role mismatch, missing/extra member, uppercase hex, non-`p` tags, empty rosters, all roles). For each one, the app outcome through `Db::replace_addressable_event` must equal the trigger's outcome on a raw INSERT, including SQLSTATE and message. - `app_roster_guard_locked_writer_rejects_stale_and_accepts_current_without_trigger` - `app_roster_guard_covers_generic_and_parameterized_writers_without_trigger` - `app_roster_guard_rechecks_after_concurrent_membership_commit_without_trigger`: the 0032 race. A newer membership commits while an older snapshot waits on the membership key. The barrier is `pg_locks` with a bound, not sleeps. `stale_legacy_roster_cannot_replace_new_locked_snapshot` (`replaceable.rs`) and `desired_schema_rejects_stale_legacy_roster_role` (`channel_members.rs`) now simulate the old binary inline (replacement key, old-head `UPDATE`, raw INSERT) instead of calling the app API, so they test the retained trigger again. The replaceable.rs one keeps its one-connection pool, so it still catches self-deadlock. `observability_source.rs` gains `every_production_event_insert_runs_the_roster_guard`, which requires a real guard call in every production `INSERT INTO events` function, with explicit exceptions (NIP-43 membership and push lease rows, both `channel_id` NULL, and the two rolled-back startup probes), plus a self-test. Falsified: removing one guard call fails the source policy; dropping the role clause or `lower()` fails the parity table; disabling the trigger fails both legacy tests. The PG tests are picked up by the `postgres-ci` nextest filter (`test(/postgres_tests::/)`); the source policy runs in `just test-unit`. ### Coverage limits (review follow-up) - `every_production_event_insert_runs_the_roster_guard` is a presence check. It rejects missing, commented, and quoted calls, but it does not prove a call is awaited, reachable, or passed the event's real kind and channel. Behavior is covered by the PG tests above. The test now says this in its doc comment. - Exemptions match by function header. A kind 39002 insert added inside one of the four exempt functions would pass the policy. This is documented next to the exemption list. - The 19-case parity table and the race test drive `Db::replace_addressable_event` only. The generic, parameterized, and locked writers get the mismatch case only, and the parameterized path's membership-key-before-delete ordering is not exercised concurrently. All five writers call the same validator, so this PR doesn't widen these tests. - `disable_roster_trigger` commits `DISABLE TRIGGER` on the test database. That is safe under the per-test database harness the `postgres-ci` profile uses, but not against a shared database. Its doc comment now says so. ## Validation Run on a Blox workstation (private PG 16 and Redis) against a tree byte-identical to this commit: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib`: pass. - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --test observability_source`: 19 passed. - `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p <pkg>` for buzz-admin, buzz-audit, buzz-deletion, buzz-push-gateway, buzz-relay, buzz-search, buzz-workflow: pass. - buzz-db: the full run passed 513 and was stopped at a 240 s deadline on `writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default`, which hangs the same way on the unmodified base. A second run excluding the three host-flaky runtime tests already reproduced on the base passed all 511 others. ## Simpler? Not yet. While the trigger is still in place, the check runs twice. Phase 2 deletes the trigger, its function, the startup catalog and behavior probes, the migration.rs equivalence asserts, and the pgschema reconcile entry, which leaves one check in Rust. ## Phase 2 (separate PR, after fleet rollout) **Prerequisite before claiming complete roster serialization (phase 2 or anywhere else):** make both kick paths take the channel membership key before they change rows, and add a concurrent kick-vs-roster-publication test. The retained trigger does not prove this; it has the same gap. A new migration drops the trigger from `events` and its partitions, then drops `guard_channel_roster_snapshot()`. It also removes the schema files and includes, `verify_channel_roster_fence*` and the relay startup call, the migration.rs asserts, and the probe tests, and updates `scripts/reconcile-schema-after-pgschema.sql`. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
|
60de1db0b8 |
fix(db): admit fleet sweeps per tenant instead of in-SQL fence predicate (#8318)
## What Removes every production call to the SQL fence predicate `community_write_allowed()` from application SQL, so no application mutation depends on the boolean predicate anymore. This is one prerequisite for BUZZ-315 part B; #8322 (tolerating absent fence objects) is a separate one. The triggers and SQL functions stay in this PR because mixed-version pods still depend on them. The predicate isn't inlined. It's a VOLATILE plpgsql function that takes the deletion lock and *then* reads lifecycle state on a fresh snapshot, and an inline expression would read state from the statement's start snapshot. A separate earlier check would race deletion. So each sweep now: 1. reads its candidate community IDs with a plain read, bounded the same way the original statement was, 2. opens one `AdmittedTx` per community (`begin_community_sweep_transaction`, a thin wrapper over `begin_community_write_transaction` that turns an admission refusal into "skip this tenant"; the four periodic sweeps go through `sweep_admitted_communities`, which also owns their error handling), 3. runs the original mutation scoped to `community_id = $1` and commits. | Site | Change | | --- | --- | | `runtime/push_enqueue.rs` | Deleted the redundant predicate. This transaction already calls `guard_transaction`. | | `store/relay_invite.rs` `reap_expired_relay_invites` | Keeps the global expiry order and the 1,000-row ceiling. Candidates are pre-filtered to active tenants so fenced invites can't fill the batch. Admission is still what authorizes the write. | | `store/workflow.rs` `prune_scheduled_workflow_fires_before` | Prunes per admitted community and sums the row counts. | | `store/channel.rs` `reap_expired_ephemeral_channels` | Archives per admitted community and returns the committed rows, so the relay still runs their system and discovery follow-ups. The candidate read has no lifecycle pre-filter (it has no `LIMIT`, so admission alone decides). | | `store/event.rs` `backfill_d_tags` | Backfills per admitted community at startup. | | `store/push.rs` `claim_due_match_batch_with_loader` | Picks the earliest due active community, admits it, and claims under the same `FOR UPDATE OF q SKIP LOCKED` and batch limit. It skips at most 16 tenants that fence between the read and admission. | | `store/push.rs` `reap_exhausted_matches` | Reaps per admitted community. | **Tenant failures.** The four periodic sweeps (invite reap, workflow fire prune, channel reap, exhausted match reap) log a warning and continue when one tenant fails. That tenant's rows are left unmodified and stay eligible, so the next tick retries them. A tenant error doesn't abort processing of the other tenants already in the selected candidate page. Invite cleanup keeps its oldest-first 1,000-row selection, so if one tenant owns that entire page and its delete keeps failing, tenants outside the page wait. No persistent tenant-local failure for that delete is known in the current schema, and base aborted the whole page on any error. The returned count or rows cover the tenants that committed. Claim, enqueue and the startup backfill still return the error to the caller. **Database outages.** A connection-level error (pool acquire timeout, closed pool, socket I/O; `DbError::is_connection_unavailable`) isn't tenant-local, so it stops the periodic sweep at that tenant instead of moving on. Without this, an outage that began after the candidate read cost one writer acquire timeout and one warning per remaining tenant, and invite cleanup runs inside the usage-metrics leader tick. Rows already committed are still returned, so reaped channels keep their follow-ups. Remaining tenants retry next tick. **Known limit (pre-existing, tracked separately):** - *Claim at a locked head.* `claim_due_match_batch_with_loader` returns `None` once an admitted tenant claims zero rows. If every due row in the oldest active tenant is row-locked, younger tenants aren't tried on that call. Base behaved the same way. This PR doesn't change it. ## Tests All tests use a one-session fixture (`test_support::admission_fixture`) with `session_replication_role = replica`, so the trigger backstop is off and only application admission protects the fenced tenants. The fixture shadows `community_write_allowed` with a function that raises, in a per-call `admission_test_<uuid>` schema. - One test per site: a quiescing tenant's rows are untouched while an active tenant in the same sweep still progresses. - Race tests for invite reap, channel reap and claim. These are the sites where the candidate read already filters out fenced tenants. Each test holds the tenant's deletion lock, waits until the sweep is blocked in admission, fences the tenant in that transaction, and asserts its rows are untouched. The claim test also asserts that a second active tenant is claimed in the same call. - `channel_reap_returns_committed_rows_after_earlier_tenant_error` and `periodic_reaps_continue_after_tenant_error_and_retry_retained_rows` inject a per-tenant failure. They check that later tenants commit, that the failed tenant's rows are retained, and that the next call processes them. - `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection` runs the sweep helper against a closed pool with three candidates and asserts only the first is attempted. `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` (PostgreSQL) commits the first tenant, closes the pool, and asserts the first tenant's result is returned and the sweep stops at the second of three candidates. `connection_unavailable_covers_only_pool_and_io_failures` pins the classification; the per-tenant failure tests above confirm a database-raised error still continues. Falsification, each with the tests failing as expected: | Mutation | Result | | --- | --- | | Original SQL restored at invite sweep, push claim, d-tag backfill | 0/3 pass (`legacy SQL fence predicate called`) | | `guard_community_write` returns `Ok(())` after taking the lock | race tests + channel reap test 0/4 pass | | Per-tenant errors abort the sweep again | 0/2 pass | | Sweep helper `continue`s instead of stopping on a connection-level error | `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection` and `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` fail | | Sweep helper drops already-committed results when it stops (`return Vec::new()`) | `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` fails | | Sweep helper removed from the source-policy chokepoint check | `serving_table_writes_expose_syntactic_chokepoint_or_guarded_tx_routes` fails | The PostgreSQL tests are under `postgres_tests` modules with `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]`, which puts them in the `.config/nextest.toml` PostgreSQL filter. CI evidence is under Verification. ## Verification CI at head `5d37fbda` ([run 38925996275](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275)) is green. The PostgreSQL job ([job 117062895683](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275/job/117062895683)) passed 1017/1017. That includes named PASS lines for all 30 `admission_postgres_tests`, `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page`, and both writer-pool tests listed below. Unit Tests ([job 117058136482](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275/job/117058136482)) has PASS lines for `connection_unavailable_covers_only_pool_and_io_failures` and `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection`. Local gates ran on a Linux cloud workstation against private PostgreSQL 16 and Redis. The tree was `735170df`, which is this head rebased on `main` `c0ab789`, so the gates built the merge result. | Gate | Result | | --- | --- | | `cargo fmt --all -- --check` | pass | | `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` | pass | | `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib --tests` | 185 passed | | `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` | pass | | PostgreSQL lane for buzz-db (excluding the two writer-pool tests below) | 530 passed | | PostgreSQL lanes for buzz-admin, buzz-audit, buzz-deletion, buzz-push-gateway, buzz-search, buzz-workflow | all pass | | PostgreSQL lane for buzz-relay | 413/426. The 13 `group_state_postgres_tests` fail with `PoolTimedOut` on unmodified `main` `c0ab789` too (see below) | | The three mutations in the falsification table above (`continue` ×2, `return Vec::new()`) | each fails its target test | These failures happen only on the workstation, and each one passes in CI's PostgreSQL job at this head: - `writer_pool_metrics_stop_after_session_timeout_setup_failure` stalls. It's an unchanged writer-pool configuration test, and it stalled the same way at earlier heads. - The 13 relay `group_state_postgres_tests` fail at the same point, `ensure community: Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)`, on unmodified `main` `c0ab789`. This PR doesn't touch `buzz-relay`. ## What got simpler - No application mutation calls the boolean predicate `community_write_allowed()` anymore. Dropping the fence objects still has other dependencies: serving-write lease acquisition calls `assert_community_write_allowed()` (`store/deletion.rs:3068`), catalog validation requires both functions (`store/deletion.rs:1195-1198`), and the triggers and compatibility SQL still use them. Those belong to #8322 and part B, not this PR. - The claim's `target` CTE is gone, and every sweep uses the same admission-and-skip helper. - The four periodic sweeps share one loop (`sweep_admitted_communities`) for admission, skip, continue-on-tenant-error and stop-on-outage, instead of four copies of it. - The source policy treats that helper as a tenant-local chokepoint, so `backfill_d_tags` no longer needs a reviewed exception. - The per-tenant loops add code, because each community now gets its own admitted transaction. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Luke Tornquist
|
2745a419a8 |
buzz-db: tolerate absent universal write-fence objects (expand) (#8322)
## What This is the expand step for retiring the 32 universal `community_write_fence_*` triggers and their SQL functions (BUZZ-315). Relay pods auto-migrate at boot (`BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE`). The drop migration therefore runs while the previous release is still serving, and that release must not depend on the objects it drops. Today the app depends on them in four places, and this PR removes all four from its own code paths. Seven in-SQL `community_write_allowed` predicates in fleet sweeps and push (`push_enqueue.rs`, `channel.rs`, `event.rs`, `push.rs`, `relay_invite.rs`, `workflow.rs`) are #8318's scope. The release is independent of the fence functions only with both this PR and #8318. **It changes no schema.** The objects stay and keep working until the follow-up drop PR. | Old dependency | Now | |---|---| | Startup and readiness (`validate_serving_catalog_on`) require `community_write_allowed`, `assert_community_write_allowed`, `enforce_community_write_fence` and all 32 triggers | No longer required. Still required: the tenant tables, `community_deletion_lock_key` and the enabled community tombstone trigger. | | Serving-lease admission runs `SELECT assert_community_write_allowed($1)` | Uses `guard_community_write`, the same shared lock and state check as ordinary serving writes, in the same transaction as the lease `INSERT`. Fenced or missing communities still map to `AccessDenied`. | | Live scoped-table discovery calls `community_write_fence_excluded_table()` | Uses a Rust `EXCLUDED_SCOPED_TABLES` list. A unit test pins it equal to the SQL list while both exist. | | The deletion executor compares the live `fenced_tables` against the frozen inventory | Only tenant-table equality is compared. Inventories **still record** live fences, so an older executor that validates an inventory frozen by this release still matches. The digest still covers the full frozen manifest. | `lock_community_deletion_shared` now refuses transactions that are not READ COMMITTED, so every lock-then-read admission gets the check: `guard_community_write`, serving-lease finalization (`guard_transaction_with_serving_lease`), lease renewal/verification, owner preparation and owner-mutation admission. The old SQL assertion did this check for the lease path, and the trigger backed up the rest. The isolation level comes back from the existing `pg_advisory_xact_lock_shared` statement, so the hot path makes no extra round trip. The refusal comes before any lifecycle-state read. ## Mixed versions | Combination | Why it is safe | |---|---| | Previous release, this DB | No schema change, so all old checks still see the 32 fences. | | This release, DB with fence objects | Extra objects are tolerated, and the trigger backstop still applies. | | This release **plus #8318**, DB without fence objects | Serving, readiness, lease admission and deletion proven by `migration_schema_fence_objects_are_optional_for_serving_and_deletion`, which drops them inline. Without #8318, serving and deletion still work, but the push matcher, exhausted-job reaper, invite retention, ephemeral reaper and startup d_tag backfill fail with `42883 community_write_allowed(uuid) does not exist` (seen in deploy-stack E2E). | | Older executor, inventory frozen by this release | `fenced_tables` is still populated from the live catalog (32). | This PR does not depend on #8318 to merge and can ship alongside it, but it is not drop-safe alone. The drop PR (#8323) needs #8219, #8318 and this PR deployed on every pod, and every rollback image after the drop must include #8318. ## Tests - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::migration_schema_fence_objects_are_optional_for_serving_and_deletion` migrates to 0060. It then runs the following with the fence objects present, then again after dropping them inline: - serving startup - readiness - the deletion catalog check - `inventory_schema` - lease acquire/release - `AccessDenied` for quiescing, fenced, tombstoned and missing communities - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::deletion_lock_admission_rejects_pinned_snapshot_isolation` checks that REPEATABLE READ and SERIALIZABLE are refused by both `guard_community_write` and `guard_transaction_with_serving_lease`. The lease case uses a never-acquired lease, so if the isolation check is skipped it fails as stale instead. - `buzz-deletion` `postgres_tests::approved_legacy_fence_inventory_accepts_current_catalog` checks that a legacy digest with 32 fences validates against a live catalog with none, and that an unknown tenant table is still rejected. - `store::deletion::tests::scoped_table_exclusions_match_sql_during_transition` checks exclusion-list parity. - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::serving_lease_acquire_waits_for_fence_lock_then_refuses` holds the exclusive deletion lock and checks that lease acquisition stays pending. It then commits `fenced` and requires `AccessDenied` with no lease row persisted. Removing the lease path's `guard_community_write` call fails this test, while the other four lease/admission tests above still pass. - `buzz-deletion` `serving_guard_heartbeats_long_operation_through_quiescing` now requires `AccessDenied` for a lease acquired during quiescing, rather than any error. Each test was confirmed to fail when its fix is removed (rc 100, 0/1): the isolation refusal, the three validators restored to the base version, the fence-list comparison restored, and one name dropped from the Rust list. ## What got simpler The lease path loses its special SQL assertion and its error-code translation and reuses the ordinary app guard. The serving and deletion catalog checks each lose one requirement. No new abstraction. The `fenced_tables` reader stays only for mixed-version executors; the drop PR deletes it. **Identified debt (pre-existing, outside this diff):** `runtime::postgres_tests::writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default` hangs on clean `177551dda` too. ## Verification (Blox, tree identical to this commit) | Gate | Result | |---|---| | `cargo fmt --all -- --check` | pass | | `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` | pass | | `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib` | 167/167 | | `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` | pass | | `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p` buzz-admin / audit / deletion / push-gateway / relay / search / workflow | all rc 0 (4, 7, 12, 11, 402, 20, 2) | | `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db` | 510 pass, 1 fail: the pre-existing hang above, interrupted | | Round 2 (this head): `-p buzz-db` / `-p buzz-deletion` | 511 pass + the same pre-existing hang interrupted / 12/12 | The new PG tests are selected by the `postgres-ci` filter `(test(/postgres_tests::/) or binary(/^postgres_/)) and not test(/(^|::)external_infra[^:]*::/)`. buzz-review-completed --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Brad Seiler
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2d0f78c6e1 |
feat(auth): support explicit mesh JWKS transport (#8382)
## Summary Allow an issuer to opt into mesh HTTP for its JSON Web Key Set (JWKS). Public HTTPS remains the default. This supports deployments whose service mesh authenticates and protects the key endpoint. The sealed source contract selects transport and contributes to policy identity. Mesh mode requires a DNS hostname and checks every resolved address against an explicit allow-list before pinning one address. Both modes disable proxies, reject redirects, cap responses, and enforce a whole-fetch deadline. The relay cannot verify mesh security: operators must enforce mutual TLS, endpoint authorization, and egress restrictions. ### Related issue No duplicate mesh-JWKS issue or PR found. Existing NIP-FI relay enforcement: #7224. No deployment change is included. ### Testing - At `eccb8cb19420abda44cf6e5e62b1361e2843bd1d`: full auth package and auth/relay all-target clippy passed. Full relay package passed: 1,457 library tests, 37 binary tests, and 9 boot tests; 446 tests were ignored. - At prior head `113939838cd81d5e8d0b0f8783c42ffaae44a4d3`: the full relay library suite failed the demo echo test (1,455 passed, 1 failed, 440 ignored). Independent checks reproduced that timeout at base `d61fe2071d2b3d8e56dd931947f16bfe0d6173fe`; the receive-cancellation defect is outside this change. A later pass does not establish that defect is fixed. - Three falsifying mutations at `eccb8cb194` were caught: mixed DNS answers, proxy bypass, and whole-fetch deadline. The full locked auth package passed after restoring the exact source. - At `eccb8cb194`, `cargo build --locked --release -p buzz-relay -p buzz-cli -p buzz-admin` passed with command-local `CARGO_PROFILE_RELEASE_STRIP=none`. This avoids a macOS loader error without a source, lockfile, or project-profile change. - Earlier hooks failed the ACP signal test and Tauri login-shell PATH test. The ACP failure also reproduced on unmodified main `93ffc37c`. Main merged without conflict. The full Tauri package then passed with `RUST_TEST_THREADS=1`: 3,422 library tests and 3 integration tests, 19 ignored. All pre-push hooks passed with that same command-local setting; no hook or test was skipped. - At `eccb8cb194`, isolated `just test` passed all 107 runner steps. The monolithic `just ci` run timed out after 1,120 seconds; all recipes passed across that run and separate `just desktop-tauri-test`, `just web-build`, and `just mobile-test` invocations. No monolithic pass is claimed. - Exact-head release live-local checks passed: loopback HTTP mesh JWKS warm; valid assertion 101; expired/wrong issuer/wrong audience 403; valid signed disconnect 200; wrong command audience 403. Redirect-only JWKS returned assertion 503 without a request to its target. Both omitted/default and explicit public transport rejected HTTP at startup. - A separate NIP-FI-off release CLI smoke test created an open channel, sent an accepted message, read it back, and fetched its thread. The assertion probe closes after upgrade; it does not prove a complete NIP-42 session. Local loopback tests do not prove deployment mesh authentication, endpoint authorization, egress controls, or real `240/4` routing. Generated with Codex ## Human Testing valid assertion / configured community audience: HTTP 101 (expected 101) expired assertion: HTTP 403 (expected 403) wrong issuer: HTTP 403 (expected 403) wrong community audience: HTTP 403 (expected 403) valid command JWT / configured command audience: HTTP 200, body=b'{"disconnected": true}' (expected 200) valid command signature / wrong audience: HTTP 403 (expected 403) --------- Signed-off-by: seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Local Builder <1c476cb1127ea270cb900bdc3891060140bdd1173f91498030ee9b4db01c2f20@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Local Builder <1c476cb1127ea270cb900bdc3891060140bdd1173f91498030ee9b4db01c2f20@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
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c0ab789499 |
feat(buzz-db): retire the channel-TTL trigger (#8210)
## Summary This drops the channel-TTL event trigger. The application already refreshes ephemeral-channel deadlines in the event transaction (`event_follow_up::refresh_channel_ttls`, from #8135), so the trigger only repeats that work. This PR originally retired both follow-up triggers. #8352 has since retired the push-match trigger in migration 0063, so after the rebase this PR covers only the TTL half. Migration `0065_retire_channel_ttl_trigger.sql`: - `SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s'` (the same bound as 0063) - drops `events_refresh_channel_ttl` and `refresh_channel_ttl_after_event_insert()` Dropping the trigger on the partitioned parent also drops its partition clones. Published migrations, including 0022 and 0024, stay checksum-frozen. The same objects are removed from `schema/` (`schema/functions/…`, `schema/triggers/events.sql`, `schema/schema.sql`) and from the pgschema reconcile script. After this, migrated and desired-state databases have no event follow-up triggers. Tests: - `follow_up_retirement_tests.rs` (renamed from `push_retirement_tests.rs`): the push-retirement upgrade test now stops at 0063. A new test upgrades 0064 → 0065 and checks that the TTL trigger is gone from the parent and every partition, that the function is gone, and that the published checksums haven't changed. - `event_follow_up_postgres_tests.rs`: the contract now has two arms. `AppOnly` is the shipped schema, where both triggers are absent. `Dual` reconstructs the historical overlap of both triggers. The `PushRetired` arm (the push trigger dropped, the TTL trigger kept) was the shipped state before this PR. Its tests are removed because `Dual` and `AppOnly` together cover it. - `embedded_migrator_contains_consolidated_initial_schema` pins the 0065 statements and checks that both objects are absent from the desired schema. **Deploy gate:** do not run 0065 against a database still served by a relay older than #8135. After 0065, raw SQL writers no longer refresh TTL deadlines. `docs/push-gateway-deployment.md` is updated to match. ### What got simpler The trigger and the app no longer both refresh TTL deadlines; the app is now the only producer. One plpgsql function and one trigger are gone from both schema paths, and 8 per-partition drops are gone from the reconcile script. The follow-up contract drops from three arms to two. ### Related issue BUZZ-313 (Linear), part of the trigger-retirement work. ### Testing Head is `4f7d0baf0`. Results below are at `678927730` unless noted. `678927730..4f7d0baf0` changes only one test in `crates/buzz-db/src/store/event.rs`, described in the first bullet. - **Fixed test, `permanent_channel_event_commits_do_not_lock_the_channel_row`** (`4f7d0baf0`). - **Why it changed:** after 0065, its raw-pool inserts no longer ran any TTL refresh, so the test passed whatever `refresh_channel_ttls` did. This was raised in review. - **What it does now:** it inserts through the production `AdmittedTx` path and keeps the barrier and the tuple-lock probe. It commits all N transactions while an external transaction holds `FOR SHARE` on the channel row. It also asserts that no `buzz_db_channel_ttl_refresh_failures_total` is counted. - **Mutation check:** with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` injected into `refresh_channel_ttl`, the new test fails (`must not wait on the channel row`, timeout at 10s). The old test passes under the same mutation. - **Blox:** fmt and `buzz-db` clippy pass. - **GitHub CI at `4f7d0baf0`:** every required check passes (56 pass, 0 fail). CI builds the merge ref with `main` `93ffc37cb`. - **New and renamed tests, checked by name in the CI logs at `4f7d0baf0`.** These pass in PostgreSQL Domain / PostgreSQL Tests ([117033725006](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38915998692/job/117033725006)): - `permanent_channel_event_commits_do_not_lock_the_channel_row` - `migration_schema_ttl_retirement_drops_every_partition_trigger_and_keeps_checksums` - `migration_schema_push_retirement_preserves_ttl_and_published_checksums` - `event_insert_ttl_refresh_handles_permanent_ephemeral_duplicate_and_activation_race` - `{desired,migration_schema}_event_follow_up_contract_{dual,app_only}` (four tests) `embedded_migrator_contains_consolidated_initial_schema` passes in Rust / Unit Tests ([117024125423](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38915998692/job/117024125423)). No `*_push_retired` test runs anywhere. - **Blox gates at `678927730`** (private PG16 + Redis, on a workstation shared with other sessions): - `cargo fmt --check`, workspace `clippy -D warnings` and `buzz-db --lib` all pass. - The `buzz-admin`, `buzz-audit`, `buzz-deletion`, `buzz-push-gateway`, `buzz-search` and `buzz-workflow` Postgres packages pass. - `buzz-db`: 517 of 519 tests passed. The 2 that hung, both `writer_pool_*` tests, were killed. `buzz-relay`: 413 of 426 passed. The 13 failures are covered below. - **Uncontended reruns at `4f7d0baf0`** on a fresh, idle workstation (PG16.15, `competing=0` for every arm): - **`writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default` predates this PR.** It timed out 3/3 at head and 3/3 at `main` `93ffc37cb`, with a 300s timeout per run. - **`writer_pool_metrics_stop_after_session_timeout_setup_failure` also predates this PR.** It timed out 2/3 at head and 2/3 at `main`, and passed in the remaining run on each side. - Both tests pass in CI. The gate accepts them as a named exception for this PR, as a pre-existing hang on the PG16 test environment. - **`buzz-db`:** 518 of 519 tests passed. The single failure is `writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default`, killed after it hung (the exception above). - **`buzz-relay`: still open.** 413 of 426 tests passed. The same 13 `handlers::group_state_postgres_tests` failed as on the shared box, each panicking at once in its fixture's `ensure community` step with `Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)`. Contention does not explain them. The fixture's community setup is in `buzz-db`, which this PR changes. A head/`main` comparison of the full `buzz-relay` package on the same idle box is running to find out whether this predates the PR. All 13 pass in CI at this head. - **E2E (Gimli, Blox)** at `050e593af`. `050e593af..678927730` changes only tests and docs; the migration, schema and runtime code are byte-identical. Gimli's audited verdict: **EXERCISED AND WORKS**, for DB and relay runtime only. Gimli ran it at `050e593af`; this head's runtime is byte-identical but was not freshly executed. - **Upgrade:** a real relay startup took the schema from 0064 to 0065. That removed the TTL function and the trigger from the parent table and from all 8 partitions. Checksums for migrations 1–64 are unchanged. - **Lock-timeout rollback:** with a real lock held, the migration failed with `55P03` at 5.0007s and the schema rolled back fully to 64. Once the lock was released, a retry applied 65. - **Fresh desired schema:** after pgschema plus reconcile, the retired objects are absent. - **Real signed kind-9 sends:** on both schema paths, these refreshed ephemeral-channel deadlines to about +600s. Permanent channels stayed NULL. - **Raw SQL insert:** at 64 it refreshed the deadline. After 65 it left the deadline unchanged, on both the upgraded and the fresh schema. - **Not covered:** native or device testing, and deploy. - **Review:** Legolas found 0 P0 and 0 P1. His three optional P2s are fixed in `678927730`. - **No human app test:** this is a DB-only change. - **Migration numbering:** #8237 and #8372 also add a `0065_*` migration. Whichever PR merges second must renumber. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Bradley Axen
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d039d9a2d5 |
fix(relay): confirm requested channels in one membership query (#8378)
## What A request that names channels with `#h` used to check each channel missing from the cached access set with its own `is_member` query. These checks ran one after another, so the database cost of a request grew with the number of channels it named. That cost is why the relay capped explicit `#h` values at 128, and why mobile splits large communities into many requests ([#8342](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8342)). This PR makes the check one query, and then raises the cap. - **One membership query.** WS REQ, WS COUNT, and HTTP `/query` and `/count` now share `confirm_requested_channel_access`. It checks every unconfirmed channel with one `membership_pairs` statement (`channel_id = ANY($2)`), so one request costs one query, whatever number of channels it names. `membership_pairs` uses the same SQL rules as `is_member`: deleted channels and removed members don't count, and it runs on the writer pool. - **Hash-set lookups.** Comparing the requested channels with the accessible set no longer costs requested × accessible comparisons. This covers `apply_channel_scope_to_query`, the system-channel scope helpers, the COUNT and bridge loops, and `#h` dedupe. - **`MAX_EXPLICIT_CHANNEL_VALUES` goes from 128 to 2048.** Huddle liveness used the same constant to limit session IDs. It now has its own constant, `MAX_HUDDLE_LIVENESS_SESSIONS`, which stays at 128, because each linked session still costs a separate mesh-directory lookup. Authorization rules are unchanged: - A scoped token still sets the upper limit. A channel outside the token is never checked. - Channels already cached and readable system channels are skipped. - Repaired channels are added in request order, each once, so `keep_repaired_system_channels_named` still sees the same repaired tail. - A database error still closes the request (or returns 500 over HTTP). One difference: the old loop could leave a partial repair if a later query failed, and that can no longer happen. ## Not in this PR - **Client chunk sizes.** `desktop/src/shared/api/relayClientShared.ts:39` and `mobile/lib/shared/relay/nostr_filters.dart:8` stay at 128. They can go up only after every relay they talk to runs this change. - **Per-connection limit on live channel scope.** Each authorized channel in a live WS subscription still gets a fan-out index entry for each kind, plus a Redis topic retain. Real membership limits this, not the cap. Still, an account in at least 2048 channels could now register up to 1024 × 2048 channel scopes on one connection; before, the most was 1024 × 128. If we want to keep the old worst case, the fix is a limit on the total channel scope per connection, not per REQ. ## Testing - `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --tests` and `cargo fmt` are clean. - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib`: 1449 passed, 6 failed. All 6 are in `api::media::tests` and fail because the local Postgres on :5432 has no `buzz` role. Nothing in this change touches them. - I ran the Postgres lane (`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh`) for the bridge, req, count, group-state, and system-channel tests on local PG14: 55 passed. That includes the new `named_channels_missing_from_the_cache_are_confirmed_together`, which checks that the reader's channels missing from the cache are added in request order, each once, and that a stranger's channel stays out. - Not done yet: a live run against a local relay sending a REQ with more than 128 `#h` values. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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7852b1670c |
fix(search): normalize profile name tiers in one place (#8334)
🤖 ## Summary Profile name search (`POST /profiles/search`, added in #8301) sorts results into tiers: an exact name first, then a name that starts with the query, then a name with a later word that starts with it. This PR stacks on #8301 and fixes two review items. **Tier normalization in one place.** Before this change, the query was lower-cased in Rust (`to_lowercase`), and the names were lower-cased in SQL (`lower()`). These can disagree. Under a `C` collation, PostgreSQL's `lower()` changes only ASCII letters, while Rust also lower-cases letters like `É`. So a search for `Émile` did not put the profile named `Émile` in the exact tier. Now the query and both name fields go through the same SQL expression: lower-case, collapse whitespace runs to one space, then trim. The query is bound once and both sides compare equal by construction. The trim also moved after the collapse, so surrounding whitespace that the regex turns into a space is now trimmed too. **Ranking wording.** The doc comment and `docs/profile-search.md` said "ties keep the NIP-50 order". That was wrong. Ties are ordered by `ts_rank_cd` over the two name fields only (not the whole profile, as in NIP-50), then newest first, then event id. Out of scope, not changed here: matching names that contain escaped Unicode or newlines, and any new name index. ## Related issue Review on #8301: https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8301#pullrequestreview-5524491230 ## Testing - New case in `profile_names_match_name_words_only`: profiles `Émile` and a newer `Émilee`, query `Émile`. The exact match must come first. - Ran the Postgres integration tests against a `postgres:17-alpine` database created with `--locale=C`: - this branch: `profile_names_match_name_words_only` and `profile_names_survive_unparsable_content` pass; - #8301 code with the new case: `profile_names_match_name_words_only` fails (`Émilee` sorts before `Émile`). - Nine other tests in that file fail locally on both this branch and #8301 because they reuse one database (duplicate community hosts). CI gives each test its own database. - `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-search --all-targets -D warnings`, and `cargo test -p buzz-search`: clean. - The pre-push hook's `rust-tests` and `desktop-tauri-checks` passed. Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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f148c0f22c |
feat(relay): add profile search over name and display_name only (#8301)
🤖 > **Review as a pair with block/buzz-app#1084** (the app change that uses this endpoint). Either can merge first: the app falls back to the old search on relays without this endpoint. ## Summary Searching for a person by name over the relay's general search returns profiles that only *mention* the text somewhere else: in an avatar image embedded as text, in the bio, or in the verification address. A search for "wes" could fill every result page with profiles whose avatar data happens to contain "Wes", and never return the person actually named Wes. This adds a relay endpoint, `POST /profiles/search`, that looks only at a profile's **name** and **display name**. Every other profile field is ignored. **Matching and paging are the same as the relay's existing full-text profile search** (NIP-50 search over kind:0 profiles with `search_mode: "prefix"`). A client can switch to this endpoint without a visible change in which people a query finds: - Each query word must match a whole word of the name; the last word can be a prefix. Words can be in any order, so "johnson wes" finds "Wes Johnson". Case is ignored. - Pages work the same way: up to 100 results per page, up to page 1000. - The results are exactly the old results minus profiles that match only outside their names. The order is better for people search: exact name first, then names that start with the query, then names with a later word that starts with it, then other matches. Ties are ordered by `ts_rank_cd` over the two name fields only (not the whole profile, as in NIP-50), then newest first, then event id. The response is a JSON array of the original signed profile events (Nostr kind:0), so clients can verify them as they do today. The buzz-app client change is block/buzz-app#1084. ## Details - Request: `{"query": "wes", "limit": 20, "page": 1}`. `query` is 1–100 characters after trimming; `limit` is 1–100 (default 20); `page` is 1–1000 (default 1); unknown fields are rejected with 400. - The search reuses the full-text search's own query builder (`buzz-search`), so the word rule cannot drift from it. The existing full-text index on events stays the access path; the name check runs only on rows the index already matched. There is no new index. One small migration (`0061`) adds the function `profile_name_fields()`; it reads no table data, so it runs instantly. - Only current profiles count: a replaced profile stops matching. Profiles that are not a JSON object, or whose name fields are not strings, never match. Content that PostgreSQL cannot read as `jsonb` (for example a `\^@` escape or very deep nesting) also never matches, and it cannot make the search fail for everyone else. - The handler loads the matched events through the normal routed event read and applies the same reader visibility check as other reads, in search order. - Access uses the same checks as the relay's GIF search endpoint: a signed HTTP request (NIP-98), identity admission (NIP-FI), rate limit, replay protection, and relay membership. That code moved out of `gifs.rs` into one shared helper in `bridge.rs`; GIF behavior is unchanged. - The route is added to the existing protected-route and NIP-FI shadow/enforce route tables. Docs: `docs/profile-search.md`. - Two test-only lines get `sadscan:disable` comments, as other fixtures already do: an existing public ES256 test key in `router.rs`, and the local Postgres test URL in the search integration test. ### Related issue None found. ### Testing - Postgres test for the search query (`profile_names_match_name_words_only`): only name fields match (avatar data URL, `about`, `nip05`, `banner`, non-string names and non-object content are excluded); words in any order and across both name fields; whole words only for completed words; ranking order; pages split without overlap or gaps; replaced profile; other community; `%` literal. - Postgres end-to-end test through the router: an admitted member gets only the name-matching signed event, and the returned event still verifies. - Request validation unit tests; existing GIF admission tests and router route-table tests pass. - Local end-to-end run with buzz-app#1084 against a relay built from this head, with about 195 seeded profiles. For every query tried, the endpoint's results were a subset of the full-text search's results; the only profiles missing were avatar-only matches. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Kalvin C
|
cdfc38ecbd |
feat(search): add newest-first sort to bridge search (#8371)
## Summary Adds an opt-in newest-first order to bridge search, so clients can offer "Most recent" alongside relevance. - `buzz-search`: `SearchQuery` gains `sort: SearchSort`. `Relevance` keeps the existing `ts_rank_cd` ordering. `Newest` orders hits by `created_at DESC, id`, and `page` steps through that order. Newest skips the exact-profile-lexeme prioritization, which only applies to relevance ranking. - Bridge `POST /query`: search filters accept `search_sort: "newest"`. When the field is missing or has another value, results stay in relevance order. Community scope, channel intersection and per-hit authorization are unchanged. - NIP-11 lists `buzz-search-sort` in `supported_extensions`. Clients only send the field to relays that advertise it, so they never get relevance results labelled as newest. - WebSocket NIP-50 search stays relevance-only. `NOSTR.md` documents the bridge extension. ### Related issue N/A ### Testing - New Postgres integration test `newest_sort_pages_by_time_then_id_within_scope`. It pages a channel in newest order, including an equal-timestamp tie split across a page boundary and a newer hit outside the channel scope. It checks that the pages join up in `(created_at desc, id asc)` order and that relevance still ranks the strongest match first. - Unit tests: - `bridge_search_sort_extension_selects_newest_only_when_named` - `advertises_nip_cl_and_search_sort_extensions` - Ran the buzz-search Postgres integration suite, the relay `nip11` and `bridge_search` unit tests, `cargo fmt --check`, and `cargo clippy -p buzz-search -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` on Linux. - Local relay exercised through signed `POST /query`: - NIP-11 lists `buzz-search-sort`. - Relevance and newest return different orders. - Newest pages 1–3 return 25 hits with no gaps or duplicates, including same-second ties across page boundaries. - A non-member gets no hits from a private channel; a member gets all of them. - Client integration is in a companion block/buzz-app change. It was exercised end to end against this relay through the production broker: switching sort, paging, scope changes and capability fallback. Deployment note: clients only offer newest sorting after a relay with this change advertises `buzz-search-sort`. --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Tom Brow
|
6766174673 |
chore(push): retire push notification database trigger (#8352)
Buzz must schedule mobile push notifications when it saves an eligible message. The relay, the server that receives and stores messages, now does this in application code. An older database trigger still exists. This trigger is a rule that runs automatically when a message is saved. This PR removes the old trigger and its supporting database function. The relay remains responsible for scheduling notifications. Migration 0063 makes this change in existing databases; updated setup scripts apply it to new databases. The change does not turn on push notifications. Production migration and deployment need separate approval. Before deployment, verify the release images and all pending database migrations. If push needs to be stopped after release, disable it with the feature flag and keep the qualified application version and database schema. Do not downgrade the application image. ### Validation - Local checks passed: 519 isolated database integration tests, 166 database unit tests, 17 source-policy tests, and the relay push-runtime tests. - Tests verify that the migration removes the old trigger, preserves earlier migration records, and lets the application schedule push work correctly. A concurrency test exercises the real application path; deliberately removing its lock makes the test fail. - [Current-head CI passed on retry](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38752849383/attempts/2). The first attempt had one database-connection timeout during test setup; the failed jobs passed when rerun on the unchanged commit. - Initial local CI and push checks hit unrelated ACP test failures, which passed when run separately. Only the Rust-test push hook was skipped under the repository's local-check exception; other applicable hooks passed. ### Before merge - [x] Migration 0063 is available and the push trigger remains on [main at |
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Tom Brow
|
5397ea49e2 |
fix(push): verify extended App Attest proofs with a focused owned module (#8329)
## Summary Apple SDK 27.1 device captures include authenticator extension data that the current verifier rejects. Replace the general appattest dependency with a private gateway module that verifies the complete original bytes, frames enrollment and assertions separately, and accepts well-formed optional extensions without SDK-specific length or flag allowlists. The module retains established signature, P-256, CBOR, and certificate-chain libraries. App identity, exact enrollment environment, credential/key binding, nonce, challenge, and increasing-counter checks remain enforced. Bounded parsing rejects ambiguous duplicate keys, truncation, trailing data, and oversized inputs. Fixture helpers are test-only. Adapted code retains both upstream MIT notices and source provenance. Category/version properties remain authenticated observations under the chosen compatibility-release policy. This does not implement Apple's additional distribution-category/version enforcement; introducing those restrictions requires a separately defined deployment policy. The [verification contract](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/app-attest-owned-verifier/docs/app-attest-compatibility.md) records this and other limits. Related: https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8020 addresses assertion extension handling. This change also covers enrollment extensions, credential-key parsing, and certificate validation. ### Validation - Gateway suites: 77 default tests and 79 personal-development tests passed, plus startup policy and Clippy. - Added signed enrollment/certificate, generated CBOR mutation, maximum-counter, and PostgreSQL race/replay coverage. All 12 isolated Postgres tests passed. Apple's historical fixture is tested structurally, not accepted as a current enrollment. Positive synthetic leaf certificates are generated at test time. - Protected SDK 26.5/27.1 enrollments and assertions pass the verifier, including the same key across SDK upgrades; development enrollment rejects under production policy. Captures are personal-development identities, not supported production-identity evidence. - Full local CI passed Rust tests and reached 6,828 passing desktop JS tests before an unchanged 10 ms focus-timer test failed; its five-test file passed in isolation. The pre-push native suite had 3,421 passes and an unchanged 300 ms child-PID test failure, also passing in isolation. Prior ACP timing flakes and these unrelated hook exceptions do not waive required CI. - Windows CI exposed a missing system OpenSSL installation for the test fixture generator. The test dependency now builds bundled OpenSSL; all 30 focused App Attest tests pass locally. [Current-head CI](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38636062347) passed, including Windows Rust, PostgreSQL, and desktop integration tests. - [Prior-head Codex review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8329#issuecomment-6177515598) found no major issues. Carl subsequently identified a dropped credential-length workaround; fixed in [ |
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Logan Johnson
|
d28f6b2f70 |
feat(relay): let channel-state filters opt in to system channels (#8182)
🤖 ## Summary After part 2, a client can read a system channel only if it already knows the ID. This PR lets a client find system channels on purpose, with an ordinary Nostr filter and no new filter key. A filter on the channel-state kinds (39000–39003) now also returns the system channels the reader can read when it has either: - `#t:["system"]`, the channel type tag that every channel-state event already carries; or - any `#P`, the creator tag from #8174. Asking for the channels of a named creator returns a small result, so it does not fill generic channel lists. The filter then matches as usual. Existing clients send neither on these kinds, so they still never see a system channel. | Reader wants | Filter | |---|---| | My system channels | `{kinds:[39002], #p:[me], #t:["system"]}`, then their kind:39000 by `#d` | | Open system channels | `{kinds:[39000], #t:["system"]}` | | One creator's labeled channel, system or not | `{kinds:[39000], #P:[creator], #t:[label]}` | Private system channels stay hidden from non-members, as for any private channel. Values in one tag filter combine with OR, so `#t:["system", label]` means `system` **or** the label; use `#P` plus the label instead. Part 3 of 3, stacked on part 2. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - The opt-in is decided per filter in `handlers/system_channels.rs` and applies on REQ, COUNT and the HTTP bridge. It applies only when every kind in the filter is 39000–39003. - A label alone is not an opt-in. - `NOSTR.md` documents the system channel query rules. - **Spec.** NIP-CL says how a filter asks for system channels. - The relay information document (NIP-11) now lists `"nip-cl"` in `supported_extensions`. Clients use this to tell if a relay supports labels and system channels, and refuse those calls on a relay that does not. NIP-CL documents this. ### Testing - End-to-end relay test: `#t:["system"]` finds both system channels for a member and only the open one for a non-member; 39002 `#p:[me]` with `#t:["system"]` lists the member's system channels; `#P` includes a creator's system channels; creator plus label returns exactly one channel with `limit: 1` and excludes another creator's channel with the same label; a label alone does not return the system channel; COUNT and HTTP `/query` and `/count` agree. - The test fails when the opt-in is disabled. - Unit tests for which filters opt in. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels ← this PR --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
|
cdf03f618a |
feat(relay): leave system channels out of reads that do not name them (#8181)
🤖 ## Summary After part 1, a system channel is still returned by every query that returns ordinary channels, so existing clients would show it as a chat. This PR makes the relay leave system channels out of every read that does not name them. Clients do not need to filter, so clients that know nothing about system channels stay correct. | Query | Before | After | |---|---|---| | A query that does not name a channel (no `#h`), COUNT, full-text search, the HTTP `/query` and `/count` routes, artifact queries (`{"artifact": ...}`), the sidebar | Includes system channels | Leaves them out | | "Channels I belong to" (kind:39002 `#p:[me]`) | Includes them | Leaves them out | | A filter that names the channel with `#h`, or with `#d` on kinds 39000–39003 | Ordinary read rules | Unchanged: members can read it, and anyone can read it if it is open | Push notifications and "you were added to a channel" notifications (kinds 44100/44101) skip system channels, because a client that received one would show the channel. A client that is given a system channel's ID, for example in a pasted link, can still open it. Naming the ID is the opt-in. This keeps system channels ordinary NIP-29 groups. Part 2 of 3, stacked on part 1. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - The rule lives in one place: `get_accessible_channel_ids`, the set of channels a query may read when it does not name one. It is the union of the reader's memberships and every open channel; both halves now exclude `channel_type = 'system'`. Because the filter is in SQL before `LIMIT`, pages stay full. - A filter that names a system channel adds it to that filter's scope only (`handlers/system_channels.rs`). A sibling filter in the same request keeps the implicit set, so naming one system channel cannot widen another filter. - Thread windows and the workflows API name their channel, so they follow the same named-channel rule. - Artifact queries have their own read check in SQL. It reads a system channel only when the query's `#h` names it. - When a request re-checks membership for a named channel that its first lookup missed, a confirmed system channel joins only the filters that name it. Before, a reader who joined a system channel during the request could have it added to a sibling filter's scope. - The system-channel lookup runs only when a filter names a channel outside the implicit set, so ordinary queries do not pay for it. - **Spec.** NIP-CL lists the reads that leave system channels out, and says when a filter names one. `AGENTS.md` notes this for `get_channels`. ### Testing - End-to-end relay test (Postgres and Redis) with a private system channel, an open system channel and an ordinary channel, as a member and as a non-member: REQ without `#h`, NIP-50 search, COUNT, HTTP `/query`, HTTP search, HTTP `/count`, the channel list, and 39002 `#p:[me]` return only the ordinary channel. Named reads by `#h` and `#d` follow member-or-open on REQ, COUNT, search and HTTP. - Relay test: adding a member to a system channel sends no kind:44100; an ordinary channel still does. - Both tests fail when the SQL exclusion or the named-channel scope is removed. - Database test: an artifact in an open system channel is missing from `{"artifact":"current"}` and present with `#h:[<system channel>]`, for a member and a non-member. It fails without the channel-type condition. - Relay test: the membership re-check confirms a system channel that the system-channel lookup missed. The channel goes to the filter that names it, and a sibling filter's scope does not include it. It fails without the fix. - Unit tests for the per-filter scope. They now run in `just test-unit` and `scripts/run-tests.sh`. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them ← this PR 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Wes
|
7b11c6147d |
test: fix recurring CI flakes in desktop and Postgres lanes (#8343)
Fixes the CI flakes that failed most often across `main` and unrelated branches from Oct 5 to Oct 14. The counts come from 150 failed `CI` runs. Every change except the nextest config is test-only. | Flake | Runs hit | Root cause | Fix | |---|---|---|---| | `probe_codex_acp_version_…descendant_holds_pipe_open` | 5 | The test writes its script in-process and then execs it. If a sibling test spawns a process in that window, the child inherits the open write fd and Linux rejects the exec with `ETXTBSY`. The probe swallows that error as `None`. | Write probe scripts from a short-lived `/bin/sh` (`write_executable_script`) | | `empty-edit-delete.spec.ts` (`:51`, `:74`, `:95`) | 11 | The seeded `mock-general-welcome` id isn't hex, so `formatTimelineMessages` can't overlay its edit. The post-subscribe window refetch then reverts the row. | Emit a per-test message with a real id after the exact channel subscription is live | | `huddle-transcription.spec.ts:798` | 9 | The composer's delayed initial autofocus (TipTap `focus()` runs in rAF) lands after the voice popover opens and dismisses it. | Wait for `message-input` focus before opening the popover | | `voice-note.spec.ts:906` | 6 | The fixture `ping.mp3` is about 1s long, so playback can end before `paused === false` is observed. | Loop the fixture audio | | `workflows.spec.ts:291` | 5 | The `Message text` fill runs before the inspector swaps to the new step, so it fills the trigger's condition instead. | Scope the fill to the step inspector after its `Action` menu appears | | `cluster_global_probe_commits_tokens_and_sessions_prove_coverage` | 3 | The `max-threads = 1` group only serializes these tests with each other. Other tests' sessions still mask cluster-wide `pg_stat_activity` (`MaskedActivity`). | `threads-required = "num-test-threads"` | | `test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner_and_releases_on_drop` | 1 (this PR) | The test retries the lock right after dropping the leader. Postgres releases a session advisory lock only after the backend notices the disconnect, so the retry can run first. | Poll for the successor, bounded at 5s | ### Validation - **ETXTBSY:** a Linux experiment with Rust 1.95 using the same write→chmod→spawn pattern under concurrent spawns hit `ETXTBSY` 4–7% of the time. Using the `sh` writer, it hit 0 of 6,000. I did not catch it inside the full suite locally, so this fix is based on the mechanism, not an in-suite repro. All 11 probe tests pass on Linux and macOS. - **empty-edit-delete:** the baseline failed 16 of 45 runs (`--repeat-each`, 6 workers, no retries). The spec fix alone brings that to 4/45. The remaining failures come from a separate product race, described below. - **huddle:** the baseline failed 5 of 10 runs. With the fix, 60 of 60 passed without retries. - **nextest:** checked with a throwaway crate on 0.9.136. A grouped test with `num-test-threads` ran alone, even with `max-threads = 1`. - I have not stress-run the voice-note and workflows fixes; they rely on CI. ### Not in this PR - **Product bug in `useChannelLinks`:** the debounced `#channel` autocomplete close lets Enter accept a stale suggestion for about 120ms. That accounts for the remaining `empty-edit-delete` failures, and it affects users too. With the spec fix plus a synchronous close, the spec passed 120 of 120 runs. This needs a product decision, so it's held for a separate PR. - **Composer autofocus race:** the delayed autofocus can close an overlay the user just opened. The real fix is to revalidate when the delayed focus runs. Overlaps #6530. - **`thread-head-stale-edit.spec.ts:55`:** a forced click on a pointer-events-none action bar is suspected, but I couldn't reproduce it. - **Remaining ETXTBSY exposure:** about 40 other Rust tests write and then exec scripts, and 17 specs still edit the non-hex seed message. Root-cause lanes by Princess Donut, Mongo and Mordecai. Carl integrated and verified them. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <5d97ac8c272fa949af56c71e586146b1706e5c4c3daa125db5b4625e12e0686c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Mongo <81cabd2ca1792494372ed410283c00770c0cf35afca052e940fa522883212b45@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Mordecai <f314b6033b6e13df94c8e9e1187d3666b6b9ce54e66ee986e31cdaa909e8dcbc@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Bradley Axen
|
8b60dcf8e3 |
feat(relay): deliver full signed events to operator listeners (#8309)
## Summary
Operator-listener mention notifications now carry the full signed event,
so a listener such as kgoose can wake an agent without first fetching
the event (one signed round trip less on time-to-first-reply).
Because the notification now carries message content, two mitigations
come with it, as agreed in #buzz-security:
1. **Each target signs its own registration.** `POST
/operator/listener/pubkeys` takes `{"registrations": [proof, …]}`. Each
proof is a kind `24245` event signed by the target pubkey, with exactly
one `p` tag (the listener pubkey) and one `u` tag
(`{RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN}/operator/listener/pubkeys`), and a
`created_at` within ±60s. The old unsigned `{"pubkeys": […]}` POST body
is rejected with 400. `DELETE` is unchanged.
2. **Only notify a target that can read the event.** Before each
delivery the relay re-checks, on the writer, that:
- the registration still exists;
- the event isn't deleted;
- neither the target nor its recorded NIP-OA owner is banned;
- the target passes the relay-membership gate (with the owner path when
`allow_nip_oa_auth` is on);
- the channel is open, or the target is an active member.
A delivery that fails the check retries with backoff instead of being
dropped, because a mention can commit just before the target is added to
the channel. It fails permanently, with no HTTP request, once attempts
are exhausted.
The payload is now `v: 2`: the v1 fields plus `event`, the full signed
NIP-01 event.
There's no migration. Existing registrations stay in place and age out
under the 30-day retention; only a configured listener could have
created them. Listeners must sign proofs to register new targets, so
receivers have to accept `v: 2`.
Companion kgoose change: squareup/cash-server#136794 signs registrations
with the agent key. The kgoose receiver in squareup/cash-server#136004
currently accepts only `v: 1` and bodies up to 4 KB, so it needs to
accept v2 and a larger body.
## Testing
- Unit tests:
- proof verification (forged signer, wrong kind, stale or future, other
or ambiguous listener, other or missing endpoint);
- signed-only request bodies;
- delivery payload carries a verifiable event;
- unreadable or failed loads retry, then fail, without an HTTP request.
- Postgres tests:
- every access predicate (open, member and non-member private,
channel-less, closed community with target or owner membership, owner
ban, removed member, deleted channel or event, removed registration);
- the route test (signed registration accepted; a proof for another
listener and the unsigned body both rejected).
- Mutation runs confirmed that the membership, owner, ban and
reader-visibility guards each fail a test when removed.
- Local relay exercise with a fake listener:
- signed registration returned 200; unsigned, stale and wrong-listener
proofs returned 400;
- open-channel mentions delivered v2 with an event whose id and
signature verify independently;
- a private-channel mention of a non-member retried without delivering,
then delivered once the target was added.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Will Pfleger
|
e645918c63 |
fix(relay): match pushed-down tags by position, not containment (#8335)
🤖 The relay pushes several tag filters into SQL as JSONB containment (`tags @> [[name, value]]`). Containment ignores element position, so a tag like `["x","e",<id>]` or `["meta","t",v]` satisfies `#e:[<id>]` or `#t:[v]`, and `#t:["t"]` matches `["t","other"]`. Because the predicate runs before `LIMIT`, a newer event that only matches by containment can take a `limit: 1` slot; the exact NIP-01 post-filter then drops it and the real match is never returned. Where no post-filter follows, the decoy is returned or counted outright. `push_exact_tag_match` in `buzz-db/src/store/event.rs` keeps containment as the GIN-indexed prefilter (one array-bound `tags @> ANY(...)`, so the e-tag planner shape is unchanged) and adds a positional `EXISTS (... tag->>0 = name AND tag->>1 = ANY(values))`. It now backs every `EventQuery` tag pushdown: | Pushdown | Before | Effect of over-match | |---|---|---| | `#e` (`e_tags`, query and COUNT) | containment | REQ `limit` slot theft; COUNT has no post-filter and counted decoys; thread aux closure returned decoy reactions/replies | | artifact `#d` (`d_tag_values`) | containment | `limit` slot theft on NIP-AR identity lookups | | `custom_tag` (bridge `#buzz-channel`) | containment | no post-filter: a decoy project/repository was returned for its channel | | shared-gated visibility (`shared_gated_reader`) | containment of `["shared","true"]` | a private event tagged `["x","shared","true"]` took a page slot before `event_visible_to_reader` dropped it, so the page came back short. Never a visibility leak: the post-filter stays in place | **Bridge `/count` honors `#buzz-channel`.** `POST /query` scoped project/repository reads by `#buzz-channel`, but `POST /count` ignored it, so a count for one channel counted matching projects in every channel the reader can see. `/count` now sets the same `custom_tag` on both its channel-scoped and access-scoped paths, and the COUNT SQL builder pushes `custom_tag` down exactly like the query builder, so `/count` and `/query` select the same events on both the fast count and the post-filtered fallback. Left unchanged: the retention-free purge predicate for mesh status (`tags @> [["k","buzz-mesh-status"]]`). It mirrors the migration 0019 trigger, has no `LIMIT`, and only affects how the author's own deleted event is purged. REQ `#t` outside group-state kinds is still post-filtered only. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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71d7aa0436 |
feat(relay): add the system channel type (#8180)
🤖 ## Summary Buzz uses channel membership to decide who can read what, and every channel a person belongs to shows up in their client as a chat. So there is no way to make a group that exists only for access control, for example "only this agent and its owner can read the agent's config". Such a channel would appear in both people's sidebars, search results and unread counts. This stack adds a **system channel**: an ordinary channel that queries leave out unless they ask for it. This first PR adds the type itself. - `kind:9007` (create channel) with `["channel_type", "system"]` creates a system channel. - It is private unless the creator sends `["visibility", "open"]`. - While it is private, its channel metadata event (kind:39000) carries the NIP-29 `hidden` marker, which means "hide this group's metadata from non-members". Until now the relay set `hidden` only for DMs. On its own this PR does not yet hide system channels from queries. Part 2 does that. Part 1 of 3, stacked on #8176 (the channel labels and creator lookup stack, which this feature uses). ### Related issue None found. ### Details - Migration 0062 adds `system` to the `channel_type` Postgres enum. No new columns. - `buzz_core::channel::ChannelType::System`, and `system` is now a reserved label name (labels cannot equal a channel type name). - `buzz-admin` reconcile writes `hidden` with the same rule as the relay. Usage metrics count system channels. - **Rollback.** A relay older than this change cannot read `channel_type = 'system'`. Do not roll back past it while system channels exist. - **Spec.** NIP-CL gets a "System channels" section. `ARCHITECTURE.md` lists the `System` type. ### Testing - Relay test: a system channel is private and `hidden` by default; opening it removes `hidden`; its first `t` tag is `system`. - Migration embed and usage-metrics tests. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type ← this PR 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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a3909acc67 |
feat(relay): match label and creator filters before the page limit (#8176)
🤖 ## Summary After parts 1 and 2, a client can ask for "channels with label X" or "channels created by key K". But the relay applied these tag filters after it read one page of the newest channel events. So a request such as `{kinds:[39000], #t:["workspace"], limit:10}` could return fewer than 10 channels, or none, while matching channels existed. This PR moves the label and creator match into the database query, before the page limit. Part 3 of 3, stacked on part 2. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - Applies only when every kind in the filter is a relay-signed channel-state kind (39000–39003). Other kinds keep today's behavior. - The database match uses JSONB containment on `tags`, which is GIN-indexed. Containment can match a little too much (for example, a tag that contains both strings in another position), never too little. So the relay still checks each returned event with the normal Nostr filter rules, and `COUNT` requests keep that check too. - The same match is applied to the query path and the count path. - **Spec.** NIP-CL now says that `#t` and `#P` match before `limit`. - **Choosing one channel.** The relay does not make labels unique, so two creates for one label can both succeed, for example when two processes of one agent start at the same time. NIP-CL gets a "Choosing one channel" section: a client that needs one channel per creator and label looks it up with `#P` + `#t`, creates it only if none exists, and otherwise uses the oldest one (the lowest `created_at` tag, then the lowest channel ID). Every reader that follows this rule picks the same channel, even after an edit. ### Testing - Relay test: many channels, one match, small `limit`. The request returns the match for both `#t` and `#P`. This test fails without the change. - Unit test: `#t` and `#P` reach the database query only for channel-state kinds. - Relay test: one creator sends two creates for the same label at once. Both channels exist, a `#P` + `#t` lookup finds both, and the oldest-channel rule picks the same one in either order, even after the older channel's metadata is re-published by an edit. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel ← this PR **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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2f79374f48 |
feat(relay): channel labels (#8175)
🤖 ## Summary A plugin or agent often needs to tag its own channels and then find them again, for example "my attention-config channel" or "all channels of this workspace". Today a channel has no labels: the relay ignores any `t` tags in create or edit requests. This PR adds channel labels. - A create request can carry up to 8 labels as `["t", "<label>"]` tags. - An edit request with `t` tags replaces the label set. `["t", ""]` alone clears it, the same convention as `["ttl", ""]`. Only owners and admins can change labels, as for the name. - The relay publishes each label as a `t` tag on the channel's state events, after the channel type tag. Part 2 of 3, stacked on part 1. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - **Rules.** A label uses 1–64 characters from `a-z`, `0-9`, `.`, `:` and `-`. The relay refuses a label equal to a channel type name (`stream`, `forum`, `dm`, `workflow`, `system`), so a label cannot make a channel look like another type. - **No trust from labels.** Any admin can set a label. Only the relay-written creator tag (part 1) says who made a channel. - **Storage.** New migration `0061_channel_labels.sql` adds `channels.labels TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'`. Channels without labels look and behave as before. - **Readers.** The CLI and `buzz-acp` read the channel type from the first `t` tag. Before this PR they used the last one, which would now be a label. - **Spec.** NIP-CL gets a "Channel labels" section with these rules. ### Testing - Relay tests: labels at creation appear after the type tag, edit replaces and clears them, invalid labels are refused, and members who are not admins cannot change them. - Unit tests for the label rules: allowed characters, length, reserved type names, the 8-label cap and the clear marker. - `buzz-acp` test: the channel type comes from the first `t` tag, not a label. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels ← this PR 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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b3795236cc |
fix(relay): reject unreadable write targets as missing (#8249)
🤖 A sender who cannot use or read a referenced event, artifact or workflow now gets exactly the response it would get for an ID that does not exist. #8197 (merged) set this rule for deletions; this applies it to the other writes that look up a target, plus the workflow read and webhook endpoints. Artifact `create` and workflow definition saves are the exceptions, described below. Access is checked before any message that depends on the target, readability goes through `event_visible_to_reader` (including #8197's private-deletion rule), and soft-deleted targets keep matching missing ones. | Path | Checks, in order | Response for any unusable target | |---|---|---| | Reaction (kind 7) | target lookup → `event_visible_to_reader` → every channel gate for the derived channel, including archived | `invalid: reaction target event not found` | | Edit (kind 40003) | target in the edit's `h` channel and readable → author / agent-owner check, including an author since removed from a private channel | `invalid: edit target not found or not editable by you` | | Forum vote (kind 45002) | target in the vote's `h` channel and readable → kind check | `invalid: vote target event not found` | | Report by event (kind 1984 `e`) | `event_visible_to_reader` → token channel scope → channel membership or open | `invalid: report target event not found` | | Reply (NIP-10 and workflow `send_message` replies) | parent in the reply's channel and readable | `reply parent not found` | | Artifact update / delete / restore / move | head exists and is homed in `h` (move: in the source the sender can write) → revision, type, deleted and root checks | `conflict: artifact head unavailable` | | Workflow trigger (kind 46020) | workflow exists and sender is its owner | `invalid: workflow not found or not triggerable by you` | | `GET /workflows/{id}/runs` and `/runs/{run_id}/approvals` | workflow exists, has a channel, and the caller can read it | `404 {"error":"workflow not found"}` | | `POST /hooks/{id}` | workflow exists and the provided secret matches its stored secret → definition and trigger-type checks | `404 {"error":"workflow not found"}` | Two of these reject writes that used to be accepted: a reaction to an event the sender cannot read (such as someone else's author-only event), and a report on an event the reporter cannot read. Reports by pubkey and by blob are unchanged. In an archived channel, writes whose channel comes from their target (reactions and deletions) get that target's not-found response, and an artifact move out of an archived source channel gets `conflict: artifact head unavailable` like any other source the sender cannot write; every other write keeps `invalid: channel is archived`. A webhook call with an absent or wrong secret, or to a workflow without a webhook secret, now gets `404` instead of `401`/`400`. Artifact `create` and workflow definition saves still report a taken ID, as NIP-AR allows for artifacts. Removed messages, none of which any client depends on from these endpoints: `edit target event not found`, `must be event author to edit`, `target event belongs to a different channel`, `target event has no channel`, `parent event belongs to a different channel`, `parent event has no channel association`, `artifact home changed`, `workflow is not accessible`, `workflow is not channel-scoped`, the webhook's `authentication failed` and `webhook secret required but not configured`, `forbidden: not authorized to trigger this workflow` for non-owners (it remains for an owner whose channel authority lapsed), and `restricted: not a channel member` for an edit by an author removed from a private channel. `e2e_existence_oracle` checks each event write over HTTP and WS, and the workflow read and webhook endpoints over HTTP, against missing, soft-deleted, other-channel, private-channel, archived, author-only and wrong-kind targets as applicable, with a positive control per path. It runs in the Backend Integration job alongside `e2e_author_only_deletion`. `removed_author_edit_does_not_reveal_target` checks that a removed author's edits of their remaining message, their deleted message and a missing ID get identical answers. In the PostgreSQL suite, `head_outside_authorized_channel_matches_missing_head` covers the artifact transaction, `workflow_reply_to_unusable_parent_matches_missing` covers workflow replies through `RelayActionSink::send_message`, `scoped_token_report_does_not_reveal_target` and `scoped_token_reaction_does_not_reveal_target` cover channel-scoped tokens, and `channelless_workflow_runs_read_as_missing` covers the runs read for a workflow with no channel. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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ea24a3ee3d |
fix(ci): remove Detect Changed Paths timeout and deletion test race (#8300)
🤖 ## Summary This PR removes two CI flakes that failed relay-stack runs on 2026-10-13. Both passed when rerun. - **Detect Changed Paths timeout.** This first CI job had a 2-minute limit. Its steps take about 75 seconds, but GitHub sometimes finishes the job minutes after the last step. In three runs, every step had finished, but GitHub still cancelled the job at the limit, and all later jobs failed. The limit is now 10 minutes. - **PostgreSQL deletion test.** `approval_boundary_blocks_claim_until_exact_inventory_is_approved` sometimes could not claim an approved deletion request. This was a race in the test, not a product bug. How the test race happens: - The test sends an UPDATE that the database must reject. Then it claims the same row. PostgreSQL sends the error to the client before it rolls back the statement and releases its row lock. sqlx returns as soon as it gets the error. - The claim runs on another pooled connection with `FOR UPDATE ... SKIP LOCKED`. It can skip the row while the lock is still held, and return no claim. - The test now runs the rejected UPDATE on its own connection. Then it sends `SELECT 1` on that connection before it claims. That round trip completes only after PostgreSQL has finished the rollback. Production code does not change. A claim that skips a row locked by another transaction is correct behavior. I checked the other tests in this file. Only this test has a rejected write on the request row immediately before a `SKIP LOCKED` claim. In the other tests, a blocking `approve` call runs before the claim. ### Related issue N/A. No existing PR found. Failing runs: [timeout #8174](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38468285648/job/115540525751), [timeout #8176](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38468321774/job/115541550557), [timeout #8182](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38468329504/job/115541197994), [deletion test #8182](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38468329504/job/115550003726). ### Testing - I confirmed the order in the PostgreSQL 17 source: `EmitErrorReport()` (which flushes to the client) runs before `AbortCurrentTransaction()` in `tcop/postgres.c`. A BEFORE UPDATE trigger locks the row first (`GetTupleForTrigger` in `commands/trigger.c`). - I could not reproduce the failure locally: 0 failures in 410 runs, including runs on a CPU-limited PostgreSQL container. The fixed test passes against PostgreSQL 17. Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Ian Oberst
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2270b66e14 |
test(buzz-db): drop partition scratch schemas on panic (#8293)
## Summary
The partition Postgres tests dropped their scratch schema with a
`drop_schema` call at the end of each test body. When a test panicked,
that call never ran, so the schema leaked into the shared database,
along with any `{schema}_*` sibling schemas or reader role the test
created. A reviewer on #7993 hit this locally: the leaked schema plus a
database-wide catalog query made later runs fail. CI hides it because
the test wrapper gives each process its own database.
`scratch_pool` / `scratch_pool_with_max_connections` now return `(pool,
ScratchSchema)`. The guard owns the admin pool and schema name and
cleans up on `Drop`:
- **Fresh thread and connection.** `Drop` runs on the test's runtime
thread, which can't drive the test's pools while it blocks, so cleanup
runs on its own thread with its own runtime and connection.
- **Terminates the test's backends first.** Both pools record each
connection's backend pid. A test that panics mid-transaction keeps its
locks, because the rollback would only run on the blocked runtime.
Without this step `DROP SCHEMA` waits on those locks.
- **Drops `{name}` plus every schema and role named `{name}_*`.** This
replaces the per-test sibling-schema and `DROP ROLE` cleanup. The reader
role is now named `{schema}_reader`.
- **Bounded.** `lock_timeout = '10s'`. Failures print a warning and
never panic inside `Drop`.
The 52 call sites are migrated mechanically. Test-only change.
### Related issue
Follow-up from review on #7993. No existing issue found.
### Testing
- New `scratch_schema_is_dropped_when_a_test_panics_holding_a_lock`: the
test body creates a sibling schema, takes `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` on a
scratch table in an open transaction, and panics. The test then asserts
no `{name}` / `{name}_*` schema remains.
- Proved it can fail: with the backend-termination step disabled,
cleanup hits the lock timeout and the test fails, reporting both leaked
schemas.
- Partition Postgres lane: `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db
--lib -E 'test(partition)'`, 53/53 passed.
- The same filter run directly against the shared `buzz` database: 53/53
passed, then 0 `partition_audit_test_%` schemas and 0
`partition_audit_%` roles remained.
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --tests` clean. Pre-push hooks passed.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Luke Tornquist
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d25384a4f3 |
buzz-db: admit every fenced-table writer in app code (#8219)
## Summary This makes every serving writer of a community-write-fenced table take community admission in application code. That's the "Dual enforcement" step of the Supported Writer Contract in `ARCHITECTURE.md`. Admission means the shared community deletion lock plus the active/not-deleted check from `deletion::guard_community_write`. It's taken before the transaction's first tenant write or row lock and held until commit. The 32 `community_write_fence_*` triggers, the six fence SQL functions and `validate_serving_catalog` are unchanged. They stay authoritative. Removing them is a separate migration that will be checked table by table. ## Changes - **New admission entry point.** `begin_community_write_transaction` (`runtime/mod.rs`) builds an `AdmittedTx` for non-event writers. It sits next to the existing event-write entry points and shares their implementation. - **Writers moved onto it:** - `api_tokens`, `archived_identities`, `channels`, `channel_members` (including DM and admin paths), `community_bans`, `git_repo_names` - `moderation_actions` and `moderation_reports`, `personal_read_accounts` and `personal_read_frontiers`, `pubkey_allowlist` - `push_leases`, `push_match_queue`, `push_wake_outbox` - `relay_invites`, `relay_members` (including the new-community owner bootstrap and the startup `pubkey_allowlist` backfill), `join_policy_acceptances` - `thread_metadata`, `users`, `workflows`, `workflow_runs`, `workflow_approvals`, `scheduled_workflow_fires` - Personal-read helpers now require `&mut AdmittedTx`. - **`buzz-audit`.** An append now passes admission first, then takes a transaction-scoped audit-chain lock (`pg_advisory_xact_lock`). This replaces the session lock and the `catch_unwind` unlock cleanup. The relay audit worker retries a `lock_timeout` on either lock and keeps the entry; an admission refusal is terminal, as the trigger's refusal was. - **Fleet-wide statements.** These keep `community_write_allowed(...)` in the same SQL statement, because there's no single community to admit up front: - scheduled-fire prune - invite expiry - push matcher claim and exhausted-job cleanup - startup `d_tag` backfill - channel TTL cleanup - **Relay-member removal.** `remove_relay_member` and `remove_relay_member_if_role` run `delete_member_with_acceptances` inside their admitted transaction. The helper no longer opens its own transaction, so the member lock, the `join_policy_acceptances` delete and the member delete all hold admission until commit. `delete_workflow` and `delete_workflow_for_owner` are gone on `main`, and the coordinate deletion path they used to back was already admitted. - **Unchanged exceptions.** The deletion-executor generation exception and the serving-lease path work as before. - **Tables with no production writer.** `delivery_log` and `subscriptions` are only written by a historical cutover script and a test fixture. Their triggers stay. - **No cross-community moves.** No production `community_id` move exists on a fenced table. The only `SET community_id = NULL` is the deletion-executor purge. So no dual-community lock ordering was needed. ## What got simpler - Per-store ad-hoc writer helpers are gone: `begin_event_write_transaction` and `acquire_event_write_connection` in `channel.rs`, and `begin_operation_transaction` in `push.rs`. - Audit append drops the session advisory unlock, the `catch_unwind`/`resume_unwind` panic handling, `log_inner` and the `futures-util` dependency. ## Notes for reviewers - **New crate dependency.** `buzz-audit` now depends on `buzz-db` only to call the free function `buzz_db::deletion::guard_community_write`. `ARCHITECTURE.md` names this as the one sanctioned subsystem edge, and its audit section is updated to match. - **Hot paths.** `ensure_user` first checks whether the user exists and returns without admission when it does (no write happens). Only a real insert takes admission. `touch_api_token` has no production caller today. - **No-op writers stay read-only.** The startup allowlist backfill returns early on plain reads when the legacy table is gone, it has no rows for the community, or the community already has members, so a quiescing deployment community still starts. It re-checks under admission before inserting. - **Owner mutations.** When admission refuses a transfer or a provisioning and a deletion request exists, both report `DeletionPending`, as before. For a transfer, the operator API keeps its coded `deletion_lifecycle_conflict` 409. For provisioning, it keeps the existing uncoded 409, `owner_conflict: community deletion is pending`. - **Per-community worker loops.** `claim_due_push_wakes` and similar now return `AccessDenied` for a community that goes quiescing between the active-host scan and the claim. The worker logs it at `debug` and the next scan skips the community. - **Kick side effects.** `membership_removal_fence` admits before the membership lock to keep the lock order of `add_member`. A community that leaves `active` between the kick and the fence skips live subscription eviction; the membership cache is already invalidated and fan-out re-checks membership. This is documented on the function. ## Testing - **New refusal tests.** 19 tests: the 18 in `store::admission_postgres_tests`, plus `audit_append_requires_application_admission_with_triggers_bypassed`. Each runs with ordinary triggers disabled (`session_replication_role = replica`), checks that a raw fenced insert would succeed, and asserts that the writer is refused for both `quiescing` and `fenced` communities. Active writes still succeed. - **The tests catch a missing check.** Measured in review at `6fc073c3f`: with the guard in `AdmittedTx::admit` bypassed, 25 tests fail. That includes 16 of the 18 database admission tests. The audit test stays green there, because audit calls `guard_community_write` directly. - **Affected PG suites, with triggers on:** 183/183 passed across 16 store suites, push 18/18 run isolated, audit 7/7. The existing artifact, reaction and replaceable admission tests pass. - **Review fixes, each checked to fail without its fix:** - `allowlist_backfill_requires_application_admission` and `owner_mutations_report_pending_deletion_when_admission_refuses` fail with the old `relay_members.rs`. - `empty_allowlist_backfill_skips_admission` fails (`AccessDenied … write-fenced (quiescing)`) without the allowlist-rows early return. - `audit_worker_retries_admission_lock_timeout_until_original_entry_is_appended_once` holds the community deletion lock exclusive and fails without the admission retry arm. - The existing audit-chain retry test now looks for the transaction-scoped lock and passes. - The two owner-revoke mini-schema tests (`bridge.rs`, `ingest.rs`) now include `communities` and `community_deletion_lock_key`, which admission reads; both failed without that. - **Static checks:** `cargo fmt --check` and workspace `cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings` pass. - **Not run locally:** the `mobile-check` step of `just ci` (the build machine couldn't reach pub.dev, and clean base fails the same way) and the full `just test` lane. CI on this PR covers both. `mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` fails on the build machine at base `394d4a434` as well; it uses no database. Refs BUZZ-314. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
|
8bb49a1b6a |
feat(relay): publish channel type and creator on every channel-state event (#8174)
🤖 ## Summary Clients cannot tell who created a channel, and only the channel-metadata event says what type of channel it is. This PR makes every relay-signed channel-state event carry both facts, so a client can find "the channel that this key created" with one ordinary Nostr filter. - Channel metadata, admin list and member list events (kinds 39000, 39001 and 39002) now all carry the channel type as their first `t` tag, then the creator as a `P` tag. - The creator comes from the relay's own record of who signed the channel's create request. No client can set it, and it does not change when ownership moves. - Channel metadata (kind:39000) also carries `["created_at", <unix seconds>]`, the time the channel was created. The event's own `created_at` changes on every edit, so before this a client could not tell which of two channels is older. This is part 1 of a 3-part stack (channel labels and creator lookup). The system channels stack (#8180–#8182) builds on it. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - **Why `P`.** Several Nostr specs (NIP-22, NIP-34, NIP-72) use uppercase `P` for the author of the root object, and lowercase `p` for people involved. Lowercase `p` is already used on these events for members and DM participants, and a filter matches tag values, not their meaning, so `#p` would mix them. - **Trust.** A client that trusts a channel because of its creator must also check that the relay key signed the event. - **Order.** The type `t` tag comes first, so clients that read the first `t` tag still get the type after part 2 adds labels as more `t` tags. - **Creation time.** The relay reads it from `channels.created_at`, so an edit does not change it. #8176 uses it to pick one channel when two creates race. - `buzz-admin reconcile` writes the same tags when it rebuilds these events. `NOSTR.md` documents the tags. - **Spec.** New `docs/nips/NIP-CL.md` defines these tags, the trust rule and lookup by creator. Later PRs in both stacks add their parts to it. `NOSTR.md` links to it. ### Testing - Relay tests in `group_state_postgres_tests.rs`: each of the three kinds carries the type first, then the creator; the creator stays the same after an ownership transfer; kind:39000 carries the stored creation time, and still does after an edit. - Unit test for the shared tag builder that both the relay and `buzz-admin reconcile` use. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time ← this PR 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
|
52d13efc08 |
fix(buzz-db): delete workflow and membership children explicitly (#8212)
## What Workflow deletion and relay-member removal relied on `ON DELETE CASCADE` to remove child rows. Both paths now delete their own children inside the same transaction, so a later migration can drop those foreign-key actions without changing behavior. **Workflow deletion** (`store/workflow/deletion.rs`, the coordinate path used by NIP-09 deletes of workflow definitions): - Locks the target workflow row with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE`, under the same owner and coordinate predicate as before. A concurrent run or fire insert has to lock that row for its foreign key, so the child deletes see every committed child. - Deletes scheduled fires first. A new fire has to lock the workflow row, and a cron attach locks the fire before the run, so deleting fires before the run lock keeps the lock order consistent and avoids a deadlock. - Then locks the workflow's runs `FOR UPDATE` in `id` order. An approval that names another workflow but references one of these runs key-share locks only the run, so the workflow lock alone doesn't exclude it. - `delete_workflow_with_children` then deletes approvals (for the workflow or any of its runs), then runs, then the workflow, and returns its `channel_id`. **Relay-member removal** (`store/relay_members.rs`): `remove_relay_member` and `remove_relay_member_if_role` share a new `delete_member_with_acceptances` helper. It locks the member row under the existing predicate (any non-owner, or an exact role), deletes `join_policy_acceptances`, then deletes the member, in one transaction. The `RemoveResult` outcomes are unchanged. **Removed:** `delete_workflow` (no callers) and `delete_workflow_for_owner` (test-only), plus their `Db` wrappers. The community-confinement test now drives the production coordinate deletion. ## Tests - `test_support::retire_foreign_key_delete_actions` rewrites every `CASCADE`, `SET NULL` and `SET DEFAULT` foreign key in the test's own per-test database as `NO ACTION`, which is the target schema of the follow-up migration. It asserts that none remain. All triggers stay live, including foreign-key checks and the community write fence. It refuses to run unless `current_database()` has the per-test wrapper's exact shape (`buzz_nt_` plus 24 hex digits), which excludes the run's `_desired` template. It checks the name only. - `workflow_deletion_removes_children_without_cascades` and `member_removal_deletes_acceptances_without_cascades` run the production paths on that schema and require every child row to be gone. One approval references another workflow but this workflow's run, which pins the `run_id` branch. The owner, role-mismatch and not-found outcomes still hold. - `workflow_deletion_waits_for_and_removes_concurrent_run` and `member_removal_waits_for_and_removes_concurrent_acceptance` hold a child insert open in a second transaction, wait until the removal is blocked on a lock, and then commit. The removal must succeed with no children left. - `workflow_deletion_waits_for_concurrent_fire_attach_without_deadlock` holds a fire row the way the cron attach does, then attaches a run to it while the deletion waits. Both must succeed. - `workflow_deletion_waits_for_and_removes_concurrent_cross_workflow_approval` does the same with an approval for another workflow that references this workflow's run. - The bridge test schema now includes `join_policy_acceptances`. ## What got simpler Two delete paths no longer depend on implicit constraint actions, and two unused workflow-delete functions are gone. This is the first step of retiring the `CASCADE` and `SET NULL` foreign keys. **Identified debt (later PRs):** `channel_members` and `personal_read_frontiers` (no hard-delete path found yet for their parents), the deletion `manifest_keys` cascade, the `SET NULL` actions on `executor_heartbeats` and `product_feedback`, and the `users` self-reference. That last one is a composite `(community_id, agent_owner_pubkey)` `ON DELETE SET NULL` that would try to null the `NOT NULL` `community_id`. Also, a scheduled fire for workflow B can link to a run of A (that FK is already `NO ACTION`), which would block A's run delete; the scheduler always attaches a run to its own workflow's fire, so this needs same-workflow enforcement in the cascade work. ## Verification Head `081be4c0d`, tree `ab649487`, on a Linux cloud workstation: fmt, buzz-db and workspace clippy, source policy and buzz-db lib pass; the six new tests pass; buzz-db PostgreSQL passes 490/490 and buzz-relay PostgreSQL 378/378. A sixth mutation, moving the fire delete back after the run lock, makes `workflow_deletion_waits_for_concurrent_fire_attach_without_deadlock` fail with `40P01` (deadlock detected). Previous head: Head `787c7c42d`, tree `6b9cf5d5`, on a Linux cloud workstation: fmt, buzz-db and workspace clippy, source policy and buzz-db lib pass; the new tests pass 5/5; buzz-relay PostgreSQL passes 378/378; buzz-db PostgreSQL passes 488/489, the one failure being `parent_contention_times_out_without_blocking_the_other_table` in `store/partition/`, which this PR doesn't touch and which passes on its own at the same tree. A fifth mutation, removing the run lock, makes the new cross-workflow approval test fail with the reviewer's exact 23503 on `workflow_approvals_community_id_run_id_fkey`. Previous head `00cba2f4a`, tree `2f89fed4`, base `e9269cbdf`. Results from a Linux cloud workstation: - fmt, buzz-db and workspace clippy, the source policy and buzz-db lib all pass. - The buzz-db PostgreSQL suite passes 488/488. - The buzz-relay PostgreSQL suite passes 378/378. Each of four mutations makes exactly one of the new tests fail with the foreign-key violation you'd expect (23503): - swapping the fires and runs deletes - deleting approvals by `workflow_id` only - removing the workflow row lock - removing the member row lock GitHub CI is green at this head. buzz-review-completed --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Jarrod Sibbison
|
8599efb6a3 |
feat(relay): allow HTTP operator listener delivery URLs (#8287)
## Summary Operator listener configuration currently rejects HTTP URLs, preventing delivery to sibling services over internal HTTP connections. Accept HTTP and HTTPS delivery URLs while retaining the existing pubkey, duplicate-route, and URL restrictions. Add configuration coverage for internal hostnames and custom ports, verify signed delivery through the real HTTP client, and include the listener suite in both unit-test runners. Shared NIP-98 signing and push gateway code are unchanged. ### Related issue Related: #7934 refactors operator listener delivery tests. No matching open issue found. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib operator_listener`: 13 passed, including signed HTTP delivery and redirect rejection. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, shell syntax, Justfile parsing, and diff whitespace checks passed. - `just test`: passed. - `just ci`: stopped at mobile analysis with an existing undefined `buzzDevPushAppProfile` in `mobile/test/features/settings/notification_toggle_test.dart:81`. Workspace and native desktop formatting/Clippy, desktop frontend checks, and web checks passed. The mobile file is unchanged by this PR. Locally verified with a spiked listener client Signed-off-by: jsibbison-square <jsibbison@squareup.com> |
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Ian Oberst
|
85b7331784 |
fix(relay): partition audit observability follow-ups (#7994)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **The alert rules changed in c3a314e71.** If you reviewed the alert
guidance earlier, please look again.
> - **The two range-based rules now apply only to live pods.** A range
selector such as `[30m]` keeps reading a terminated pod's samples until
they leave the window. So `BuzzPartitionAuditNotRunning` could fire for
about 10 minutes after normal pod turnover, and
`BuzzPartitionAuditFailing` could keep firing for up to an hour after
the pod was gone. Each rule now adds `and <counter>`, which requires the
counter to be exported right now:
> ```yaml
> expr: |
> sum without (outcome) (increase(buzz_partition_audit_runs_total[30m]))
== 0
> and sum without (outcome) (buzz_partition_audit_runs_total)
> ```
> ```yaml
> expr: |
> increase(buzz_partition_audit_failures_total[1h]) >= 2
> and buzz_partition_audit_failures_total
> ```
> - **The audit counters start at 0.** When the relay starts, it exports
every `buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{table, outcome}` series and
`buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` at 0, before the first audit.
`increase()` ignores a new series' first sample. Before this change, it
could miss the first periodic failure, or read a table's first
`degraded` run as a stopped loop. This change is also what makes the
`and <counter>` gate work: the counters now exist for a relay's whole
life.
>
> The doc's old claim that pod turnover can't leave an alert firing was
true only of the instant-selector stale rule. The doc now explains the
difference.
## Why
These are the observability follow-ups deferred from #6515 ("fix(db):
audit partition catalog before creation"):
- **Timestamp-age alerts go silent** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4127212141)).
Partition gauges are set only when a table audits successfully, and the
exporter evicts idle gauges after 2,700 s by default. After sustained
failures, `buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds`
disappears. A table that has never audited successfully never has it. An
alert on `time() - last_success` then has no input.
- **Startup fallback failures are not counted** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4127212158)).
When the startup fallback audit fails, it logs an error but does not
increment `buzz_partition_audit_failures_total`. Periodic failures do.
- **Repaired environments are always `degraded`**.
`PartitionTableAudit::degraded()` counts every legacy leaf, even one
wholly in the past. The `bb-block-staging` audit of the repaired catalog
reports `degraded` only because of `events_p2026_07_08_legacy`
`[2026-07-01, 2026-09-01)`. With this rule, every repaired environment
stays `degraded`, so nobody can alert on the outcome.
- **Partition config tests can see a poisoned env** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4137416297)).
Two partition config tests take only `ENV_MUTEX`. A NIP-FI test running
in the same process can make them see its deliberately invalid
environment.
Partition health is still diagnostic only, through
`/_status.partition_catalog` and metrics. Nothing here affects
`/_readiness`. Handling concurrent creation (#6515 item 4) is out of
scope and stays with the catch-all advancement work.
## What
- **Success timestamp survives failures.** Each failed table audit
refreshes `buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds` with
`increment(0.0)`, which leaves the value unchanged. It still resets the
exporter's idle tracking, the same mechanism as
`refresh_legacy_active_gauge_recency`. Sustained failures therefore keep
the last success exported and its age rising. A table that has never
succeeded exports `0`. A failed audit still never makes the last success
look fresh.
- **Alert guidance.** New `docs/partition-catalog-monitoring.md` covers
the metrics, how long each series lives, and the audit outcomes. It
notes that `runs_total` has no `unsafe` outcome. It gives three alert
rules:
- timestamp age, which also covers never-successful tables and sustained
failures;
- `sum without (outcome)
(increase(buzz_partition_audit_runs_total[30m])) == 0` for a stopped
audit loop. Counters are never idle-evicted, and this rule fires before
the stopped loop's timestamp is evicted, so there is no false resolve;
- an aggregate failure-counter rule.
Both range-based rules also require their counter to be exported right
now (`and <counter>`), so a terminated pod's leftover samples can't
raise or hold an alert.
- **Zero counter baselines.** `try_install` exports each
`buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{table, outcome}` series (`ok`,
`degraded`, and `error` for both tables) and
`buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` at 0 before the startup audit, the
same way the auth series already start at 0. A failure in the startup
audit itself can still happen before the first scrape. The doc says so;
the stale rule covers that case.
- **Failure counter.** `buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` now counts
failed explicit audit attempts: the startup fallback audit and each
periodic audit. Both paths go through one helper,
`counted_partition_audit`. A failed `ensure_future_partitions` call,
such as a DDL error that the fallback then recovers, is not counted by
itself. A single attempt never counts twice.
- **Historical legacy leaves.** A legacy leaf is historical when its
finite upper bound is at or before the current month start. It is still
reported under `children` as `legacy_leaf`, but it no longer degrades
the table. A legacy leaf that still covers the current month or any
lookahead month stays degraded. All other degradation causes are
unchanged. The verdict now lives in `PartitionAuditReport::outcome()`,
which `buzz-admin partition-audit` uses. The JSON outcome names and exit
codes are the same as before.
- **Test hygiene.** Both partition config tests now use `env_guards()`.
## How it was tested
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p
buzz-relay -p buzz-admin --all-targets -- -D warnings`.
- New unit tests:
- The repaired incident layout with an injected clock: `degraded` in
August 2026 and `ok` on 2026-09-01T00:00Z, when the upper bound equals
the current month start, and on 2026-09-15. The legacy leaf is still in
the serialized report. The `outcome` label on the run counter follows
the verdict.
- A table test of the legacy-leaf predicate: the upper bound before, at,
and one second after the month start; lookahead and beyond-horizon
leaves; historical leaves with trigger drift; anomalous and `DEFAULT`
children; no audited month.
- Outcome precedence (error, then unsafe, then degraded) and the
`buzz-admin` exit-code mapping.
- Startup: a failed fallback counts once, a successful fallback after a
DDL failure counts nothing, and a successful ensure never runs the
fallback. Each periodic failure counts once. Against an unreachable
database, startup counts one aggregate failure while each table still
records two `error` runs.
- On the production exporter, never-successful audits leave run counters
and a `0` success timestamp for both tables.
- On the production exporter, all six run-counter series and the failure
counter read 0 before any audit. After one failed audit, `error` reads 1
and `ok`/`degraded` stay at 0. Removing the initialization fails this
test.
- PostgreSQL lane (`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh`) with new or extended
tests:
- The repaired layout is not degraded in September. The same catalog is
degraded in August.
- With a 1 s idle timeout, a failed audit leaves the success timestamp
unchanged, and sustained failures keep it exported past the idle
timeout. When audits stop, the timestamp is evicted but the run counters
remain. The next success exports a fresh timestamp.
- Mutation check: removing the failure-path refresh fails both alert
fixtures.
- These fixtures check the emitted series. They do not evaluate the
rules themselves, including the `and <counter>` gate. `promtool` isn't
available locally or in CI, and the doc points to `promtool test rules`
for that.
- `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh`.
- `config::` and `nip_fi_config::` tests run together in one process
five times.
## Related
This PR conflicts textually with #7993 (catch-all advancement) in
`crates/buzz-db/src/store/partition.rs` and
`crates/buzz-relay/src/main.rs`. Whichever PR merges second will be
rebased onto the other.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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klopez4212
|
5dc693aeaf |
Extract shared Huddle audio client for desktop consumers (#8129)
Huddle audio was embedded in the v0 desktop client, forcing other clients to duplicate its protocol and codec behavior. This extracts `buzz-audio-client` so v1 can depend on a pinned library revision without building the v0 application. The crate owns the bounded v2 audio handshake, roster parsing, wire format, Opus sender, and per-peer NetEQ jitter buffer. The v0 human and agent senders use it, and the desktop retains room admission, identity/signing, TLS policy, device routing, mute, and teardown. Receive decoding preserves v1's support for 120 ms Opus packets. No relay protocol changes, speech models, or model downloads are included. Docker builder stages include CMake because cargo-chef compiles the workspace dependency graph. Dependency security: Opus 0.4 replaces the unmaintained `audiopus_sys` backend with `opusic-sys`. NetEQ is pinned exactly to 0.8.3 because its published Rust sources never reference its declared ringbuf dependency. RUSTSEC-2026-0293 is documented as unreachable for this audited source, and a wrapper restriction rejects every other consumer of vulnerable ringbuf versions. Independent review confirmed the scope; re-audit/remove the exception when changing NetEQ. NetEQ 0.9.1 still declares ringbuf 0.3, so a version bump alone does not remove it. Local `cargo deny check` passes with this constrained exception. Validation: - All 21 shared-crate tests pass, including real loopback WebSocket authentication/cancellation, real Opus-to-NetEQ playback, malformed input, and 120 ms decoding. These tests are included in `just test-unit`. - Shared-crate, root workspace, and desktop Tauri Clippy pass; `just desktop-tauri-check` passes. - The desktop Tauri test workspace passes; native two-person listening/device checks remain separate. - All mandatory push checks pass at `d06bac5dc`, including the complete Rust unit gate and desktop workspace checks. Existing agent timing and relay log-capture tests failed under concurrent load, passed separately, and passed in the full serial test run; no tests or hooks were skipped. - One test-only fixture change allows cold Perl startup before the escaped-process test's inner timeout (2 seconds instead of 300 ms). Its independent 5-second watchdog, 300-second surviving pipe writer, and all assertions remain intact. All eight process-helper tests pass; independent review confirmed this still tests bounded drain completion. - Dependency inspection confirms the library brings in no desktop application, Tauri, identity store, relay server, or speech-model crates. - Independent source review found no correctness blockers. Draft: a native two-person call, mute/leave/cancellation, and microphone/speaker switching still need a runtime tryout and human review. Full `just ci` was stopped during the unrelated mobile toolchain download because of disk pressure; it is not a passing gate. Consumer integration is tracked in block/buzz-app#489. --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com> |
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Will Pfleger
|
40c1c474e7 |
fix(relay): hide deletions of author-only events from other readers (#8197)
🤖 Opened by an agent (Hayt) for Will Pfleger. The relay keeps `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS` (event reminders `30300`, push leases `30350`, private managed agents `30179`) readable only by their author, but a NIP-09 deletion request (`kind:5`) for one of those events was readable by any community reader. The deletion carries no `h` tag, so ingest stores it with its target's channel (none), and every read gate classified it by its own kind, `5`. Another reader could read and count it by author, by id, live, or over HTTP, learning the deleted ids, how many, and when. A deletion is now exactly as private as the event it deletes: - **Classification by the deletion's own `k` tag.** `buzz_core::kind::is_author_only_event_kind` treats a `kind:5` that names an author-only kind in a `k` tag as author-only. Only the canonical decimal spelling counts (`"30300"`, not `"030300"` or `"+30300"`), so Rust classification, ingest and the admin SQL (which matches the tag text) always agree. Because it reads the deletion, not a target lookup, the deletion stays private after its target is soft-deleted or gone. It is generic over `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS`, so a kind added to the list later (for example `44300`) is covered automatically. - **Every read surface.** The shared per-event gate (`is_author_only_event`, used by WS REQ historical and lookup by id, COUNT fallbacks, HTTP `/query`, `/count`, search hydration and the thread window), live fan-out in `handlers/event.rs`, the COUNT fast-path guard (`filter_can_match_author_only_kinds` now treats any filter that can match `kind:5`, including unfiltered and id-only filters, as needing per-event filtering), the channel-window aux closure in the bridge, and admin event preview plus report list and detail (SQL suppression of `kind:5` rows with a tag whose first two elements are `k` and an author-only kind, matching the Rust classifier; soft-deleted rows included). - **Enforcement still reaches the author.** The admin report query takes the private-deletion `k` list from its caller next to the hidden kinds. HTTP-facing reads pass both; `admin_get_report_for_enforcement` passes neither, so report-directed bans, timeouts and action recovery still resolve the stored author of a reported private deletion. - **Ingest agreement.** `validate_standard_deletion_event` rejects a deletion of a stored (including soft-deleted) author-only event, by `e` or by `a` coordinate, unless it carries the matching canonical `["k","<kind>"]`. It also rejects an author-only `k` on a deletion of any other kind, so a public deletion can't hide itself from the readers who need it. A deletion whose target is itself a private deletion is rejected with `invalid: cannot delete a private deletion request`: it would otherwise be stored as a public event revealing the private deletion's id and timing, and NIP-09 gives a deletion of a deletion no effect. A deletion of a public deletion is unchanged. The `k` tag only narrows who can read the request; it grants no one new deletion authority. - **Unauthorized deletions learn nothing about the target.** On every delete-by-id path, no target-dependent error (its kind, the artifact and `k`-marker errors, the artifact-removal-marker error, or where it lives) is returned until every access check that could block the deletion has passed. A sender who fails any of them gets `invalid: deletion target not found or not deletable by you`, the same text and status as for a missing target. Errors that depend only on the request, never on the target, are unchanged: for example a `kind:9005` whose own `h` channel is archived still gets `channel is archived`, for a missing target and a real one alike. "May not delete" includes an author who has since been removed from the target's private channel, an author whose token is scoped to a different channel, and anyone deleting in an archived channel. The single-target rule (exactly one `e` or `a` tag) now runs before any target lookup, so every target faces the gates. For `kind:5` with an `e` target, ingest decides authority (effective author or the owning human of the authoring agent) first, then takes the channel from that same lookup, soft-deleted targets included, so tombstones face the same gates; an authorized re-deletion of a soft-deleted target now keeps the target's stored channel instead of being treated as global, so historical access checks, `#h` filtering and live routing all use that channel: readers outside a private channel no longer see it, and that channel's members and subscribers do. The token channel scope, scoped-token global-event, membership and archived checks then reject with the shared denial, all before `validate_standard_deletion_event` returns its artifact and `k`-marker errors. Other kinds, and `kind:5` with only `a` coordinates, keep their existing errors. For NIP-29 `kind:9005`, a target outside the `h` channel is denied like a missing one, so the relay no longer returns "different channel" or "no channel"; `may_delete_channel_event` (the author while still a member or the channel is open, a channel owner/admin, or the owning human of the author agent) is then checked in the `h` channel before the artifact-removal-marker error. No access restriction is removed and nothing becomes newly deletable. An authorized sender who names the wrong `h` channel for a `kind:9005` now gets the shared denial. Whether kind:5 content is full-text indexed depends on how the database was built. The desired-state schema (`schema/schema.sql`, which CI applies) and databases created before migration `0008` index it; an empty database initialized through `0008` gets a positive allowlist that doesn't. Where it is indexed, the per-event gate on search hydration is what keeps a private deletion out of other readers' search results. No current client is affected by the new rejection. `buzz-app`'s signer only allows `kind:5` for channel messages (with `h`) and managed-agent `30177` coordinates, and neither `buzz-app` nor this repo's desktop or CLI publishes deletions for `30300`, `30350` or `30179` today. NIP-ER already requires `k=30300` on reminder deletions. Coverage: - `crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` (Backend Integration job): a non-author gets nothing from WS REQ, WS COUNT, HTTP `/query` and `/count` (by author, mixed kinds, and id), search, or live delivery, while the author gets the deletion. Search runs WS and HTTP against a private deletion and a public control deletion sharing a reason word; with `BUZZ_TEST_SEARCH_INDEXES_DELETIONS=1` (set by the CI step) the author must get exactly both and another reader exactly the control; ingest rejects a missing, wrong, non-canonical, or public-target marker, and an untagged deletion of an already soft-deleted target. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` also sends one non-owner's deletions over HTTP and WS for a missing, live, soft-deleted, private-channel and global target, plus the `kind:9005` equivalents including a target in another channel and one with no channel, and requires the identical rejection text and HTTP status in every case; another member's deletion of a private event never names its kind. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `removed_author_deletion_does_not_reveal_target`: an author removed from a private channel gets the missing-target rejection over HTTP and WS for `kind:5` and `kind:9005` (with `h` set to a channel they can write to) against their retained message; the channel owner can still delete the removed author's message, and the author can still delete in a channel they can write to. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `archived_target_deletion_does_not_reveal_target`: over HTTP and WS, `kind:5` against a message, the same message with a wrong `k`, and an artifact in an archived channel, and `kind:9005` against the archived-channel message with `h` set to an active channel, all match the missing-target rejection; a `kind:9005` for an artifact-removal marker in the archived channel matches a missing target with the same `h`; in an active channel the owner still gets the `k`-mismatch and artifact errors. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `deletion_of_private_deletion_rejected`: over HTTP and WS, the author's deletion of their private deletion, with no `k` and with `k=5`, gets the rejection and stores nothing; a non-author's gets the missing-target rejection; a `kind:9005` against it gets the missing-target rejection; the private deletion stays hidden from another reader in WS REQ and COUNT, HTTP `/query` and `/count`, and live delivery; a deletion of a public deletion is still accepted. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `soft_deleted_target_keeps_its_channel`: an author removed from a private channel, and an author in an archived channel, re-deleting their own soft-deleted message get the missing-target rejection; a distinct successful re-deletion is readable by a channel member and not by an outsider, by id and by `#h`, and is delivered live to the member's `#h` subscription but not to the outsider's. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `multi_target_deletion_error_ignores_targets`: deletions with two `e` tags, or an `e` and an `a` tag, get the identical single-target error whether the first target is missing, live, in another private channel, a private reminder or an artifact. - `handlers::ingest::postgres_tests::scoped_token_deletion_rejection_does_not_reveal_target`: a non-owner and the target's author, each with a token scoped to another channel, get the same rejection for a missing, live, soft-deleted and global target, and the author's `kind:9005` naming the token's channel gets it for a missing target, a live target in another channel and a global target; a token scoped to the target's channel still deletes, and its re-deletion of the soft-deleted target is stored with that target's channel. - `thread_window::postgres_tests`: stored private deletions never reach a non-signer through the thread-window or channel-window aux closures, or by id once their target is gone. - `api::admin::postgres_tests`: ban and stranded-ban recovery on a reported private deletion reach the stored author while report detail hides it; `admin_moderation` tests treat non-canonical markers as public. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Wes
|
03ce924e32 |
fix(ci): restore green main after merge skew and new advisory (#8277)
Main CI has been red since
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Bradley Axen
|
1d9f2c81a5 |
feat(relay): accept an owner's presence for its agents (kind 20003) (#8261)
## Summary App-hosted agents (buzz-app agents2) run inside the desktop app without a socket per agent, so they can't send their own kind 20001 presence and always read as offline — including to their owner on another device. This adds **kind 20003, an owner's presence for its agents**: - Owner-signed; `content` is the status (`online` / `away` / `offline`); each `p` tag names an agent (1–256 distinct). - WebSocket only (rejected on HTTP ingest, like 20001). - The relay keeps only the agents the signer owns (`users.agent_owner_pubkey`) — cached `true` from `observer_owner_cache`, the rest resolved with one `list_agents_for_owner` query. Only positive links are cached, so a just-linked agent isn't hidden for the cache TTL and the observer path isn't poisoned. - Sets (180s TTL) or clears each agent's presence in one Redis round trip, the same keys kind 20001 writes, so the presence snapshot reports them with no client change. - Not fanned out: live presence is matched by author, and the author here is the owner. A new kind rather than `p` tags on 20001, so a relay without this ignores the batch instead of storing it as the owner's own presence. ## Testing - `agent_presence_request_names_distinct_agents_with_a_known_status` (unit). - `presence_storage_postgres_tests::agent_presence_stores_only_owned_agents` (Postgres + Redis): only the owner's agent goes online, another owner's agent doesn't, a pre-cached `false` doesn't hide a linked agent, and `offline` clears it. All 5 presence Postgres tests pass via `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay --lib -E 'test(/presence/)'`. - `buzz-pubsub` ignored Redis test `test_presence_many_sets_with_ttl_and_clears` passes. - clippy clean. Plain `cargo test` failures locally were environmental only (buzz-media "role buzz does not exist", mesh_demo 504). - Not yet exercised end to end against a local relay + app. App side: block/buzz-app#862. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Benoît Quenaudon
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799cfd7050 |
Start the ACP idle interval when channel turns complete (#8149)
A channel turn can outlast the idle interval, leaving its pool eligible for teardown immediately after completion. Reset the idle clock when a channel result settles, while letting heartbeat-only pools expire normally. Add regression coverage for both cases. This addresses premature idle teardown. Broader callback continuity and human workflow testing remain pending, so this PR stays in draft. Signed-off-by: Benoit Quenaudon <bquenaudon@squareup.com> |
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Bradley Axen
|
30873ba46b |
docs(nest): replace commit attribution policy with the runtime facts (#8236)
## What The nest `AGENTS.md` template (`desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/nest_agents.md`) ships to every Buzz user's agents. Its "Git Commit Attribution" section is cut from a general attribution policy (separate claims, author "per applicable policy", hypothetical repos that require a human author, "stop and ask") down to what the runtime actually does: - `buzz-acp` sets a default git identity and signing. Agents use it, but change the author when a repository or their human needs a different one. The operator can opt out with `BUZZ_GIT_IDENTITY=user`. - Credit the other party with `Co-authored-by`: the human you work for when you commit as yourself, or yourself when you commit as them. - Follow each repository's own `AGENTS.md` for sign-off (DCO) and other attribution rules. The buzz-acp base prompt gets the same co-author default. `NEST_AGENTS_VERSION` goes from 6 to 7 so existing nests refresh, and the template test now asserts the new content. ## Why Agents read the old section as a puzzle to solve on every commit. They looked for an applicable policy, wondered whether the human should be the author, and stalled. DCO and sign-off rules are per-repository and already live in each repo's own `AGENTS.md` (this repo says `git commit -s`), so they don't belong in a template that every OSS user's agents read. Companion buzz-app change: block/buzz-app#833. ## Validation `cargo test --lib managed_agents::nest` in `desktop/src-tauri`: 55 passed, including the legacy-attribution upgrade test. I pushed with `--no-verify`: the change is Markdown plus a version constant and a test, and the nest tests above are the relevant suite. CI runs the full set. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: bundled00 <f172256d14c11991d58561c98a594e7397d64087502e7bc90f2c0e8d0d45363f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Bradley Axen
|
326e2301cb |
perf(relay): drop per-pulse ban reads and owner-link writes on HTTP (#8233)
## Why Agents send an HTTP typing pulse (`POST /events`, kind 20002) every 3–5 seconds while they work. #8207 already routes the pulse's write-restriction and serving checks through #8208's short-TTL caches. Two per-pulse costs were still left at the membership step: - **A fresh ban read** for the agent, plus its owner when the agent comes in through NIP-OA (`deny_banned` → `community_ban_outcome`). - **Four writer round-trips for owner-admitted agents**, on every request: `materialize_nip_oa_owner` runs 2× `ensure_user` + the `agent_owner_pubkey` upsert + an `is_agent_owner` confirm, even though the link already exists. ## What changes - **Typing's ban check reads the restriction cache.** `submit_event` already parses the event before the membership step, so typing pulses call a new `enforce_relay_membership_ephemeral`. Its ban check reads through `restriction_state_cached`, the same 30s bound the pulse's write-restriction check already has. Every other HTTP route, persistent `POST /events`, and socket auth still read fresh (`cached: false`). - **`materialize_nip_oa_owner` skips a link it already knows.** If `observer_owner_cache` already holds `(community, agent, owner) = true`, it returns `true` right away. `agent_owner_pubkey` has one production writer, which sets it only `WHERE agent_owner_pubkey IS NULL`, and nothing clears it, so the skipped writes were no-ops. This helps every caller (HTTP, socket auth, audio). The owner-link disconnect only runs on the first write, so it still runs. - **`observer_owner_cache` capacity goes from 1k to 100k**, so concurrently active agents actually hit it. That's tens of MB per pod at most, the same scale as `restriction_cache`. Per-pulse Postgres work at the membership step: | Agent | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Direct relay member | host lookup (writer) + membership + ban | host lookup (writer) + membership | | Owner-admitted (NIP-OA) | host lookup + 2 memberships + 2 bans + 4 writer trips | host lookup + 2 memberships | ## Not in this PR - **Caching host → community.** It's the tenant-binding step every HTTP request goes through, and it reads from the writer. Community deletion depends on new requests not binding once a community leaves `active`. A cache would keep binding a quiescing community for its TTL. The serving-write leases may make that harmless, but that needs a closer look than a "safe fixes" PR. - **Caching relay membership.** Removing a member has no HTTP equivalent of the socket disconnect, so a cache would delay removal by its TTL. - **The desktop client reusing one connection.** That's going in a separate buzz-app PR. ## Unrelated one-liner The `sadscan` pre-commit hook scans whole staged files. It blocked this commit on a pre-existing test-only URI in `handlers/auth.rs` (`postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@127.0.0.1:1/buzz`, a deliberately unreachable stub). I added the hook's own `// sadscan:disable np.postgres.1` marker to that line. ## Testing - New Postgres tests. I confirmed each one fails when its guard is removed: - `typing_ban_gate_uses_cached_restriction_row`: a member banned in Postgres with a cached clear row can still type. Fails if typing reads fresh. - `persistent_post_ban_gate_reads_fresh`: a stale cached ban doesn't refuse a kind-9 post that Postgres allows. Fails if every kind reads the cache. - `known_owner_link_skips_materialize_writes`: after the link is cached, deleting the agent row behind the cache's back stays deleted. Fails without the short-circuit. - `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay --lib --tests`: 397/397 passed. This was local PG14. - `cargo test -p buzz-relay`: 1430 passed and 7 failed. The same 7 fail without this commit in this environment: 6 `api::media` tests can't find a `buzz` role on :5432, and `mesh_demo` returns a 504. - `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` is clean. - An independent agent review found no blockers. Its optional suggestions are test gaps: nothing pins the owner-cascade cached read, or the `false` literals at socket auth. - **Not yet done:** a run against a live local relay, and human testing. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Bradley Axen
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6c388bde62 |
feat(relay): accept typing indicators over HTTP POST /events (#8207)
## Summary Agents hosted inside the Buzz app sign their own events but don't hold a WebSocket, so they couldn't show "typing…" in a channel. `POST /events` rejected kind 20002 (typing indicator) with `restricted: unknown event kind`. Now, when `POST /events` receives a kind 20002 event, the bridge passes it to the same channel broadcast the WebSocket path uses. Live subscribers in the channel get the pulse. Nothing is written to Postgres. Before broadcasting, the relay checks, in order: - the event has an `h` tag naming the channel - the serialized event is at most 2 KiB (real typing events are ~600 bytes). Measuring the whole JSON, not just content and tag values, means piling on empty tags can't get around the cap - the signature and id are valid - bans and timeouts - the community write fence (over HTTP, a quiescing community's host already fails to bind with a 404, so this catches quiescing that starts after the tenant is bound) - the sender is a channel member, or the channel is open (same rule as WebSocket) - the signer is the pubkey that authenticated the request (checked first; a mismatch returns 403) The existing HTTP admission rate limit and relay-membership gate still run before any of this. Other ephemeral kinds are still rejected over HTTP. `publish_channel_ephemeral` is the old WebSocket channel-broadcast code moved into a shared helper, so both paths use the same membership check and fan-out. Unlike the WebSocket path, HTTP requires the `h` tag. Over WebSocket, a 20002 with no channel goes to every subscriber. Points left for review: - HTTP typing pulses count against the same per-pubkey HTTP quota as message posts (default 300/min). One pulse every 3 s is 20/min per active channel. - A failed Redis publish is logged and the POST still returns `accepted: true`, same as the WebSocket path. A pulse is resent every 3 s and expires after 8 s, so a retry would only resend a stale pulse. The `sadscan:disable` comment on an existing test URL in `ingest.rs` is there because the secret scanner reads every file a commit touches. It uses the same form as the other local test fixtures in the repo. ### Related issue Needed for Agents2 typing indicators in buzz-app. The client PR depends on this one and will follow as a draft. ### Testing - 9 new Postgres-backed tests in `api/typing_postgres_tests.rs` cover these cases: a member's pulse is published and not stored; a non-member gets a 400; a timed-out member gets a 403; a signer mismatch gets a 403; a missing `h` tag gets a 400; a tampered event gets a 400; kind 20001 is still rejected; oversized events get a 400 (2 KiB of content, one 2 KiB tag value, or `h` + 10k empty tags); a community that starts quiescing after the tenant is bound gets a 400 `community writes are fenced`, and nothing is published. Two mutation checks: with the fence removed, the fence test fails; with the old content-plus-tag-values cap, the empty-tags case is accepted and the test fails. - The full buzz-relay Postgres lane on |
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Tom Brow
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868e2f8f32 |
refactor(push): one app profile per gateway (#8206)
Buzz push currently selects an application profile, such as `dogfood`, during client registration. We want each gateway to serve one Apple app configured by the operator instead. This removes profile selection from the client, relay, and gateway, while allowing internal and public gateways to use their own Apple identities. This PR implements that model in the Buzz source and upstream deployment chart. Discovery, enrollment, grants, and leases no longer carry an application-profile selector. Each gateway has one configured Apple application and APNs transport. The protocol changes are incompatible with the old registration format, so relays advertise `buzz-push-v1` instead of `nip-pl`. Old clients do not discover the new push capability. Updated clients use separate Keychain records and register again. The [push notes](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/push-capability-v1/docs/buzz-push.md) describe the experimental contract. Landing this PR is the first step. Publish the matching gateway image and upstream chart, then land the [shared chart update](https://github.com/squareup/cash-helm-charts/pull/5740) and [gateway deployment update](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/1085). Before cutover, stop old gateway instances and check legacy registration state. Migrations refuse to proceed if old gateway installations or active relay leases remain; they do not delete that state. Physical-device verification remains necessary before production activation. ### Validation Gateway and focused Flutter push tests pass, as do the Swift package, simulator build, and native notification/enrichment tests. A local relay advertises `buzz-push-v1` without `nip-pl` or `app_profiles`. The PostgreSQL suite passed 868 tests; its two migration-test failures were corrected and pass a focused rerun together with the gateway cutover guard. Chart rendering and release-contract checks pass. Desktop JavaScript tests, desktop and web builds, native desktop compilation, mobile analysis/tests, and desktop native tests pass. The full Rust unit lane and prescribed `just test` command pass, including workspace integration tests against task-isolated local services. The production overlay now requires an explicitly supplied APNs topic, with omission and rendered-value regression coverage. The corrected Swift checksum assertion passes the complete package suite: 78 XCTest tests and 42 Swift Testing tests. No physical-device enrollment or production cutover is claimed. Local merge validation: the embedded migration test and formatting pass after reserving profile migration 0060 behind rollback migration 0059. The local pre-push Rust lane failed ACP timing/steering tests (`idle_resets_on_stdout_activity`, `keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, and the failed/missing-outcome steering tests). ACP and its dependency manifests are unchanged by this branch; all four pass in an isolated single-thread rerun. The documented local-check exception skips only the Rust pre-push lane for publication; required CI remains mandatory. Mobile and desktop pre-push lanes passed. Combined migration validation: after rollback 0059 landed, the main merge preserves profile migration 0060 and both embedded migration assertions. The focused migration test and formatting pass. The next local push again failed only the unchanged ACP idle/keepalive timing tests (1053 passed, 2 failed, 3 ignored); other lanes passed. Publication uses the same documented local Rust-lane exception; required CI remains mandatory. Follow-up review fix: removed the legacy profile column from the copied-lease fixture. All four event-follow-up contract tests pass on isolated PostgreSQL databases, covering desired and migrated schemas in dual and app-only modes. Formatting passes. Publication retains the prior passing local-lane evidence and uses the authorized pre-push exception for the known unrelated ACP timing failures; required CI remains mandatory. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> |
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Bradley Axen
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bcc46fe835 |
perf(relay): cache ephemeral-path serving and restriction reads (#8208)
## Summary
Typing pulses and agent observer frames each ran two Postgres reads on
the WebSocket path in `handlers/event.rs`: whether the community still
serves writes (`is_serving_active`), and the sender's ban/timeout row
(`moderation_restriction_state`). Both now read through short-TTL moka
caches on `AppState`, following the membership cache's pattern.
- **Serving state, keyed per community, 10 s TTL.** Every typer in a
community shares one entry, so a pod does about one read per community
per 10 s.
- **Raw restriction row, keyed per (community, pubkey), 30 s TTL.** It
caches the row, not the verdict, so the verdict is still taken at "now"
and a cached timeout lifts the second it ends. One exception: `banned`
is computed when the row is read, so a ban with an expiry can outlast
that expiry by up to the TTL.
- **The TTL is the staleness bound.** On every pod, and for every way a
ban or timeout changes (signed commands, the admin API, report
resolution, an owner's moderation reaching their agents), the ephemeral
path sees the change within 30 s (10 s for archive/delete). As a best
effort, signed ban/unban/timeout/untimeout (9040–9043) also drop the
target's own entry on the pod that handles the command. Bans also keep
their existing cluster-wide socket disconnect, and archiving a community
disconnects all of its sockets.
- **Hit/miss counters** `buzz_serving_active_cache_{hits,misses}_total`
and `buzz_restriction_cache_{hits,misses}_total`, matching the
membership cache, so the saved reads can be confirmed in prod.
- **The durable fence stays uncached.** Persistent ingest, moderation
commands, auth, and NIP-43 leave (28936, ephemeral-range but ingested)
still read Postgres directly. The worst staleness case is a
just-timed-out user's typing dots or observer frames getting through on
another pod for up to 30 s. Real messages are never affected.
### Related issue
N/A. This is the ephemeral-path Postgres read cost raised in the
typing-indicator load discussion. Searched for existing PRs and found
none.
### Testing
- New Postgres tests:
- The ephemeral gate honours a cached ban and admits an expired cached
timeout.
- The ephemeral fence honours a cached "fenced" community.
- A cache miss fills both caches.
- At the `handle_event` seam, a stored write (kind 1) is accepted
despite a cached ban or a cached "fenced" state, and NIP-43 leave skips
the cached ban. Mutation-checked: switching either ingest check to its
cached variant, or dropping the 28936 carve-out, turns one red.
- Timeout and untimeout commands drop the cached row. Mutation-checked:
removing the invalidation turns it red.
- Live test on a local relay: 100 typing pulses made 0
restriction/serving reads; 10 real messages made 10 of each. A timeout
written straight to the DB refused messages at once and typing after ~30
s; an archive written straight to the DB fenced typing after ~10 s.
- `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay --lib --tests`: 384/384
passed (local PG14).
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-relay --lib --tests`: 1470 passed. The 6
`api::media` failures are environmental: those tests seed through the
default `:5432` database, which locally has no `buzz` role.
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` is clean.
- Review follow-up commit pushed with the full pre-push hook passing.
- Also adds a `sadscan:disable` marker to an existing dev-only test URL
in `ingest.rs`. The commit hook flagged it once the file was staged, and
the identical URLs elsewhere in that file already carry the marker.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: ART <ea39c1c8acf57180161ef4ba4ed68abf8589f5291956b909a5aa991fc66664ca@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ART <ea39c1c8acf57180161ef4ba4ed68abf8589f5291956b909a5aa991fc66664ca@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
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Tom Brow
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5b907b838a |
fix(push): isolate push enqueue and stop workers on rollback (#8216)
Push enqueueing previously ran inside the message transaction, so a push lock or database error could block or reject a message. Configured relay writers now submit bounded best-effort work only after commit. A dedicated connection and bounded queue isolate enqueue waits and failures from message-write connections. Overload, errors, process loss, or shutdown may drop a notification; the committed message remains authoritative. `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=false` disables the application producer and workers. Updated writer connections always bypass any surviving enqueue trigger. The overlap migration updates an existing function without resurrecting retired objects. Apply it before relying on isolation with a surviving trigger, and replace every old enabled process and writer connection: missing settings preserve legacy behavior during overlap. SIGTERM/Ctrl-C cancels enqueue, matcher, and delivery work before listener drain. Durable queues, claims, leases, preferences, and delivery configuration remain intact. Claims expire normally; gateway requests already accepted may still deliver. Reactivation requires an explicit operator decision about retained work. There is no automatic purge, startup interlock, or backfill of messages written while disabled. Built on merged [#8135](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8135), including [#8178](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8178). Trigger retirement [#8210](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8210) remains open; this change is tested with the trigger present and after removal. Operational details are in [the rollback and reactivation guide](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/relay-push-rollback/docs/push-gateway-deployment.md#relay-rollback-and-reactivation). ### Validation [ |
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Bradley Axen
|
1e80066c93 |
feat(relay): reshape read-state API to the sidebar wire format (#8220)
## Summary Changes the private read-state API (`/buzz/v1`) to the sidebar wire format agreed in #buzzin-in-secret. **The counting code is unchanged.** Requests and responses take the new shape, so the client integration can build against it now and later behavior fixes (counting rules, followed threads, another-device pings) ship without another wire change. Nothing ships against v1 yet (no buzz-app use on `main`), so this replaces version 1 directly. Supersedes #8188 (same branch content, rebased onto current `main`, plus the thread-cap and doc changes below). ``` GET /buzz/v1/me/sidebar?limit=&cursor= | ?channel_ids=a,b,… → { channels: [channel], next_cursor } channel: { channel_id, unread: bool, mentions, read_through_id|null, latest_id|null, threads: [thread] } thread: { root_id, unread: bool, mentions, read_through_id|null, latest_id } POST /buzz/v1/me/read-state { intents: [{ type: "mark_through", target: { channel_id [, root_id] }, message_id }] } → { outcomes: [applied|blocked|invalid|unknown], channels: [channel] } ``` What changed and why: - **Channel and thread positions are fully separate.** Channel `unread`/`mentions` count only top-level messages. Thread replies count only on their thread row. `mark_channel_read` and its whole-channel cut are gone. "Mark channel read" sends a channel `mark_through` at `latest_id`, plus one per thread row to clear threads too. - **Channel `latest_id` is always a top-level message.** It used to be able to point at a reply, and a channel `mark_through` rejects a reply as its anchor. It also skips a reply-marked message whose ancestry never resolved, because marking through one would fail on every retry. - **`read_through_id`:** frontiers stored only the anchor's arrival time. Migration 0058 adds `personal_read_frontiers.through_message_id`, which follows the greatest arrival, and drops the now-unused `threads_through_timestamp`. This is the only storage change. - **Counts are plain numbers.** The exact/at_least/unknown wrappers are gone. Evidence the relay can't use (unusable tags, unresolved ancestry, undecided conversation membership, past the scan cap) leaves the message out, so counts can undercount. - **POST returns the updated row** of each distinct channel it applied to, so the client doesn't refetch after every read. If those rows can't be read after the writes commit, `channels` is omitted and the outcomes still stand. The row refresh shares the 8 s intent deadline. - **Up to 25 thread rows per channel** (was 5). Five hid a mention in a sixth unread thread. 25 is the most that keeps a POST's rows for `MAX_INTENTS` (100) channels inside the 1 MiB response limit; 50 would be ~1.4 MB, a 503 that hides already-committed outcomes. A unit test builds that worst-case response and fails if the cap outgrows the limit. - **The doc separates shape from behavior.** `/buzz/v1` promises a stable shape (fields, types, status variants, what `mark_through` does). What the counts include (which messages are unread or directed, which threads are listed, the bounds) may change while v1 is pre-release, so clients replace their rows with each response instead of reconciling against local counts. - **Removed from the wire:** the explicit-contexts read (`GET /me/read-state?targets=`), `account`, channel name/type/archived/hidden (these come from Nostr metadata), `latest_message_at`/`_complete`, and the NIP-11 `max_contexts`/`max_context_messages`/`max_thread_summaries`. Deliberately deferred (behavior or additive, no shape change): - Thread counting rule (relay counts a reply if you wrote or replied to its direct parent; the client uses "posted anywhere in the thread or followed"), the workflow-owner attribution p-tag, and thread-row `mentions` counting every counted reply rather than directed ones. - `follow`/`unfollow` intents, listing followed threads that are already read, and a truncation flag for the thread list. Thread: buzz://channel/6f773b94-34d0-4004-bec9-a100b6ad17d5 (#buzz-bff, root 31020fff) ### Related issue Follows #8157. Supersedes #8188; replaces the wire parts of the closed #8155. ### Testing - `cargo test --no-fail-fast -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay` at |
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Luke Tornquist
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16eb0b6685 |
feat(buzz-db): run push enqueue and channel TTL refresh in app code (#8135)
## Summary Moves the producer side of the two event follow-up triggers into application code. The triggers stay in place, so both producers run until a later change drops the triggers after this ships to every pod. Builds on #8130 (`AdmittedTx`). Refs BUZZ-176. ### Push match enqueue New `store::event_follow_up::enqueue_push_match` replaces the `events_enqueue_push_match` trigger (`schema/functions/enqueue_push_match_job.sql`, migration 0023) and matches it exactly: - Same kind allowlist (9, 40002, 45001, 45003), now `PUSH_MATCH_KINDS`. - Takes the same SHARED `buzz_push_gate:<community>` advisory lock as its own statement, so under READ COMMITTED the lease check gets a snapshot taken after the lock is granted. Lease activations still take it EXCLUSIVE in `push.rs`. - Same lease predicate (`active AND endpoint_enabled AND expires_at > now`), then `INSERT push_match_queue ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`. - Fails closed: any error rejects the event, as the trigger did. It runs right after the INSERT, only when the insert affected a row. The consumer side (claims, `lease_until`, attempts, reaper) is already app-owned and is unchanged. ### Channel TTL refresh `AdmittedTx` now records every channel that received an event (except kind 9007 and channel-less events). `AdmittedTx::commit()` refreshes their `ttl_deadline` as the last statement before COMMIT, which keeps the commit-time behavior of the deferred `events_refresh_channel_ttl` trigger (migration 0024): - One savepoint per channel, in sorted order, under the same SHARED `buzz_channel_ttl:<community>:<channel>` lock. - Runs the same `UPDATE` with the same `archived_at`/`deleted_at` filters as its own statement after the lock, so its snapshot follows the lock grant. Its `ttl_seconds IS NOT NULL` qual filters a permanent channel before any tuple lock, so a permanent channel's row is never locked. An ephemeral channel's row lock is held through the remaining refreshes and the COMMIT round trip (the trigger held it only inside COMMIT). - Lock keys come from one builder per protocol (`channel::channel_ttl_lock_key`, `push::push_gate_lock_key`), shared by the SHARED and EXCLUSIVE sides. The shared push-gate wait is observed through `observe_advisory_lock(LockType::PushGate, …)`. - On failure it rolls back the savepoint, logs a warning, and increments `buzz_db_channel_ttl_refresh_failures_total{reason}`, where `reason` is `lock_timeout` or `error`. The event still commits, matching the trigger's `EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS`. A cancelled statement (`57014`) still rejects the transaction, because plpgsql never caught that either. - While both producers run, an app refresh that hits `lock_timeout` is counted, and then the trigger retries it inside COMMIT and may succeed. So during the dual window the failure counter can over-report and the worst-case wait doubles. Both go away when the retirement PR drops the triggers, after which the counter is exact. ### Call sites Every production `INSERT INTO events` calls `event_follow_up::after_admitted_insert`: - `insert_event_on` - `insert_event_with_thread_metadata_tx` - `LockedMemberSnapshot::replace_member_event` - `replace_addressable_event` - `publish_nip43_membership_locked` - `accept_lease_event` (kind 30350, a no-op today, kept so the policy has no exceptions) `replace_parameterized_event_in_transaction_impl` inserts inside the `parameterized_replace` savepoint. It enqueues the push job inside the savepoint, so a rollback to that savepoint also drops the job, and records the TTL channel only after the savepoint is released. The two rolled-back verification probes (`verify_floor_guard_behavior`, `verify_channel_roster_fence_behavior`) are named exceptions, because they never commit. ### Source policy `tests/observability_source.rs` adds `every_production_event_insert_runs_the_follow_up_hook`. It scans every `crates/*/src` and fails on any function that inserts into `events` without the hook. Matching is normalized (letter case, whitespace, `\` continuations, `\n`/`\t`/`\r` escapes, optional `public.`). The file is masked once first: comments (`//`, nested `/* */`) and string, raw-string (including `br"`/`cr"`), and char literals become spaces. `#[cfg(test)]` markers, `fn` signatures and the hook are all found in that masked view, so a marker in a comment (even a multiline block comment) strips nothing, an `fn` line inside a multiline string doesn't split a function, and a commented-out or quoted hook doesn't count. SQL is still matched in the original text. A table test pins the masker's output for each literal form. A fixture test pins what the scan rejects (no hook, push without TTL, a hook in a line comment, block comment, or string, lowercase or line-broken or escaped SQL, writers after test-only items or under comment mentions) and what it ignores (writers in `#[cfg(test)] mod`). A floor of seven hooked writers catches a scan that silently stops seeing writers. ### Tests `src/store/event_follow_up_postgres_tests.rs` is the contract suite from the BUZZ-176 discovery work, ported to the `AdmittedTx` API. It is a crate-internal `#[cfg(test)]` module because it runs `SET LOCAL` timeouts and in-transaction reads through the crate-private `AdmittedTx::conn()`. It runs on both the desired and migration schemas, in two arms: - **dual**: production during the migration window, with the triggers and the app code both running. - **app-only**: drops both triggers in the disposable database (and asserts no partition clones remain), the way the retirement migration will. The trigger-only baseline is the base branch, where the same suite passed before this change. The suite also pins the two branches that differ from "swallow everything": a `lock_timeout` failure increments `buzz_db_channel_ttl_refresh_failures_total{reason="lock_timeout"}` exactly once, and a statement cancel (`57014`) during the refresh rejects the event with no row, job, or deadline change. ## What got simpler Nothing yet. This adds a parallel producer during the migration window. It is what lets the follow-up PR delete two plpgsql functions, two triggers, and the "keep in sync with migrations/00xx" duplication between `schema/functions/` and `push.rs`. ## Verification Rebased onto `main` @ `745501962`. All runs used a Linux cloud workstation with the pinned toolchain (rustc/clippy 1.95.0, hermit), and the tree was clean before and after each run. The final head, `c5a06a82`, changes only `crates/buzz-db/tests/observability_source.rs` compared with `1eb11bde` (via `fbc9a598`, `7c0baa41`, `9199992c` and `d405b2f6`). Production source is identical between the two. | Check | SHA | Result | |---|---|---| | `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --all-targets -D warnings` | `fbc9a598` | pass | | `cargo clippy` (workspace) | `1eb11bde` | pass | | source policy (`--test observability_source`), fmt, buzz-db clippy | `c5a06a82` | 17/17, pass, pass | | `cargo test --locked -p buzz-db` (non-PG) | `c5a06a82` | 148 lib + 17 policy + 5 doctests | | source policy (`--test observability_source`) | `fbc9a598` | 16/16 | | `cargo test --locked -p buzz-db` (non-PG) | `fbc9a598` | 148 lib + 16 policy + 5 doctests | | contract suite (`store::event_follow_up_postgres_tests`, desired/migration × dual/app-only) | `1eb11bde` | 4/4 | | buzz-db PG full | `1eb11bde` | 464/464 | | buzz-relay PG | `1eb11bde` | 378/378 | | GitHub CI | `fbc9a598` | 53 pass, 0 fail (Codex security review pending) | **Falsifications** (each mutation made the named test fail, then was reverted): - dropping the `relay_members` hook → policy names `publish_nip43_membership_locked` - no-op push producer → app-only arms fail, dual arms pass (trigger covers) - skipping the TTL refresh → app-only fails on the deadline; dual fails on the failure-metric assertion - swallowing `57014` → all four arms fail - dropping the metric increment → all four arms fail - unanchored `#[cfg(test)]` match, or no escape handling → fixture test fails - a `#[cfg(test)]` constructor that skips admission, added inside `impl AdmittedTx` (indented or as a column-0 `mod`) → `admitted_tx_is_constructed_only_by_admitting_constructors` fails; putting the strip back into the constructor scan → its fixture test fails - at `7c0baa41`: `accept_lease_event`'s hook commented out and the real call made through an alias → policy names `accept_lease_event` (the same mutation passes under the `fbc9a598` policy); hook matching on unmasked text → the comment/string fixtures fail - at `9199992c`/`d405b2f6`: no nested block-comment depth, no string-escape skip, no `br"`/`cr"` raw-literal prefix, or no raw-string branch at all in the masker → the follow-up fixture test fails - at `c5a06a82`: finding `#[cfg(test)]` in the unmasked text → `writer_after_block_commented_cfg_test` is no longer reported; finding `fn` signatures in the unmasked text → `writer_after_raw_string_example` is no longer reported; no `cr` raw prefix → the masker table test fails on `cr"` - unhooked writers appended to `side_effects.rs` (after test-only items, under a doc-comment mention, with an escaped newline) → policy names each **Live relay E2E**: an independent reviewer ran this at `1eb11bde` against a real relay and CLI, with PostgreSQL 17 and Redis 7, the follow-up triggers absent, and no partition clones. - A kind 9 on a TTL channel advanced the shortened deadline by about 580 s. On a permanent channel, the deadline stayed NULL. - Each accepted event produced exactly one pending `push_match_queue` row with the same event id. - An exact signed replay was a no-op. - While the exclusive TTL lock was held, the event and its job stayed invisible and the deadline didn't change. After release, both persisted once. - Roster create/join/add/remove kept SQL and wire state in step (1→2→3→2), with one current 39002 head. - NIP-33 replace, duplicate, stale, failure and retry cases all passed. Limits: the push lease was a SQL fixture, and push consumers were disabled. Kind 30023 is global, so channel-scoped TTL on the parameterized path is covered only by the PG contracts. No live relay rerun was done at `fbc9a598`, because that delta is test-only. **Latency** (measured at pre-rebase `f8380927`, same production delta; debug build on loopback, 1,000 samples per cell, EVENT→OK): head app-only p50/p99 3.80/4.58 ms (permanent) and 3.87/4.64 ms (TTL), against base trigger-only 3.49–3.53/4.00–4.03 ms and 3.56–3.62/4.30–4.46 ms. About +0.3 ms p50, from the extra client round trips (lock, UPDATE, savepoints, push lock/insert) that the triggers ran server-side. One debug loopback run, not a production p99. Not measured: contention from many writers on one hot TTL channel, where each writer now waits on the channel row lock for about two more client round trips (RELEASE SAVEPOINT and COMMIT) than with the trigger. In review, a burst of 8 concurrent posts to one TTL channel committed with no deadlock or lock timeout. Watch send p99 and `pg_locks` waits on `channels` during rollout. **Known pre-existing, not touched here:** `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` is flaky when Redis is present. It returns a 504 in 4 of 5 runs at base `745501962` and 2 of 5 at `fbc9a598`, always at the same assertion. No CI lane selects it. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tom Brow
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4db7bb0e7f |
fix(push): stop backfilling messages on lease activation (#8178)
Remove the 120-second message scan from push lease activation and renewal. Subsequent eligible messages continue through the existing database trigger. The lease protocol, schema, trigger, and advisory-lock order remain unchanged. Related enqueue-gating work: #2145. No duplicate open PR or issue found. ### Validation - All 18 PostgreSQL push persistence tests pass against isolated desired-state databases after review changes. - The existing concurrency test verifies activation waits for an in-flight insert and a subsequent message queues once. The retention fixture activates its lease before inserting its message. - Formatting and PostgreSQL test discovery pass. The earlier full local run passed repository lint/static checks, native desktop pre-push checks, and every non-ACP integration step. - Broad local checks hit unrelated ACP idle/keepalive timing failures. A serial retry passed two affected tests but still failed the keepalive deadline test. The pre-push hook was skipped with author authorization after its other checks passed. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> |
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Kalvin C
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8f66f7051c |
feat: raise hosted community limit to fifty (#8186)
## Summary - Raise the stock relay active ownership quota from 5 to 50 for creation and ownership transfer. Raise the absolute lifetime quota from 20 to 50 reserved hosts; completed owner deletions still permanently consume lifetime capacity to bound create/delete host squatting. - Honor the owner-list `can_create` projection across Desktop settings, create flow, and onboarding instead of imposing a client-side count. Display server `quota_used` / `quota_limit` when available; when the projection is missing, let the server's `limit_reached` decide. - Cover 49→50 and 50→51 admissions, deleted-owner lifetime exhaustion, and rendered create gates under 5/50, 0/50 exhausted, and missing projections. ## Verification - Desktop full `pnpm test` and `pnpm typecheck` pass after the 50-cap update; `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passes. Four targeted Playwright cases and `pnpm build:e2e` passed for the original dynamic-quota change at the previous commit, before changing test fixtures from 20 to 50. - `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib` cannot compile here: macOS dyld rejects the `sqlx_macros` dylib with `mis-aligned LINKEDIT string pool` on this host before the crate's tests run. CI must validate the DB package. ## Rollout / manual validation - Confirm `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` is unset or 50 on **every** production relay replica; this per-process cached override takes precedence over the stock default. - Confirm Builderlab's list/create/transfer proxy passes the relay's `quota_used`, `quota_limit`, `can_create`, and `limit_reached` without its own 5-community gate. Its backing implementation is not in this repo and was not verified here. - Human test: with an owner at 49 live communities, create the fiftieth, verify the fifty-first returns `limit_reached`; transfer into an owner at 49 then at 50 and confirm the same boundary. Check a deleted-owner account at 0 active/50 lifetime displays the generic limit and disables creation. This manual check remains outstanding. --------- Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |