The relay side of NIP-FI agent tokens. An agent token has its own type, `nip-fi-agent+jwt`, and carries its human owner's pubkey in `nostr_owner_pubkey`. This PR verifies that claim, makes denying or disconnecting the owner cut off every agent that owner authorized, and makes the verified owner decide community admission. A relay without agent support refuses the unknown type, so nothing needs to advertise or configure agent support. The `NIP-FI.md` text for the agent type is included. Builds on #8372 and #8377 (both merged). ### Owner claim and owner deny - **Token type binds the owner claim (`buzz-auth`).** A `DedicatedNipFi` issuer policy accepts `nip-fi+jwt` (human) and `nip-fi-agent+jwt` (agent); `AccessTokenAtJwt` policies stay `at+jwt`-only with their `client_id` and subject rules unchanged, and unknown types are refused. An agent token must carry a lowercase-hex `nostr_owner_pubkey` distinct from its `nostr_pubkey`; a human or `at+jwt` token carrying the claim with any value, including null, is `evidence_rejected`. The verified owner is exposed as `VerifiedAssertion::owner()`. - **No agent switch.** There is no relay setting, NIP-11 field or operator binding field for agent support. - **Session owner.** Each connection records its NIP-FI issuer and the agent's owner (`NipFiSession`) on the root WebSocket manager and the audio registry. `disconnect_nip_fi(iss, target)` closes a connection when either its own key or its recorded owner equals the target. - **Owner deny check.** `nip_fi_core::assertion_denied` checks the deny set for both `(iss, k)` and `(iss, owner)`, and every existing deny check uses it: WebSocket before upgrade and after registration, HTTP, audio, and the shadow observer, so shadow and enforce make the same decisions. The shadow disconnect observer matches a session's key or owner under its issuer with the same rule, so an owner's disconnect records a would-close for its agents. ### Shadow owner check In shadow mode, WebSocket AUTH, audio join and HTTP admission record a `Stage::Owner` verdict when an admitted agent token's owner is banned (`owner/denied`), conflicts with the agent's stored owner (`owner/denied`), or cannot be checked because a read failed (`owner/unavailable`). These are reads only; shadow admission is unchanged. Shadow applies the same stored-owner rule as enforce but never writes the link, so it can't predict a later owner-link write failure, or which of two racing first links wins. ### Admission through the verified owner - **Owner bans, unconditionally.** `community_ban_outcome` takes the token owner and checks its ban in place of a NIP-OA owner. That applies whether the agent is a member itself, the relay is open, or the agent is admitted through its owner. - **Owner-derived membership.** In `api::relay_members::check_membership`, an agent that is a member itself is still admitted first. Otherwise, when a verified assertion names an owner, the owner's membership decides (`MembershipDecision::ViaOwner`), and no NIP-OA is needed on the connection. The issuer has already passed this community's NIP-FI binding check at that point. When a token owner is present it is the only owner considered. - **Stored-owner consistency.** `link_agent_owner` replaces the boolean `materialize_nip_oa_owner` result with `OwnerLink::{Linked, Conflict, Unavailable}`. An unset stored owner is recorded, so relay bans and roster removal of the owner reach the agent through `revoke_live_access`. Shadow and enforce judge the stored owner through one read, `stored_owner_link`, and `link_agent_owner` writes (atomically, first write wins) only when that read finds no owner; a failed read fails closed. If the stored owner differs from the token owner, the request is refused with `authorization denied` on HTTP, WS and audio. A NIP-OA owner conflict keeps its existing link-error refusal. - **One decision on every surface.** Root WS AUTH, audio registration and every NIP-98 HTTP route (bridge, `buzz/v1`, git transport and settings, invites, media, workflows, moderation reads) pass `NipFiAdmission::token_owner()` / `VerifiedAssertion::owner()` into the same ban, membership and owner-link steps. The final socket check rereads bans and writer-side membership; it doesn't reread the owner link, which is written once from NULL. HTTP membership still goes through the bounded replica read. With a verified agent token, every HTTP admission refusal, including the fresh ban rereads in `buzz/v1` and Git settings, is NIP-FI's fixed `authorization_denied` (or `authorization_unavailable` when a dependency fails), and audio checks bans before writing the owner link. `enforce_relay_membership` now takes the `TenantContext`, because it writes the owner link. - **Publishing.** A ban caught while publishing over `POST /events` after the shared membership check is also an admission refusal. Ingest reports it as a typed `IngestError::Ban` (banned, or ban lookup unavailable) at the write gate, the HTTP typing indicator's cached gate, and the moderation and relay-admin command rereads. `IngestError::Ban` carries the legacy error. The bridge turns it into the fixed `authorization denied` / `authorization unavailable` only when the request carries a verified agent token. WebSocket and token-less HTTP responses are byte-for-byte unchanged, and timeouts, scopes, permissions and every other ingest error keep their existing responses. ### Rollout - **Deploy the relay before kgoose.** An older relay refuses `nip-fi-agent+jwt`, so agents are locked out until both are deployed. Humans are unaffected. - **There is no agent-only switch.** Setting NIP-FI to shadow or off turns it off for humans too. - **Rollback is safe for owner links.** Stored owner links survive a rollback, and the older code still honors them. - **Shadow signals:** in `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total`, `stage="owner"` means an owner would-deny (`owner/denied`) or an owner read that was unavailable (`owner/unavailable`), not a success. A clean agent admission shows as `stage="admit", outcome="admit"`. - **The relay checks that the owner is a member, not which issuer the owner logged in through.** In a community that trusts several issuers, any trusted issuer can name any member as owner. That matches the spec: the issuer is trusted to vouch for the owner, and kgoose requires the owner's attestation. Agent tokens are only issued to relays whose NIP-FI binding trusts the issuer, and NIP-FI itself is off unless configured. No deployed config or secrets change. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
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NIP-FI Community Issuer Bindings
A deployment that provisions communities under one host suffix, for example
<name>.communities.buzz.xyz, stores the NIP-FI issuers allowed to vouch for
each community in community_nip_fi_issuers. The relay writes these rows when
it creates a community; buzz-admin nip-fi backfills and edits them.
A host may hold a binding only when it is exactly one DNS label under the
suffix, has no port, and is not reserved. A host is reserved when
https://<host> is a command_audiences entry of any issuer in
BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS, so a command audience can never become a community
assertion audience. The relay refuses to start while a reserved host holds a
binding, and the operator lookup route reports no issuers for a host that is not
bindable or for an issuer that is not configured.
Configuration
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING is read in every NIP-FI mode. Unset or empty
binds nothing.
{
"host_suffix": "communities.buzz.xyz",
"authorized_issuers": ["https://app.builderlab.xyz/api/goose"]
}
host_suffixis a lowercase domain name without a port or trailing dot.authorized_issuersis non-empty, and every entry must be anissuerinBUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS. Each issuer is 1 to 2048 bytes.- The suffix must not cover any
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIEShost, and everycanonical_urithere must be readable. The relay andbuzz-adminboth refuse to start otherwise.
buzz-admin parses the same variables with the relay's parser. Run it with the
relay's environment: BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING, BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS,
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES, and DATABASE_URL.
Database community source
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database resolves communities from these
bindings instead of BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES. The relay refuses to start if
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING is unset or BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES is set.
In off mode no snapshot is loaded.
| Variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE |
env |
env or database |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS |
1,000,000 | 1 to 10,000,000 community-issuer rows; a larger load fails |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS |
10,000 | under the 30s refresh interval |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MAX |
100,000 | 1 to 1,000,000 hosts |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT |
8 | at least 1, clamped below the database pool size |
Each pod loads a snapshot before it binds any listener, and refreshes it
every 30s. A removed binding stops admitting new connections within 30s plus
the configured refresh timeout (40s by default) while refreshes succeed, and within two minutes of the last good load while they
fail. Open WebSocket sessions are not rechecked when a binding is removed;
they end at their own session deadline. Alert on
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120 and on
absent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds).
Commands
buzz-admin nip-fi backfill
buzz-admin nip-fi bind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
backfill binds the authorized issuers to every active, unbound, bindable
community, a page of 1000 hosts at a time. Archived communities are bound on
purpose, so unarchiving leaves a community that can log in. A community whose
deletion has started is skipped. It always prints its counts and exits 1 while
any bindable community remains unbound:
{"rows_bound": 12, "unbound": 0, "unbound_hosts": [], "truncated": false}
unbound_hosts lists at most 100 hosts; truncated is true when there are
more.
bind refuses a reserved host, a host that is not one label under the suffix,
and an issuer not in BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS.
unbind works without BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING. It refuses to remove a
community's last issuer, because an empty community looks never-provisioned and
the next backfill would bind it again. To swap issuers, bind the new one and
then unbind the old one. To stop a community logging in, archive or delete it.
When the provisioning config is present and shows the host is not bindable (a
reserved host or one outside the suffix), unbind removes the last issuer too;
this is how to clear a reserved-host binding that blocks relay startup.
backfill never adds the default issuers beside an operator bind: both lock
the community row, and the backfill only inserts while the community still has
no binding.
Lookup route
GET /operator/communities/nip-fi-binding?host=<host> is operator-signed and
returns {"host": ..., "active": ..., "issuers": [...]}. kgoose relies on this
contract:
hostis the host stored on the community row.- Every lifecycle state answers 200.
activeisfalseonce the community is archived or its deletion has started quiescing, including a tombstoned community; it staystruewhile a deletion is only requested. issuersis[]whenBUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDINGis unset, the host is not bindable, or nothing is bound. Only issuers inBUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERSare reported, in byte order.- 404 means no community has this host; 400 means the host is malformed.
Rollout
- Deploy the relay with
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDINGset. New communities are bound at creation from then on. - Run
buzz-admin nip-fi backfillwith the relay's environment. Repeat it until it exits 0. - Do not turn on the database binding source in enforce mode while any bindable community is unbound: an unbound community fails closed.
Database source runbook
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database reads communities from these bindings
instead of BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES. Move one mode at a time, and only move
forward when the step's go signals hold.
Off
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database with BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off. No
snapshot loads in off, but every BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_* and
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_* value is validated, so a bad one fails this deploy.
- Go: the rollout completes, and
buzz-admin nip-fi backfillexits 0. - No-go: a pod fails config validation. Fix the named variable.
Shadow
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=shadow. Each pod now loads the snapshot before any
listener binds, refreshes it every 30 s, and records what enforce would decide
without refusing anything. Shadow labels database-source records
community="bound" or "unmapped", never a host.
- Go, held for at least a day of normal traffic:
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_secondsstays under 60 on every pod.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_totalis flat.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rowsis under 0.5.buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_totalis flat.- The non-
admitshare ofbuzz_nip_fi_shadow_totalis only what you expect to deny;community="unmapped"comes only from hosts you do not serve. stage="owner"counts as would-deny: each is an agent enforce will refuse for its token owner.
- No-go: any of these fails. Return to
offand investigate.
Enforce
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce. Watch the same signals, plus the rate of 503
responses on login.
- Go: the shadow signals keep holding, and 503s stay at their shadow baseline.
- No-go: logins return 503 or are refused unexpectedly. Set
mode=off(below).
Alerts
- Stale snapshot:
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120, together withabsent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds)for a database-source pod. - Near the row cap:
buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rows > 0.8.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rowsis the size of the last good load. - Over the cap or too slow: any increase of
buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_total{reason=~"over_cap|timeout"}. - Live lookups shed: any increase of
buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_total.
When the snapshot is too big or too slow
A load fails when the snapshot has more rows than
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS or takes longer than
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS. Both get worse as communities are
added, so they usually arrive during normal growth, not at a deploy.
- New pods: the startup load fails and the process exits, so new pods crash-loop and a rollout stalls. Boot already fails when the database is unreachable; what this source adds is that snapshot size and load time can also fail it.
- Running pods: their refreshes fail but the last good snapshot keeps
answering. Once it is 120 s old it is stale, and every login's host goes to
a live lookup. Live lookups share
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHTslots (8 by default). Concurrent logins for the same host share one lookup, and a login waits up to 50 ms for a free slot; how many are shed depends on login load across distinct hosts and on lookup latency. In enforce, a shed login gets 503 (authorization_unavailable); in shadow it is only recorded as a would-deny.
Ways out, in order:
- Raise
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS(up to 10,000,000) orBUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS(under 30,000), whichever the failurereasonnames, and roll out. - If that cannot land quickly, set
BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off.offloads no snapshot, so pods boot and admit as they did before NIP-FI.
Assertion policy ID change
This release changes every verified assertion's policy ID once, on purpose.
The base ID (derive_assertion_policy_id in crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/config.rs)
no longer hashes the configured community audiences. The ID carried on a
verified assertion is now IssuerPolicy::id_for_community: a hash of that base
and the one community audience the request resolved to. The issuer is still
committed through the base.
Policy IDs from earlier releases therefore do not match. Inside the relay the ID is only carried on the verified assertion and never compared with a stored ID, so admission is unaffected. Anything outside the relay that recorded old policy IDs, such as dashboards, log queries or allow-lists, should expect new values after the upgrade.