Files
buzz/RELEASING.md
Will Pfleger f7ff4294fa feat(nip-fi): harden Blossom kind-24242 verifier to NIP-FI spec (#7288)
Brings `buzz-media`, `buzz-relay`, all first-party kind-24242 minters,
and desktop token minting into compliance with [NIP-FI
§kind-24242](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/main/docs/nips/NIP-FI.md).

## What changed

**`buzz-media/src/auth.rs`**
- Add `BlossomStrictness` enum (`Strict` | `Permissive`). `Strict`
applies full NIP-FI rules (active modes); `Permissive` preserves
pre-NIP-FI Off-mode behavior byte-identical [FI-INV-15].
- Rewrite `verify_blossom_auth_event_for_verb` with count-based
cardinality: exactly one `t`/`expiration`/`server` in `Strict`;
duplicate `x` also rejected. `Permissive` keeps main's boolean semantics
exactly: any valued `t` other than the verb (including `""`) rejects,
valueless `t` is ignored.
- `Strict`: mandatory `server` tag on all proofs (upload + read); absent
or mismatched → `evidence_rejected` (`ServerMismatch`).
- `Strict`: 60-second proof window (`now - created_at <= 60s`,
`expiration <= created_at + 60s`). `Permissive`: 3600s / optional
server.
- **[F1]** Permissive server validation uses any-match semantics: a
proof with multiple `server` tags is accepted if any tag matches the
bound host. This restores origin/main base behavior. Strict
duplicate-rejection unchanged.
- **[F1 compat]** Permissive server gate uses `server_values.is_empty()`
(valued tags only) rather than `server_count > 0` (includes valueless
tags). A lone valueless `["server"]` tag is treated as absent in
Permissive/Off mode, matching pre-NIP-FI base behavior [FI-INV-15].
- **[F4]** Valueless `x` tags in Strict get reads are tracked before
`filter_map` so they cannot become absent scope (host-wide
authorization). Any `x` tag present in Strict must contain the exact
requested sha256.
- **[F3 unit]** Cases A–D in `auth.rs` are helper-level unit tests: they
call `verify_blossom_upload_auth` and `verify_upload_hash_only`
directly. They do not enter the upload pipeline
(`process_upload`/`process_video_upload`). Retained as helper evidence.

**`buzz-media/src/error.rs`**
- Add `DuplicateTag(&'static str)` variant.
- Add `blossom_denial_kind()` method: classifies each auth error as
`MissingEvidence`, `EvidenceRejected`, or `AuthorizationDenied`.
Non-auth errors return `None`.
- `IntoResponse` retains the legacy JSON 401 shape [FI-INV-15].

**`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs`**
- Add `MediaDenial(MediaError, BlossomStrictness)` wrapper mapping to
byte-exact NIP-FI fixed responses in `Strict`; falls through to legacy
JSON in `Permissive`.
- `blossom_strictness_from_state()` selects `Strict` when
`state.config.nip_fi.is_enforce()`, otherwise `Permissive`. Strictness
is threaded through the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` NIP-98 closures on
upload and read, and through the post-admission X-SHA-256, hash-binding,
and membership denials.
- `extract_blossom_auth` keeps first-value `Authorization` extraction;
Enforce rejects repeated fields at the `admit_nip_fi_http` cardinality
gate, and Off keeps legacy behavior [FI-INV-15].
- Both membership-denial call sites use
`media_denial(RelayMembershipRequired, strictness)` so Strict mode
produces the correct fixed-text response.
- `upload_blob` serving-write fence conversion (`:406`) uses
`map_err(|e| media_denial(e, strictness))` — a community fence committed
between auth admission and lease acquisition no longer resets Strict to
Permissive.
- Mode-driven regressions in `mod postgres_tests` (selected by the
nextest `postgres-ci` profile via `test(/postgres_tests::/)`, `#[ignore
= "requires Postgres"]`), run through the full relay router with a real
Enforce verifier and assertion: Enforce rejects Permissive-only proofs
(300s lifetime, missing `server` tag) on both upload routes and reads
with `evidence rejected`; Off accepts the same proofs with pre-NIP-FI
responses; DenyProtected answers 503 before any proof check; membership
denials are `authorization denied` text/plain in Enforce and exact
legacy JSON 403 in Off, with a member positive control. GET and HEAD are
each discriminated (HEAD with a suppressed body). Both upload routes pin
the handler's `X-SHA-256` missing/malformed/unsigned and post-body
hash-mismatch denials in both modes. Off rejects an empty-valued `t`
beside a valid one with legacy 401 JSON in either order, and ignores a
valueless one. Exact status, Content-Type, challenge, and body bytes are
pinned.

**`buzz-media/src/upload.rs`** (`mod minio_tests`)
- **[F3 pipeline]** Four tests exercising the actual post-body call
sites (`process_upload` `:85`, `process_video_upload` `:413`) with real
MinIO I/O: buffered/streaming × expired-proof-accept +
mismatched-hash-reject. The positive cases use
`fresh_strict_upload_auth` (`created_at = now-58`, `expiration = now+2`,
lifetime = 60s) — Strict-admissible at sign time — followed by a real 3s
sleep so the proof is expired when the upload completes.
`nostr::Timestamp::now()` reads the OS wall clock directly; paused Tokio
time does not advance it. The negative cases use a pre-expired proof
with a mismatched `x` tag. All four are `#[ignore = "requires MinIO"]`;
no CI lane runs them automatically.

**`buzz-media/src/validation.rs`**
- `minimal_valid_mp4()` promoted to `#[cfg(test)] pub(crate)` — a
618-byte pre-computed H.264/avc1 fast-start MP4 available to all
`buzz-media` test modules; smoke-tested by
`test_minimal_valid_mp4_passes_validate_video_file`.

**`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/media.rs`**
- `sign_blossom_upload_auth`: `server` tag mandatory; upload expiry 60s
(was 3600s/300s).
- `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s).

**`desktop/src-tauri/src/media_proxy.rs`**
- Single re-mint+retry on 401/403 for range requests; non-auth failures
do not retry.

**`crates/buzz-cli/src/client.rs`**
- Read expiry: 60s (was 600s). Upload expiry: 60s. `server` tag
mandatory on upload.

**`crates/buzz-dev-mcp/src/view_image.rs`**
- `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s). Test updated.

**`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_auth.dart`**
- `_mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 600). Refresh margin updated.

**`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_upload.dart`**
- `_uploadAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 300). `server` tag mandatory.

**`mobile/lib/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer.dart`**
- **[F2]** Remove Android-specific `VideoPlayerController.networkUrl`
streaming path. `video_player_android` 2.9.5 freezes headers into static
`DefaultHttpDataSource` request properties — a 60s proof minted at
controller creation time becomes stale on seeks. All platforms use the
authenticated local-file download path.
- **[F2 transport]** `unawaited(request.sink.close())` before
`client.send()`. `AbortableStreamedRequest` carries no request body;
without closing the sink, `IOClient.send()` awaits
`stream.pipe(ioRequest)` which blocks until the sink ends — every video
download hung in loading indefinitely on every platform.
- **[F2 pending-ctrl]** `pendingController` ref set before the first
`await (initialize())`, cleared in all exit paths. Effect cleanup
disposes `pendingController.value` so a close-during-init releases the
native player even if the initialized event never arrives.
- **[F2r(a)]** On native init failure (post-create,
pre-initialized-event), the inner catch starts disposal detached via
`unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` — the
`.catchError` handler absorbs any disposal exception so it does not
reach the test error zone — then rethrows the original load error.
`video_player` 2.11.1 completes the init future with an error without
disposing the native player.
- **[F2r(b)]** Non-2xx error body cancelled via `_cancelVideoResponse()`
(subscribe+cancel) instead of `drain()`. `drain()` waits for the
upstream to close; a stalled server body blocked `initializeVideo`
indefinitely.
- **[F2r(d)]** `unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` in
the catch — not `await`. Two failure mechanisms exist: (1) when
`createWithOptions()` throws, `_creatingCompleter` is never completed
and `await dispose()` deadlocks at `:682-683`, blocking the outer catch
from setting error state. (2) when `createWithOptions()` succeeds but
initialization fails, `dispose()` runs but its thrown exception becomes
an unhandled async error reaching the test zone. Both are fixed:
`unawaited` lets the outer catch run immediately and set `error.value`;
`.catchError(...)` on the detached disposal future absorbs any disposal
exception.


**`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_test.dart`**
- `_FinalizingFakeClient`: calls `request.finalize().drain()` — a test
without the sink fix times out because the drain never completes,
validating the transport contract.
- F2r(a): `forceInitError=true` fake emits `PlatformException` on
subscribe; `disposeCallCount >= 1` verifies disposal even on init
failure.
- F2r(b): `stalledBody` `StreamController` with `onCancel` Completer
(bounded completion signal, not a sleep). Asserts: (1)
`bodyStreamCancelled=true` while body stream is still open (impossible
with `drain()`); (2) error UI visible while body remains open. Restoring
`drain()` breaks both.
- F2r(c): `neverInitialize=true` fake never sends initialized event;
unmount asserts `disposeCallCount >= 1` via `pendingController`.
Distinct from the event-error case.
- F2r(d): `forceCreateError=true` fake throws `PlatformException` from
`createWithOptions()` itself (before any player ID is returned). Asserts
error UI visible within a bounded deadline. With the old `await
dispose()` the outer catch is blocked — `error.value` is never set and
the error UI assertion fails at the deadline; with
`unawaited(dispose())` the error text appears immediately.


**`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_transport_test.dart`**
(separate file)
- Real-IO loopback probes using `flutter_test` (not `package:test`) to
avoid `depend_on_referenced_packages` lint. No
`TestWidgetsFlutterBinding` — no HttpClient override interfering with
`dart:io`.
- Probe 1: `HttpServer.bind(loopbackIPv4, 0)` reads the full request
body before replying. Without `sink.close()`, `req.drain()` hangs and
the test times out.
- Probe 2: server signals request arrival via a Completer (not a sleep);
abort fires after confirmed arrival; `client.send()` must throw
`RequestAbortedException` (typed assertion) within a bounded 5s
deadline.

**`scripts/test-video-upload.sh`**
- Proof minted with `+60` expiry and mandatory `server` tag.

**`buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_media*.rs`** +
**`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs` test fixtures**
- All fixtures updated to 55s expiry + `server` tag.

**`RELEASING.md`**
- New "NIP-FI upload proof freshness (relay floor)" section documenting
that 60s proofs require the first relay release carrying this PR's
post-body hash-only check (the first tag > `v0.2.1` — update once cut)
for reliable large-file uploads. Operators on older self-hosted relays
(≤ `v0.2.1`) must upgrade before receiving these clients.

## Finding 3: 60s upload proofs vs old-relay compatibility

Desktop/CLI/mobile upload proofs are now 60s. Older relays re-run full
expiry verification after the body is transferred. A valid upload whose
body transfer takes >60s will fail on an old relay.

**Resolution (relay floor prerequisite):** `RELEASING.md` requires that
verified supported deployments (relay releases confirmed to carry the
post-body hash-only check, commit `75e9bef748`) be in place before
distributing 60s-proof client builds. Unknown or unverified self-hosted
relay deployments are excluded from distribution until they upgrade.
This makes the verified-deployment status a prerequisite for release
distribution, not a post-distribution advisory. The concrete tag (`>
v0.2.1`) is to be recorded once cut.

## Sequencing note

Builds on #7264 (merged): Blossom strictness is derived from its
`config.nip_fi` mode in this PR, so enabling `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce`
activates the strict verifier with no further wiring.

## GIF compatibility exception

An unauthenticated Off-mode request on a configured tenant with no GIF
provider changes from 404 to 401 (base `gifs.rs:269-275` checked an
unconfigured provider first; the current code authenticates first). All
other Off-mode Blossom responses are byte-identical to pre-NIP-FI
behavior.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-28 14:46:56 -04:00

18 KiB

Releasing Buzz

Buzz has three independent release lanes. Desktop and relay use release PRs. Mobile uses immutable release-candidate tags cut directly from remote main:

Lane Entry point Artifact
Desktop just release-desktop <version> Packaged desktop app (signed/notarized macOS, unsigned Windows, and Linux)
Relay just release-relay ghcr.io/block/buzz container image
Mobile scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate X.Y.Z Exact mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N source identity

The lanes version independently. Desktop reads its manifests, relay reads its crate manifest, and mobile derives both source and marketing version from the exact candidate tag. The mobile handoff to the private buzz-releases pipeline remains manual because OSS CI cannot trigger private CI.

Quick Start

Prepare desktop releases locally from an up-to-date, clean main checkout:

just release-desktop 0.5.3

The recipe generates the immutable candidate and opens or updates its pull request. Candidate branch creation uses the operator's GitHub permissions; the release App is intentionally limited to creating protected release tags.

# Relay release
just release-relay
just release-relay 0.4.0

# Publish the next mobile candidate from the exact current remote main commit
scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate 0.5.0

Desktop uses an immutable generated candidate PR; relay continues using its metadata PR. Mobile does not. Each mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N tag is an immutable candidate and the artifact of record. There is no mobile release branch, stable mobile tag alias, finalization step, or mobile GitHub Release.


How It Works

Desktop

  1. Run just release-desktop <version> from a clean, up-to-date main checkout. The script creates one deterministic candidate commit and records both its frozen base and the verified prior release ledger in candidate metadata.
  2. Review the exact candidate SHA, complete changelog, and CI. Regenerating or pushing the branch creates a new candidate and requires checks to run again.
  3. Squash merge the PR after all protected-branch checks pass. The merge is the human authorization event; an authorized owner/admin bypass is treated the same way. Unrelated changes reaching main do not invalidate the reviewed candidate.
  4. auto-tag-on-release-pr-merge verifies the closed event against GitHub's PR identity, validates candidate content, and proves every required check came from its trusted producer and was successful when the PR merged. It creates desktop-v<version> at the exact reviewed PR head—not the squash commit. Retries accept that tag only at the same SHA and never move it. GitHub does not expose when an individual check rerun was created, so an ordinary rerun after merge deliberately makes tag verification fail closed; inspect that run and create a new candidate version rather than retrying the blocked tag.
  5. The tag triggers release.yml. It builds and stages all platform artifacts, publishes the versioned release only after the complete set succeeds, then updates the rolling updater manifest last for stable versions.

Because squash merging leaves immutable candidate tags on side history, the next release uses validated prior candidate metadata as its ledger boundary. It includes unrelated commits after the prior frozen base and excludes exactly the prior release's recorded squash commit; tag ancestry is deliberately irrelevant.

Relay

  1. just release-relay runs locally on main, creates or updates a relay-release/<version> PR, bumps crates/buzz-relay/Cargo.toml, regenerates Cargo.lock, and updates the relay changelog.
  2. Merge the PR. auto-tag-on-release-pr-merge pushes relay-v<version>.
  3. The tag triggers docker.yml. Stable releases update the version aliases and latest; prereleases do not. Each release also publishes an optimized, symbol-bearing image under matching debug- tags (for example, debug-0.3.0 and debug-latest) for native profiling. The ordinary tags remain stripped and are the default for deployments that do not need it.

Every push to main continues to publish the rolling relay :main and :sha-<7> tags, plus matching :debug-main and :debug-sha-<7> variants.

NIP-FI upload proof freshness (relay floor)

Desktop, CLI, and mobile clients mint Blossom upload authorization proofs with a 60-second expiry (expiration = now + 60). Older relays (≤ v0.2.1) re-run the full auth verifier — including the expiry check — after receiving the full upload body, so a 60-second proof that was valid when admitted can expire during a large or slow transfer, causing a spurious rejection.

The repair (commit 75e9bef748d2149ce459b14da842e706a51a5f78, landed in this PR) replaces the post-body full-verifier call with a hash-only check (verify_upload_hash_only): the relay verifies the freshness and all other proof fields before reading the body; the only check after transfer is that the body's SHA-256 matches what was declared in the signed proof.

Clients cannot lengthen proofs beyond 60 seconds (NIP-FI §Strict limits the max proof window to 60 s). This is a relay-side concern:

  • The relay release that includes this PR's changes (the first relay tag > v0.2.1, containing commit 75e9bef748d2149ce459b14da842e706a51a5f78) performs a hash-only post-body check, eliminating the expiry window during transfer. Update this line with the concrete relay tag once it is cut.
  • Older self-hosted relays (≤ v0.2.1) re-verify the full proof expiry after transfer and may reject large uploads over slow connections. Upgrading the relay is the fix; no client workaround exists within Strict constraints.

Prerequisite before distributing desktop, CLI, or mobile builds that mint 60-second upload proofs: verify that all supported relay environments have been upgraded to a relay release containing commit 75e9bef748d2149ce459b14da842e706a51a5f78. An unknown or unverified deployment does not satisfy this prerequisite. Deployments running ≤ v0.2.1 must be upgraded before receiving these clients.

When releasing a new relay version that carries the post-body hash-only check, record the concrete tag here so release operators can verify the prerequisite. When releasing desktop, CLI, or mobile for environments where self-hosted relays may be running pre-floor versions, document the floor in release notes and require operators to upgrade before distributing these clients.

Mobile

  1. Publish a candidate. From a clean checkout whose origin is the canonical block/buzz repository, run scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate X.Y.Z. The script resolves and fetches the exact current origin/main commit, derives the next number from exact remote tags for that marketing version, and publishes an annotated mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N tag there through the dedicated buzz-release-bot GitHub App. It never uses the operator's checked-out commit and never moves an existing candidate.
  2. Build the exact tag. Enter the candidate tag as mobile_ref in the private Buzz mobile Buildkite pipeline. OSS CI deliberately cannot trigger that private pipeline. The tag supplies both source commit and release version. Flutter receives clean marketing version X.Y.Z; Buildkite's monotonically increasing build number supplies the platform build number.
  3. Promote tested artifacts. Promote the already-built signed artifact for each platform through its store workflow. Record the exact tag with the build or rollout record. No source ref is changed and no final build is cut.

The iOS and Android artifacts for one marketing version may come from different RC tags. For example, iOS can ship mobile-v0.5.0-rc.2 while Android ships mobile-v0.5.0-rc.3. Each platform's exact candidate tag is its source record. There is intentionally no single selected or final candidate for the marketing version.

The simplification trades away a separate stabilization line. Unrelated commits that reach main become part of every later candidate, and there is no retained hotfix branch or branch-ancestry history. Add a dedicated hotfix flow later if a release actually needs isolation from main.

mobile/pubspec.yaml keeps 0.0.0+1 only as a valid, visibly non-release fallback for local development and validation builds. Release jobs always inject both version fields. mobile/CHANGELOG.md is retained as historical release data. It is not a release ledger for this flow.


Version Sources

Lane Release version authority
Desktop desktop/package.json and synchronized desktop manifests
Relay crates/buzz-relay/Cargo.toml
Mobile Exact mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N remote tag

just bump-desktop-version <version> updates the desktop manifests and regenerates their lockfiles. just bump-relay-version <version> updates the relay crate and regenerates Cargo.lock. Mobile has no bump recipe or release-metadata PR.


Signed macOS Canary

Use the manual Signed macOS Canary workflow when you need an Apple Silicon build of current main for explicit testing without publishing a release:

gh workflow run signed-macos-canary.yml --repo block/buzz --ref main

The workflow derives a -test.<run-number> version, signs and notarizes the DMG, verifies it with Gatekeeper, and uploads it as a short-lived Actions artifact with seven-day retention. Because this is a public repository, any signed-in GitHub user can download that artifact while it exists; it is unpublished, not private. The workflow has no release permissions, does not create or move tags, and cannot update buzz-desktop-latest or latest.json.

Download the artifact from the completed run:

gh run download <run-id> --repo block/buzz --name <artifact-name>

The workflow intentionally accepts only main. Use the normal release process for distributable builds or builds from an immutable release tag.


Release Retry

release.yml has no manual dispatch and cannot build from main or another caller-selected ref. If a run for an existing immutable desktop-v<version> tag fails, rerun that failed workflow from GitHub Actions (or use gh run rerun <run-id> --failed --repo block/buzz). A rerun repairs the versioned draft if publication did not complete. It does not promote that version to the auto-updater; promotion is a separate manual action. Do not recreate, move, or push the immutable tag again.

Mobile intentionally has no branch or arbitrary-ref fallback. The private Buildkite pipeline accepts only an exact candidate tag.


Internal Releases

For mobile, trigger the private Release Mobile pipeline with an exact RC tag for the platform build being cut. For desktop, start Release Desktop and enter the exact public source tag as desktop_ref=desktop-v<version>; a generic v<version> tag is intentionally rejected. See the buzz-releases README for the rest of the private pipeline contract.


What Gets Published

Desktop publishes two GitHub releases:

  1. desktop-v<version>: the user-facing release with installers and the exact updater-manifest.json promotion candidate. Publishing this release does not expose it through in-app auto-update.
  2. buzz-desktop-latest: the rolling auto-updater release. Its latest.json changes only through the manual promotion workflow.

Promote an OSS desktop release to auto-update

After installing and testing the published desktop-v<version> artifacts, run Promote OSS Desktop Auto-Update from the main branch and enter the exact stable X.Y.Z version. The workflow validates the immutable tag and release, the retained manifest and every referenced updater asset, and requires the version to be newer than the currently promoted version before replacing buzz-desktop-latest/latest.json. Same-version retries succeed only when the manifest is identical; downgrades are rejected.

Withholding promotion leaves existing clients on the previous version. If a promoted release is bad, ship and promote a higher patch version; changing the manifest to an older version does not downgrade clients that already updated.

Mobile publishes only annotated mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N git tags. Store artifacts and rollout records retain the exact tag they used. Mobile does not publish a GitHub Release or a stable mobile-vX.Y.Z alias.


Platform Support

The release workflow builds two separate macOS DMGs: Apple Silicon (darwin-aarch64, the release job) and Intel (darwin-x86_64, the release-macos-x64 job), an unsigned Windows x64 NSIS installer (its filename includes _alpha-unsigned), and Linux .deb and .AppImage packages. Both macOS DMGs are codesigned, notarized, and attached to the same desktop-v<version> release. Intel users download the _x64.dmg.

The Linux AppImage is post-processed by desktop/scripts/fix-appimage.sh, which strips infra libraries over-bundled by linuxdeploy (they crash on Mesa 25+ / GLib 2.88 distros; see tauri-apps/tauri#15665) and re-signs the artifact. As a result the AppImage relies on the host's Wayland/GStreamer/graphics stack and requires GLib >= 2.72 (Ubuntu 22.04 or newer). The release-linux job builds inside a ubuntu:22.04 container for broad GLIBC compatibility.


Prerequisites

  • Write access to the block/buzz GitHub repository
  • An origin remote whose configured URL is the canonical block/buzz repository
  • gh CLI authenticated with permission to push the candidate branch and open its pull request
  • The Default main ruleset configured for squash-only merging, strict required checks, stale-review dismissal, and the Desktop Release Candidate check
  • Release tag ruleset 14378754 active for desktop-v* and mobile-v*, with creation, update, deletion, and non-fast-forward protections and buzz-release-bot as its sole always-bypass actor
  • The buzz-release-bot App credentials configured for GitHub Actions
  • The following GitHub Actions variables and secrets configured for the desktop release lane:
    Name Kind Purpose
    BUZZ_RELEASE_TAGGER_CLIENT_ID Variable GitHub App client ID used to create protected release tags
    BUZZ_RELEASE_TAGGER_PRIVATE_KEY Secret GitHub App private key
    OSX_CODESIGN_ROLE Secret macOS signing role used by block/apple-codesign-action
    CODESIGN_S3_BUCKET Secret macOS signing exchange bucket
    BUZZ_UPDATER_PUBLIC_KEY or SPROUT_UPDATER_PUBLIC_KEY Secret Tauri updater public key
    TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY Secret Tauri updater private key
    TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD Secret Password for the private key

Mobile candidate publication requires workflow-dispatch access and the existing release App because strict tag protection denies direct human creation. The App must be installed on block/buzz, have Contents write and Metadata read, and retain an always bypass on the immutable mobile-v* tag rules. It does not require GitHub Releases permissions, repository Administration permission, or a mobile release-branch ruleset. The publisher validates the App token's effective current_user_can_bypass value rather than reading the ruleset's hidden bypass actor list.


Troubleshooting

The desktop candidate is stale or cannot be squash merged

Do not update the branch manually and do not weaken the ruleset. Run just release-desktop <version> again from current main; this regenerates the candidate, reruns CI, and requires a fresh trusted approval on the new exact head. The post-merge verifier refuses to tag a squash whose parent differs from the recorded candidate base or whose tree differs from the validated PR head.

Local just release-desktop fails with "must be on main branch"

Switch to main and pull latest before running the release recipe.

Local just release-desktop fails with "working tree is dirty"

Commit or stash your changes before running the release recipe.

New commits land after publishing a mobile candidate

Run scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate <version> again after the intended fix reaches remote main. It publishes a new immutable RC tag at the new exact remote commit. Continue referring to each tested or shipped platform artifact by its own exact tag.

scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate fails because main moved during publication

The App-backed workflow may already have published the requested immutable RC at the prior main tip before the operator command detects the race. Do not move or delete that tag, and do not treat it as the candidate for current main. Inspect the run URL from the command output, then rerun scripts/mobile-release.sh candidate <version> to publish the next RC from the new current main tip.

A mobile candidate command selects the wrong RC number

Do not retry by moving or deleting a tag. Inspect the exact remote mobile-v* tags and resolve the unexpected state. Candidate numbers are monotonically increasing remote identities.

A mobile candidate publication is rejected by repository rules

Confirm buzz-release-bot remains the sole always-bypass actor for the active mobile-v* ruleset and that its Actions credentials are available. Do not grant direct human creation or weaken update or deletion protection. Existing candidate tags must remain immutable.

Auto-updater reports "no update available"

Verify that the buzz-desktop-latest release exists and contains a valid latest.json. The manifest covers all four platform keys (darwin-aarch64, darwin-x86_64, linux-x86_64, windows-x86_64); a missing entry usually means that platform's release job failed. Check the workflow run.