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## Summary Operators can enable, disable and inspect a community's stored NIP-FI requirement through signed POST/GET `/operator/communities/nip-fi-policy` and `buzz-admin nip-fi-policy`. This replaces the old enable-only endpoint and drops the `nip-fi-upgrade` command added earlier in this PR, along with obsolete compatibility code. Each saved intent binds its desired state and observed generation/state. Every accepted new intent advances the generation, including same-state changes. Committed retries recover history without reapplying policy; stale requests are refused. Current status exposes one pair of reusable `expected_*` preconditions. Historical receipts remain readable after policy changes or target deletion, including old rows with null preconditions. Their UUIDs cannot be reused for new requests. Migration 0085 stays additive; main’s default-channel recovery migration retains version 0084. It preserves old receipt rows and INSERT compatibility. Operator instructions cover use, recovery and client migration: [usage guide](33a1c0bb87/docs/operator-nip-fi-upgrade.md), [client contract](33a1c0bb87/docs/operator-nip-fi-policy-client.md). ### Rollout and containment The old `/operator/communities/nip-fi-upgrade` route is removed; GET and POST return 404 without its old auth handler. A pending sponsorship client still targets that route. Migrate that client to the supported API and deploy it with mutation dispatch paused before this relay version reaches its fleet. Its complete CAS preconditions must be durably saved before first dispatch and reused unchanged after a crash or lost response. This is a pending integration dependency, not a claim that the caller is deployed. Close `BUZZ_NIP_FI_UPGRADES_ENABLED` on every old relay. Keep `BUZZ_NIP_FI_CHANGES=false` on new relays. Apply schema first and finish the whole-fleet rollout before opening the new gate and resuming migrated clients. Before opening the new gate, verify the deployed artifact SHA on every pod and probe each pod directly: the old route must return 404, and a fresh, well-formed, signed policy request with a new UUID must return 503 `upgrades_disabled`. A committed retry is not a gate probe. Old pods with the old gate open can still accept unfenced enables. Do not roll back to those writers after a policy operation. The old variable is no longer read by this version; the new gate defaults off and controls both directions. Read accepted intent in `receipt`, current preconditions/effective policy through status, and effective discovery through `/info`. Enable stays `pending` because receipts cannot certify fleet-wide socket closure. Under global `enforce`, stored disable leaves FI effectively required. Closing the gate preserves receipt recovery; use a fresh CAS disable or existing archive controls for containment. Preserve uncertain requests and their UUIDs. This PR performs no live state change or deployment. ### Related issue N/A ### Testing Published repair head: `33a1c0bb87a6fa10212eb4ec60788e24189627e2`, incorporating main `39d5159caf`. The Git policy guards now apply only to matched paths. Unknown GET/POST paths on relays without a web directory return 404 instead of inheriting the internal endpoint’s 403. The matched internal endpoint retains its localhost restriction and 1 MB body limit, including its method fallback. The signed removed-route 404 assertion is unchanged. Main’s migration 0084 is unchanged; the additive policy migration is now 0085 with identical SQL. Its populated-receipt upgrade test starts at schema 84. Formatting and commit hooks pass; independent source review has no findings. At this exact head, formatting, all-target Clippy (`-D warnings`, relay/db/admin/pubsub), and test compilation (relay/db/admin, `--lib --tests --no-run`) pass with exit 0. The full native PostgreSQL lane passes: 1,373/1,373 tests, exit 0, including the unchanged signed removed-route 404 assertion, fresh-database migration and populated receipt upgrade from main schema 84 to 85. The first full package run used an uninitialized private database and stopped with two missing-table errors; that failed attempt is retained. After schema initialization and verification, the corrected full package rerun passes: 2,041/2,041 tests, exit 0 (1,396 skipped by unit selection). The separate PostgreSQL lane skips 2,064 tests by its selection. Both full runs use the exact published repair head. Hosted CI remains pending. The new router test reproduced the old failure with the exact localhost-only response body; the new production-router regression also passes in the corrected package run. Four individual guard mutations are running serially; their assertion-failure receipts and the restored final green run remain pending. Brad authorized one `git push --no-verify` of this repair conditional on passing lint and compilation. Those gates passed; the push exited 0 and both the remote branch and GitHub PR SHA were verified as `33a1c0bb87a6fa10212eb4ec60788e24189627e2`. The normal publication attempt was stopped before completion and its log is retained. This exception leaves remaining tests and acceptance requirements outstanding. Historical evidence below applies to the earlier published head, not the published repair. Published head: `d31793ccbcdfd748361bcd559358915862b5ed57`. This integrates main's missing `ChannelEvent.received_at` fixture correction and corrects the newly integrated initial-policy test to use `nip_fi_changes`, with matching documentation. Independent source review has no open findings. At this exact head, all-target Clippy with `-D warnings` passes for buzz-relay, buzz-db, buzz-admin and buzz-pubsub; independent Clippy and formatting checks also passed. The normal push hooks failed (push exit 1): - Rust: `buzz-acp` recovery test hit its 15-second test deadline. Nextest completed 844/1101 tests: 843 passed, 1 failed, 3 skipped; 257 were not run. - Tauri: `buzz-terminal` login-shell test received no child output within its 10-second test deadline; 26 passed, 1 failed. - Mobile: gallery test `2 trailing images match carousel at 208.0, scale 1.0` expected no loading placeholders and found two; 4,524 passed, 60 skipped, 1 failed. These are two test-level deadline failures and one assertion failure, not compiler errors. The failing source paths are unchanged from main `6c3ffd160b`; no baseline reproduction or flaky classification is claimed. Desktop JS checks/tests/typecheck, branch-skew and file-size checks passed. Full hooks are not reported as passing. The first hosted PostgreSQL run atd31793ccfailed the removed-route assertion (expected 404, got 403); the router repair above addresses that failure. That hosted run’s Rust unit, Tauri and mobile jobs passed. Historicald31793ccpublication exception: Brad explicitly authorized a single `git push --no-verify` for this head on 2026-11-06 after the failed normal-hook run. That push exited 0 and its remote SHA was verified. Failed-hook evidence is retained. The earlier `cf2c9ba599` publication also used an explicit exception. Neither exception waives outstanding validation, review or human acceptance before merge. Historical evidence at `5b2eb6f09366b8a8f480a5fc61e8e5368f62302d`: 2,006 affected-package tests and 32 disposable-relay checks passed. These predate the latest main merge and are not final-head evidence. Earlier native PostgreSQL and separate `just ci` / `just test` attempts were incomplete, interrupted or failed and are not passing results. No staging run or human runtime confirmation is claimed. This PR is not a draft and is ready for review; readiness does not attest human runtime confirmation. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Brad Seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@seiler-test.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
481 lines
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481 lines
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# =============================================================================
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# Buzz Backend — Local Development Environment
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# =============================================================================
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# Copy this file to .env and adjust as needed:
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# cp .env.example .env
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#
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# All defaults here work with `docker compose up` out of the box.
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#
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# Service ports (defaults):
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# Postgres → localhost:5432
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# Redis → localhost:6379
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# Typesense → localhost:8108
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# Adminer → localhost:8082 (DB browser UI)
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#
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# Note: If port 8082 conflicts, change the adminer port in docker-compose.yml
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# =============================================================================
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Database (Postgres 17)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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DATABASE_URL=postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@localhost:5432/buzz
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# Optional read-replica URL; unset/blank keeps all reads on the writer.
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# READ_DATABASE_URL=postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@localhost:5433/buzz
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PGHOST=localhost
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PGPORT=5432
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PGUSER=buzz
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PGPASSWORD=buzz_dev
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PGDATABASE=buzz
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Redis 7
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379
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# Max connections in each of the relay's Postgres pools — writer and, when
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# READ_DATABASE_URL is set, reader (default 50).
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# BUZZ_DB_POOL_SIZE=50
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# Read-only partition catalog audit interval, clamped to 60s..24h (default 900s).
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# BUZZ_PARTITION_AUDIT_INTERVAL_SECS=900
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# Emergency kill switch for all automatic partition DDL, including catch-all
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# advancement; audits remain enabled.
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# BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_CREATE_ENABLED=true
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# Replace an empty partition catch-all with six months of dedicated monthlies,
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# at startup and on every audit interval (default true). Has no effect while the
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# kill switch above is off.
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# BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_ADVANCE_ENABLED=true
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# Writer-session Postgres timeouts for buzz-db-backed pools and the relay audit
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# pool, all in milliseconds; 0 disables the lock and idle timeouts. The
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# separately deployed push gateway owns its own database and session policy
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# and does not consume these knobs.
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# lock_timeout: fail a statement that waits this long on any lock instead of
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# parking behind a wedged holder (default 5000).
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# BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=5000
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# idle_in_transaction_session_timeout: reap sessions idle inside an open
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# transaction — bounds how long a wedged client can hold locks (default 60000).
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# BUZZ_DB_IDLE_TXN_TIMEOUT_MS=60000
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# statement_timeout: cap any single statement's runtime (default 120000). A
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# session cannot disable it: 0 or anything above 300000 installs 300000 (5
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# minutes) and logs a warning at startup. Migrations, schema destruction, and
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# community-deletion inventory and purge transactions lift it for themselves.
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# Generic event reads (REQ history, /query, /count) and read-replica sessions
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# are further capped at 20s. Warning: a pathologically low value (e.g. 1) also
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# times out connection setup and can prevent any DB connection from
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# establishing.
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# BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS=120000
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Typesense (search)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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TYPESENSE_API_KEY=buzz_dev_key
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TYPESENSE_URL=http://localhost:8108
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Relay (WebSocket server)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Bind address for the relay (host:port)
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BUZZ_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0:3000
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# Public WebSocket URL — used in NIP-42 auth challenges
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RELAY_URL=ws://localhost:3000
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# Stable relay signing key (required). `just bootstrap` generates a random key in
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# the gitignored .env file. Preserve that value across restarts and backups.
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# BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY=<32-byte hex private key>
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# Optional: path to the web UI dist directory. When set, the relay serves
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# the web frontend at / for browser requests. Leave unset for local dev
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# (use `just web` for Vite HMR instead).
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# BUZZ_WEB_DIR=./web/dist
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# NIP-PL mobile push is an explicit deployment opt-in. A gateway URL alone
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# never enables it. When enabled, the exact HTTP(S) delivery URL is required.
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# Rollback requires replacing every enabled writer/worker process. Inspect and
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# explicitly decide retained queue disposition before re-enabling (see docs/push-gateway-deployment.md).
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BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=false
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BUZZ_PUSH_GATEWAY_DELIVERY_URL=https://push.buzz.xyz/v1/deliveries/apns
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Admin Dashboard (private moderation surface)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Host name that serves the moderation dashboard and its /api/admin/v1
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# endpoints. Leave unset to keep the admin surface absent.
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# BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST=admin.localhost:3000
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#
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# Authentication mode. Accepted values: nip98 (default), disabled.
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# Any other value is a startup error. Token authentication was removed:
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# BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN is ignored with a startup warning — remove it from the environment.
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# BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=nip98
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#
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# Option A — BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=nip98 (Nostr pubkey-based auth, default):
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# NIP-98 HTTP Auth. Each request must carry an Authorization: Nostr header
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# with a signed kind-27235 event. Authorized principals are resolved from:
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# 1. RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS — comma-separated 64-char hex pubkeys (config Operators).
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# 2. RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY — implicit Operator fallback when RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS is unset.
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# 3. relay_operators table — DB-managed Operator/Moderator roster.
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# The dashboard requires a NIP-07 browser extension.
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# Setting RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS for the admin console does NOT require
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# RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN; that origin is only for community provisioning
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# (see below). When BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST is set, the relay advertises the admin
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# origin in its NIP-11 document (`admin_api` field) so clients can auto-discover
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# the console without manual URL entry.
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# RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS=<64-char hex pubkey>[,<64-char hex pubkey>...]
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#
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# Option B — BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled (read-only, no authentication):
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# Anyone who can reach the relay can read, in every community: reports (with
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# reporter notes and reported message content, deleted included), feedback and
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# attachments, bans and timeouts with reasons, the community directory, member
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# search and profiles (not staff status), and any stored message by ID.
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# Writes and staffing are refused.
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# Only people allowed to see all of that should be able to reach it. The admin
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# API is on the relay's main listener and its hostname check uses the caller's
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# Host header, so the whole relay port must be private, not just the admin
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# hostname. The relay logs a WARN on every startup.
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# `just admin` defaults to this mode for local review.
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#
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# Directory holding the built dashboard assets (`pnpm -C admin-web build`).
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# BUZZ_ADMIN_WEB_DIR=./admin-web/dist
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#
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# Canonical origin (http(s)://host[:port], no path) that community-provisioning
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# NIP-98 requests are verified against. Required only to USE the provisioning
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# endpoints (POST /operator/communities) — not for the admin console. When
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# RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS is set but this is unset, the relay boots with a WARN
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# and provisioning requests fail closed until it is set.
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# RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN=http://127.0.0.1:3000
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# Deployment-global operator-listener routes. Each configured Nostr identity
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# may register target pubkeys and receives mention notifications at its URL.
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# URLs may use HTTP or HTTPS. Use HTTP only for operator-controlled internal
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# connections: NIP-98 signs requests but does not encrypt them, and
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# notifications carry full message content.
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# Format: pubkey:deliveryUrl;pubkey:deliveryUrl
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# BUZZ_OPERATOR_LISTENER_TIMEOUT_MS=5000
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# BUZZ_OPERATOR_LISTENERS=<64-char hex pubkey>:https://listener.example/mentions
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# Optional endpoint that receives each new per-community storage snapshot
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# written by `buzz-admin storage-snapshot`, in NIP-98 relay-signed POST batches
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# shaped like kgoose's storage-usage record request. One relay pod checks for a
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# new snapshot every 5 minutes. Receivers must treat a repeated community and
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# measured_at as already recorded.
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# BUZZ_STORAGE_USAGE_URL=https://kgoose.example/cash-app/goose/v1/buzz/storage-usage/record
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# Optional relay-owned KLIPY key. When set, NIP-11 advertises GIF search and
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# authenticated desktop clients use this relay as the metadata/search proxy.
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# Keep the real value in your deployment's secret manager; never commit it.
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# BUZZ_KLIPY_API_KEY=
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# Shared Redis-backed admission limits. Defaults shown below; each value must
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# be a positive integer.
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_HUMAN_MESSAGES_PER_MIN=60
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_GIF_SEARCHES_PER_MIN=30
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_HUMAN_API_CALLS_PER_MIN=300
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_HUMAN_WS_EVENTS_PER_SEC=10
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_AGENT_STANDARD_MESSAGES_PER_MIN=120
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_AGENT_STANDARD_API_CALLS_PER_MIN=600
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_AGENT_ELEVATED_MESSAGES_PER_MIN=300
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# BUZZ_RATE_LIMIT_AGENT_PLATFORM_MESSAGES_PER_MIN=600
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Git (NIP-34 bare repositories)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Root directory for ephemeral Git workspaces and the disposable pack cache.
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# Default: ./repos (relative to CWD).
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# BUZZ_GIT_REPO_PATH=./repos
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# BUZZ_GIT_MAX_PACK_BYTES=524288000
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# BUZZ_GIT_MAX_REPO_BYTES=1048576000
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# Process-local immutable pack/index cache. Zero disables retention.
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# BUZZ_GIT_PACK_CACHE_PATH=./repos/.pack-cache
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# BUZZ_GIT_PACK_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=5368709120
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# BUZZ_GIT_PACK_CACHE_MAX_CONCURRENT_POPULATIONS=2
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# S3-Compatible Object Storage (media + Git/CAS)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The local MinIO container is reachable from host processes at localhost:9000.
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# Path style keeps the bucket in the URL path and is required by this local DNS
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# setup. Use `virtual` only when the provider requires bucket-as-subdomain URLs.
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BUZZ_S3_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:9000
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BUZZ_S3_ACCESS_KEY=buzz_dev
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BUZZ_S3_SECRET_KEY=buzz_dev_secret
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BUZZ_S3_BUCKET=buzz-media
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BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1
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BUZZ_S3_ADDRESSING_STYLE=path
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Media Upload Admission
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Bound image/video parser and storage work admitted by one relay process.
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# BUZZ_MEDIA_MAX_CONCURRENT_UPLOADS=8
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# BUZZ_MEDIA_MAX_CONCURRENT_UPLOADS_PER_PUBKEY=2
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# BUZZ_MEDIA_UPLOADS_PER_MINUTE=30
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# GET/HEAD /media/* always require Blossom t=get auth and relay membership.
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# BUZZ_REQUIRE_MEDIA_GET_AUTH and BUZZ_REQUIRE_MEDIA_READ_AUTH are no longer
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# read; setting either (including to false) changes nothing and the relay warns
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# about it at startup.
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Ephemeral Channels (TTL testing)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Override the TTL for all ephemeral channels (in seconds). When set, any
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# channel created with a TTL tag will use this value instead of the
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# client-provided one. Unset to use the client-provided TTL.
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# BUZZ_EPHEMERAL_TTL_OVERRIDE=60
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# How often the reaper checks for expired ephemeral channels (default: 60s).
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# BUZZ_REAPER_INTERVAL_SECS=5
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Logging / Tracing
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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RUST_LOG=buzz_relay=debug,buzz_datastore=info,buzz_db=debug,buzz_auth=debug,buzz_pubsub=debug,tower_http=debug
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# Optional OpenTelemetry-only target filter. This is deliberately independent
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# from RUST_LOG so log verbosity changes cannot break trace parentage.
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# BUZZ_OTEL_FILTER=buzz_relay=info,buzz_relay::access=off,buzz_datastore=info
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#
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# Access log: the relay writes JSON lines for security-relevant actions under
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# the `buzz_relay::access` target, with an `event` field of `http`, `auth`,
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# `req`, `count`, `sync`, or `close`. `http` is one line per HTTP request, written
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# by one layer when the response is ready (not proof the body was delivered):
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# `route` is the matched route template (never the raw path), with the response
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# `status` and `time_to_response_ms` on every line. It carries the login
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# (`method`, `pubkey`, `pubkey_verified`) and `outcome` (`success`, `denied`,
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# `failed`, `challenged`, or `undecided` when the route recorded no decision; a
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# refusal is final). `/query` and `/count` add the filter summary and
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# `result_count`; `/events` adds `accepted`, `kind`, `event_id` and a fixed
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# `reject_reason` code; invite and admin attachment routes add their own fields
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# (`invite_id`, `expires_at`, `max_uses`, `joined`, `feedback_id`,
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# `attachment_sha256`). Invite codes, tokens and Blossom read hashes are never
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# logged. An attachment read with admin auth disabled logs
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# `method=network_trusted` and no key. A request dropped before its response
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# logs `request=aborted` with no `status`.
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# Every matched route is logged except `/` (non-upgrade), `/info`,
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# `/.well-known/nostr.json`, `/health`, `/_liveness` and `/_readiness`.
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# Requests matching no route log only at status 400 and above, as
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# `route="<unmatched>"`, except that the SPA and static files the relay
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# serves when enabled (web assets, invite landing pages, git web pages, the
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# admin bundle) log nothing at any status, including 404. Successful WebSocket
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# upgrades log no `http` line.
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# `auth` is one line per WebSocket login, written when it succeeds or is
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# refused; every root WebSocket `auth` line carries the TCP `peer_addr`.
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# `req` / `count` / `sync` is one line per WebSocket read (a NIP-AR sync
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# subscription is a `sync` read), with the same filter summary
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# (search text is never logged, only `search: true`). A `sync` line is written
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# when its initial set completes, not when live delivery ends: its summary is
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# the registered live filter (kinds and channels, never artifact predicates)
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# and `events_queued` counts the initial set. `buzz_ws_reads_total` counts
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# parsed reads by `type` (`req`, `count`, `sync`). The summary lists up to
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# 10 kinds, channel ids, authors and `p` values each; `kind_count`,
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# `channel_count`, `author_count` and `p_count` appear only when the list is
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# `*` or shows fewer values than the filters held. `close` is the
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# connection's one line: duration, totals, the login's `pubkey`, `method` and
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# `pubkey_verified`, and `reads_suppressed` / `auth_suppressed` for repeated
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# refusals past the first 16. It is written however the connection ends, with
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# `refused` (`not_admitted`, `connection_limit`) when the relay refused it
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# before serving it. Refusals that arrive after `close` has been written log
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# their own lines.
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# Successful lines and git's credential-less first request
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# (`outcome=challenged`) are INFO; refusals, error statuses and aborted
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# requests are WARN. A successful `/query` or `/count` that returned nothing
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# (`result_count=0`) is DEBUG, since polling clients make most of them. A
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# WebSocket read is WARN only when it ends in `error`;
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# refused and `aborted` reads stay INFO, since `aborted` means the read ended
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# before completing: the client closed the connection or sent CLOSE, a same-ID
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# REQ replaced it, or the session was cancelled, all of which are routine. Turn it down with
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# `buzz_relay::access=warn` (keeps refusals, errors and aborted HTTP requests,
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# and of WebSocket reads only `error` outcomes) or `buzz_relay::access=off` in
|
||
# RUST_LOG.
|
||
# It is off in the OTel export by default so lines are not shipped twice.
|
||
# Removed or renamed: `NIP-42 auth successful/failed`, `WebSocket connection
|
||
# established/closed` and the `event=connect` line (folded into `close`), `HTTP
|
||
# bridge request` (folded into the bridge's `http` line), `Event ingested via
|
||
# pipeline` (the WebSocket `Event ingested` line and the `/events` line carry
|
||
# its fields), `relay invite minted`, `relay member added via invite` and `admin
|
||
# feedback attachment read` (folded into the route's `http` line), the `addr`
|
||
# field, now `peer_addr`, and the JSON `span` field (`spans` already ends with
|
||
# the current span; a line logged under an explicit parent span loses that
|
||
# parent's fields). Git subprocess stderr moved from WARN to DEBUG because hook
|
||
# output can contain message text.
|
||
|
||
# Request header holding the real client IP, logged as `client_ip` on `http`,
|
||
# `auth`, `close` and connection-limit lines next to `peer_addr` (optional,
|
||
# case-insensitive; unset or empty turns it off). A list value logs its
|
||
# rightmost entry; a value that isn't an IP address is not logged. Set it only
|
||
# when every request reaches the relay through a proxy that overwrites this
|
||
# header (for example `cf-connecting-ip` behind Cloudflare or `x-real-ip`
|
||
# behind nginx); otherwise clients can forge it.
|
||
# BUZZ_CLIENT_IP_HEADER=x-real-ip
|
||
|
||
# OTLP tracing endpoint (optional — leave unset to disable)
|
||
# OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4317
|
||
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
# ACP (Agent Communication Protocol — buzz-acp harness)
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
# The ACP harness bridges Buzz events to AI agents. Each env var below maps
|
||
# to a CLI flag of the same name (lowercase, hyphens → underscores). All values
|
||
# are optional unless noted; defaults are shown in comments.
|
||
#
|
||
# Quick start:
|
||
# BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY=<hex> BUZZ_RELAY_URL=ws://localhost:3000 buzz-acp
|
||
|
||
# ── Identity & auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Nostr private key (hex or bech32). REQUIRED — identifies the agent on the relay.
|
||
# BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY=<32-byte hex or nsec1… private key>
|
||
|
||
# Relay WebSocket URL the harness connects to.
|
||
# Note: the relay itself uses RELAY_URL (above); this is the ACP harness's
|
||
# connection target — they happen to point at the same place in local dev.
|
||
# BUZZ_RELAY_URL=ws://localhost:3000
|
||
|
||
# ── Agent subprocess ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Binary to spawn as the AI agent (e.g. "goose", "codex-acp", "claude-code").
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_AGENT_COMMAND=goose
|
||
|
||
# Comma-separated arguments passed to the agent binary.
|
||
# Goose default: "acp". Codex/Claude default: "" (empty).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_AGENT_ARGS=acp
|
||
|
||
# Binary for an optional MCP server sidecar (e.g. buzz-dev-mcp for buzz-agent).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_MCP_COMMAND=
|
||
|
||
# Number of parallel agent subprocesses (1–32).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_AGENTS=1
|
||
|
||
# Desired LLM model ID. Applied to every new ACP session.
|
||
# Use `buzz-acp models` to discover available model IDs.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_MODEL=
|
||
|
||
# Optional Databricks model-picker visibility filter. Discovery-only; this does
|
||
# not grant inference access. Comma-separated full-string * / ? patterns are
|
||
# OR-matched against raw workspace endpoint and Unity Catalog model-service IDs.
|
||
# Unset or blank shows every catalog entry. A nonblank value with no usable patterns is invalid.
|
||
# DATABRICKS_MODEL_FILTER=databricks-*,data_tools.goose.*
|
||
|
||
# ── Timeouts & sessions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Max seconds per agent turn before timeout (default 320 = ~5 min).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_TURN_TIMEOUT=320
|
||
|
||
# Max turns per session before proactive rotation. 0 = disabled (rotate only
|
||
# on MaxTokens / MaxTurnRequests). Recommended: 50 for long-running agents.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_MAX_TURNS_PER_SESSION=0
|
||
|
||
# ── Prompts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# System prompt injected into every agent session (inline text).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_SYSTEM_PROMPT=
|
||
|
||
# Path to a file containing the system prompt (mutually exclusive with above).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE=
|
||
|
||
# Message sent to the agent immediately after session creation.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_INITIAL_MESSAGE=
|
||
|
||
# ── Heartbeat ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Seconds between heartbeat prompts. 0 = disabled. Must be 0 or ≥10.
|
||
# Recommended: 60 for long-running agents to prevent idle session timeouts.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=0
|
||
|
||
# Heartbeat prompt text (inline). Mutually exclusive with file variant.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_HEARTBEAT_PROMPT=
|
||
|
||
# Path to a file containing the heartbeat prompt.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_HEARTBEAT_PROMPT_FILE=
|
||
|
||
# ── Desktop development ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# DEV-only: replay first-run onboarding and the Welcome Team kickoff on each
|
||
# app launch while keeping the current identity and relay data.
|
||
# VITE_BUZZ_FORCE_FRESH_ONBOARDING=true
|
||
|
||
# Protected internal builds only: selects the module graph that contains the
|
||
# default-off Bestie experiment. Official OSS builds must leave this unset.
|
||
# VITE_BUZZ_BESTIE=1
|
||
|
||
# ── Subscription & filtering ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Subscribe mode: "mentions" (default), "all", or "config" (rule-based).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_SUBSCRIBE=mentions
|
||
|
||
# Comma-separated event kind numbers to subscribe to (overrides mode defaults).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_KINDS=
|
||
|
||
# Comma-separated channel UUIDs to limit subscription scope.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_CHANNELS=
|
||
|
||
# Set to true to disable the @-mention filter in mentions mode.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_NO_MENTION_FILTER=false
|
||
|
||
# Path to TOML config file for rule-based subscriptions (config mode).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_CONFIG=./buzz-acp.toml
|
||
|
||
# ── Dedup & self-ignore ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# How to handle duplicate events: "queue" (default) or "drop".
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_DEDUP=queue
|
||
|
||
# Set to true to process the agent's own messages (default: ignore self).
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_NO_IGNORE_SELF=false
|
||
|
||
# ── Session scoping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# How ACP provider sessions are scoped in channels: "channel" (default) or
|
||
# "thread". "channel" keeps one provider session per channel (legacy). "thread"
|
||
# gives each canonical channel thread its own isolated provider session; direct
|
||
# messages stay conversation-scoped either way. Ships as "channel" so thread
|
||
# scoping can be canaried and rolled back without code changes.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_SESSION_POLICY=channel
|
||
|
||
# ── Context ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Max context messages fetched for thread replies and DMs (0–100). 0 = disabled.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_CONTEXT_MESSAGE_LIMIT=12
|
||
|
||
# ── Presence & typing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Set to true to disable automatic online/offline presence status.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_NO_PRESENCE=false
|
||
|
||
# Set to true to disable typing indicators while the agent is processing.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_NO_TYPING=false
|
||
|
||
# ── Advanced tuning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Event channel buffer capacity (WebSocket → harness). Increase for
|
||
# high-throughput agents. Minimum 1.
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_EVENT_BUFFER=256
|
||
|
||
# ── Legacy aliases ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# These are accepted for backward compatibility but the canonical names above
|
||
# are preferred:
|
||
# BUZZ_ACP_PRIVATE_KEY → BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY
|
||
|
||
# Optional relay join policy. Markdown is served by the relay so every join
|
||
# surface can present the same documents. Each document and the independent age
|
||
# attestation are optional; configuring any one enables policy acceptance.
|
||
# BUZZ_TERMS_OF_SERVICE_MARKDOWN="# Terms of Service\n\nFull terms here."
|
||
# BUZZ_PRIVACY_POLICY_MARKDOWN="# Privacy Policy\n\nFull policy here."
|
||
# BUZZ_AGE_ATTESTATION_REQUIRED=true
|
||
|
||
# ── NIP-FI database community source ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
# Where NIP-FI communities come from: "env" (BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES, default)
|
||
# or "database" (bindings created by provisioning; needs
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING and must not be combined with
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES). See docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md.
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=env
|
||
# Most community-issuer rows one snapshot may hold (1..=10000000).
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS=1000000
|
||
# Snapshot load timeout in ms; must be under the 30s refresh interval.
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS=10000
|
||
# Hosts whose "not found" is cached for 5s (1..=1000000).
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MAX=100000
|
||
# Concurrent live lookups; clamped below the database pool size.
|
||
# BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT=8
|
||
|
||
# Optional absolute legacy-v1 invite cutoff, UTC RFC3339 whole seconds.
|
||
# Unset preserves natural token expiry; never changes v2 invitations.
|
||
# BUZZ_INVITE_V1_INVALID_AFTER=2026-12-01T00:00:00Z
|
||
|
||
# Optional NIP-FI historical verified profiles (disabled by default): issuer JSON
|
||
# entries may set public_profile=true, public_issuer_label="Example Corp", and
|
||
# verified_at_refresh_seconds=3600 (integer 0..86400). Requires a stable relay
|
||
# key and NIP-FI enforcement. Profiles are historical records and are never
|
||
# retracted.
|
||
|
||
# Permit community FI policy enables and disables only after the whole fleet
|
||
# supports policy management. A closed gate preserves receipt recovery/status.
|
||
BUZZ_NIP_FI_CHANGES=false
|
||
|
||
# NIP-CL compact membership discovery. Deploy fleet-wide dark before enabling.
|
||
BUZZ_MEMBERSHIP_SNAPSHOT_ENABLED=false
|
||
# Independent listed-open public membership lookup; also deploy disabled.
|
||
BUZZ_MEMBERSHIP_PUBLIC_ENABLED=false
|