Files
buzz/deploy/compose/README.md
Cea Stapleton Cordasco 6636ce9f68 docs(nips): specify v2 proxy transport and bounded denial observation
The published contract named a `trusted-proxy-hmac-v1` profile that no
implementation accepts. This replaces it with `trusted-proxy-hmac-v2` as the
sole stock proxy transport, specified from the wire format: envelope layout,
length-prefixed MAC input, canonical encodings, discovery identifier, replay
namespace, and lease bounds, with negative vectors.

Denial handling is re-scoped. The no-mutation invariant now covers
authoritative authorization state only, and denial observability moves to a
separately bounded, non-authoritative channel carrying reason codes and
correlation identifiers under payload minimization. A denied admission
creates no authorization receipt, and a failed observation write never
blocks, retries, or latches the denial.

Runtime operations, deployment, and integration guidance is framed as future
contract rather than current behavior. Subject stability is stated as a
verifier trust assumption with its reassignment consequence, and the
key-snapshot rollback claim is narrowed to what the model enforces.

This is a documentation change. It adds no runtime parser, adapter, or
enforcement path. Session-path rechecks and the policy digest input set
remain relay-side follow-ups. The 24 trace and 16 invariant identifiers are
unchanged.
2026-08-12 13:11:31 -05:00

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Markdown

# Buzz Docker Compose deployment
This is the single-node/VPS deployment bundle. It is intentionally separate from
the root `docker-compose.yml`, which remains local development infrastructure.
## Quick start
```bash
cd deploy/compose
cp .env.example .env
$EDITOR .env # replace every CHANGE_ME value
./run.sh start
```
For a public VPS with automatic Let's Encrypt certificates:
```bash
cd deploy/compose
BUZZ_COMPOSE_TLS=true ./run.sh start
```
The bootstrap script should eventually replace manual `.env` editing for normal
users. It is responsible for generating stable secrets and, optionally, an owner
keypair.
## Production notes
- Requires Docker Compose v2.24.4 or newer; the TLS override uses Compose's
`!reset` tag to remove the direct relay port when Caddy terminates HTTPS.
- Default `BUZZ_IMAGE` tracks `ghcr.io/block/buzz:main` for early testing. Pin it to `ghcr.io/block/buzz:sha-<7>` or a semver release tag for production once available.
- Keep `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY`, `BUZZ_GIT_HOOK_HMAC_SECRET`, database/Redis,
and S3 secrets stable across restarts.
- `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` is intentionally not prefixed with `BUZZ_`; it must be a
64-character hex Nostr pubkey when closed relay mode is enabled.
- `BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE` is opt-in. Set `BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE=true` or run
`buzz-admin migrate` before starting the relay when bootstrapping a fresh
database. Auto-migration requires an image that includes embedded SQLx
migrations.
- PostgreSQL must allow the `pgcrypto` extension — schema bootstrap and
migrations run `CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto` (used for
`gen_random_uuid()` and digest hashing). On managed PostgreSQL, ensure the
extension is permitted for the migration role or pre-create it as an
administrator.
- The proposed NIP-FI configuration contract is future-facing; this bundle
does not imply that the current relay parses or enforces it. See the
[identity configuration contract](../../docs/CORPORATE_IDENTITY.md).
- The stack uses Postgres, Redis, MinIO, and a git data volume because
those are real Buzz dependencies today. Minimal mode can simplify this later.
Run `./run.sh backup-hint` for the backup checklist.
## NIP-FI readiness
This Compose bundle does not provision a NIP-FI runtime, trusted edge, issuer
integration, or conformance runner. It makes no claim that the proposed
`BUZZ_NIP_FI_V1_CONFIG_JSON` document is parsed or enforced. Do not advertise
or enforce NIP-FI from this bundle, and do not add a provider-specific sidecar
or unsigned corporate identity header as a substitute.
An activating deployment must pin an exact image, isolate verifier ingress
when `trusted-proxy-hmac-v2` is enabled, deliver HMAC secrets through a
secret store rather than `.env`, and pass the complete exact-head behavioral
matrix before activation. A valid Compose render or healthy relay does not
close those gates. See the
[provider-neutral deployment guide](../../docs/NIP_FI_DEPLOYMENT.md) and
[runtime operations guide](../../docs/NIP_FI_RUNTIME_OPERATIONS.md).
## Validation
Before sharing an install link publicly, verify a fresh install with:
```bash
cd deploy/compose
cp .env.example .env
$EDITOR .env
./run.sh config
./run.sh start
curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:$(grep -E '^BUZZ_HTTP_PORT=' .env | cut -d= -f2-)/_liveness"
./run.sh status
```