35 KiB
NIP-FI conformance matrix
This companion matrix makes the normative NIP-FI specification and its formal model reviewable as executable traces. The specification remains normative; the model and this matrix must agree with it.
Use synthetic issuers, subjects, keys, assertions, and domains. A denial with “no mutation” means no binding, lifecycle, enrollment, publication, or last-seen mutation; a redacted security audit record is allowed. Internal decision names below need not be exposed on the wire: public failures use only the redacted auth-required: or restricted: classes defined by the specification.
Review LC-13 together with the model's RevokeKey transition: its active, inactive, already-revoked, lineage-drift, post-commit-reread, and Q+Y branches intentionally form one regression surface.
Stable subcase labels for allocation and mechanical regression checks are LC-13.active, LC-13.inactive, LC-13.already-revoked, LC-13.lineage-drift, LC-13.post-commit-reread, and LC-13.q-plus-y. They are parts of the single public LC-13 trace rather than additional trace IDs.
OP-3 has two separately evaluated subcases under one public trace ID: OP-3.absent is always required and proves that an unimplemented/default-off projection has no surface or advertisement; OP-3.implemented applies only when a separate privacy-approved projection exists and proves its publication and non-authority constraints. A conformance report records OP-3.implemented as not applicable — never blank or failed — when no such projection exists; when it exists, the subcase must pass.
Lifecycle lineage checks also expose stable subcases without adding public trace IDs: LC-17.valid and LC-17.lineage-drift cover re-enablement, while LC-20.valid and LC-20.lineage-drift cover recovery. Each drift subcase includes missing, mismatched, and unreadable retired-pair state.
State shorthand
B_i,B_k: active binding lookups for the presented identity and proven key.P: retired exact-pair selector for(i, k).X: disabled-identity selector fori.Y: revoked-key selector fork.Q: pending explicit replacement fori.Q(i) = kandk in Ymay coexist after key revocation:Qpreserves retired-pair lineage whileYindependently denies the key throughout the authorization domain.- “Lifecycle reads” means
B_i,B_k,P,X,Y, andQare read in the same linearizable transition.
Required traces
| ID | Pre-state / configuration | Presented evidence | Atomic reads | Decision | Mutation | Lease / session effect | Public result | Specification / model anchors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TR-1 | Trusted-proxy profile; direct verifier ingress is reachable or inbound assertion copies are not stripped | Client-controlled proxy header and otherwise valid proof | None | Reject non-conforming ingress | None | None | restricted: or connection rejection without claim detail |
Transport, Trust |
| TR-2 | Browser WebSocket client without a trusted proxy | Assertion in URL/query string | None | Reject forbidden transport | None | None | No authenticated session; token never logged | Transport, Privacy |
| TR-3 | Client-attached HTTP profile | Valid assertion and valid NIP-98 proof on different requests | None | Reject evidence that is not co-located | None | None | HTTP 401 with redacted body |
Transport, Rejection |
| TR-4 | Client-attached profile | Malformed, non-Bearer, or multiple bearer assertion values | None | Reject presented-invalid evidence | None | None | restricted: / HTTP 403 with redacted body |
Transport, Rejection |
| AS-1 | Accepted issuer configured | Missing assertion, or missing Nostr proof | None | Deny missing independent evidence | None | None | auth-required: / HTTP 401 |
Transport, Proof, Rejection, Proof model |
| AS-2 | Accepted issuer configured | Bad signature; symmetric/none algorithm; wrong issuer or audience |
None | Reject assertion | None | None | restricted: / HTTP 403 without validation detail |
Validation, Validation model |
| AS-3 | Accepted issuer configured | Missing/expired exp, future nbf or iat beyond skew |
None | Reject assertion | None | None | restricted: / HTTP 403 |
Validation, Validation model |
| AS-4 | Accepted issuer configured; exercise the optional npub normalization when advertised |
Missing, empty, ambiguous, or wrong-type sub; malformed or ambiguous key claim; valid all-lowercase and all-uppercase bare NIP-19 Bech32 npub encodings of the same key; invalid Bech32m/mixed-case/checksum/prefix/TLV/length variants |
None | Accept only valid configured encodings that resolve to one 32-byte key and canonicalize both permitted npub case forms to the same lowercase hex; reject every malformed, Bech32m, or ambiguous variant |
None | None | Normal processing for the valid canonical key; otherwise restricted: / HTTP 403 |
Validation, Validation model |
| AS-5 | Key set unavailable, stale beyond policy, or unknown kid after a fresh bounded fetch |
Otherwise plausible JWT | None | Fail closed; do not drive unbounded refreshes | None | None | restricted: / HTTP 403 |
Validation, Validation model |
| AS-6 | Issuers A and B use the same sub |
Valid assertion from each issuer | Issuer-qualified lifecycle reads | Treat (A, sub) and (B, sub) as different identities |
Only the selected identity may enroll | Independent leases | Normal result for each qualified identity | Definitions, Domain terms |
| PR-1 | Any binding state | Invalid, stale, replayed, wrong-target, or wrong-payload NIP-42/NIP-98 proof | None | Reject proof before authorization | None | None | restricted: / HTTP 403 |
Proof, Proof model |
| AU-1 | Any binding state | Valid assertion with k_a != k |
None | Deny key_mismatch before state access |
None | None | restricted: without either key |
Authorization, Transition |
| AU-2 | B_i = B_k = (i, k) and no lifecycle gate |
Matching valid assertion and proof | Lifecycle reads and known expiry bounds | Allow existing binding | None | Create direct lease bounded by the earliest assertion, binding, policy, and implementation limit | Success | Authorization, Transition |
| AU-3 | B_i = (i, k_old) |
Valid assertion for i; proof by k_new |
Lifecycle reads | Deny binding_conflict |
None | None | restricted: without conflict detail |
Authorization, Binding invariant |
| AU-4 | B_k = (i_other, k) |
Valid assertion for i; proof by k |
Lifecycle reads | Deny binding_conflict |
None | None | restricted: without conflict detail |
Authorization, Binding invariant |
| AU-5 | B_i = B_k = (i, k) and no lifecycle gate |
Matching assertion and proof; display-name, email, or similar metadata changed | Lifecycle reads | Same allow decision as unchanged metadata | No binding or authorization mutation from metadata | Equivalent bounded lease | Success without exposing profile values | Validation, Terms |
| EN-1 | No binding or lifecycle gate; attested-key mode |
Valid assertion with k_a = k; valid proof |
Lifecycle reads | Allow created binding | Create (i, k) with attested-key provenance |
Create bounded lease | Success | Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-2 | No binding or lifecycle gate; attested-key mode |
Valid assertion without key claim; valid proof | Lifecycle reads | Deny key_attestation_required |
None | None | restricted: |
Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-3 | No active binding or lifecycle gate; provisioned mode |
Valid assertion and proof | Lifecycle reads | Deny binding_required |
None | None | restricted: |
Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-4 | No binding or lifecycle gate; tofu mode |
Valid assertion without key claim; valid proof | Lifecycle reads | Allow created binding with accepted TOFU risk | Create (i, k) with tofu provenance |
Create bounded lease | Success | Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-5 | No binding or lifecycle gate; tofu mode |
Valid assertion with k_a = k; valid proof |
Lifecycle reads | Allow created binding | Create (i, k) with attested-key provenance |
Create bounded lease | Success | Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-6 | Existing (i, k) has attested-key provenance |
Later valid assertion omits the key claim; valid proof by k |
Lifecycle reads and stored provenance | Allow existing binding without downgrade | Preserve attested-key provenance exactly |
Create bounded direct lease | Success | Enrollment, Transition |
| EN-7 | provisioned mode; no active binding for i or k; i not disabled or pending; k not revoked; exact (i, k) not retired |
Separately authorized provisioning | Enrollment mode, active, and lifecycle state | Allow privileged provisioning | Atomically create (i, k) with provisioned provenance and append provision history |
No direct lease; later direct authority still requires valid assertion and fresh proof by k |
Operator transition; not an Authorize response |
Enrollment, Lifecycle model |
| EN-8 | Non-provisioned mode; active binding for i or k; i disabled or pending; k revoked; exact (i, k) retired; a required mode, active-binding, or lifecycle-selector read is unreadable; or a concurrent competing provision wins |
Separately authorized provisioning | Serialized attempts to read mode, active, lifecycle, and history state | Deny ineligible, unreadable, or losing provision | None; never overwrite or clear active/lifecycle state or append provision history | No lease | Privileged transition failure without selector detail | Enrollment, Lifecycle model |
| CC-1 | No binding or lifecycle gate | Concurrent identical first use of (i, k) |
Serialized lifecycle reads | One create; all others observe exact match and allow existing | Exactly one insertion | Equivalent bounded leases | Success | Authorization, Transition |
| CC-2 | No binding or lifecycle gate | Concurrent (i, k1) / (i, k2) or (i1, k) / (i2, k) |
Serialized lifecycle reads | At most one create; conflicting attempt denies | At most one insertion | Lease only for committed pair | Conflicting request receives restricted: |
Authorization, Binding invariant |
| CC-3 | Any prospective enrollment | Lifecycle lookup, insertion, or committed-result reread fails | Required state is unavailable | Fail closed | None beyond a transaction proven committed | No new lease from an unreadable result | restricted: |
Authorization, Safety |
| LC-1 | (i, k) in P; no active binding |
Still-valid matching assertion and proof, with or without matching key claim | Lifecycle reads | Deny pair_retired |
None | No lease | restricted: without tombstone detail |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-2 | i in X, including before first enrollment |
Valid assertion for i; proof by any key |
Lifecycle reads | Deny identity_disabled |
None | Invalidate/deny direct and dependent delegated leases | restricted: |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-3 | k in Y, including without an active binding |
Valid assertion for any identity; proof by k |
Lifecycle reads | Deny key_revoked |
None | Invalidate/deny every lease depending on k |
restricted: |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-4 | Q(i) = k_old; no active binding |
Valid assertion for i; proof by fresh k_new |
Lifecycle reads | Deny explicit_replacement_required |
None | No lease | restricted: |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-5 | Active (i, k_old); Q(i) is absent; eligible unbound k_new |
Separately authorized rotation; fresh target-bound proof by k_new; current assertion for i with k_a = k_new when attestation is required |
Old/new active, Q, lifecycle, proof, and optional attestation state |
Allow privileged rotation | Atomically remove (i, k_old) from B, add that exact pair to P, create (i, k_new) with deterministic provenance, preserve Q(i) as absent, and append distinct rotation history; do not add k_old to domain-scoped key revocation |
After commit, invalidate old direct and dependent delegated leases; new pair may later obtain a bounded lease | Operator transition; not an Authorize response |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-6 | i in X, Q(i) = k_old, and (i, k_old) in P |
Separately authorized recovery with otherwise eligible k_new |
Identity, pending-replacement, retired-pair, and new-key state | Deny identity_disabled |
None, including no selector clearing or history append | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without private detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-7 | Eligible active old pair or pending replacement; k_new is active, revoked, or (i, k_new) is retired |
Separately authorized rotation or recovery with otherwise valid proof | Old/new active and lifecycle state | Deny ineligible replacement-key state | None; do not retire the old pair or disturb the conflicting binding | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without selector detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-8 | One eligible active old pair; two distinct eligible replacement keys | Concurrent separately authorized rotations with valid replacement proofs | Serialized old/new active and lifecycle state | At most one complete rotation succeeds | Exactly one rotation and history record; loser makes no mutation | Old leases invalidated once; lease possible only for committed replacement | One operator transition succeeds at most | Revocation, Safety |
| LC-9 | Any eligible provision, retire, disable, revoke, rotate, recover, or re-enablement transition | Injected failure while writing active state, selectors, or lifecycle history | Transactional active, lifecycle, and history state | Fail closed | Entire transition rolls back; prior state and history remain unchanged | No new lease or partial invalidation claim | Privileged transition failure | Lifecycle model, Safety |
| LC-10 | Authorization and provision/retire/disable/revoke/rotate/recover/re-enable race | Valid evidence plus concurrent lifecycle transition | Serialized active and lifecycle state | Serialization decides; completed lifecycle state cannot be violated | No post-transition resurrection or partial replacement | Matching leases invalidated when transition is observed | Result matches the serialized state; no stale allow or private detail | Authorization, Safety |
| LC-11 | Active (i, k) with absent Q(i) |
Separately authorized pair retirement; inject present or unreadable Q(i) |
Active pair, Q, other selectors, and lifecycle history |
Commit valid retirement; deny lineage drift without mutation | Atomically recheck absent Q(i), remove (i, k), add it to P, set Q(i) = k, and append one history record. Present or unreadable Q(i) rolls back with no selector or history mutation |
Invalidate matching direct and dependent delegated leases only after a successful commit | Operator transition or redacted failure; not an Authorize response |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-12 | Identity i may be active with absent Q(i), pending replacement without an active binding, or never enrolled |
Separately authorized identity disablement; inject present or unreadable Q(i) for the active branch |
Active pair, X, P, Q, and lifecycle history |
Commit valid disablement; deny active-branch lineage drift without mutation | Atomically recheck absent Q(i) when active, add i to X, remove and retire any active pair, set Q(i) for that pair, and append one history record. Present or unreadable Q(i) in the active branch rolls back with no mutation; without an active pair, preserve any existing Q(i) |
Invalidate direct and dependent delegated leases for i only after a successful commit |
Operator transition or redacted failure; not an Authorize response |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-13 | LC-13.active: k has a unique active pair and absent Q(i). LC-13.inactive: k is inactive or never bound. LC-13.already-revoked: inactive k is already in Y. LC-13.lineage-drift: the active pair has present or unreadable Q(i). LC-13.post-commit-reread and LC-13.q-plus-y evaluate the committed branch states |
Separately authorized key revocation, including a repeated invocation; execute every labeled subcase | Active pair, Y, P, Q, and lifecycle history before commit; durable Y and any affected P/Q state after commit |
Commit valid revocation; deny active-branch lineage drift without mutation | Atomically add or preserve k in Y and append exactly one history record per successfully committed separately authorized invocation. If the unique active pair exists, first recheck absent Q(i), then retire the pair and set Q(i) = k; present or unreadable Q(i) rolls back the invocation with no history append. If no active pair exists, make no P or Q mutation and preserve every pre-existing Q. Reread the committed state: the active-pair result with simultaneous Q(i) = k and k in Y is expected and neither selector is cleared or normalized away; the inactive or already-revoked result retains k in Y without P or Q mutation |
Invalidate every direct or delegated lease depending on k only after a successful commit |
Operator transition or redacted failure; not an Authorize response |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-14 | Successful LC-5 rotation or LC-20 recovery has committed (i, k_new) and retired the exact old pair |
Fresh valid assertion and proof for k_new |
Lifecycle reads | Allow existing replacement binding | None | Create a bounded direct lease for k_new; the old pair remains denied by LC-1 and the old key is denied across the authorization domain only after LC-13 |
Success only for k_new |
Revocation, Liveness |
| LC-15 | (i, k) is pair-retired and pending replacement; k is not in Y and has no active binding |
Eligible first enrollment for distinct identity j with proof by k |
Lifecycle reads for (j, k) |
Apply normal enrollment policy; pair retirement alone does not revoke k across the authorization domain |
Create (j, k) only when the configured enrollment mode permits |
Bounded direct lease only for (j, k) |
Normal result for j; no authority for i |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-16 | Q(i) = k_old and (j, k_old) is active; eligible distinct k_new; i is enabled for recovery or disabled for re-enablement |
Separately authorized matching transition for i with valid replacement proof |
Old/replacement active and lifecycle state | Apply recovery only when i is enabled, or re-enablement only when i is disabled, without treating pair retirement as domain-scoped key revocation |
Create only (i, k_new), preserve retired (i, k_old), and do not disturb (j, k_old) or add k_old to Y |
Invalidate only dependencies of the retired pair; new binding may later obtain a lease | Operator result without disclosing j |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-17 | LC-17.valid: i in X, with or without Q(i) = k_old; when Q is present, (i, k_old) in P; eligible k_new. LC-17.lineage-drift: Q(i) = k_old but the exact retired pair is missing, mismatched, or unreadable |
Separately authorized enablement with fresh target-bound proof by k_new and current matching assertion when required; execute each lineage subcase |
Identity, old/new key, proof, readable pending/retired-pair selectors, and history state inside the atomic transition | Valid: allow privileged enablement. Drift or stale compare: deny fail closed before mutation | Valid: atomically create (i, k_new) with deterministic provenance, clear X, preserve absent Q or conditionally compare-and-clear present Q(i) = k_old, append enablement history, and preserve exact old-pair retirement without domain-scoped key revocation. Drift or stale compare: no binding, selector, or history mutation |
Valid: after commit, invalidate prior-pair dependencies; new binding may later obtain a bounded direct lease. Drift or stale compare: no lease or invalidation | Operator transition or redacted failure; ordinary enrollment never sees an ungated re-enabled identity | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-18 | Eligible rotation, recovery, or re-enablement; replacement proof is valid and issuer attestation is optional | Supplied current assertion for i has k_a != k_new |
Old/new active, lifecycle, proof, and assertion state | Deny mismatched supplied attestation | None; do not create a binding or record attested provenance | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without claim detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-19 | Two privileged state transitions affect the same identity or key, including two recoveries from one Q(i) = k_old to distinct eligible replacement keys or recovery racing disablement/re-enablement |
Concurrent provision, retire, disable, revoke, recover, rotate, or re-enable requests with valid transition-specific evidence for their observed pre-state | Serialized active, selector, and history state with precondition and conditional-comparison recheck | At most one incompatible transition commits; a still-eligible serialized successor may commit only from the complete new state, and a recovery cannot commit after disablement wins | Each committed transition is atomic with one typed history append; a stale compare-and-clear loser makes no mutation | Invalidation follows only committed transitions; a loser triggers none | Deterministic operator results without private selector detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-20 | LC-20.valid: Q(i) = k_old, (i, k_old) in P, no active binding for i, and eligible unbound k_new. LC-20.lineage-drift: Q(i) = k_old but the exact retired pair is missing, mismatched, or unreadable |
Separately authorized recovery with fresh target-bound proof by k_new and current matching assertion when required; execute each lineage subcase |
Old/new active, readable pending/retired-pair selectors, proof, and optional attestation state inside the atomic transition | Valid: allow privileged recovery. Drift or stale compare: deny fail closed before mutation | Valid: atomically preserve retired (i, k_old), create (i, k_new) with deterministic provenance, conditionally compare-and-clear Q(i) from k_old to absent, and append distinct recovery history without revoking k_old across the domain. Drift or stale compare: no binding, selector, or history mutation |
Valid: after commit, invalidate old-pair dependencies; new pair may later obtain a bounded lease. Drift or stale compare: no lease or invalidation | Operator transition or redacted failure; not an Authorize response |
Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-21 | Otherwise eligible rotation, recovery, or re-enablement, including when issuer attestation is optional | Supplied key-attestation assertion is stale, resolves to an identity other than i, or has no key claim |
Assertion policy, assertion, proof, active, and lifecycle state | Deny invalid supplied replacement attestation; invalid evidence cannot degrade to absent optional evidence | None | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without identity or claim detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-22 | Otherwise eligible rotation, recovery, or re-enablement | Missing, stale, replayed, wrong-target, or wrong-key Nostr proof for k_new |
Proof, active, and lifecycle state | Deny replacement-key control failure | None | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without proof detail | Proof, Lifecycle model |
| LC-23 | Otherwise eligible provision, retire, disable, revoke, rotate, recover, or re-enablement | Missing or invalid lifecycle authority, or authority bound to another operation or domain | Lifecycle-authority scope plus active and lifecycle state | Deny unauthorized privileged transition | None | No lease or invalidation | Privileged transition failure without authority detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| LC-24 | Otherwise eligible rotation, recovery, or re-enablement in a domain that requires issuer attestation | Attestation evidence is absent, or the supplied current assertion for i has no key claim |
Assertion policy, proof, active, and lifecycle state | Deny missing required replacement attestation | None | No new lease | Privileged transition failure without claim detail | Revocation, Lifecycle model |
| SE-1 | HTTP endpoint | Valid assertion and NIP-98 proof | Lifecycle reads | Apply decision to this request only | Enrollment only when allowed | No reusable HTTP lease implied | Per-request result | Sessions, Session model |
| SE-2 | Active direct WebSocket lease reaches its earliest assertion, binding, policy, or implementation bound | No new upgrade assertion | Current time and observed dependencies | Reject protected operations or close | None | Direct lease expires; renewal requires a new connection, fresh assertion, and fresh NIP-42 proof | restricted: / closure without private detail |
Sessions, Session model |
| SE-3 | One WebSocket authenticates k1 and k2; only k1 is authorized |
Operations attributed to each key | Per-key lease lookup | Allow only operations attributed to k1 |
None | k1 lease never authorizes k2 |
Independent per-key result | Sessions, Session model |
| SE-4 | Direct or delegated lease depends on binding/policy/delegation state that becomes invalid | Previously valid session | Observed dependency state | Deny after the documented detection bound | None | Invalidate every dependent lease; do not claim immediate revocation when polling | Redacted denial/closure | Sessions, Safety |
| SE-5 | Active delegated WebSocket lease reaches its earliest owner-binding, delegation, policy, or mandatory finite implementation bound | No newly validated delegated decision | Current time and observed dependencies | Reject protected operations or close | None | Lease expires; a new delegated decision requires fresh delegate proof, an active owner binding, and revalidated delegation, but no delegate assertion | restricted: / closure without private detail |
Delegation, Delegation model |
| DG-1 | Owner has an eligible active binding; delegation is valid and narrower; finite delegated-lease maximum configured | Delegate proves its own key; no delegate assertion | Active owner binding plus delegation conditions; cached owner lease alone is insufficient | Allow only intersected delegated operations | No binding or lifecycle-selector mutation for the owner or delegate | Delegated lease is bounded by the mandatory finite implementation maximum and shorter owner-binding, delegation, or policy limits; no independent assertion bound | Success for allowed delegated operation | Delegation, Delegation model |
| DG-2 | Owner binding is retired/revoked, or delegation expired/revoked | Delegate presents formerly valid proof | Owner and delegation dependencies | Deny | None | Invalidate dependent delegated lease on documented detection schedule | restricted: |
Delegation, Delegation model |
| DG-3 | No finite delegated-lease maximum is configured | Otherwise valid owner binding, delegation, and delegate proof | Delegation configuration | Deny delegated authorization; delegation is unsupported | None | No delegated lease | restricted:; discovery must omit/disable delegation |
Delegation, Discovery |
| BD-1 | Two server-resolved authorization domains | Client attempts to choose another domain or reuse evidence across domains | State only for trusted resolved D |
Ignore/reject client domain choice; no cross-domain authority | None outside selected domain | Domain-scoped lease only | Redacted denial when no selected-domain authority exists | Definitions, Safety |
| OP-1 | Conflict, validation failure, or lifecycle denial | Any denied request | As required by the decision | Deny without disclosing the conflicting identity, key, claims, or selector | None | None or matching lease invalidation | Only auth-required: / restricted: or HTTP 401/403 |
Rejection, Privacy |
| OP-2 | Relay supports a subset of transports, enrollment modes, or delegation | NIP-11 query | Supported configuration, including the finite delegated-lease maximum when delegation is enabled | Advertise only supported behavior | None | None | When delegation is enabled, publish a positive delegated_lease_max_seconds; expose no issuer-internal tenant, claim, or audience detail |
Discovery, Conformance hooks |
| OP-3 | OP-3.absent: projection unimplemented/default-off; OP-3.implemented: separate projection privacy-approved and implemented |
For each applicable subcase, query discovery/publication and present any available projection as auth evidence; in the implemented subcase also publish an approved label | Projection availability plus normal NIP-FI evidence and lifecycle state only | OP-3.absent: pass only with no projection surface or advertisement. OP-3.implemented: report not applicable when no separate projection exists; otherwise pass only when approved non-private labels publish. Both applicable decisions: never accept projection as authorization evidence |
Both keep projection separate from binding state; the absent subcase creates no projection state | No authorization lease from either subcase | Absent: no projection surface. Implemented: N/A or no iss, sub, bearer material, or private claim disclosure |
Privacy, Safety |
| OP-4 | NIP-FI authorization succeeds or fails | Assertion, iss, sub, and mutable profile claims are available internally |
Protocol output, publication, history, and operational log/metric capture | Authorization result is independent of publication; private material remains access-controlled | No assertion/private-claim insertion into events, tags, filters, or relay history; no raw bearer or unredacted identity/profile claim in operational logs or metrics | Normal lease effect only | No private material in protocol output | Transport, Privacy |
Conformance claim
An implementation may claim NIP-FI conformance only for the transport profiles, enrollment mode, and delegation behavior it advertises and tests. Every applicable trace above must pass against the same reviewed implementation revision. Trusted-proxy traces such as TR-1 additionally require deployment evidence for both properties: origin isolation, proving that untrusted clients cannot reach verifier ingress, and inbound assertion-header stripping. That evidence names the enforced isolation control and records negative bypass and header-injection tests; code-only tests cannot establish full trusted-proxy conformance. Unsupported optional NIP-FI behavior must be omitted from discovery rather than represented as implemented. OP-3's absent/default-off branch applies to every implementation; its implemented branch is reported not applicable when no separate projection protocol exists and must pass when one does. That protocol is not part of NIP-FI conformance or discovery.