buzz/docs/push-gateway-deployment.md

# Buzz Push Gateway deployment

`buzz-push-gateway` is the standalone public APNs last hop intended for `push.buzz.xyz`. Build it with `Dockerfile.push-gateway`; do not run it in the relay image or give relays APNs credentials.

## Network and health

- Public listener: `BUZZ_PUSH_BIND_ADDR` (default `0.0.0.0:8080`). Route `https://push.buzz.xyz` to this port.
- Private health listener: `BUZZ_PUSH_HEALTH_ADDR` (default `0.0.0.0:8081`). Probe `/_liveness` and `/_readiness`; do not expose this port publicly. The chart has no pod-ingress allowance for 8081; Kubernetes node/kubelet-origin probe traffic is exempt from NetworkPolicy. Add a narrowly selected monitoring source only if the target CNI requires pod-origin health scraping.
- Readiness fails when PostgreSQL authority is unavailable. Graceful shutdown stops accepting new requests before draining in-flight APNs calls.

## Required configuration

| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` | PostgreSQL authority/admission store. Runtime credentials need DML on the six gateway tables, not DDL. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_PUBLIC_DELIVERY_URL` | Exact externally signed URL, normally `https://push.buzz.xyz/v1/deliveries/apns`. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_MAX_GRANT_LIFETIME_SECONDS` | Maximum delegation capability lifetime (`1..=31536000`). |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_MAX_INSTALLATION_LIFETIME_SECONDS` | Maximum encrypted-token installation lifetime (default 90 days, max one year). Clients must renew before expiry. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED_PROFILES` | Comma-separated closed application profiles: `buzz-ios-dogfood` and/or `buzz-ios-app-store`. Dogfood is the only enabled MVP profile. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_APP_ATTEST_ROOT_CERT_PATH` | Read-only mounted Apple App Attest root certificate PEM. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_{DOGFOOD,APP_STORE}_APP_ATTEST_APP_ID` | Exact server-owned Apple App Attest application identifier (`TEAMID.bundle-id`) for each closed profile. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_{DOGFOOD,APP_STORE}_APNS_TOPIC` | Server-owned APNs topic for each profile. Never accepted from a client. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_{DOGFOOD,APP_STORE}_APNS_ENVIRONMENT` | `production` or `sandbox`, selected per profile by deployment configuration. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_{DOGFOOD,APP_STORE}_APNS_CERT_PATH` | Read-only certificate/private-key PEM for an enabled profile. A dormant profile may omit it. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_GRANT_KEYS` | Capability AEAD keyring, `id:base64-32-bytes[,predecessor...]`; current key first. |
| `BUZZ_PUSH_TOKEN_KEYS` | Independent token-custody AEAD keyring in the same format. Never reuse grant keys. |

The single canonical `push.buzz.xyz` deployment owns a closed profile registry
for both dogfood (`xyz.block.buzz.dogfood.mobile`) and App Store
(`xyz.block.buzz.mobile`) application identities. Enrollment's profile selector
only chooses a candidate entry: the corresponding App Attest verifier must
cryptographically validate that entry's configured application ID before the
profile is stored with the installation. Assertions and delivery subsequently
select App Attest policy, APNs topic, certificate-backed connection pool, and
environment from that stored profile. No client request or relay grant can
supply or override an APNs topic. The MVP enables and credentials dogfood only;
the App Store entry remains registered but dormant until a later rollout.

Optional endpoint quota policy variables are `BUZZ_PUSH_ENDPOINT_QUOTA_WINDOW_SECONDS` (default `10`, max `86400`) and `BUZZ_PUSH_ENDPOINT_QUOTA_MAX_DELIVERIES` (default `10`, max `10000`). These are Buzz policy hypotheses, not Apple-published limits; tune under load while retaining a hard ceiling.

## Secret and key rotation rules

Mount the App Attest root read-only and startup will reject any byte mismatch. The sole accepted artifact is Apple’s **Apple App Attestation Root CA** from `https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/Apple_App_Attestation_Root_CA.pem`: certificate SHA-256 fingerprint `1C:B9:82:3B:A2:8B:A6:AD:2D:33:A0:06:94:1D:E2:AE:4F:51:3E:F1:D4:E8:31:B9:F7:E0:FA:7B:62:42:C9:32`; exact PEM-file SHA-256 `c778d09ac341f7fd9f8f3b19e2b815af6aed4ad4490e1e92c05cb355212a5013`. Treat an Apple root rotation as a reviewed code/config rollout, not an unpinned mount replacement. Mount the APNs certificate identity and both AEAD keyrings from a secret manager; never place values in an image, manifest, log, or metrics label. Keep the current AEAD key first and retain decrypt-only predecessors until every capability/token encrypted under them has expired or been re-encrypted. Grant and token key ids and bytes must be distinct. Rotation is an operator rollout: add the new current key while retaining predecessors, deploy, wait through the retention window, then remove the old key.

The gateway stores APNs tokens encrypted in PostgreSQL. Database backups therefore contain ciphertext plus authority metadata and must receive the same access controls and retention treatment as the service secrets.

## PostgreSQL and replicas

All replicas must share one PostgreSQL database. Delivery authority, replay admission, and endpoint quota reservation are transactional there, so replica count does not multiply the abuse ceiling. The gateway owns a scoped migration history under `crates/buzz-push-gateway/migrations`; it creates only the six `push_gateway_*` authority tables plus SQLx's migration-history table and never runs relay migrations.

The Helm chart runs a single pre-install/pre-upgrade migration Job using `migration.existingSecret`; that secret contains a DDL-capable `DATABASE_URL`. The URL MUST name a dedicated gateway database, not the relay database: SQLx stores its `_sqlx_migrations` history in `public`, so sharing a database would collide with another application's migration history. `migration.runtimeDatabaseRole` names an existing LOGIN role (the default is `buzz_push_gateway_runtime`) used by runtime `DATABASE_URL`. After scoped migrations, the Job revokes database `CREATE` from that role and schema `CREATE` from both `PUBLIC` and the role, then grants only database `CONNECT`, schema `USAGE`, and `SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE` on the six gateway tables. The migration role must own the database/schema objects or otherwise be allowed to issue those grants; it is never provided to runtime replicas. Readiness rejects an empty/partial schema, missing DML, or a runtime role that retains database/schema `CREATE`. Helm waits for the migration hook before updating replicas, so rolling deployments never race unconditional startup migration. Readiness must be removed from load-balancer service endpoints before terminating a pod.

The service reaps expired challenges and replay rows, idle quota rows, expired/revoked delegations, and retention-eligible installations (including their encrypted token ciphertext) at startup and every five minutes. Monitor reaper failures and table growth; retention does not depend on process restarts.

## Metrics and alerting

The gateway serves Prometheus metrics at `GET /metrics` on the **private health listener** (`BUZZ_PUSH_HEALTH_ADDR`, default `0.0.0.0:8081`) — the same port as the probes, never on the public `8080`. All series are sanitized and bounded-cardinality: label values are drawn only from closed sets (the five APNs outcome classes, the fixed admission results, the static error codes already returned to callers, and the readiness causes). No endpoint, device token, relay pubkey, request id, or any request-scoped identifier is ever used as a label.

| Metric | Type | Labels | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| `push_gateway_apns_deliveries_total` | counter | `outcome` = `accepted` \| `invalid_endpoint` \| `retry` \| `configuration_fault` \| `permanent_request_fault` | Terminal APNs send outcomes. |
| `push_gateway_apns_delivery_seconds` | histogram | — | APNs send round-trip latency (seconds). |
| `push_gateway_admissions_total` | counter | `result` = `admitted` \| `rejected` \| `unavailable` | Outcome at the `authorize_delivery` replay/quota fence. |
| `push_gateway_delivery_errors_total` | counter | `class` (static) | Selected delivery-handler exit classes only (see note). |
| `push_gateway_reaper_failures_total` | counter | — | Retention reaper sweep failures. |
| `push_gateway_readiness_failures_total` | counter | `cause` = `not_accepting` \| `authority` | Readiness probe failures by cause. |

`push_gateway_delivery_errors_total` is intentionally **narrow**: it counts only selected exit classes of the `/v1/deliveries/apns` handler — `class` ∈ `invalid_grant` (grant rejected at the admission seam, before a permit is issued), `temporarily_unavailable` (authority unavailable at the admission seam), `profile_mismatch`, `token_custody` (endpoint-token open failure), `finish_failed` (detached disposition/join failure returned as 503). Request/auth/attestation/grant validation on the enrollment, delegation, rotation, and revocation handlers is **not** counted by this metric; it is a delivery-hot-path signal, not a total error rate across the API.

Scraping is **opt-in** and off by default, so the default chart render is unchanged and `8081` keeps no pod ingress. To enable it, set `podMonitor.enabled=true` (renders a prometheus-operator `PodMonitor` scraping the `health` port `/metrics`) and `networkPolicy.monitoring.enabled=true` with `networkPolicy.monitoring.namespaceSelector` / `podSelector` naming your scraper — this adds a single `8081` ingress rule scoped to that source, never a blanket allowance. Node/kubelet-origin probe traffic remains exempt from NetworkPolicy regardless.

Alerting rules ship as an opt-in prometheus-operator `PrometheusRule` (`prometheusRule.enabled=true`). Thresholds and operator actions:

| Alert | Fires when | Severity | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| `PushGatewayConfigurationFault` | any `configuration_fault` outcomes for 10m | critical | The enabled profile's APNs certificate/topic/environment is unhealthy. Check the matching `BUZZ_PUSH_{DOGFOOD,APP_STORE}_APNS_*` configuration. No endpoints are being invalidated. |
| `PushGatewayAdmissionUnavailable` | any admission `unavailable` for 5m | critical | PostgreSQL authority store is unreachable. Check DB connectivity and the pod's `postgresEgressCidrs` NetworkPolicy. |
| `PushGatewayReadinessAuthorityFailing` | readiness `authority` failures for 5m | warning | Replicas are being pulled from the Service on DB check failure. Fix DB health before capacity drops below the PodDisruptionBudget. |
| `PushGatewayReaperFailing` | reaper failed ≥2 times within 30m (runs every 5m) | warning | Expired reservations aren't being swept, growing the bounded-until-expiry window. Check DB write availability. |
| `PushGatewayHighApnsRetryRate` | retryable fraction > `prometheusRule.apnsRetryRatioThreshold` (default `0.25`) over a 10m window, above `apnsRetryMinSamples` (default `20`) attempts, held true for 15m | warning | APNs is throttling or degraded (429/500/503). Deliveries are delayed, not lost. |

## Relay configuration

Relay push is an explicit deployment opt-in through `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=true`;
the established strict boolean parser rejects unknown values and the default is
false. When enabled, an absent `BUZZ_PUSH_GATEWAY_DELIVERY_URL` selects the exact
canonical URL `https://push.buzz.xyz/v1/deliveries/apns`; operators can provide
another exact HTTPS `/v1/deliveries/apns` URL as an advanced override. An
explicitly empty URL while enabled is a startup error. Only an enabled relay
advertises its host-scoped NIP-PL descriptor, accepts leases, and starts the
matcher and delivery worker. Relays retain lease matching, authorization, durable
jobs/retries, and generation checks; they receive only opaque capabilities and
never APNs tokens or provider credentials.

An enabled relay exports the following bounded-cardinality series on its
existing Prometheus endpoint. None carries a community, account, relay key,
installation, event, or request identifier as a label.

| Metric | Type | Labels | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| `buzz_push_enabled` | gauge | — | `1` only when the deployment opt-in is active. |
| `buzz_push_match_jobs_total` | counter | `result` = `matched` \| `unmatched` \| `error` \| `context_error` | Accepted message events evaluated by the matcher. |
| `buzz_push_match_queue_seconds` | histogram | — | Relay receipt to matcher evaluation latency. |
| `buzz_push_wakes_total` | counter | `result` = `enqueued` \| `duplicate` \| `inactive_lease` | Durable wake-enqueue outcomes. |
| `buzz_push_wake_enqueue_errors_total` | counter | — | Set-wise outbox transactions that failed. |
| `buzz_push_wake_queue_seconds` | histogram | — | First-attempt outbox enqueue-to-worker latency. |
| `buzz_push_gateway_requests_total` | counter | — | Relay requests that reached the gateway transport seam. |
| `buzz_push_gateway_request_seconds` | histogram | — | Relay-observed gateway request latency. |
| `buzz_push_deliveries_total` | counter | `outcome` (static closed set) | Accepted, retried, suppressed, exhausted, invalid, or failed relay delivery outcomes. |

## Relay integration status

The operational relay integration is complete: per-origin event matching with
read-authorization checks, durable enqueue, send-time revalidation, and NIP-98
delivery run only when `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=true`. End-to-end use still requires
the client App Attest enrollment/delegation flow to place a gateway-issued opaque
capability—not a raw APNs token—into the encrypted relay lease.

## Internal dogfood evaluation and rollback

The MVP is ready to enable only when all of these are true: the internal iOS
artifact was built with `mobile/ios/Flutter/PushEnabled.xcconfig`; the canonical
gateway has the dogfood profile enabled with its server-owned App Attest app ID,
APNs topic, production certificate identity, and production APNs environment;
and only the selected internal relay deployments set `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=true`.
The App Store profile remains configured but dormant, and ordinary/App Store
iOS builds continue to omit the push capability and notification extension.

Local physical-device development may instead use the normal
`xyz.block.buzz.mobile` development identity with the push overlay and sandbox
entitlements. Its local gateway must enable only the closed App Store profile,
configured with that profile's server-owned App Attest application ID, APNs
topic, sandbox certificate, and sandbox environment. This is a development
integration proof, not dogfood release validation, and does not authorize
enabling the App Store profile on the canonical production deployment.

Dogfood end-to-end release validation starts after this feature reaches `main`:
publish the next immutable `mobile-vX.Y.Z-rc.N` candidate from the exact current
`origin/main` commit, build that tag through the normal Block release pipeline,
and wait for the signed `xyz.block.buzz.dogfood.mobile` artifact to appear in
Mobile Releases/Comp Portal before installing it on a physical device. Verify
APNs delivery, fetched and signature-verified notification content, and
exact-message tap routing against the canonical gateway and a push-enabled
internal relay before widening the internal evaluation.

Before that first push-enabled candidate, the private dogfood builder must
include `PushEnabled.xcconfig` from its generated `AppOverrides.xcconfig`. Its
manual signing and export configuration must also map separate distribution
profiles for both `xyz.block.buzz.dogfood.mobile` and
`xyz.block.buzz.dogfood.mobile.NotificationService`; an app-only profile does
not provision the extension. The App Store builder must continue omitting the
overlay and extension profile until that rollout is separately approved.

For each evaluation cohort, measure relay receipt-to-match, wake queue, relay-to-
gateway, and gateway-to-APNs latencies from the histograms above. Track the
ratio of accepted or replay-terminal relay outcomes to newly enqueued wakes,
gateway APNs accepted/retry/invalid/configuration outcomes, retry exhaustion,
and NSE resolution fallback. APNs acceptance cannot prove device presentation:
record a small manual physical-device sample with event-created, banner-visible,
and notification-tap timestamps, and verify that the visible title/body came
from fetched, signature-verified relay content and that the tap opened the exact
triggering message. Keep fallback-to-channel and placeholder/failure cases as
explicit counts in the manual sample until privacy-preserving client telemetry
is designed.

Rollback does not require deleting credentials or mutating existing leases.
Set `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=false` on the enabled relays to stop advertisement, lease
acceptance, matching, workers, and new gateway traffic; disable the dogfood
gateway profile if the gateway itself is unhealthy; and ship the next internal
build without the push overlay if client behavior must be removed. Existing
leases and gateway authorities then expire naturally. Do not enable the App
Store build capability or profile as part of this internal evaluation.

## Helm production inputs

The chart defaults to the `main` image tag because `.github/workflows/docker.yml` publishes it from the push-gateway lane. For a production rollout, open that workflow run's **Publish public push gateway image** job summary and copy its `sha256:...` digest. Verify the published subject and provenance before injecting it:

```bash
gh attestation verify \
  oci://ghcr.io/block/buzz-push-gateway@sha256:<64-lowercase-hex> \
  --owner block
```

Only after that command succeeds, set the exact digest as `image.digest`; the chart then renders `ghcr.io/block/buzz-push-gateway@sha256:...` and ignores the mutable tag. `values-production.yaml` is an intentionally invalid production-input contract: deployment CI must inject this verified `image.digest`, the provisioned dogfood Apple application identifier, an environment-owned Gateway parent reference, and the actual PostgreSQL network. Schema validation rejects the artifact when any remains empty; the render guard proves both rejection and a fully injected render.

Network policy keeps APNs HTTPS and PostgreSQL egress in separate CIDR lists. APNs currently requires broad TCP/443 reachability; `networkPolicy.postgresEgressCidrs` must be narrowed to the production database network, and the DNS namespace/pod selectors must match the cluster DNS deployment. The sample private CIDR is not a claim about the production topology.

Kubernetes does not restart pods when referenced Secret bytes change. AEAD or APNs certificate rotation therefore requires an explicit rolling restart after the secret manager update (for example, `kubectl rollout restart deployment/<release>-buzz-push-gateway`) and readiness verification before removing predecessor keys. Service-account token automount is disabled.

## Gateway chart release

The gateway chart has a collision-free release lane separate from the main
`buzz` chart. To publish version `X.Y.Z`, update both `version` and `appVersion`
in `deploy/charts/buzz-push-gateway/Chart.yaml`, validate the chart, and open a
same-repository PR whose branch is exactly `push-chart-release/X.Y.Z`:

```bash
deploy/charts/buzz-push-gateway/tests/render.sh
git switch -c push-chart-release/X.Y.Z
git add deploy/charts/buzz-push-gateway/Chart.yaml
git commit -m "release: push gateway chart X.Y.Z"
git push -u origin push-chart-release/X.Y.Z
```

When that PR merges, `.github/workflows/auto-tag-on-release-pr-merge.yml`
creates `push-chart-vX.Y.Z` and dispatches
`.github/workflows/push-gateway-helm-chart.yml` with that immutable tag and bare
version. The publisher verifies the checked-out commit is the tag target and the
chart version equals `X.Y.Z` before pushing
`oci://ghcr.io/block/buzz/charts/buzz-push-gateway`. A manually pushed
`push-chart-vX.Y.Z` tag is the documented rescue path and runs the same checks.