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Trusted operators can choose `initial_requires_nip_fi` on create-only community provisioning. True commits required policy (generation 1), validated issuer bindings and the owner with the new community in one transaction. Omitted, null or false preserves optional creation; a non-null field in legacy ensure mode returns coded 400. Missing effective bindings refuses required insertion without leaving a row. The response reports policy read from the stored row. Same-owner create-only replay now accurately reports `existed` instead of `created`; it stays successful and read-only, including after policy disable or issuer-config changes. Different-owner conflict, legacy ensure, bootstrap and the operator authorization gate retain their behavior. This adds no schema changes or server-wide default flag. Upgrade the whole serving relay fleet before callers request true. An old writer may ignore the field and insert an optional row: response checks detect it but cannot undo it, and later lookup remains read-only. Turn caller targeting off before relay rollback. Mode off stores policy but bypasses enforcement, independently of the upgrade gate. ### Related issue Replaces closed #9172. The separate lifecycle API remains in #9176. ### Validation Draft head: `bf16a1e0aba102c3be86f9621bd53d2cae98661c`. Independent source review covers this head. Formatting, diff sanity, Clippy, build, all 14 signed HTTP scenarios and full local `just ci` pass at this head. GitHub reports 59 successful and 38 skipped checks, with none pending or failing in the collected snapshot. At parent `b9d9423a6058387f42c310f5a7e4dbe0c8d8b40f`, all 1,978 package tests and 1,346 PostgreSQL tests passed (PostgreSQL concurrency 2). Four deliberate mutations were detected and restored. Clippy then found seven needless borrows in the new HTTP test; this head removes those borrows only. Earlier validation passed 1,344/1,346 PostgreSQL tests at concurrency 8; the replay assertion was corrected and the timeout disappeared at concurrency 2. Failed-run evidence is retained. At this head, the first mandatory push-hook attempt failed all nine boot-lifecycle tests on child startup deadlines. A subsequent serial run passed all nine (seven PostgreSQL-only cases skipped), with unchanged deadlines and source. The first diagnostic was interrupted during compilation without a result; all evidence is retained. A normal-hook retry was stopped when the author explicitly authorized one push with `--no-verify` for this exact commit. That exception skips local pre-push hooks for publication only; failed hooks and remaining validation still gate readiness. Explicit human runtime confirmation remains a separate acceptance step; agents have not attested it. Generated with Codex Validation update at the same draft head: Clippy, build and all 14 signed HTTP workflow scenarios passed, including atomic required creation, stored-policy replay after disable without a current binding, and refusal without leaving a row. The first live harness run stopped after 12 checks because its SQL helper fetched rows after an UPDATE without RETURNING; that harness query was corrected and the complete workflow passed. Relay source stayed unchanged. The full local `just ci` run failed in `mobile-check`: Dart formatting reported 266 changes among 1,068 files, with unresolved `flutter_lints` configuration warnings. The format check used `--output=none`; the worktree remains clean. Repository validation is therefore not green. That failure is retained as historical evidence; see the successful setup-corrected rerun below. Explicit human runtime confirmation remains separate. Final local validation: after `just mobile-install`, `mobile-check` passed without formatting edits, and full `just ci` completed successfully at `bf16a1e0aba102c3be86f9621bd53d2cae98661c`. Tracked files remained clean after installation and after the complete run. This confirms the earlier mobile formatting failure resulted from missing worktree dependencies. All failed runs remain preserved. GitHub's current ready-for-review state is preserved; no agent added `buzz-review-completed` or attested human runtime acceptance. --------- Signed-off-by: Brad Seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@seiler-test.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
254 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
254 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# NIP-FI Community Issuer Bindings
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A deployment that provisions communities under one host suffix, for example
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`<name>.communities.buzz.xyz`, stores the NIP-FI issuers allowed to vouch for
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each community in `community_nip_fi_issuers`. The relay writes these rows when
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it creates a community; `buzz-admin nip-fi` backfills and edits them.
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A host may hold a binding only when it is exactly one DNS label under the
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suffix, has no port, and is not *reserved*. A host is reserved when
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`https://<host>` is a `command_audiences` entry of any issuer in
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`, so a command audience can never become a community
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assertion audience. The relay refuses to start while a reserved host holds a
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binding, and the operator lookup route reports no issuers for a host that is not
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bindable or for an issuer that is not configured.
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A community with durable `requires_nip_fi=true` always retains its last issuer.
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The internal `allow_last` exception for unbindable hosts cannot override this
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policy. Bind a replacement first, or archive/delete the community for containment.
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Bulk backfill skips required communities whose bindings are missing; its closing
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report still counts them as unbound. Repair those bindings with an explicit bind.
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## Configuration
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` is read in every NIP-FI mode. Unset or empty
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binds nothing.
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```json
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{
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"host_suffix": "communities.buzz.xyz",
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"authorized_issuers": ["https://app.builderlab.xyz/api/goose"]
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}
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```
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- `host_suffix` is a lowercase domain name without a port or trailing dot.
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- `authorized_issuers` is non-empty, and every entry must be an `issuer` in
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`. Each issuer is 1 to 2048 bytes.
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- The suffix must not cover any `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES` host, and every
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`canonical_uri` there must be readable. The relay and `buzz-admin` both
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refuse to start otherwise.
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`buzz-admin` parses the same variables with the relay's parser. Run it with the
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relay's environment: `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING`, `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`,
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`, and `DATABASE_URL`.
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### Database community source
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database` resolves communities from these
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bindings instead of `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`. The relay refuses to start if
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` is unset or `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES` is set.
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In `off` mode no snapshot is loaded.
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| Variable | Default | Bound |
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|----------|---------|-------|
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| `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE` | `env` | `env` or `database` |
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| `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS` | 1,000,000 | 1 to 10,000,000 community-issuer rows; a larger load fails |
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| `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS` | 10,000 | under the 30s refresh interval |
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| `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MAX` | 100,000 | 1 to 1,000,000 hosts |
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| `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT` | 8 | at least 1, clamped below the database pool size |
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Each pod loads a snapshot before it binds any listener, and refreshes it
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every 30s. A removed binding stops admitting new connections within 30s plus
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the configured refresh timeout (40s by default) while refreshes succeed, and within two minutes of the last good load while they
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fail. Open WebSocket sessions are not rechecked when a binding is removed;
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they end at their own session deadline. Alert on
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`time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120` and on
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`absent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds)`.
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## Initial policy on operator creation
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A trusted NIP-98 operator may send `initial_requires_nip_fi: true` with
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`create_only: true` to `POST /operator/communities`. The community, owner,
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issuer bindings and required policy (generation 1) commit in one transaction.
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Omitted, null or false creates an optional community at generation 0. A non-null
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policy field without `create_only: true` returns 400
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`initial_policy_requires_create_only`.
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Required insertion needs an effective provision binding for the host; otherwise
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400 `nip_fi_binding_required` leaves no row. Reserved hosts retain the existing
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`reserved_host` refusal. The successful response includes the stored
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`requires_nip_fi` and `status: "created"` for insertion or `"existed"` for a
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same-owner replay. A replay changes neither policy nor bindings, including after
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an operator disable or a change in issuer configuration. A different owner
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retains the existing conflict. Legacy ensure and deployment bootstrap remain
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optional and do not accept an explicit initial policy.
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This policy is independent of `BUZZ_NIP_FI_UPGRADES_ENABLED`. Mode `off` stores
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it but bypasses enforcement. The production creation paths are operator
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create-only, legacy operator ensure, and deployment bootstrap; only create-only
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accepts this choice.
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Upgrade the **whole serving relay fleet** before callers request true. Older
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writers may ignore the unknown field and insert an optional row. Checking the
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created response for stored true detects that incompatible writer, but cannot
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undo its insertion; a later existing-row lookup remains read-only. Turn caller
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targeting off before rolling back the relay. Turning it off affects future
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insertions only; it does not clear existing policy.
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## Commands
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```sh
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buzz-admin nip-fi backfill
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buzz-admin nip-fi bind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
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buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
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```
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`backfill` binds the authorized issuers to every active, unbound, bindable
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community, a page of 1000 hosts at a time. Archived communities are bound on
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purpose, so unarchiving leaves a community that can log in. A community whose
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deletion has started is skipped. It always prints its counts and exits 1 while
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any bindable community remains unbound:
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```json
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{"rows_bound": 12, "unbound": 0, "unbound_hosts": [], "truncated": false}
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```
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`unbound_hosts` lists at most 100 hosts; `truncated` is true when there are
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more.
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`bind` refuses a reserved host, a host that is not one label under the suffix,
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and an issuer not in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`.
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`unbind` works without `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING`. It refuses to remove a
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community's last issuer, because an empty community looks never-provisioned and
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the next `backfill` would bind it again. To swap issuers, bind the new one and
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then unbind the old one. To stop a community logging in, archive or delete it.
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When the provisioning config is present and shows the host is not bindable (a
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reserved host or one outside the suffix), `unbind` removes the last issuer too;
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this is how to clear a reserved-host binding that blocks relay startup.
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`backfill` never adds the default issuers beside an operator `bind`: both lock
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the community row, and the backfill only inserts while the community still has
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no binding.
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## Lookup route
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`GET /operator/communities/nip-fi-binding?host=<host>` is operator-signed and
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returns `{"host": ..., "active": ..., "issuers": [...]}`. kgoose relies on this
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contract:
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- `host` is the host stored on the community row.
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- Every lifecycle state answers 200. `active` is `false` once the community is
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archived or its deletion has started quiescing, including a tombstoned
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community; it stays `true` while a deletion is only requested.
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- `issuers` is `[]` when `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` is unset, the host is
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not bindable, or nothing is bound. Only issuers in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS` are
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reported, in byte order.
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- 404 means no community has this host; 400 means the host is malformed.
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## Rollout
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1. Deploy the relay with `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` set. New communities
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are bound at creation from then on.
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2. Run `buzz-admin nip-fi backfill` with the relay's environment. Repeat it until
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it exits 0.
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3. Do not turn on the database binding source in enforce mode while any
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bindable community is unbound: an unbound community fails closed.
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## Database source runbook
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database` reads communities from these bindings
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instead of `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`. Move one mode at a time, and only move
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forward when the step's go signals hold.
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### Off
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Set `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database` with `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off`. No
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snapshot loads in `off`, but every `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_*` and
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_*` value is validated, so a bad one fails this deploy.
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- Go: the rollout completes, and `buzz-admin nip-fi backfill` exits 0.
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- No-go: a pod fails config validation. Fix the named variable.
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### Shadow
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Set `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=shadow`. Each pod now loads the snapshot before any
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listener binds, refreshes it every 30 s, and records what enforce would decide
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without refusing anything. Shadow labels database-source records
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`community="bound"` or `"unmapped"`, never a host.
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- Go, held for at least a day of normal traffic:
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- `time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds` stays
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under 60 on every pod.
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- `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_total` is flat.
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- `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rows`
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is under 0.5.
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- `buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_total` is flat.
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- The non-`admit` share of `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` is only what you expect
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to deny; `community="unmapped"` comes only from hosts you do not serve.
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- `stage="owner"` counts as would-deny: each is an agent enforce will refuse
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for its token owner.
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- No-go: any of these fails. Return to `off` and investigate.
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### Enforce
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Set `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce`. Watch the same signals, plus the rate of 503
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responses on login.
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- Go: the shadow signals keep holding, and 503s stay at their shadow baseline.
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- No-go: logins return 503 or are refused unexpectedly. Set `mode=off` (below).
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### Alerts
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- Stale snapshot: `time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120`,
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together with `absent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds)`
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for a database-source pod.
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- Near the row cap: `buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rows > 0.8`.
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`buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows` is the size of the last good load.
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- Over the cap or too slow: any increase of
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`buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_total{reason=~"over_cap|timeout"}`.
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- Live lookups shed: any increase of `buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_total`.
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### When the snapshot is too big or too slow
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A load fails when the snapshot has more rows than
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS` or takes longer than
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS`. Both get worse as communities are
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added, so they usually arrive during normal growth, not at a deploy.
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- New pods: the startup load fails and the process exits, so new pods
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crash-loop and a rollout stalls. Boot already fails when the database is
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unreachable; what this source adds is that snapshot size and load time can
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also fail it.
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- Running pods: their refreshes fail but the last good snapshot keeps
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answering. Once it is 120 s old it is stale, and every login's host goes to
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a live lookup. Live lookups share `BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT` slots
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(8 by default). Concurrent logins for the same host share one lookup, and a
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login waits up to 50 ms for a free slot; how many are shed depends on login
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load across distinct hosts and on lookup latency. In enforce, a shed login
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gets 503 (`authorization_unavailable`); in shadow it
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is only recorded as a would-deny.
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Ways out, in order:
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1. Raise `BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS` (up to 10,000,000) or
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`BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS` (under 30,000), whichever the
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failure `reason` names, and roll out.
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2. If that cannot land quickly, set `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off`. `off` loads no
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snapshot, so pods boot and admit as they did before NIP-FI.
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## Assertion policy ID change
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This release changes every verified assertion's policy ID once, on purpose.
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The base ID (`derive_assertion_policy_id` in `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/config.rs`)
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no longer hashes the configured community audiences. The ID carried on a
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verified assertion is now `IssuerPolicy::id_for_community`: a hash of that base
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and the one community audience the request resolved to. The issuer is still
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committed through the base.
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Policy IDs from earlier releases therefore do not match. Inside the relay the ID
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is only carried on the verified assertion and never compared with a stored ID, so
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admission is unaffected. Anything outside the relay that recorded old policy IDs,
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such as dashboards, log queries or allow-lists, should expect new values after
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the upgrade.
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