fix(ocr): live busy pre-check before posting a candidate's escrow

runOcrOneShot posted the escrow before calling the supplier, so a busy
supplier's 409 stranded an already-paid escrow until reclaim - and the
buyer-side busy-retry multiplies this into several stranded escrows per
page. Add a live /status check per candidate, immediately before its
escrow posts, mirroring sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: "working"
skips to the next candidate without posting, anything else (free,
unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as usable so the check is an
optimisation, never a gate. Bounded to a 2s timeout so a stalled
supplier cannot meaningfully delay the request.

Existing candidate-fallback, escrow-ref capture, usage recording, and
receipt labels are unchanged.

buyer/Dockerfile

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
 RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
 
 COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
+# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
+COPY patches ./patches
 COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
 COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
 COPY supplier/package.json ./supplier/package.json

buyer/src/sdk/Marketplace.ts

@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ import {
   buildPostEscrowTx,
   buildPostTtsEscrowTx,
   buildPostChatEscrowTx,
+  buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
   ttsPromptHash,
   chatSessionPromptHash,
+  ocrPromptHash,
   buildAcceptTx,
   buildReclaimTx,
   TxConstructionError,
@@ -88,6 +90,8 @@ import type {
   SubmitPromptResult,
   SubmitTtsOptions,
   SubmitTtsResult,
+  SubmitOcrOptions,
+  SubmitOcrResult,
   StartChatOptions,
   StartChatResult,
   ChatSettleMode,
@@ -807,6 +811,278 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
     };
   }
 
+  // ─── submitOcr — full lifecycle for ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1 ──
+
+  async submitOcr(opts: SubmitOcrOptions): Promise<SubmitOcrResult> {
+    const { advertRef, image_b64, mime, output_format, payment_lovelace } = opts;
+    const request = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
+
+    let advertDatum: AdvertDatum | null = null;
+    let escrowOutputRef: OutputReference | null = null;
+    let escrowRefStr = "";
+    let postedAtMs = Date.now();
+
+    const previewStr = `[ocr:${mime} ${output_format} ${image_b64.length}b64]`;
+    const recordFailure = (reason: string): void => {
+      this.historyStore.save({
+        escrow_ref: escrowRefStr || `${"0".repeat(64)}#0`,
+        supplier_pkh: advertDatum?.supplier_pkh ?? "",
+        capability_id: advertDatum?.capability_id ?? "",
+        prompt_preview: previewStr,
+        posted_at: postedAtMs,
+        status: "failed",
+        failure_reason: reason,
+      });
+    };
+
+    // ── 1. Resolve advert + post escrow (OCR prompt_hash) ─────────────
+    let escrowResult;
+    try {
+      const utxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
+      if (utxo && utxo.datumHex) {
+        try {
+          advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(utxo.datumHex);
+        } catch { /* builder will re-throw structurally */ }
+      }
+      escrowResult = await buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
+        chain: this.chain,
+        buyerKey: this.walletKey,
+        advertRef,
+        request,
+        payment_lovelace,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) {
+        recordFailure(err.reason);
+        throw err;
+      }
+      this.emitProgress({ type: "chain_submit_failed", detail: (err as Error).message });
+      recordFailure((err as Error).message);
+      throw err;
+    }
+
+    escrowOutputRef = escrowResult.escrowOutputRef;
+    escrowRefStr = refToString(escrowOutputRef);
+
+    this.emitProgress({ type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
+
+    // ── 2. Wait for the escrow tx to confirm ──────────────────────────
+    try {
+      await this.chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
+    } catch { /* mock providers / tests */ }
+
+    // ── 3. Re-fetch escrow datum to capture posted_at ─────────────────
+    try {
+      const escrowUtxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(escrowOutputRef);
+      if (escrowUtxo && escrowUtxo.datumHex) {
+        const ed = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo.datumHex);
+        postedAtMs = ed.posted_at;
+      }
+    } catch { /* metadata best-effort */ }
+
+    if (!advertDatum) {
+      const reason = "advert datum unavailable after escrow post";
+      recordFailure(reason);
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError(reason);
+    }
+
+    // ── 4. Call supplier /v1/ocr/extract ──────────────────────────────
+    const supplierBaseUrl = advertDatum.endpoint_url;
+    const supplierHttp = new HttpClient({
+      baseUrl: supplierBaseUrl,
+      fetch: this.fetchImpl,
+    });
+    const ocrBody = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
+
+    let ocrResult;
+    try {
+      ocrResult = await supplierHttp.postJson("/v1/ocr/extract", ocrBody, {
+        headers: { "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof HttpError) {
+        const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
+        const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
+        recordFailure(reason);
+        throw sErr;
+      }
+      recordFailure((err as Error).message);
+      throw err;
+    }
+
+    // 202 + poll mirror of submitTts's async handling. OCR inference for a
+    // page runs seconds; the long tail is the Submit tx confirmation.
+    if (ocrResult.status === 202 && ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object") {
+      const jobId = (ocrResult.body as { job_id?: string }).job_id;
+      if (typeof jobId !== "string" || jobId.length === 0) {
+        const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
+          status: ocrResult.status,
+          message: "supplier 202 response missing job_id",
+        });
+        recordFailure("malformed_response");
+        throw sErr;
+      }
+      const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;
+      const POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
+      const pollDeadline = Date.now() + POLL_TIMEOUT_MS;
+      let polled = ocrResult;
+      let firstIter = true;
+      while (Date.now() < pollDeadline) {
+        if (!firstIter) {
+          await new Promise<void>((r) => setTimeout(r, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
+        }
+        firstIter = false;
+        try {
+          polled = await supplierHttp.getJson(`/v1/ocr/extract/${jobId}`);
+        } catch (err) {
+          if (err instanceof HttpError) {
+            const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
+            const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
+            recordFailure(reason);
+            throw sErr;
+          }
+          throw err;
+        }
+        if (polled.status === 200) break;
+        if (polled.status === 202) continue;
+        const failBody = (polled.body && typeof polled.body === "object")
+          ? polled.body as { reason?: string; message?: string }
+          : {};
+        const sErr = new SupplierError(failBody.reason ?? "supplier_http_error", {
+          status: polled.status,
+          message: failBody.message ?? `supplier returned ${polled.status}`,
+        });
+        recordFailure(sErr.reason);
+        throw sErr;
+      }
+      if (polled.status !== 200) {
+        const sErr = new SupplierError("timeout", {
+          status: polled.status,
+          message: `supplier job ${jobId} not done within ${POLL_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`,
+        });
+        recordFailure("timeout");
+        throw sErr;
+      }
+      ocrResult = polled;
+    }
+
+    if (!ocrResult.ok) {
+      const bodyReason =
+        ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object"
+          ? ((ocrResult.body as { reason?: string }).reason ?? "supplier_http_error")
+          : "supplier_http_error";
+      const sErr = new SupplierError(bodyReason, {
+        status: ocrResult.status,
+        message: `supplier returned ${ocrResult.status}`,
+      });
+      recordFailure(bodyReason);
+      throw sErr;
+    }
+    if (ocrResult.parseError || !ocrResult.body || typeof ocrResult.body !== "object") {
+      const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
+        status: ocrResult.status,
+        message: "supplier body is not valid JSON",
+      });
+      recordFailure("malformed_response");
+      throw sErr;
+    }
+
+    const responseBody = ocrResult.body as {
+      output_format?: string;
+      content?: string;
+      usage?: { prompt_tokens?: number; completion_tokens?: number; total_tokens?: number };
+      receipt?: import("@marketplace/shared/receipt").Receipt;
+      receipt_signature?: string;
+    };
+    if (!responseBody.content || !responseBody.receipt || !responseBody.receipt_signature) {
+      const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
+        status: ocrResult.status,
+        message: "supplier response is missing content / receipt / receipt_signature",
+      });
+      recordFailure("malformed_response");
+      throw sErr;
+    }
+    const receipt = responseBody.receipt;
+    const receiptSignature = responseBody.receipt_signature;
+
+    this.emitProgress({ type: "supplier_called", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
+
+    // ── 5. Receipt verification ───────────────────────────────────────
+    if (receipt.supplier_pkh !== advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
+      recordFailure("wrong_supplier");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_supplier");
+    }
+    if (receipt.escrow_ref !== escrowRefStr) {
+      recordFailure("wrong_escrow_ref");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_escrow_ref");
+    }
+    // The OCR prompt commitment uses the SAME canonical hash the supplier
+    // validated against the escrow datum. Recompute from the envelope we
+    // sent; a mismatch means the supplier signed a different request.
+    const expectedPromptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
+    if (receipt.prompt_hash !== expectedPromptHash) {
+      recordFailure("prompt_hash_mismatch");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("prompt_hash_mismatch");
+    }
+    if (receipt.model !== advertDatum.model) {
+      recordFailure("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
+    }
+    // The receipt's response_hash must commit the content we actually
+    // received in the requested output shape.
+    const expectedResponseHash = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256")
+      .update(canonicalize({
+        content: responseBody.content,
+        output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
+      }), "utf8")
+      .digest("hex");
+    if (receipt.response_hash !== expectedResponseHash) {
+      recordFailure("response_hash_mismatch");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("response_hash_mismatch");
+    }
+    if (typeof receiptSignature !== "string" || !SIG_RE.test(receiptSignature)) {
+      recordFailure("invalid_signature");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
+    }
+    if (receiptSignature === ZERO_SIGNATURE) {
+      recordFailure("invalid_signature");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
+    }
+    if (!HEX64_RE.test(receipt.prompt_hash) || !HEX64_RE.test(receipt.response_hash)) {
+      recordFailure("malformed_receipt");
+      throw new ReceiptVerificationError("malformed_receipt");
+    }
+
+    this.emitProgress({ type: "receipt_verified", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
+
+    this.historyStore.save({
+      escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
+      supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
+      capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
+      prompt_preview: previewStr,
+      posted_at: postedAtMs,
+      status: "completed",
+      response: responseBody.content.length <= 200
+        ? responseBody.content
+        : responseBody.content.slice(0, 200),
+      receipt,
+      receipt_signature: receiptSignature,
+    });
+
+    return {
+      output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
+      content: responseBody.content,
+      usage: {
+        prompt_tokens: responseBody.usage?.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
+        completion_tokens: responseBody.usage?.completion_tokens ?? 0,
+        total_tokens: responseBody.usage?.total_tokens ?? 0,
+      },
+      receipt,
+      receiptSignature,
+      escrowRef: escrowOutputRef,
+    };
+  }
+
   // ─── startChat / endChat — multi-turn llm.chat.v1 lifecycle ────────────
 
   /**

buyer/src/sdk/types.ts

@@ -187,6 +187,35 @@ export interface SubmitTtsResult {
   escrowRef: OutputReference;
 }
 
+/**
+ * SubmitOcrOptions — arguments to Marketplace.submitOcr() for model-scoped
+ * `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1` capabilities. The same `{image_b64,
+ * mime, output_format}` envelope is hashed (sha256 ∘ canonical) into the
+ * escrow datum's `prompt_hash` AND posted to the supplier's /v1/ocr/extract
+ * body, so the supplier can verify the request matches the on-chain commit.
+ */
+export interface SubmitOcrOptions {
+  advertRef: OutputReference;
+  image_b64: string;   // plain base64, no data: prefix
+  mime: string;        // image/png | image/jpeg | image/webp
+  output_format: string; // markdown | html | json
+  payment_lovelace: bigint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SubmitOcrResult — returned from Marketplace.submitOcr() on success.
+ * `content` is the extraction in the requested output_format; the receipt's
+ * response_hash commits sha256(canonical({content, output_format})).
+ */
+export interface SubmitOcrResult {
+  output_format: string;
+  content: string;
+  usage: { prompt_tokens: number; completion_tokens: number; total_tokens: number };
+  receipt: Receipt;
+  receiptSignature: string;
+  escrowRef: OutputReference;
+}
+
 /**
  * StartChatOptions / StartChatResult — Marketplace.startChat() for the
  * `llm.chat.v1` capability. Opens the escrow (session-init prompt_hash) and

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-1.yml

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-2.yml

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-3.yml

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek.yml

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-1.yml

@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-2.yml

@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-3.yml

@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-gpt.yml

@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-2.yml

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-3.yml

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-4.yml

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat-2.yml

@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat-3.yml

@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat.yml

@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi.yml

@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-tts.yml

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier.yml

@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ services:
       - "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
       - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-mainnet-https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
       - "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
     logging:
       driver: json-file

gateway/Dockerfile

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
 RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
 
 COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
+# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
+COPY patches ./patches
 COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
 COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
 COPY gateway/package.json ./gateway/package.json

gateway/src/config.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ export interface GatewayConfig {
   walletHealthIntervalMs: number;
   sdkRegistryMax: number;
   corsOrigins: string[];
+  /** Capability id the /v1/ocr/extract route escrows against. Model-scoped
+   * per the marketplace convention (one model, one id). Env: OCR_CAPABILITY_ID. */
+  ocrCapabilityId: string;
 }
 
 function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): string {
@@ -138,6 +141,7 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): GatewayConf
     chatSettleMode: chatSettleMode(env),
     walletHealthIntervalMs: posInt(env, "WALLET_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS", 10 * 60 * 1000),
     sdkRegistryMax: posInt(env, "SDK_REGISTRY_MAX", 500),
+    ocrCapabilityId: env.OCR_CAPABILITY_ID ?? "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
     corsOrigins: (env.GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS ?? "")
       .split(",")
       .map((o) => o.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""))

gateway/src/index.ts

@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@ export function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
 const invokedDirectly =
   typeof process !== "undefined" &&
   process.argv?.[1] !== undefined &&
-  /gateway\/(src|dist)\/index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
+  // Accept both path separators: on Windows process.argv[1] arrives with
+  // backslashes, so a forward-slash-only pattern silently never matches and
+  // the process exits 0 without ever starting the server.
+  /gateway[\\/](src|dist)[\\/]index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
 
 if (invokedDirectly) {
   try {

gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+/**
+ * gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract.
+ *
+ * One escrow per page against a model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model>.v1`
+ * supplier (config.ocrCapabilityId). Lifecycle mirrors the one-shot chat
+ * path, all inside the per-key mutex: parse → select supplier → preflight →
+ * per-candidate live busy pre-check → submitOcr (escrow → supplier call →
+ * receipt verify) → resolve Submitted ref → Accept (awaited) → record usage
+ * → wallet-health → respond.
+ *
+ * Response (200):
+ *   {
+ *     output_format, content,
+ *     usage: { prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, total_tokens },
+ *     x_vector: {
+ *       receipt, receipt_signature, escrow_ref,
+ *       receipt_labels: ["first-party-brokered"]
+ *     }
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Venue attribution: the caller MAY send
+ *   X-Venue:          venue slug (e.g. "apify"), ≤ 32 chars
+ *   X-Run-User-Hash:  sha256 of the venue-side runner id, 64 hex
+ * Both are logged on a structured line per settled job. The wedge-ledger
+ * emitter consumes these lines; a usage-table venue
+ * column is deliberately deferred to later work so this route stays
+ * schema-additive. payer_class is derived at ledger time from the hash
+ * (known first-party hashes vs the rest), never asserted here.
+ *
+ * Demo keys are rejected: the demo executor is chat-session-shaped and its
+ * wallet holds one escrow per session; OCR needs a funded per-key wallet.
+ */
+
+import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
+import type { Request, Response } from "express";
+import { TxConstructionError } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
+import {
+  ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
+  ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
+  MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
+} from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
+import { SupplierError, type ProgressEvent } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
+import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
+import type { GatewayStore } from "../db/store.js";
+import { requireKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
+import { asyncHandler } from "../middleware/http.js";
+import { selectCandidates, type SupplierCandidate } from "../routing/selectSupplier.js";
+import { preflight } from "../onchain/preflight.js";
+import { resolveSubmittedRef, acceptAndConfirm } from "../onchain/settle.js";
+import { ensureWalletHealthy } from "../walletHealth.js";
+import { badRequest, forbidden, notFound, paymentRequired, toGatewayError } from "../openai/errors.js";
+
+/** Operator-model v0: HAL8 operates both the custodial buyer and the
+ * supplier fleet, so every receipt this route returns is first-party
+ * brokered. Becomes per-supplier metadata when
+ * control-independent supply exists. */
+const RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 = ["first-party-brokered"] as const;
+
+const B64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
+const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
+const VENUE_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;
+
+/** Bound on the live busy pre-check below - cheap enough that a stalled
+ * supplier never meaningfully delays the request. */
+const SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
+
+interface ParsedOcrRequest {
+  image_b64: string;
+  mime: string;
+  output_format: string;
+  /** "" = any model under the capability (single-model ids). */
+  model: string;
+}
+
+function parseOcrRequest(body: unknown): ParsedOcrRequest {
+  if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) {
+    throw badRequest("invalid_body", "request body must be a JSON object");
+  }
+  const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  const image = b.image_b64;
+  if (typeof image !== "string" || image.length === 0) {
+    throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` is required and must be a non-empty base64 string");
+  }
+  if (image.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
+    throw badRequest("image_too_large", `\`image_b64\` exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} characters`);
+  }
+  if (!B64_RE.test(image)) {
+    throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
+  }
+
+  const mime = b.mime;
+  if (typeof mime !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(mime)) {
+    throw badRequest("invalid_mime", `\`mime\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
+  }
+
+  const rawFormat = b.output_format ?? "markdown";
+  if (typeof rawFormat !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(rawFormat)) {
+    throw badRequest(
+      "invalid_output_format",
+      `\`output_format\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  let model = "";
+  if (b.model !== undefined && b.model !== null) {
+    if (typeof b.model !== "string" || b.model === "") {
+      throw badRequest("invalid_model", "`model` must be a non-empty string when provided");
+    }
+    model = b.model;
+  }
+
+  return { image_b64: image, mime, output_format: rawFormat, model };
+}
+
+/** Sanitized venue-attribution headers. Invalid values drop to "".
+ * Exported for direct unit testing (I3 review finding) — it is the only
+ * gate on what lands in the ocr_settled/ocr_failed structured log lines the
+ * wedge-ledger emitter reads, so it needs coverage independent of the HTTP
+ * route. */
+export function venueAttribution(req: Request): { venue: string; runUserHash: string } {
+  const venueRaw = req.header("X-Venue") ?? "";
+  const hashRaw = req.header("X-Run-User-Hash") ?? "";
+  return {
+    venue: VENUE_RE.test(venueRaw) ? venueRaw : "",
+    runUserHash: HEX64_RE.test(hashRaw) ? hashRaw.toLowerCase() : "",
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Live busy pre-check, run immediately before a candidate's escrow posts.
+ * Mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: same signal ("working" on the
+ * supplier's own /status), same best-effort posture. Posting an escrow only
+ * to have the supplier reject as busy strands the escrow until reclaim and
+ * burns the tx fee, so this is worth a bounded, cheap HTTP round trip.
+ *
+ * Never a gate: the indexer already filters candidates on advert status, so
+ * a timeout, network error, non-2xx, or malformed body all resolve to "not
+ * busy" (unknown, not blocking) - a briefly-unreachable /status must never
+ * stop the candidate from being attempted.
+ */
+async function isSupplierBusy(
+  endpointUrl: string,
+  fetchFn: typeof globalThis.fetch,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const res = await fetchFn(`${endpointUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/status`, {
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) return false;
+    const body = (await res.json()) as unknown;
+    const status = body && typeof body === "object" ? (body as { status?: unknown }).status : undefined;
+    return status === "working";
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function recordOcrUsage(
+  store: GatewayStore,
+  p: {
+    keyId: string;
+    capabilityId: string;
+    model: string;
+    supplierPkh: string | null;
+    escrowRef: string | null;
+    costLovelace: bigint | null;
+    promptTokens: number;
+    completionTokens: number;
+    status: "completed" | "failed";
+    failureReason?: string;
+  },
+): void {
+  store.insertUsage({
+    id: randomUUID(),
+    key_id: p.keyId,
+    created_at: Date.now(),
+    kind: "ocr",
+    model: p.model,
+    capability_id: p.capabilityId,
+    supplier_pkh: p.supplierPkh,
+    escrow_ref: p.escrowRef,
+    cost_lovelace: p.costLovelace !== null ? p.costLovelace.toString() : null,
+    prompt_tokens: p.promptTokens,
+    completion_tokens: p.completionTokens,
+    status: p.status,
+    failure_reason: p.failureReason ?? null,
+  });
+}
+
+export function makeOcrExtractHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
+  return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+    const keyRow = requireKey(req);
+    if (keyRow.demo) {
+      throw forbidden("demo_key_unsupported", "demo keys cannot use /v1/ocr/extract; create a funded API key");
+    }
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const parsed = parseOcrRequest(req.body);
+    const attribution = venueAttribution(req);
+    await ctx.mutex.run(() => runOcrOneShot(deps, keyRow.id, ctx, parsed, attribution, res));
+  });
+}
+
+async function runOcrOneShot(
+  deps: GatewayDeps,
+  keyId: string,
+  ctx: ReturnType<GatewayDeps["registry"]["getContext"]>,
+  parsed: ParsedOcrRequest,
+  attribution: { venue: string; runUserHash: string },
+  res: Response,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const { config, store, chain, fetchFn } = deps;
+  const capabilityId = config.ocrCapabilityId;
+
+  // Hoisted above the try so the catch block can report whatever is known
+  // even when the failure happens AFTER an escrow was posted (e.g. the
+  // supplier call or settle step fails) — these fields are the
+  // reconciliation spine that joins on-chain settlement to platform
+  // billing, and losing them makes paid-but-failed jobs unreconcilable
+  // (I2 review finding).
+  let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.sdk.submitOcr>> | undefined;
+  let used: SupplierCandidate | undefined;
+  let escrowRefStr: string | null = null;
+
+  try {
+    const candidates = await selectCandidates({
+      indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
+      model: parsed.model,
+      capabilityId,
+      fetchFn,
+    });
+    if (candidates.length === 0) {
+      throw notFound(
+        "model_not_found",
+        parsed.model === ""
+          ? `no available supplier for capability "${capabilityId}"`
+          : `no available supplier for model "${parsed.model}" under "${capabilityId}"`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const primary = candidates[0];
+    const pf = await preflight(chain, ctx.walletKey.address, primary);
+    if (!pf.ok) {
+      throw paymentRequired(
+        pf.collateralOk
+          ? "insufficient balance for this request"
+          : "wallet has no pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X for collateral; deposit a little more AP3X",
+        {
+          x_vector: {
+            required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),
+            available_lovelace: pf.availableLovelace.toString(),
+            collateral_ok: pf.collateralOk,
+            deposit_address: ctx.walletKey.address,
+          },
+        },
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Submit. Fall back to the next supplier ONLY on a pre-post
+    // TxConstructionError (no escrow was posted). A SupplierError means the
+    // escrow is already posted — do not retry (the sweeper recovers it).
+    //
+    // submitOcr posts the escrow internally and only returns escrowRef when
+    // it resolves. When the supplier call AFTER the post throws
+    // (SupplierError: timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed
+    // response, receipt mismatch) the escrow already landed on chain but
+    // escrowRefStr below would otherwise stay null — the OCR upstream has a
+    // 120s budget, so this is likely the most common paid-but-failed shape.
+    // The SDK emits a "progress" event of type "escrow_posted" (carrying
+    // escrow_ref) the instant the tx confirms, so listen for it around each
+    // attempt and capture the ref from the event rather than only from
+    // submitOcr's return value (I2 follow-up).
+    let lastErr: unknown;
+    for (const cand of candidates) {
+      // Live pre-check, run right here (not once at the top of the request):
+      // skip a candidate that is busy right now instead of paying to find
+      // out. See isSupplierBusy's docstring for the exact signal + posture.
+      if (await isSupplierBusy(cand.endpointUrl, fetchFn)) {
+        lastErr = new SupplierError("supplier_busy", {
+          status: 409,
+          message: "supplier is busy with another job",
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      const onProgress = (ev: unknown): void => {
+        const e = ev as ProgressEvent;
+        if (e.type === "escrow_posted" && e.escrow_ref) escrowRefStr = e.escrow_ref;
+      };
+      ctx.sdk.on("progress", onProgress);
+      try {
+        result = await ctx.sdk.submitOcr({
+          advertRef: cand.advertRef,
+          image_b64: parsed.image_b64,
+          mime: parsed.mime,
+          output_format: parsed.output_format,
+          payment_lovelace: cand.priceLovelace,
+        });
+        used = cand;
+        break;
+      } catch (err) {
+        lastErr = err;
+        if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) continue;
+        throw err;
+      } finally {
+        ctx.sdk.off("progress", onProgress);
+      }
+    }
+    if (!result || !used) {
+      throw toGatewayError(lastErr ?? new Error("no supplier could be engaged"));
+    }
+
+    // Settle: resolve the live Submitted ref, Accept, await confirmation.
+    escrowRefStr = `${result.escrowRef.txHash}#${result.escrowRef.index}`;
+    const submittedRef = await resolveSubmittedRef({
+      indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
+      buyerPkh: ctx.walletKey.pubKeyHash,
+      originalRefStr: escrowRefStr,
+      fetchFn,
+    });
+    await acceptAndConfirm(chain, ctx.walletKey, submittedRef);
+
+    recordOcrUsage(store, {
+      keyId,
+      capabilityId,
+      model: used.model,
+      supplierPkh: used.supplierPkh,
+      escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
+      costLovelace: used.priceLovelace,
+      promptTokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens,
+      completionTokens: result.usage.completion_tokens,
+      status: "completed",
+    });
+
+    // Structured settle line for the wedge-ledger emitter. One line per
+    // settled job; venue/run_user_hash empty when the
+    // caller sent none.
+    console.log(JSON.stringify({
+      evt: "ocr_settled",
+      escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
+      capability_id: capabilityId,
+      model: used.model,
+      supplier_pkh: used.supplierPkh,
+      cost_lovelace: used.priceLovelace.toString(),
+      receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
+      venue: attribution.venue,
+      run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }));
+
+    // Re-shape the wallet ({collateral, working}) so the next request keeps
+    // a valid collateral UTxO. Best-effort; serialized by the mutex.
+    await ensureWalletHealthy(chain, ctx.walletKey).catch((e) =>
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console
+      console.error("[gateway] wallet-health after ocr:", e instanceof Error ? e.message : e),
+    );
+
+    res.status(200).json({
+      output_format: result.output_format,
+      content: result.content,
+      usage: result.usage,
+      x_vector: {
+        receipt: result.receipt,
+        receipt_signature: result.receiptSignature,
+        escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
+        receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
+      },
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    recordOcrUsage(store, {
+      keyId,
+      capabilityId,
+      model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
+      supplierPkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
+      escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
+      costLovelace: used?.priceLovelace ?? null,
+      promptTokens: result?.usage.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
+      completionTokens: result?.usage.completion_tokens ?? 0,
+      status: "failed",
+      failureReason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    });
+
+    // Structured failure line mirroring ocr_settled's shape (same venue /
+    // run_user_hash / escrow_ref fields) so paid-but-failed jobs — an
+    // escrow posted on-chain, then a later step (supplier call, settle)
+    // failed — can still be reconciled against on-chain state instead of
+    // vanishing from the wedge-ledger emitter's input (I2 review finding).
+    console.log(JSON.stringify({
+      evt: "ocr_failed",
+      escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
+      capability_id: capabilityId,
+      model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
+      supplier_pkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
+      venue: attribution.venue,
+      run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
+      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }));
+
+    throw err;
+  }
+}

gateway/src/onchain/preflight.ts

@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@
  * gateway/src/onchain/preflight.ts — balance + collateral pre-flight.
  *
  * The buyer wallet funds the FULL escrow at PostEscrow: price + buyer_bond +
- * supplier_bond (postEscrow.ts:132). Accept/Reclaim are Plutus script-spends
- * that also need a pure-AP3X collateral UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X (assertCollateralCandidate).
- * So required = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + collateral + fee reserve,
- * AND the wallet must currently hold a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both
- * up front and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
+ * supplier_bond, raised to the Submitted-state min-ada floor so long
+ * capability ids (e.g. the 33-byte OCR one) don't get bumped mid-flight —
+ * see escrowLockFloor (packages/shared/.../minAdaFloor.ts) and
+ * postOcrEscrow.ts:205, the SAME floor a POST actually locks. Accept/Reclaim
+ * are Plutus script-spends that also need a pure-AP3X collateral UTxO ≥ 5
+ * AP3X (assertCollateralCandidate). So required = escrowLockFloor(price +
+ * buyer_bond + supplier_bond) + collateral + fee reserve, AND the wallet
+ * must currently hold a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both up front
+ * and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
  */
 
 import type { ChainProvider, Utxo } from "@marketplace/shared/chain";
+import type { EscrowDatum } from "@marketplace/shared/cbor";
+import { escrowLockFloor } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
 
 export const COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
 export const FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE = 2_000_000n;
@@ -32,20 +38,48 @@ export interface PreflightResult {
   collateralOk: boolean;
 }
 
+export interface PreflightCost {
+  capabilityId: string;
+  priceLovelace: bigint;
+  buyerBondLovelace: bigint;
+  supplierBondLovelace: bigint;
+}
+
+/** Placeholder datum used only to size-estimate the Submitted-state min-ada
+ * floor. Every field except capability_id and the cost amounts is a
+ * fixed-size stand-in (real hash/pkh byte widths, a realistic 13-digit
+ * POSIX-ms timestamp) — capability_id's actual length is what drives the
+ * estimate, exactly as in escrowLockFloor's own contract. */
+function representativeEscrowDatum(cost: PreflightCost): EscrowDatum {
+  return {
+    buyer_pkh: "3b2fdaed0398485ff35887fb7d0ad2025348864407854f7831dc6a55",
+    supplier_pkh: "401af418a7e6fb106277292881fcdeaa1cc15b5b112e9c8bdb2d46c9",
+    advert_ref: { txHash: "a6".repeat(32), index: 0 },
+    capability_id: cost.capabilityId,
+    request_spec_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
+    prompt_hash: "23".repeat(32),
+    payment_lovelace: cost.priceLovelace,
+    buyer_bond_lovelace: cost.buyerBondLovelace,
+    supplier_bond_lovelace: cost.supplierBondLovelace,
+    deliver_by: 1_786_105_955_257,
+    posted_at: 1_786_105_625_257,
+    submitted_at: null,
+    result_receipt_hash: null,
+    state: "Open",
+  };
+}
+
 export async function preflight(
   chain: ChainProvider,
   address: string,
-  cost: { priceLovelace: bigint; buyerBondLovelace: bigint; supplierBondLovelace: bigint },
+  cost: PreflightCost,
 ): Promise<PreflightResult> {
   const utxos = await chain.queryUtxosByAddress(address);
   const available = totalLovelace(utxos);
   const collateralOk = hasCollateral(utxos);
-  const required =
-    cost.priceLovelace +
-    cost.buyerBondLovelace +
-    cost.supplierBondLovelace +
-    COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE +
-    FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
+  const economicTotal = cost.priceLovelace + cost.buyerBondLovelace + cost.supplierBondLovelace;
+  const escrowFloor = escrowLockFloor(representativeEscrowDatum(cost), economicTotal);
+  const required = escrowFloor + COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE + FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
   return {
     ok: available >= required && collateralOk,
     availableLovelace: available,

gateway/src/routing/selectSupplier.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ export function parseRef(ref: string): OutputReference | null {
 
 export interface SelectSupplierOpts {
   indexerUrl: string;
+  /** Exact model match; "" matches ANY model under the capability (used by
+   * single-model capabilities like the ocr.* ids, where the capability
+   * already pins the model). */
   model: string;
   capabilityId: string;
   fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch;
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ export async function selectCandidates(opts: SelectSupplierOpts): Promise<Suppli
   const candidates: SupplierCandidate[] = [];
   for (const raw of body as SupplierView[]) {
     if (raw.capability_id !== opts.capabilityId) continue;
-    if (raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
+    if (opts.model !== "" && raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
     if (raw.advert_status !== "Active") continue;
     if (raw.status !== "free" && raw.status !== "unknown" && !opts.ignoreStatusFor?.has(raw.supplier_pkh)) {
       continue;

gateway/src/server.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { ipRateLimit, keyRateLimit, demoIpRateLimit } from "./middleware/rateLim
 import { sendError } from "./middleware/http.js";
 import { notFound } from "./openai/errors.js";
 import { makeChatCompletionsHandler } from "./openai/chatCompletions.js";
+import { makeOcrExtractHandler } from "./ocr/extract.js";
 import { makeModelsHandler } from "./openai/models.js";
 import {
   makeOpenSessionHandler,
@@ -56,7 +57,11 @@ export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
   app.set("trust proxy", true);
   // CORS before body-parsing so preflight OPTIONS short-circuits cheaply.
   app.use(corsMiddleware(deps.config.corsOrigins));
-  app.use(express.json({ limit: "1mb" }));
+  // /v1/ocr carries a base64 page image and mounts its own larger parser on
+  // the route; every other path keeps the 1mb ceiling.
+  const jsonBody = express.json({ limit: "1mb" });
+  app.use((req, res, next) =>
+    req.path.startsWith("/v1/ocr/") ? next() : jsonBody(req, res, next));
 
   app.get("/healthz", (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
     res.json({ ok: true });
@@ -80,6 +85,12 @@ export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
   app.post("/account/withdraw", auth, makeWithdrawHandler(deps));
 
   app.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions", ...gated, makeChatCompletionsHandler(deps));
+  // Model-scoped OCR: 16mb parser covers MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS
+  // (~12M chars ≈ 9 MB binary) plus JSON envelope. Gates (auth + rate
+  // limits) run BEFORE the parser so an unauthenticated caller cannot
+  // buffer/JSON.parse up to 16mb before getting a 401, and rate limiting
+  // can actually throttle the request (2026-08 review finding C2).
+  app.post("/v1/ocr/extract", ...gated, express.json({ limit: "16mb" }), makeOcrExtractHandler(deps));
   app.get("/openai/v1/models", auth, makeModelsHandler(deps));
   app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions", ...gated, makeOpenSessionHandler(deps));
   app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions/:id/messages", ...gated, makeSessionMessageHandler(deps));

gateway/test/http.test.ts

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ function makeDeps(
     chatSettleMode: overrides?.chatSettleMode ?? "full",
     walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
     sdkRegistryMax: 100,
+    ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
     corsOrigins: [],
   };
   const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);

gateway/test/ocr.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+/**
+ * gateway/test/ocr.test.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract route coverage.
+ *
+ * Focus: auth gating, demo-key rejection, body validation, capability-based
+ * supplier lookup, and the enlarged body limit. The settle path (submitOcr →
+ * resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) reuses the one-shot chat plumbing
+ * covered by http.test.ts + the SDK suites; end-to-end runs live on testnet.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
+import { tmpdir } from "os";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
+import request from "supertest";
+import { createApp } from "../src/server.js";
+import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
+import { SdkRegistry } from "../src/sdk/registry.js";
+import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../src/wallet.js";
+import { seal } from "../src/crypto/seal.js";
+import { hashApiKey } from "../src/middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
+import { venueAttribution } from "../src/ocr/extract.js";
+import type { GatewayConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import type { GatewayDeps } from "../src/deps.js";
+import { SupplierError } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
+
+// The one-shot settle step (resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) talks to
+// the live indexer + chain; the happy-path route test below only needs to
+// prove that a successful submitOcr reaches the response with the
+// first-party-brokered disclosure label (I3), so it stubs just those two
+// chain-touching steps and keeps every other export real.
+vi.mock("../src/onchain/settle.js", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("../src/onchain/settle.js")>();
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    resolveSubmittedRef: vi.fn(async () => ({ txHash: "e".repeat(64), index: 0 })),
+    acceptAndConfirm: vi.fn(async () => "f".repeat(64)),
+  };
+});
+
+const MASTER = "ab".repeat(32);
+const IMG = Buffer.from("page bytes").toString("base64");
+
+/** A funded wallet: covers price+bonds+collateral+fee and has pure-ADA ≥ 5. */
+const fundedChain = {
+  queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [
+    { ref: { txHash: "ff".repeat(32), index: 0 }, address: "a", lovelace: 20_000_000n, assets: {}, datumHex: null, scriptRef: null },
+  ],
+} as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
+
+const OCR_SUPPLIER = {
+  utxo_ref: `${"cc".repeat(32)}#0`,
+  supplier_pkh: "s3",
+  capability_id: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
+  model: "chandra-ocr-2",
+  max_output_tokens: 4096,
+  price_lovelace: "200000",
+  supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
+  buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
+  endpoint_url: "http://sup",
+  advert_status: "Active",
+  status: "free",
+};
+
+function makeDeps(fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch, overrides?: { chain?: GatewayDeps["chain"] }): GatewayDeps {
+  const dbDir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-ocr-test-${randomUUID()}`);
+  const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
+  const config: GatewayConfig = {
+    masterKeyHex: MASTER,
+    indexerUrl: "http://ix",
+    ogmiosUrl: "http://og",
+    networkId: 0,
+    liveChain: true,
+    port: 0,
+    dbDir,
+    signupRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
+    keyRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
+    demoIpRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
+    sweeperIntervalMs: 60_000,
+    demoSessionIdleMs: 180_000,
+    chatSettleMode: "full",
+    walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
+    sdkRegistryMax: 100,
+    ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
+    corsOrigins: [],
+  };
+  const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);
+  const registry = new SdkRegistry({
+    chain,
+    indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
+    networkId: config.networkId,
+    masterKeyHex: config.masterKeyHex,
+    max: config.sdkRegistryMax,
+  });
+  const defaultFetch = (async () => new Response("[]", { status: 200 })) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+  return { config, store, chain, registry, fetchFn: fetchFn ?? defaultFetch };
+}
+
+/** Insert a key row (demo or funded) and return the raw bearer token. */
+function makeKey(deps: GatewayDeps, demo: 0 | 1): string {
+  const rawKey = `vk-${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
+  const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
+  const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, 0);
+  const sealed = seal(privHex, MASTER);
+  deps.store.insertKey({
+    id: randomUUID(),
+    key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
+    key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
+    label: demo ? "demo" : "funded",
+    wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
+    deposit_address: walletKey.address,
+    enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
+    enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
+    enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
+    master_key_version: 1,
+    created_at: Date.now(),
+    demo,
+  });
+  return rawKey;
+}
+
+function validBody() {
+  return { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" };
+}
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — auth + demo gating", () => {
+  it("401 without a bearer key, OpenAI error shape", async () => {
+    const res = await request(createApp(makeDeps()))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract").send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body.error?.type).toBe("authentication_error");
+  });
+
+  it("403 demo_key_unsupported for demo keys", async () => {
+    const deps = makeDeps();
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 1);
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("demo_key_unsupported");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — body validation", () => {
+  async function post(body: unknown) {
+    const deps = makeDeps();
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    return request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(body as object);
+  }
+
+  it("400 invalid_image on missing/empty/data-URL image_b64", async () => {
+    for (const image_b64 of [undefined, "", `data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`]) {
+      const res = await post({ ...validBody(), image_b64 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_image");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("400 invalid_mime on unsupported mime", async () => {
+    const res = await post({ ...validBody(), mime: "image/gif" });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_mime");
+  });
+
+  it("400 invalid_output_format on unsupported format", async () => {
+    const res = await post({ ...validBody(), output_format: "yaml" });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_output_format");
+  });
+
+  it("output_format defaults to markdown (reaches supplier lookup)", async () => {
+    const res = await post({ image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png" });
+    // Passes validation, then the empty indexer answer → 404 model_not_found.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — supplier lookup + body limit", () => {
+  it("404 model_not_found when no supplier advertises the capability", async () => {
+    const deps = makeDeps();
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
+  });
+
+  it("queries the indexer with the configured ocr capability id", async () => {
+    let queried = "";
+    const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
+      queried = String(url);
+      return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
+    }) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn);
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+    expect(queried).toContain("capability_id=ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1");
+  });
+
+  it("accepts a 2MB body (over the 1mb global limit — OCR route has its own parser)", async () => {
+    const deps = makeDeps();
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send({ ...validBody(), image_b64: big });
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(413);
+    // Valid base64 + no suppliers → 404 model_not_found.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("chat completions keep the 1mb ceiling (413 on a 2MB body)", async () => {
+    const deps = makeDeps();
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send({ model: "qwen", messages: [{ role: "user", content: big }] });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(413);
+  });
+});
+
+// ─── venueAttribution — pure-function header sanitization (I3) ──────────────
+//
+// grep for "first-party-brokered" used to return only source lines: nothing
+// exercised venueAttribution's regex gates or RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 reaching the
+// wire. These two blocks close that gap.
+
+function fakeReq(headers: Record<string, string>): Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0] {
+  return { header: (name: string) => headers[name] } as unknown as Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0];
+}
+
+describe("venueAttribution — header sanitization", () => {
+  it("passes through a valid venue slug and a valid lowercase hash", () => {
+    const hash = "a".repeat(64);
+    const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": hash }));
+    expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "apify", runUserHash: hash });
+  });
+
+  it("lowercases a valid but uppercase hex hash", () => {
+    const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": "A".repeat(64) }));
+    expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("a".repeat(64));
+  });
+
+  it("drops an invalid venue to empty string (uppercase, bad chars, oversized)", () => {
+    for (const bad of ["Apify", "apify!", "apify_venue", "a".repeat(33)]) {
+      const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": bad, "X-Run-User-Hash": "a".repeat(64) }));
+      expect(out.venue).toBe("");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("drops an invalid run-user-hash to empty string (wrong length, non-hex)", () => {
+    for (const bad of ["a".repeat(63), "a".repeat(65), "z".repeat(64), "not-hex-at-all"]) {
+      const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": bad }));
+      expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("defaults both fields to empty string when headers are missing", () => {
+    const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({}));
+    expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "", runUserHash: "" });
+  });
+});
+
+// ─── Happy path — receipt disclosure label reaches the response (I3) ────────
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — happy path", () => {
+  it("200 response x_vector.receipt_labels contains first-party-brokered", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
+      const u = String(url);
+      if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
+    }) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    // Stub only the chain-touching supplier call; escrow ref shape matches
+    // what resolveSubmittedRef's mock (module-level, top of file) expects.
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => ({
+      output_format: "markdown",
+      content: "extracted text",
+      usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
+      receipt: {
+        prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
+        response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
+        model: "chandra-ocr-2",
+        prompt_tokens: 10,
+        completion_tokens: 5,
+        wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
+        supplier_pkh: "s3",
+        escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
+      },
+      receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
+      escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
+    }));
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
+    // escrow_ref in the response comes from submitOcr's returned escrowRef
+    // (the ORIGINAL Open ref), not the mocked resolveSubmittedRef's answer —
+    // see settle.ts's docstring on why those two refs differ on-chain.
+    expect(res.body.x_vector.escrow_ref).toBe(`${"d".repeat(64)}#0`);
+  });
+});
+
+// ─── Failure path — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError (I2) ────
+//
+// submitOcr posts the escrow, THEN calls the supplier. A SupplierError
+// (timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed response, receipt mismatch)
+// means the escrow already landed on chain even though submitOcr rejects —
+// per the OCR route's 120s supplier budget, this is likely the MOST common
+// paid-but-failed shape. Before this fix, escrowRefStr was only assigned
+// from submitOcr's *return value*, so this exact case recorded escrow_ref:
+// null. The route now also listens for the SDK's "escrow_posted" progress
+// event around each attempt, so the ref survives regardless of whether
+// submitOcr goes on to resolve or reject.
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError", () => {
+  it("records the escrow_ref from the escrow_posted progress event, not null, when submitOcr posts an escrow then rejects", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
+      const u = String(url);
+      if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
+    }) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    // Same monkeypatch pattern as the happy-path test above: fetch the real
+    // per-key Marketplace instance from the registry BEFORE the request so
+    // its real EventEmitter (on/off/emit) stays live, then replace only
+    // submitOcr. The stub mirrors what Marketplace.submitOcr actually does
+    // on this failure shape: emit "escrow_posted" the instant the tx
+    // confirms, then throw once the supplier call fails.
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const knownEscrowRef = `${"9".repeat(64)}#0`;
+    const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => {
+      ctx.sdk.emit("progress", { type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: knownEscrowRef });
+      throw new SupplierError("timeout", { message: "supplier did not respond within budget" });
+    });
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+    // Snapshot the recorded calls BEFORE restoring — mockRestore() also
+    // clears .mock.calls (it runs mockReset()/mockClear() first), so
+    // reading logSpy.mock.calls after restore always sees [].
+    const loggedLines = logSpy.mock.calls.map((args) => String(args[0]));
+    logSpy.mockRestore();
+
+    expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    // toGatewayError maps SupplierError("timeout") to 504 supplier_timeout —
+    // confirms the request actually took the failure path this test targets.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(504);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("supplier_timeout");
+
+    // The reconciliation spine: the usage row recorded in the catch block
+    // must carry the real ref, not null.
+    const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
+    expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
+
+    // The structured ocr_failed log line (wedge-ledger emitter input) must
+    // carry the same ref.
+    const failedLine = loggedLines
+      .filter((line) => line.includes('"evt":"ocr_failed"'))
+      .map((line) => JSON.parse(line) as { escrow_ref: string | null });
+    expect(failedLine).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(failedLine[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
+  });
+});
+
+// ─── Busy pre-check - never post an escrow to a candidate that is busy ──────
+//
+// runOcrOneShot now checks each candidate's live /status immediately before
+// calling submitOcr for it (mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check):
+// "working" means busy and moves on to the next candidate WITHOUT posting an
+// escrow; anything else (free, unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as
+// usable. submitOcr is the escrow-posting path in these tests (same
+// monkeypatch pattern as the suites above), so asserting its call count is
+// exactly how "no escrow was posted" is observed.
+
+const OCR_SUPPLIER_A = {
+  ...OCR_SUPPLIER,
+  utxo_ref: `${"aa".repeat(32)}#0`,
+  supplier_pkh: "sA",
+  endpoint_url: "http://sup-a",
+};
+const OCR_SUPPLIER_B = {
+  ...OCR_SUPPLIER,
+  utxo_ref: `${"bb".repeat(32)}#0`,
+  supplier_pkh: "sB",
+  endpoint_url: "http://sup-b",
+};
+
+/** Indexer /suppliers lookup plus a per-endpoint /status responder, on one
+ * fetchFn - everything else falls back to the suite's usual empty array. */
+function makeFetchWithStatus(
+  suppliers: Array<typeof OCR_SUPPLIER>,
+  statusByEndpoint: Record<string, () => Response>,
+): typeof globalThis.fetch {
+  return (async (url: unknown) => {
+    const u = String(url);
+    if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify(suppliers), { status: 200 });
+    }
+    for (const [endpoint, respond] of Object.entries(statusByEndpoint)) {
+      if (u === `${endpoint}/status`) return respond();
+    }
+    return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
+  }) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+}
+
+/** Same successful submitOcr shape as the happy-path suite above, reused
+ * across the busy pre-check tests. */
+function makeSubmitOcrStub() {
+  return vi.fn(async (_opts: { advertRef: { txHash: string; index: number } }) => ({
+    output_format: "markdown",
+    content: "extracted text",
+    usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
+    receipt: {
+      prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
+      response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
+      model: "chandra-ocr-2",
+      prompt_tokens: 10,
+      completion_tokens: 5,
+      wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
+      supplier_pkh: "s3",
+      escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
+    },
+    receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
+    escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
+  }));
+}
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract - busy pre-check", () => {
+  it("a busy supplier is never sent an escrow; the route returns the busy response", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
+      "http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
+    });
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+
+    // The escrow-posting path was never invoked.
+    expect(submitOcr).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    // toGatewayError maps SupplierError("supplier_busy") to 503 overloaded -
+    // the same busy response a post-escrow 409 would have produced.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("overloaded");
+
+    const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
+    expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("a free supplier proceeds to post and settle exactly as before", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
+      "http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
+    });
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+
+    expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to the second candidate when the first is busy, posting exactly one escrow", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER_A, OCR_SUPPLIER_B], {
+      "http://sup-a": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
+      "http://sup-b": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
+    });
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // Exactly one escrow posted, and it is the second (free) candidate's -
+    // the busy first candidate was skipped, not retried after failing.
+    expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(submitOcr.mock.calls[0][0].advertRef).toEqual({ txHash: "bb".repeat(32), index: 0 });
+  });
+
+  it("a status check that errors does not block the attempt", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
+      "http://sup": () => {
+        // Simulates both a network error and an aborted (timed-out) request -
+        // isSupplierBusy's catch block treats every failure mode the same
+        // way: unknown, not busy, proceed. A real AbortSignal timeout is not
+        // exercised here to keep the suite fast; the outcome is identical.
+        throw new Error("simulated network failure reaching /status");
+      },
+    });
+    const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
+    const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
+    const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
+
+    const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
+    const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
+    (ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
+
+    const res = await request(createApp(deps))
+      .post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
+      .send(validBody());
+
+    // The candidate was still tried despite the failed pre-check.
+    expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

gateway/test/sweeper.test.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ function makeSweepDeps(opts: { chatSettleMode: "full" | "ticket"; escrows: Escro
     chatSettleMode: opts.chatSettleMode,
     walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
     sdkRegistryMax: 100,
+    ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
     corsOrigins: [],
   };
   const chain = { queryUtxo: async () => null } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];

gateway/test/unit.test.ts

@@ -208,8 +208,16 @@ describe("onchain/preflight", () => {
   });
 
   it("preflight requires balance AND collateral", async () => {
-    const cost = { priceLovelace: 2_000_000n, buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n, supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n };
-    // required = 2 + 1 + 1 + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
+    const cost = {
+      capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1",
+      priceLovelace: 2_000_000n,
+      buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
+      supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
+    };
+    // required = escrowLockFloor(2 + 1 + 1) + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
+    // — at this economic total (4 ADA) the Submitted-state min-ada floor for a
+    // short capability id (~2.2 ADA) stays well under the raw total, so the
+    // floor is a no-op here; tx-minada-floor.test.ts covers the lifted case.
     const fakeChain = { queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [pure(20_000_000n)] } as any;
     const ok = await preflight(fakeChain, "a", cost);
     expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);

indexer/Dockerfile

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
 RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
 
 COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
+# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
+COPY patches ./patches
 COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
 COPY indexer/package.json ./indexer/package.json
 COPY indexer-ui/package.json ./indexer-ui/package.json

packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/**
+ * tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts — PostEscrow tx builder for model-scoped OCR
+ * capabilities (`ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`, one page per job).
+ *
+ * Mirrors `postTtsEscrow.ts` but commits an OCR-shaped prompt_hash over the
+ * canonicalised request envelope `{image_b64, mime, output_format}` — the
+ * SAME object the supplier hashes when validating the incoming
+ * POST /v1/ocr/extract body. Any mismatch on either side fails the
+ * supplier-side prompt_mismatch gate.
+ *
+ * The image travels off-chain (buyer → supplier HTTP body); the chain only
+ * ever carries prompt_hash. Never place image bytes or extracted text in a
+ * datum.
+ *
+ * Off-chain invariants (mirror TTS's, with OCR-shaped body validation):
+ *   1. advert UTxO exists at advertRef
+ *   2. advert datum.status === "Active"
+ *   3. payment_lovelace === advert.price_lovelace
+ *   4. buyerKey.pubKeyHash !== advert.supplier_pkh
+ *   5. body.image_b64 is a non-empty plain-base64 string within size bounds
+ *      (no data-URL prefix — the mime rides in its own field)
+ *   6. body.mime ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES
+ *   7. body.output_format ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS
+ */
+
+import * as nodeCrypto from "crypto";
+import type { ChainProvider, OutputReference } from "../../chain/ChainProvider.js";
+import type { EscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/types.js";
+import { decodeAdvertDatum } from "../../cbor/AdvertDatum.js";
+import { encodeEscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
+import { canonicalize } from "../../cbor/canonical.js";
+import type { WalletKey, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "../types.js";
+import { TxConstructionError } from "../types.js";
+import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
+import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
+import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
+import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
+import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
+import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
+
+/** OCR request envelope. The buyer-side hash and the supplier-side hash
+ * MUST agree on this exact set of keys, in this exact JCS-canonical
+ * encoding, or the supplier will reject with `prompt_mismatch`. */
+export interface OcrRequest {
+  /** Plain base64 of the page image bytes. No `data:` prefix. */
+  image_b64: string;
+  /** Image content type. */
+  mime: string;
+  /** Requested extraction output shape. */
+  output_format: string;
+}
+
+export const ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES = new Set([
+  "image/png", "image/jpeg", "image/webp",
+]);
+export const ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS = new Set(["markdown", "html", "json"]);
+
+/**
+ * Upper bound on the base64 payload, in characters (~9 MB of image bytes).
+ * A 300-DPI page scan lands around 0.5–3 MB binary; this cap protects the
+ * supplier's JSON body parser and the off-chain transport, not the chain
+ * (the chain only sees the 32-byte hash).
+ */
+export const MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS = 12_000_000;
+
+/** Plain base64 (standard alphabet, optional padding). Rejects data URLs,
+ * whitespace and base64url — one canonical encoding, one hash. */
+const BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
+
+export interface PostOcrEscrowParams {
+  chain: ChainProvider;
+  buyerKey: WalletKey;
+  advertRef: OutputReference;
+  request: OcrRequest;
+  payment_lovelace: bigint;
+}
+
+function sha256Utf8Hex(s: string): string {
+  return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(s, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+
+/** Hash function shared between buyer (here) and supplier (server.ts).
+ * Exported so unit tests on either side can pin the canonicalisation. */
+export function ocrPromptHash(req: OcrRequest): string {
+  return sha256Utf8Hex(canonicalize({
+    image_b64: req.image_b64,
+    mime: req.mime,
+    output_format: req.output_format,
+  }));
+}
+
+/** Body validation shared conceptually with the supplier route. Throws
+ * TxConstructionError with a machine-readable reason. */
+export function validateOcrRequest(request: OcrRequest): void {
+  if (typeof request?.image_b64 !== "string" || request.image_b64.length === 0) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError("image required",
+      "request.image_b64 must be a non-empty base64 string");
+  }
+  if (request.image_b64.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError("image too large",
+      `request.image_b64 exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} chars`);
+  }
+  if (!BASE64_RE.test(request.image_b64)) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError("image not base64",
+      "request.image_b64 must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
+  }
+  if (!ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(request.mime)) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError("mime invalid",
+      `mime must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
+  }
+  if (!ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(request.output_format)) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError("output_format invalid",
+      `output_format must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export async function buildPostOcrEscrowTx(
+  params: PostOcrEscrowParams,
+): Promise<PostEscrowBuildResult> {
+  const { chain, buyerKey, advertRef, request, payment_lovelace } = params;
+
+  // 5–7. Body validation before any chain access.
+  validateOcrRequest(request);
+
+  // 1. Advert UTxO must exist.
+  const advertUtxo = await chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
+  if (advertUtxo === null) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError(
+      "advert ref not on chain",
+      `no UTxO at ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index}`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (!advertUtxo.datumHex) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError(
+      "advert datum missing",
+      `UTxO ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index} has no inline datum`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(advertUtxo.datumHex);
+
+  // 2. Advert must be Active.
+  if (advertDatum.status !== "Active") {
+    throw new TxConstructionError(
+      "advert is retired",
+      `advert.status is ${advertDatum.status}, expected Active`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 3. Payment must equal advertised price.
+  if (payment_lovelace !== advertDatum.price_lovelace) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError(
+      "payment must equal advertised price",
+      `payment ${payment_lovelace} != advert.price ${advertDatum.price_lovelace}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 4. Buyer cannot be supplier.
+  if (buyerKey.pubKeyHash === advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
+    throw new TxConstructionError(
+      "buyer cannot be supplier",
+      `buyerKey pkh ${buyerKey.pubKeyHash} equals advert.supplier_pkh`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Time source: same convention as chat/TTS.
+  const tipSlot = await chain.tip();
+  const isLive = detectCborBackend(chain) === "live";
+  const postedAt = isLive ? Date.now() : mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot);
+  const deliverBy = postedAt + advertDatum.max_processing_ms + NETWORK_BUFFER_MS;
+
+  const requestSpecCanonical = canonicalize({
+    capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
+    max_output_tokens: advertDatum.max_output_tokens,
+    model: advertDatum.model,
+  });
+  const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
+  const promptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
+
+  const economicTotal =
+    advertDatum.price_lovelace +
+    advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
+    advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
+
+  const escrowDatum: EscrowDatum = {
+    buyer_pkh: buyerKey.pubKeyHash,
+    supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
+    advert_ref: advertRef,
+    capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
+    request_spec_hash: requestSpecHash,
+    prompt_hash: promptHash,
+    payment_lovelace: advertDatum.price_lovelace,
+    buyer_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace,
+    supplier_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace,
+    deliver_by: deliverBy,
+    posted_at: postedAt,
+    submitted_at: null,
+    result_receipt_hash: null,
+    state: "Open",
+  };
+
+  // Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
+  // future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
+  // later bump (2026-08-07 min-ada incident).
+  const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
+
+  // Live path: reuse the capability-agnostic live builder (messages is
+  // void-marked there; the on-chain commitment is the escrowDatum, which
+  // carries our OCR prompt_hash).
+  if (isLive) {
+    const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";
+    const { buildLiveTxForEscrow } = await import(/* @vite-ignore */ liveCborPath);
+    return buildLiveTxForEscrow({
+      chain: chain as LiveOgmiosProvider,
+      buyerKey,
+      advertRef,
+      messages: [],
+      escrowDatum,
+      totalLocked,
+      deliverBy,
+      postedAt,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Mock backend path (synthetic JSON-in-hex tx body).
+  const blueprint = loadBlueprint();
+  const escrowAddress = blueprint.escrowScriptAddress(0);
+
+  const body = {
+    type: "post-escrow",
+    inputs: [],
+    outputs: [
+      {
+        ref: { txHash: "$self", index: 0 },
+        address: escrowAddress,
+        lovelace: totalLocked,
+        assets: {},
+        datumHex: encodeEscrowDatum(escrowDatum),
+        scriptRef: null,
+      },
+    ],
+    requiredSigners: [buyerKey.pubKeyHash],
+    validityRange: { lowerBoundMs: postedAt, upperBoundMs: deliverBy },
+    meta: { script_hash: blueprint.escrowScriptHash, advert_ref: advertRef },
+  };
+
+  const txCborHex = encodeTxBody(body);
+  const expectedTxHash = sha256Hex(txCborHex);
+
+  await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
+
+  return {
+    txCborHex,
+    expectedTxHash,
+    escrowOutputRef: { txHash: expectedTxHash, index: 0 },
+  };
+}

packages/shared/src/tx/index.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ export { TxConstructionError } from "./types.js";
 export { normalizeChatMessage, chatMessagesEquivalent, toolCallsEqual } from "./chatMessage.js";
 export { mockSlotToWallclockMs, mockWallclockMsToSlot, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "./internal/constants.js";
 export { detectCborBackend, type CborBackend } from "./internal/cborBackend.js";
+export { escrowLockFloor, minAdaForEscrowDatum } from "./internal/minAdaFloor.js";
 export type { Signer } from "./signer.js";
 export { MockSigner } from "./signer.js";
 export type { Blueprint } from "./blueprint.js";
@@ -37,6 +38,15 @@ export {
 } from "./escrow/postTtsEscrow.js";
 export type { PostChatEscrowParams } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
 export { buildPostChatEscrowTx, chatSessionPromptHash } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
+export type { PostOcrEscrowParams, OcrRequest } from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
+export {
+  buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
+  ocrPromptHash,
+  validateOcrRequest,
+  ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
+  ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
+  MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
+} from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
 export type { ClaimParams } from "./escrow/claim.js";
 export { buildClaimTx } from "./escrow/claim.js";
 export type { SubmitParams } from "./escrow/submit.js";

packages/shared/src/tx/wallet/planConsolidate.ts

@@ -2,9 +2,22 @@
  * planConsolidate.ts — pure pre-flight planner for the wallet-consolidate flow.
  *
  * Given a wallet's current UTxO set + a target collateral lovelace, decide
- * whether to consolidate (many → 2), split (1 → 2), or skip (already at
- * {≥collateral, working}). The same downstream tx-builder handles
- * consolidate and split — only the "reason" tag differs for logging.
+ * whether the wallet needs reshaping or is already usable for script spends.
+ *
+ * Healthy is a STRUCTURAL predicate, not a UTxO count (F7, 2026-08-08):
+ *   (a) some pure-lovelace UTxO >= collateralLovelace exists (the collateral
+ *       candidate lucid's setCollateral needs), AND
+ *   (b) at least MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE sits OUTSIDE that candidate (fee and
+ *       spend money that is not the candidate), AND
+ *   (c) fragmentation is bounded (utxos.length <= maxUtxos).
+ *
+ * The earlier revision returned `already-healthy` only for EXACTLY 2 UTxOs.
+ * The consolidate tx itself lands 3 (collateral + working + the fee-reserve
+ * remainder as change), so the shape consolidation produced could never
+ * satisfy its own health check — the wallet-health ticker re-consolidated
+ * every tick and burned 0.5 AP3X per pass (116 AP3X in one 24h soak).
+ * The health check also runs BEFORE the low-balance guard now: a wallet that
+ * can already transact must never be told "balance too low to consolidate".
  *
  * No lucid / WASM deps so this is unit-testable from a vanilla vitest.
  */
@@ -26,12 +39,24 @@ export interface PlannedConsolidate {
 
 export const DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
 export const DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE = 2_000_000n;
+/** Reshape only when fragmentation passes this; receipt/change UTxOs
+ *  accumulating between jobs are fine as long as a candidate exists. */
+export const DEFAULT_MAX_UTXOS = 6;
 const MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE = 1_000_000n;
 
+/** Lovelace of a UTxO iff it carries no native assets; null otherwise. */
+function pureLovelace(u: UtxoLike): bigint | null {
+  for (const [unit, amount] of Object.entries(u.assets)) {
+    if (unit !== "lovelace" && (amount ?? 0n) > 0n) return null;
+  }
+  return u.assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
+}
+
 export function planConsolidate(
   utxos: UtxoLike[],
   collateralLovelace: bigint = DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE,
   feeReserve: bigint = DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE,
+  maxUtxos: number = DEFAULT_MAX_UTXOS,
 ): PlannedConsolidate {
   if (utxos.length === 0) {
     throw new Error("wallet has no UTxOs — fund the address first");
@@ -42,6 +67,32 @@ export function planConsolidate(
     0n,
   );
 
+  // Structural health check first — reshaping a usable wallet wastes a fee.
+  if (utxos.length <= maxUtxos) {
+    // Smallest qualifying candidate: leave larger UTxOs as working funds.
+    let candidate: bigint | null = null;
+    for (const u of utxos) {
+      const pure = pureLovelace(u);
+      if (pure !== null && pure >= collateralLovelace) {
+        if (candidate === null || pure < candidate) candidate = pure;
+      }
+    }
+    if (candidate !== null) {
+      const workingOutside = totalLovelaceIn - candidate;
+      if (workingOutside >= MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE) {
+        return {
+          inputCount: utxos.length,
+          totalLovelaceIn,
+          collateralOutput: candidate,
+          workingOutput: workingOutside,
+          alreadyHealthy: true,
+          reason: "already-healthy",
+        };
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Reshape needed — only an actual reshape has a funds threshold.
   const required = collateralLovelace + feeReserve + MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE;
   if (totalLovelaceIn < required) {
     throw new Error(
@@ -51,23 +102,6 @@ export function planConsolidate(
     );
   }
 
-  if (utxos.length === 2) {
-    const lov0 = utxos[0].assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
-    const lov1 = utxos[1].assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
-    const smaller = lov0 < lov1 ? lov0 : lov1;
-    const larger = lov0 < lov1 ? lov1 : lov0;
-    if (smaller >= collateralLovelace) {
-      return {
-        inputCount: 2,
-        totalLovelaceIn,
-        collateralOutput: smaller,
-        workingOutput: larger,
-        alreadyHealthy: true,
-        reason: "already-healthy",
-      };
-    }
-  }
-
   const workingOutput = totalLovelaceIn - collateralLovelace - feeReserve;
 
   return {

supplier/.env.chandra.example

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# supplier/.env.chandra.example — Chandra OCR-2 supplier (ocr capability)
+#
+# Copy to supplier/.env.chandra on the host, chmod 600, fill the blanks.
+# TESTNET FIRST: run the full lifecycle (advert → escrow → claim → submit →
+# accept) on testnet before any mainnet value enters this file. Mainnet ops
+# (funding, advert post, container start) are operator-executed.
+#
+# The upstream is any OpenAI-compatible VISION endpoint serving
+# datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2 (vLLM recommended; `chandra_vllm` docker or
+# `vllm serve datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2 --revision <sha>`).
+# LICENSING: the model weights and the hosted API each carry their own
+# terms. Confirm your own licensing position with the model provider before
+# serving commercially.
+
+# ── Identity / chain ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX=            # gen-keypair output; NEW wallet, working float only
+NETWORK_ID=                       # 0 testnet | 1 mainnet — set explicitly, never default
+OGMIOS_URL=                       # wss://ogmios.vector.testnet... | mainnet equivalent
+ADVERT_REF=                       # <txHash>#<index> from tx:post-advert (below)
+LIVE_CHAIN=                       # 1 only when submitting for real
+VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS=              # per deploy/README (mainnet 1756485600000)
+
+# ── Capability ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+CAPABILITY_KIND=ocr
+
+# ── Upstream selection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# "datalab" = Datalab hosted document API (v0 deployment, decided 2026-08-06)
+# "openai-vision" = self-hosted vLLM (the attestation upgrade path)
+OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab
+
+# ── Datalab upstream (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab) ───────────────────────────────
+# TERMS: the upstream provider's end-user terms govern how you may use and
+# redistribute output, and they vary by account and plan. Confirm your own
+# position with the provider before serving third parties.
+DATALAB_API_KEY=                  # provider account key; never commit
+DATALAB_BASE_URL=https://www.datalab.to
+DATALAB_MODE=accurate             # fast | balanced | accurate
+DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS=120000         # submit + poll budget; keep < advert max_processing_ms
+
+# ── OpenAI-compatible vision upstream (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) ────────
+# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/ocrVision.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
+# OPENAI_BASE_URL=                # e.g. http://chandra-vllm:8000
+# OPENAI_API_KEY=                 # empty for a local vLLM; token for hosted endpoints
+OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS=120000          # page inference is seconds; keep < advert max_processing_ms
+# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=8192          # optional output ceiling (advert cap applies regardless)
+
+# ── OCR extras ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Datalab upstream: the pre-Claim probe defaults to per_job liveness against
+# {DATALAB_BASE_URL}/api/v1/health - no further config needed. Set
+# REVISION_PROBE_MODE=off only if you want claims without the health gate.
+#
+# openai-vision upstream only (attestation upgrade path):
+# OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE=            # exact serving prompt, pinned at integration
+# HF_MODEL_REVISION=              # 40-hex checkpoint SHA; mismatch refuses Claim
+# REVISION_PROBE_URL=             # e.g. http://chandra-vllm:8000/info
+
+# ── Service ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+PORT=8080
+
+# ── Advert posting (run once per network, testnet first) ──────────────────
+# Model string convention: datalab upstream = "datalab/convert-accurate"
+# (honest: hosted engine + mode); self-hosted = "datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2@<sha7>".
+# Endpoint host: your deployed supplier's public HTTPS endpoint (deploy
+# target tracked outside this repo, not in this file).
+#
+# pnpm --filter @marketplace/supplier tx:post-advert -- \
+#   --ogmios-url $OGMIOS_URL \
+#   --priv-key $SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX \
+#   --capability-id ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1 \
+#   --model "datalab/convert-accurate" \
+#   --max-output-tokens 8192 \
+#   --max-processing-ms 150000 \
+#   --price-lovelace 200000 \
+#   --endpoint-url https://<your-supplier-host> \
+#   --detail-uri https://<your-supplier-host>/chandra-detail.json \
+#   --detail-hash <sha256 of the detail JSON>
+#
+# max_processing_ms 150000 covers DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS (120s) + chain legs.
+# Price 200000 (0.2 AP3X) is the fleet convention placeholder — a future
+# pricing decision supersedes it. Bonds default to 1 AP3X each.
+# The detail JSON template lives at supplier/chandra-detail.example.json.
+# Testnet: DNS is not required — a direct http://<host-ip>:<port> endpoint
+# works for the testnet advert (retire it after the drills).

supplier/Dockerfile

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
 
 # Workspace manifests first to maximise layer cache reuse.
 COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
+# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
+COPY patches ./patches
 COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
 COPY supplier/package.json ./supplier/package.json
 # Buyer + indexer manifests are needed because pnpm-lock.yaml indexes the

supplier/chandra-detail.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "capability_id": "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
+  "weights_source": "hf:datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2",
+  "model_revision": "<40-hex commit SHA; self-hosted (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) deployments only — the Datalab-hosted default (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab) is a third-party API with no pinnable checkpoint, so this is unset there>",
+  "license": "modified OpenRAIL-M (weights); Apache-2.0 (code)",
+  "request_shape": {
+    "route": "POST /v1/ocr/extract",
+    "body": { "image_b64": "plain base64, no data: prefix", "mime": "image/png | image/jpeg | image/webp", "output_format": "markdown | html | json" },
+    "one_page_per_job": true
+  },
+  "receipt": {
+    "schema": "v1 (8 fields, Ed25519-signed)",
+    "response_hash": "sha256(canonical({content, output_format}))",
+    "verify": "GET /capability → pub_key_hex; verify signature over canonical(receipt)"
+  },
+  "revision_probe": {
+    "route": "<runtime info route reporting the loaded checkpoint; self-hosted (openai-vision) upstream only>",
+    "policy": "self-hosted (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) upstream: probe before every Claim, mismatch refuses the job. Datalab-hosted default (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab): per-job liveness probe only, no checkpoint pin."
+  },
+  "operator_disclosure": "first-party (HAL8-operated supplier)"
+}

supplier/src/config.ts

@@ -60,8 +60,26 @@ export interface AdvertRef {
  *   "chat"         — one-off `llm.text.generate.v1` (single prompt → single completion)
  *   "tts"          — `audio.synthesize.piper.v1`
  *   "chat-session" — multi-turn `llm.chat.v1` (escrow bookends, off-chain turns,
- *                    streaming). Requires LLM_BACKEND="openai". */
-export type CapabilityKind = "chat" | "tts" | "chat-session";
+ *                    streaming). Requires LLM_BACKEND="openai".
+ *   "ocr"          — model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1` (one page
+ *                    image → one extraction). Upstream is an OpenAI-compatible
+ *                    VISION endpoint (OPENAI_BASE_URL), e.g. vLLM serving
+ *                    datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2. */
+export type CapabilityKind = "chat" | "tts" | "chat-session" | "ocr";
+
+/** Served-checkpoint probe cadence for the ocr capability.
+ *   "per_job" — probe the upstream before every Claim (default when
+ *               REVISION_PROBE_URL is set, and always the default for the
+ *               datalab upstream, whose health route is derived).
+ *   "off"     — no probing. */
+export type RevisionProbeMode = "per_job" | "off";
+
+/** Upstream flavor for the ocr capability.
+ *   "openai-vision" — OpenAI-compatible vision endpoint (vLLM self-hosting;
+ *                     supports the revision-pin attestation probe).
+ *   "datalab"       — Datalab hosted document API (submit + poll; liveness
+ *                     probe only — hosted supply has no checkpoint to pin). */
+export type OcrUpstream = "openai-vision" | "datalab";
 
 /** LLM backend selected for the chat capability. */
 export type LlmBackend = "ollama" | "openai";
@@ -123,6 +141,37 @@ export interface SupplierConfig {
   maxChatSessions: number;
   /** Chain settlement mode for chat sessions. Default "full". */
   chatSettleMode: ChatSettleMode;
+  /**
+   * Upstream flavor for the ocr capability. Env: OCR_UPSTREAM
+   * ("openai-vision" default | "datalab").
+   */
+  ocrUpstream: OcrUpstream;
+  /** Datalab API key (X-API-Key). Required when ocrUpstream="datalab". */
+  datalabApiKey: string;
+  /** Datalab API origin. Env: DATALAB_BASE_URL, default https://www.datalab.to */
+  datalabBaseUrl: string;
+  /** Datalab quality mode: fast | balanced | accurate. Env: DATALAB_MODE. */
+  datalabMode: string;
+  /** Whole-call budget for submit+poll, ms. Env: DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS. */
+  datalabTimeoutMs: number;
+  /**
+   * Overrides the built-in per-format OCR instruction prompt when non-empty
+   * (capabilityKind="ocr" + openai-vision upstream only). Env: OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE.
+   */
+  ocrPromptOverride: string;
+  /**
+   * Expected served-checkpoint SHA (40-hex) for the ocr upstream. When set
+   * together with revisionProbeUrl, a probe mismatch refuses the Claim.
+   * Env: HF_MODEL_REVISION. "" = no pin.
+   */
+  hfModelRevision: string;
+  /**
+   * Serving-runtime info route reporting the loaded checkpoint (TGI-style
+   * /info or vLLM equivalent). Env: REVISION_PROBE_URL. "" = probing off.
+   */
+  revisionProbeUrl: string;
+  /** Probe cadence; see RevisionProbeMode. Env: REVISION_PROBE_MODE. */
+  revisionProbeMode: RevisionProbeMode;
   /**
    * When true, the supplier boots a LiveOgmiosProvider (real submitTx/awaitTx).
    * Default false → ReadOnlyOgmiosProvider (safe; no chain writes).
@@ -174,8 +223,13 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): SupplierCon
   // CAPABILITY_KIND drives whether OLLAMA_URL or PIPER_URL is required.
   // Default to "chat" so existing chat suppliers keep booting unchanged.
   const capKindStr = env.CAPABILITY_KIND ?? "chat";
-  if (capKindStr !== "chat" && capKindStr !== "tts" && capKindStr !== "chat-session") {
-    throw new Error('loadConfig: CAPABILITY_KIND must be "chat", "tts", or "chat-session"');
+  if (
+    capKindStr !== "chat" &&
+    capKindStr !== "tts" &&
+    capKindStr !== "chat-session" &&
+    capKindStr !== "ocr"
+  ) {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: CAPABILITY_KIND must be "chat", "tts", "chat-session", or "ocr"');
   }
   const capabilityKind: CapabilityKind = capKindStr;
 
@@ -204,6 +258,19 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): SupplierCon
     openaiBaseUrl = requireField(env, "OPENAI_BASE_URL");
     ollamaUrl = env.OLLAMA_URL ?? "";
     piperUrl = env.PIPER_URL ?? "";
+  } else if (capabilityKind === "ocr") {
+    // Upstream is either an OpenAI-compatible vision endpoint (self-hosted
+    // vLLM; OPENAI_BASE_URL required) or the Datalab hosted API
+    // (DATALAB_API_KEY required, validated below). Ollama and piper are
+    // unused regardless of LLM_BACKEND.
+    const upstream = env.OCR_UPSTREAM ?? "openai-vision";
+    if (upstream === "openai-vision") {
+      openaiBaseUrl = requireField(env, "OPENAI_BASE_URL");
+    } else {
+      openaiBaseUrl = env.OPENAI_BASE_URL ?? "";
+    }
+    ollamaUrl = env.OLLAMA_URL ?? "";
+    piperUrl = env.PIPER_URL ?? "";
   } else if (capabilityKind === "chat") {
     if (llmBackend === "openai") {
       openaiBaseUrl = requireField(env, "OPENAI_BASE_URL");
@@ -318,6 +385,52 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): SupplierCon
   }
   const chatSettleMode: ChatSettleMode = settleModeStr;
 
+  // OCR-capability extras. All optional; harmless when set on other kinds
+  // (ignored by the chat/tts/chat-session paths).
+  const ocrUpstreamStr = env.OCR_UPSTREAM ?? "openai-vision";
+  if (ocrUpstreamStr !== "openai-vision" && ocrUpstreamStr !== "datalab") {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: OCR_UPSTREAM must be "openai-vision" or "datalab"');
+  }
+  const ocrUpstream: OcrUpstream = ocrUpstreamStr;
+
+  const datalabApiKey = env.DATALAB_API_KEY ?? "";
+  if (capabilityKind === "ocr" && ocrUpstream === "datalab" && datalabApiKey === "") {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: OCR_UPSTREAM="datalab" requires DATALAB_API_KEY');
+  }
+  const datalabBaseUrl = env.DATALAB_BASE_URL ?? "https://www.datalab.to";
+  const datalabMode = env.DATALAB_MODE ?? "accurate";
+  if (datalabMode !== "fast" && datalabMode !== "balanced" && datalabMode !== "accurate") {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: DATALAB_MODE must be "fast", "balanced", or "accurate"');
+  }
+  const datalabTimeoutStr = env.DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  let datalabTimeoutMs = 120_000;
+  if (datalabTimeoutStr !== undefined && datalabTimeoutStr !== "") {
+    if (!POS_INT_RE.test(datalabTimeoutStr)) {
+      throw new Error("loadConfig: DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS must be a positive integer");
+    }
+    datalabTimeoutMs = Number(datalabTimeoutStr);
+  }
+
+  const ocrPromptOverride = env.OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE ?? "";
+  const hfModelRevision = env.HF_MODEL_REVISION ?? "";
+  if (hfModelRevision !== "" && !/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(hfModelRevision)) {
+    throw new Error("loadConfig: HF_MODEL_REVISION must be a 40-hex commit SHA when set");
+  }
+  const revisionProbeUrl = env.REVISION_PROBE_URL ?? "";
+  // Datalab upstream: the health route is derived from DATALAB_BASE_URL, so
+  // the liveness probe defaults ON without a REVISION_PROBE_URL. The
+  // openai-vision upstream keeps the explicit-URL requirement.
+  const probeDefault =
+    ocrUpstream === "datalab" || revisionProbeUrl !== "" ? "per_job" : "off";
+  const probeModeStr = env.REVISION_PROBE_MODE ?? probeDefault;
+  if (probeModeStr !== "per_job" && probeModeStr !== "off") {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: REVISION_PROBE_MODE must be "per_job" or "off"');
+  }
+  if (probeModeStr === "per_job" && ocrUpstream === "openai-vision" && revisionProbeUrl === "" && capabilityKind === "ocr") {
+    throw new Error('loadConfig: REVISION_PROBE_MODE="per_job" requires REVISION_PROBE_URL for the openai-vision upstream');
+  }
+  const revisionProbeMode: RevisionProbeMode = probeModeStr;
+
   const piperTimeoutStr = env.PIPER_TIMEOUT_MS;
   let piperTimeoutMs = 120_000;
   if (piperTimeoutStr !== undefined && piperTimeoutStr !== "") {
@@ -362,6 +475,15 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): SupplierCon
     chatIdleTimeoutMs,
     maxChatSessions,
     chatSettleMode,
+    ocrUpstream,
+    datalabApiKey,
+    datalabBaseUrl,
+    datalabMode,
+    datalabTimeoutMs,
+    ocrPromptOverride,
+    hfModelRevision,
+    revisionProbeUrl,
+    revisionProbeMode,
     liveChain,
     walletHealthIntervalMs,
   };

supplier/src/datalabOcr.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/**
+ * supplier/src/datalabOcr.ts — HTTP client for the Datalab hosted document
+ * API (https://www.datalab.to), used when OCR_UPSTREAM="datalab".
+ *
+ * Contract (verified against documentation.datalab.to, 2026-08-06):
+ *   POST {base}/api/v1/convert            multipart/form-data, X-API-Key
+ *     fields: file (binary), output_format (markdown|html|json), mode
+ *     → { success, error, request_id, request_check_url }
+ *   GET  {base}/api/v1/convert/{id}       X-API-Key
+ *     → { status: "complete" | ..., markdown|html|json, page_count, error }
+ *
+ * callDatalabOcr() submits ONE page image and polls until complete, then
+ * returns the SAME result shape as ocrVision.callOcrVision so runOcrJob's
+ * receipt construction is shared. Token counts are pinned to 0 — the
+ * Datalab API has no token semantics (mirrors the Piper/TTS convention);
+ * wallclock_ms brackets submit→complete locally.
+ *
+ * JSON output: when output_format="json" the result field can be an object;
+ * it is serialized with JSON.stringify to keep `content` a string. The
+ * receipt commits sha256(canonical({content, output_format})) over exactly
+ * the string the buyer receives, so determinism holds regardless.
+ *
+ * Error reasons (mirror the taxonomy of the other adapters):
+ *   "datalab_failure"   — non-2xx, network error, success:false, job error
+ *   "datalab_timeout"   — submit+poll exceeded timeoutMs
+ *   "datalab_malformed" — response JSON missing the expected fields
+ *
+ * probeDatalabHealth() — pre-Claim liveness gate for the route (the
+ * revision-probe slot repurposed for hosted supply): GETs {base}/api/v1/health
+ * with the API key; a non-OK answer refuses the Claim so escrows are not
+ * stranded behind a dead upstream.
+ */
+
+import type { OcrRequest } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
+import type { OcrVisionResult } from "./ocrVision.js";
+
+export interface CallDatalabOcrParams {
+  /** API origin, no trailing slash. Default deployment: https://www.datalab.to */
+  baseUrl: string;
+  apiKey: string;
+  request: OcrRequest;
+  /** Whole-call budget: submit + polling until complete. */
+  timeoutMs: number;
+  /** Datalab quality mode: fast | balanced | accurate. */
+  mode: string;
+  /** Poll cadence; overridable in tests. Default 2000. */
+  pollIntervalMs?: number;
+}
+
+export type DatalabErrorReason = "datalab_failure" | "datalab_timeout" | "datalab_malformed";
+
+export class DatalabError extends Error {
+  public readonly reason: DatalabErrorReason;
+  constructor(reason: DatalabErrorReason, message?: string) {
+    super(message ?? reason);
+    this.name = "DatalabError";
+    this.reason = reason;
+  }
+}
+
+function isAbortError(err: unknown): boolean {
+  if (err instanceof Error) {
+    if (err.name === "AbortError") return true;
+    if ((err as { code?: string }).code === "ABORT_ERR") return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+const EXT_BY_MIME: Record<string, string> = {
+  "image/png": "png",
+  "image/jpeg": "jpg",
+  "image/webp": "webp",
+};
+
+function sleep(ms: number, signal: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const t = setTimeout(resolve, ms);
+    signal.addEventListener("abort", () => {
+      clearTimeout(t);
+      const err = new Error("aborted");
+      err.name = "AbortError";
+      reject(err);
+    }, { once: true });
+  });
+}
+
+export async function callDatalabOcr(params: CallDatalabOcrParams): Promise<OcrVisionResult> {
+  const { baseUrl, apiKey, request, timeoutMs, mode } = params;
+  const pollIntervalMs = params.pollIntervalMs ?? 2_000;
+  const base = baseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
+  const startedAt = Date.now();
+
+  try {
+    // ── 1. Submit ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    const form = new FormData();
+    const bytes = Buffer.from(request.image_b64, "base64");
+    const ext = EXT_BY_MIME[request.mime] ?? "png";
+    form.append("file", new Blob([bytes], { type: request.mime }), `page.${ext}`);
+    form.append("output_format", request.output_format);
+    form.append("mode", mode);
+
+    let submitRes: Response;
+    try {
+      submitRes = await fetch(`${base}/api/v1/convert`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "X-API-Key": apiKey },
+        body: form,
+        signal: controller.signal,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (isAbortError(err)) {
+        throw new DatalabError("datalab_timeout", `Datalab submit exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms`);
+      }
+      throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure",
+        `Datalab submit failed: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`);
+    }
+    if (!submitRes.ok) {
+      let detail = "";
+      try { detail = await submitRes.text(); } catch { /* body unavailable */ }
+      throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure",
+        `Datalab submit returned HTTP ${submitRes.status}${detail ? `: ${detail.slice(0, 200)}` : ""}`);
+    }
+
+    let submitBody: Record<string, unknown>;
+    try {
+      submitBody = await submitRes.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
+    } catch {
+      throw new DatalabError("datalab_malformed", "Datalab submit response was not JSON");
+    }
+    if (submitBody.success !== true) {
+      throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure",
+        `Datalab submit success=false: ${String(submitBody.error ?? "no error detail")}`);
+    }
+    const requestId = submitBody.request_id;
+    if (typeof requestId !== "string" || requestId.length === 0) {
+      throw new DatalabError("datalab_malformed", "Datalab submit response missing request_id");
+    }
+
+    // ── 2. Poll until complete ────────────────────────────────────────
+    const checkUrl = typeof submitBody.request_check_url === "string" && submitBody.request_check_url.length > 0
+      ? submitBody.request_check_url
+      : `${base}/api/v1/convert/${requestId}`;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      let pollRes: Response;
+      try {
+        pollRes = await fetch(checkUrl, {
+          headers: { "X-API-Key": apiKey },
+          signal: controller.signal,
+        });
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (isAbortError(err)) {
+          throw new DatalabError("datalab_timeout", `Datalab poll exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms budget`);
+        }
+        throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure",
+          `Datalab poll failed: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`);
+      }
+      if (!pollRes.ok) {
+        throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure", `Datalab poll returned HTTP ${pollRes.status}`);
+      }
+      let poll: Record<string, unknown>;
+      try {
+        poll = await pollRes.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
+      } catch {
+        throw new DatalabError("datalab_malformed", "Datalab poll response was not JSON");
+      }
+
+      const status = typeof poll.status === "string" ? poll.status.toLowerCase() : "";
+      if (status === "complete") {
+        if (poll.error && typeof poll.error === "string" && poll.error.length > 0) {
+          throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure", `Datalab conversion error: ${poll.error}`);
+        }
+        const raw = poll[request.output_format];
+        let content: string;
+        if (typeof raw === "string") {
+          content = raw;
+        } else if (raw !== null && raw !== undefined && typeof raw === "object") {
+          content = JSON.stringify(raw);
+        } else {
+          throw new DatalabError("datalab_malformed",
+            `Datalab result missing "${request.output_format}" field`);
+        }
+        if (content.length === 0) {
+          throw new DatalabError("datalab_malformed", "Datalab result content is empty");
+        }
+        return {
+          content,
+          prompt_tokens: 0,
+          completion_tokens: 0,
+          wallclock_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
+        };
+      }
+      if (status === "failed" || status === "error") {
+        throw new DatalabError("datalab_failure",
+          `Datalab conversion status=${status}: ${String(poll.error ?? "no detail")}`);
+      }
+
+      try {
+        await sleep(pollIntervalMs, controller.signal);
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (isAbortError(err)) {
+          throw new DatalabError("datalab_timeout", `Datalab poll exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms budget`);
+        }
+        throw err;
+      }
+    }
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Liveness probe (pre-Claim gate for hosted supply) ─────────────────────
+
+export interface ProbeDatalabParams {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  apiKey: string;
+  timeoutMs: number;
+}
+
+export interface ProbeDatalabResult {
+  ok: boolean;
+  detail: string;
+}
+
+export async function probeDatalabHealth(params: ProbeDatalabParams): Promise<ProbeDatalabResult> {
+  const base = params.baseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), params.timeoutMs);
+  try {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/api/v1/health`, {
+      headers: { "X-API-Key": params.apiKey },
+      signal: controller.signal,
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      return { ok: false, detail: `health HTTP ${res.status}` };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, detail: "health ok" };
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = isAbortError(err)
+      ? `health probe exceeded ${params.timeoutMs}ms`
+      : `health probe failed: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`;
+    return { ok: false, detail: msg };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}

supplier/src/jobRunner.ts

@@ -38,11 +38,15 @@ import type { SupplierConfig } from "./config.js";
 import * as ollama from "./ollama.js";
 import * as openai from "./openai.js";
 import * as piper from "./piper.js";
+import * as ocrVision from "./ocrVision.js";
+import * as datalabOcr from "./datalabOcr.js";
+import type { OcrRequest } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
 import type {
   JobStore,
   JobResponsePayload,
   ChatJobResponsePayload,
   TtsJobResponsePayload,
+  OcrJobResponsePayload,
 } from "./jobs.js";
 
 export interface RunChatJobDeps {
@@ -364,3 +368,173 @@ export async function runTtsJob(params: RunTtsJobParams): Promise<void> {
     }
   }
 }
+
+// ─── runOcrJob ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Mirror of runTtsJob for model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`
+// capabilities. Same 7-step shape (setRunning → upstream → receipt →
+// buildSubmit → awaitTx → complete → finally release). Differences from the
+// TTS path:
+//
+//   - Upstream is `ocrVision.callOcrVision` against an OpenAI-compatible
+//     VISION endpoint (vLLM serving e.g. datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2); the
+//     one-page image rides as a data-URL content part.
+//   - response_hash = sha256(canonical({content, output_format})) — commits
+//     the extraction text AND the shape it was requested in.
+//   - prompt_tokens / completion_tokens come from upstream usage (vision
+//     tokens are real tokens, unlike Piper).
+
+export interface RunOcrJobParams {
+  deps: RunChatJobDeps;
+  jobId: string;
+  escrowRef: string;
+  claimedRef: OutputReference;
+  advert: AdvertDatum;
+  escrowDatum: EscrowDatum;
+  /** The OCR request envelope. The PROMPT_HASH committed by the buyer in
+   * the escrow datum is sha256(canonicalize(this same object)), validated
+   * by the route before Claim. */
+  requestBody: OcrRequest;
+}
+
+export async function runOcrJob(params: RunOcrJobParams): Promise<void> {
+  const { deps, jobId, escrowRef, claimedRef, advert, escrowDatum, requestBody } = params;
+
+  deps.jobs.setRunning(jobId);
+
+  try {
+    // ── 2. Call the OCR upstream (openai-vision or datalab) ───────────
+    let inference: ocrVision.OcrVisionResult;
+    try {
+      if (deps.config.ocrUpstream === "datalab") {
+        inference = await datalabOcr.callDatalabOcr({
+          baseUrl: deps.config.datalabBaseUrl,
+          apiKey: deps.config.datalabApiKey,
+          request: requestBody,
+          timeoutMs: deps.config.datalabTimeoutMs,
+          mode: deps.config.datalabMode,
+        });
+      } else {
+        const configuredMax = deps.config.openaiMaxTokens;
+        const maxTokens =
+          configuredMax > 0
+            ? Math.min(configuredMax, advert.max_output_tokens)
+            : advert.max_output_tokens;
+        inference = await ocrVision.callOcrVision({
+          baseUrl: deps.config.openaiBaseUrl,
+          model: advert.model,
+          request: requestBody,
+          timeoutMs: deps.config.openaiTimeoutMs,
+          apiKey: deps.config.openaiApiKey,
+          maxTokens,
+          promptOverride: deps.config.ocrPromptOverride,
+        });
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      const rawReason =
+        (err as ocrVision.OcrVisionError | datalabOcr.DatalabError)?.reason ??
+        (deps.config.ocrUpstream === "datalab" ? "datalab_failure" : "ocr_failure");
+      const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      // *_timeout collapses to the failure reason for jobs.fail, matching
+      // the chat/tts runner failure-code table (502 only).
+      const collapsedReason =
+        rawReason === "ocr_timeout" ? "ocr_failure"
+          : rawReason === "datalab_timeout" ? "datalab_failure"
+            : rawReason;
+      console.warn(
+        `[job_failed] jobId=${jobId} reason=${rawReason} httpStatus=502 msg=${message}`,
+      );
+      deps.jobs.fail(jobId, {
+        httpStatus: 502,
+        reason: collapsedReason,
+        message,
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // ── 3. Build + sign receipt ───────────────────────────────────────
+    const responseHash = sha256Hex(canonicalize({
+      content: inference.content,
+      output_format: requestBody.output_format,
+    }));
+
+    const receipt = buildReceipt({
+      prompt_hash: escrowDatum.prompt_hash,
+      response_hash: responseHash,
+      model: advert.model,
+      prompt_tokens: inference.prompt_tokens,
+      completion_tokens: inference.completion_tokens,
+      wallclock_ms: inference.wallclock_ms,
+      supplier_pkh: deps.supplierKey.pubKeyHash,
+      escrow_ref: escrowRef,
+    });
+    const signed = signReceipt(receipt, deps.supplierKey.privateKeyHex);
+    const resultHash = receiptResultHash(signed);
+
+    // ── 4+5. Submit tx: build + confirm as ONE wallet critical section ──
+    const submitOutcome = await deps.state.walletMutex.run(async () => {
+      let built: { txCborHex: string; expectedTxHash: string };
+      try {
+        built = await buildSubmitTx({
+          chain: deps.chain,
+          supplierKey: deps.supplierKey,
+          escrowRef: claimedRef,
+          receiptHash: resultHash,
+        });
+      } catch (err) {
+        return { kind: "build_failed" as const, err };
+      }
+      try {
+        await deps.chain.awaitTx(built.expectedTxHash, 60_000);
+      } catch (err) {
+        return { kind: "await_failed" as const, err };
+      }
+      return { kind: "ok" as const };
+    });
+    if (submitOutcome.kind === "build_failed") {
+      const message = submitOutcome.err instanceof Error ? submitOutcome.err.message : String(submitOutcome.err);
+      console.warn(
+        `[job_failed] jobId=${jobId} reason=submit_failed httpStatus=502 msg=${message}`,
+      );
+      deps.jobs.fail(jobId, {
+        httpStatus: 502,
+        reason: "submit_failed",
+        message: `Submit tx failed: ${message}`,
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (submitOutcome.kind === "await_failed") {
+      const msg = submitOutcome.err instanceof Error ? submitOutcome.err.message : String(submitOutcome.err);
+      console.warn(
+        `[job_failed] jobId=${jobId} reason=submit_timeout httpStatus=502 msg=${msg}`,
+      );
+      deps.jobs.fail(jobId, {
+        httpStatus: 502,
+        reason: "submit_timeout",
+        message: `Submit awaitTx failed: ${msg}`,
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // ── 6. Mark complete ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+    const payload: OcrJobResponsePayload = {
+      kind: "ocr",
+      output_format: requestBody.output_format,
+      content: inference.content,
+      usage: {
+        prompt_tokens: inference.prompt_tokens,
+        completion_tokens: inference.completion_tokens,
+        total_tokens: inference.prompt_tokens + inference.completion_tokens,
+      },
+      receipt: signed.receipt as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
+      receipt_signature: signed.signature,
+    };
+    deps.jobs.complete(jobId, payload);
+  } finally {
+    try {
+      deps.state.release(escrowRef);
+    } catch {
+      /* never let lock-release escape */
+    }
+  }
+}

supplier/src/jobs.ts

@@ -63,13 +63,35 @@ export interface TtsJobResponsePayload {
   receipt_signature: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * OCR-flavoured terminal payload. Stored when a `runOcrJob` succeeds.
+ * `content` is the extraction in the requested output_format (markdown/
+ * html/json as text). The receipt's response_hash commits
+ * sha256(canonical({content, output_format})).
+ */
+export interface OcrJobResponsePayload {
+  kind: "ocr";
+  output_format: string;     // "markdown" | "html" | "json"
+  content: string;
+  usage: {
+    prompt_tokens: number;
+    completion_tokens: number;
+    total_tokens: number;
+  };
+  receipt: Record<string, unknown>;
+  receipt_signature: string;
+}
+
 /**
  * Discriminated union of every job-payload shape the store can hold.
  * `kind` defaults to "chat" on the chat shape (older code paths don't
  * set it; new `runChatJob` writes can set kind: "chat" explicitly to make
  * the discriminator narrowing reliable).
  */
-export type JobResponsePayload = ChatJobResponsePayload | TtsJobResponsePayload;
+export type JobResponsePayload =
+  | ChatJobResponsePayload
+  | TtsJobResponsePayload
+  | OcrJobResponsePayload;
 
 export interface JobFailure {
   httpStatus: number;

supplier/src/ocrVision.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/**
+ * supplier/src/ocrVision.ts — HTTP client for an OpenAI-compatible VISION
+ * /v1/chat/completions endpoint (vLLM serving an OCR VLM, e.g.
+ * datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2). Used by the `ocr` capability kind.
+ *
+ * callOcrVision({ baseUrl, model, request, timeoutMs, ... })
+ *   POST ${baseUrl}/v1/chat/completions with a single user message whose
+ *   content is OpenAI vision content parts:
+ *     [{type:"image_url", image_url:{url:"data:<mime>;base64,<b64>"}},
+ *      {type:"text", text:<instruction for the output format>}]
+ *   Returns { content, prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, wallclock_ms }
+ *   — the same shape as ollama.ts / openai.ts so receipt construction is
+ *   identical downstream.
+ *
+ * The instruction text per output_format is a serving-side implementation
+ * detail (like temperature); the buyer's on-chain commitment covers the
+ * OcrRequest envelope, not the serving prompt. The exact Chandra prompt
+ * convention gets pinned against a live endpoint during integration —
+ * override per deployment via OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE without a code change.
+ *
+ * Error reasons:
+ *   "ocr_failure"   — non-2xx HTTP, network error, unexpected fetch failure
+ *   "ocr_timeout"   — request exceeded timeoutMs
+ *   "ocr_malformed" — response missing choices[0].message.content (or empty)
+ *
+ * probeRevision() — best-effort served-checkpoint probe (light v0). GETs a
+ * runtime info route and extracts a revision/SHA field if one is present.
+ * The route handler refuses to Claim on a mismatch when a pin is
+ * configured. When the receipt schema is extended to carry it, the probed
+ * value feeds `model_revision`; until then it is a claim gate and
+ * a log line.
+ */
+
+import type { OcrRequest } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
+
+export interface CallOcrVisionParams {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  model: string;
+  request: OcrRequest;
+  timeoutMs: number;
+  /** Optional bearer token (hosted endpoints). "" sends no header. */
+  apiKey?: string;
+  /** Hard output-token ceiling forwarded as max_tokens when > 0. */
+  maxTokens?: number;
+  /** Overrides the built-in per-format instruction when non-empty. */
+  promptOverride?: string;
+}
+
+export interface OcrVisionResult {
+  content: string;
+  prompt_tokens: number;
+  completion_tokens: number;
+  wallclock_ms: number;
+}
+
+export type OcrVisionErrorReason = "ocr_failure" | "ocr_timeout" | "ocr_malformed";
+
+export class OcrVisionError extends Error {
+  public readonly reason: OcrVisionErrorReason;
+  constructor(reason: OcrVisionErrorReason, message?: string) {
+    super(message ?? reason);
+    this.name = "OcrVisionError";
+    this.reason = reason;
+  }
+}
+
+function isAbortError(err: unknown): boolean {
+  if (err instanceof Error) {
+    if (err.name === "AbortError") return true;
+    if ((err as { code?: string }).code === "ABORT_ERR") return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/** Default extraction instructions per output_format. Placeholder wording
+ * pending the Chandra-convention pin (integration item); serving deployments
+ * override via OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE. */
+export function defaultOcrInstruction(outputFormat: string): string {
+  switch (outputFormat) {
+    case "html":
+      return "Convert this document page to clean, semantic HTML. Preserve reading order, tables, form fields and layout structure. Output only the HTML.";
+    case "json":
+      return "Extract this document page as JSON with layout blocks (type, bbox, text) preserving reading order, tables and form fields. Output only the JSON.";
+    case "markdown":
+    default:
+      return "Convert this document page to clean markdown. Preserve reading order, tables and structure. Transcribe handwriting faithfully. Output only the markdown.";
+  }
+}
+
+export async function callOcrVision(params: CallOcrVisionParams): Promise<OcrVisionResult> {
+  const { baseUrl, model, request, timeoutMs, apiKey, maxTokens, promptOverride } = params;
+  const url = `${baseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/v1/chat/completions`;
+
+  const instruction =
+    promptOverride && promptOverride.length > 0
+      ? promptOverride
+      : defaultOcrInstruction(request.output_format);
+
+  const payload: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    model,
+    messages: [
+      {
+        role: "user",
+        content: [
+          {
+            type: "image_url",
+            image_url: { url: `data:${request.mime};base64,${request.image_b64}` },
+          },
+          { type: "text", text: instruction },
+        ],
+      },
+    ],
+    stream: false,
+  };
+  if (typeof maxTokens === "number" && maxTokens > 0) payload.max_tokens = maxTokens;
+  const body = JSON.stringify(payload);
+
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = { "content-type": "application/json" };
+  if (apiKey) {
+    headers.authorization = `Bearer ${apiKey}`;
+  }
+
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
+
+  const startedAt = Date.now();
+  let response: Response;
+  try {
+    response = await fetch(url, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers,
+      body,
+      signal: controller.signal,
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (isAbortError(err)) {
+      throw new OcrVisionError("ocr_timeout", `OCR request exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms`);
+    }
+    throw new OcrVisionError(
+      "ocr_failure",
+      `OCR fetch failed: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`,
+    );
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    let detail = "";
+    try {
+      detail = await response.text();
+    } catch {
+      // ignore — body unavailable
+    }
+    throw new OcrVisionError(
+      "ocr_failure",
+      `OCR upstream returned HTTP ${response.status}${detail ? `: ${detail.slice(0, 200)}` : ""}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  let parsed: unknown;
+  try {
+    parsed = await response.json();
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new OcrVisionError(
+      "ocr_malformed",
+      `OCR response was not valid JSON: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object") {
+    throw new OcrVisionError("ocr_malformed", "OCR response was not an object");
+  }
+
+  const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const choicesRaw = obj.choices;
+  if (!Array.isArray(choicesRaw) || choicesRaw.length === 0) {
+    throw new OcrVisionError("ocr_malformed", "OCR response missing 'choices' array");
+  }
+  const firstChoice = choicesRaw[0];
+  if (!firstChoice || typeof firstChoice !== "object") {
+    throw new OcrVisionError("ocr_malformed", "OCR response choices[0] not an object");
+  }
+  const messageRaw = (firstChoice as Record<string, unknown>).message;
+  if (!messageRaw || typeof messageRaw !== "object") {
+    throw new OcrVisionError("ocr_malformed", "OCR response missing 'choices[0].message'");
+  }
+  const content = (messageRaw as Record<string, unknown>).content;
+  if (typeof content !== "string" || content.length === 0) {
+    throw new OcrVisionError(
+      "ocr_malformed",
+      "OCR response missing/empty choices[0].message.content",
+    );
+  }
+
+  const usageRaw = obj.usage;
+  let promptTokens = 0;
+  let completionTokens = 0;
+  if (usageRaw && typeof usageRaw === "object") {
+    const usage = usageRaw as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (typeof usage.prompt_tokens === "number") promptTokens = usage.prompt_tokens;
+    if (typeof usage.completion_tokens === "number") completionTokens = usage.completion_tokens;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    content,
+    prompt_tokens: promptTokens,
+    completion_tokens: completionTokens,
+    wallclock_ms: Date.now() - startedAt,
+  };
+}
+
+// ─── Revision probe (light v0) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export interface ProbeRevisionParams {
+  probeUrl: string;
+  timeoutMs: number;
+  apiKey?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ProbeRevisionResult {
+  ok: boolean;
+  /** 40-hex checkpoint SHA when the runtime reports one; "" otherwise. */
+  servedSha: string;
+  /** Human-readable detail for logs/alerts. */
+  detail: string;
+}
+
+const SHA40_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;
+
+/** Fields observed across serving runtimes that carry a checkpoint id
+ * (TGI /info: model_sha; vLLM variants: sha / revision / model_revision). */
+const SHA_FIELDS = ["model_sha", "sha", "revision", "model_revision"];
+
+export async function probeRevision(params: ProbeRevisionParams): Promise<ProbeRevisionResult> {
+  const { probeUrl, timeoutMs, apiKey } = params;
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
+  if (apiKey) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${apiKey}`;
+
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
+  try {
+    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { headers, signal: controller.signal });
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      return { ok: false, servedSha: "", detail: `probe HTTP ${response.status}` };
+    }
+    let parsed: unknown;
+    try {
+      parsed = await response.json();
+    } catch {
+      return { ok: false, servedSha: "", detail: "probe response not JSON" };
+    }
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object") {
+      return { ok: false, servedSha: "", detail: "probe response not an object" };
+    }
+    const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
+    for (const field of SHA_FIELDS) {
+      const v = obj[field];
+      if (typeof v === "string" && SHA40_RE.test(v)) {
+        return { ok: true, servedSha: v.toLowerCase(), detail: `probe ${field}=${v}` };
+      }
+    }
+    return { ok: true, servedSha: "", detail: "probe answered without a revision field" };
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = isAbortError(err)
+      ? `probe exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms`
+      : `probe failed: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? String(err)}`;
+    return { ok: false, servedSha: "", detail: msg };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}

supplier/src/server.ts

@@ -44,12 +44,19 @@ import {
   mockSlotToWallclockMs,
   detectCborBackend,
   normalizeChatMessage,
+  ocrPromptHash,
+  ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
+  ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
+  MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
 } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
+import type { OcrRequest } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
 
 import type { SupplierState } from "./state.js";
 import type { SupplierConfig } from "./config.js";
 import { JobStore } from "./jobs.js";
-import { runChatJob, runTtsJob } from "./jobRunner.js";
+import { runChatJob, runTtsJob, runOcrJob } from "./jobRunner.js";
+import { probeRevision } from "./ocrVision.js";
+import { probeDatalabHealth } from "./datalabOcr.js";
 import { ChatSessionStore, type ChatSessionRecord } from "./chatSession.js";
 import { endChatSession, type EndChatSessionDeps } from "./chatSessionRunner.js";
 import { callOpenAiStream } from "./openai.js";
@@ -427,9 +434,9 @@ function makeGetJobHandler(deps: ResolvedDeps) {
       // Defensive narrowing: this poll route only knows how to render the
       // chat shape. A future shared JobStore could mix capabilities; we'd
       // want each kind's poll to be sure it's reading its own.
-      if ("audio_b64" in payload) {
+      if (payload.kind === "ocr" || "audio_b64" in payload) {
         return jsonError(res, 500, "wrong_payload_kind",
-          "tts payload returned to chat poll route");
+          "non-chat payload returned to chat poll route");
       }
       return res.status(200).json({
         choices: payload.choices,
@@ -696,6 +703,303 @@ function makeGetTtsJobHandler(deps: ResolvedDeps) {
   };
 }
 
+// ─── POST /v1/ocr/extract ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Mirror of makeTtsHandler for model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`
+// capabilities. Same lifecycle (validate → resolve advert → resolve escrow →
+// hash check → claim → fire-and-forget runner → 202). Differences:
+//   - body shape: { image_b64, mime, output_format } (one page per job)
+//   - prompt_hash is ocrPromptHash(envelope) — shared with the buyer-side
+//     builder in packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts
+//   - optional served-revision probe BEFORE Claim: a mispinned or
+//     unreachable upstream refuses the job instead of stranding the escrow
+//     in Claimed.
+
+/** Plain base64 (standard alphabet, optional padding). Shared shape with the
+ * buyer-side validator; kept local so route validation stays dependency-light. */
+const OCR_BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
+
+function makeOcrHandler(deps: ResolvedDeps) {
+  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+    // Slot held by THIS request (null until acquired / after hand-off).
+    let acquiredRef: string | null = null;
+    try {
+      // ── 1. Header ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const headerVal = req.header("X-Escrow-Ref");
+      if (!headerVal) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "escrow_ref_required", "X-Escrow-Ref header is required");
+      }
+      const escrowRef = parseEscrowRef(headerVal);
+      if (escrowRef === null) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "escrow_ref_malformed",
+          'X-Escrow-Ref must match "<64-hex>#<int>"');
+      }
+      const escrowRefStr = `${escrowRef.txHash}#${escrowRef.index}`;
+
+      // ── 2. Body ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const body = (req.body ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      const imageB64 = typeof body.image_b64 === "string" ? body.image_b64 : "";
+      if (imageB64.length === 0) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "image_required",
+          "body.image_b64 must be a non-empty base64 string");
+      }
+      if (imageB64.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
+        return jsonError(res, 413, "image_too_large",
+          `body.image_b64 exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} chars`);
+      }
+      if (!OCR_BASE64_RE.test(imageB64)) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "image_not_base64",
+          "body.image_b64 must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
+      }
+      const mime = typeof body.mime === "string" ? body.mime : "";
+      if (!ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(mime)) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "mime_invalid",
+          `mime must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
+      }
+      const outputFormat = typeof body.output_format === "string" ? body.output_format : "";
+      if (!ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(outputFormat)) {
+        return jsonError(res, 400, "output_format_invalid",
+          `output_format must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`);
+      }
+      const ocrRequest: OcrRequest = { image_b64: imageB64, mime, output_format: outputFormat };
+
+      // ── 3. Advert ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const advertResult = await fetchActiveAdvert(deps);
+      if ("error" in advertResult) {
+        const e = advertResult.error;
+        return jsonError(res, e.status, e.reason, e.message);
+      }
+      const advert = advertResult.datum;
+
+      // ── 4. Escrow ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const escrowUtxo = await deps.chain.queryUtxo(escrowRef);
+      if (escrowUtxo === null || !escrowUtxo.datumHex) {
+        return jsonError(res, 404, "escrow_not_found",
+          `escrow UTxO ${escrowRefStr} not found on chain`);
+      }
+      let escrowDatum: EscrowDatum;
+      try {
+        escrowDatum = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo.datumHex);
+      } catch (err) {
+        return jsonError(res, 404, "escrow_decode_failed", (err as Error).message);
+      }
+
+      // ── 5. State / identity / capability ────────────────────────────
+      if (escrowDatum.state !== "Open") {
+        return jsonError(res, 409, "escrow_not_claimable",
+          `escrow state is ${escrowDatum.state}, expected Open`);
+      }
+      if (escrowDatum.supplier_pkh !== deps.supplierKey.pubKeyHash) {
+        return jsonError(res, 403, "wrong_supplier",
+          "escrow supplier_pkh does not match this node");
+      }
+      if (escrowDatum.capability_id !== advert.capability_id) {
+        return jsonError(res, 409, "capability_mismatch",
+          `escrow capability ${escrowDatum.capability_id} != advert ${advert.capability_id}`);
+      }
+
+      // ── 6. Hash checks ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const expectedRequestSpecHash = sha256Hex(canonicalize({
+        capability_id: advert.capability_id,
+        max_output_tokens: advert.max_output_tokens,
+        model: advert.model,
+      }));
+      if (escrowDatum.request_spec_hash !== expectedRequestSpecHash) {
+        return jsonError(res, 409, "request_spec_mismatch",
+          "request_spec_hash in escrow does not match advert spec");
+      }
+      // The OCR prompt commitment is the canonicalisation of the full
+      // request envelope. The buyer SDK computes the same shape (shared
+      // ocrPromptHash) when building the escrow datum.
+      const expectedPromptHash = ocrPromptHash(ocrRequest);
+      if (escrowDatum.prompt_hash !== expectedPromptHash) {
+        return jsonError(res, 409, "prompt_mismatch",
+          "prompt_hash in escrow does not match request body");
+      }
+
+      // ── 7. Deadline ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      const tipSlot = await deps.chain.tip();
+      const isLive = detectCborBackend(deps.chain) === "live";
+      const nowMs = isLive
+        ? Date.now()
+        : Math.max(mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot), escrowDatum.posted_at);
+      if (nowMs >= escrowDatum.deliver_by) {
+        return jsonError(res, 408, "past_deliver_by",
+          `now ${nowMs} >= deliver_by ${escrowDatum.deliver_by}`);
+      }
+
+      // ── 7.5. Upstream probe (before Claim, when configured) ─────────
+      // A failure REFUSES the job here — claiming with a dead or mispinned
+      // upstream would strand the escrow (and, for self-hosted supply,
+      // corrupt the attestation story). 503 tells the buyer to retry/route
+      // elsewhere. Datalab upstream: liveness only (hosted supply has no
+      // checkpoint to pin). openai-vision upstream: liveness + optional
+      // served-revision match against HF_MODEL_REVISION.
+      if (deps.config.revisionProbeMode === "per_job") {
+        if (deps.config.ocrUpstream === "datalab") {
+          const probe = await probeDatalabHealth({
+            baseUrl: deps.config.datalabBaseUrl,
+            apiKey: deps.config.datalabApiKey,
+            timeoutMs: 10_000,
+          });
+          if (!probe.ok) {
+            console.warn(`[upstream_probe_failed] ${probe.detail}`);
+            return jsonError(res, 503, "upstream_probe_failed",
+              `upstream health probe failed: ${probe.detail}`);
+          }
+        } else if (deps.config.revisionProbeUrl !== "") {
+          const probe = await probeRevision({
+            probeUrl: deps.config.revisionProbeUrl,
+            timeoutMs: 10_000,
+            apiKey: deps.config.openaiApiKey,
+          });
+          if (!probe.ok) {
+            console.warn(`[revision_probe_failed] ${probe.detail}`);
+            return jsonError(res, 503, "revision_probe_failed",
+              `served-revision probe failed: ${probe.detail}`);
+          }
+          if (
+            deps.config.hfModelRevision !== "" &&
+            probe.servedSha !== "" &&
+            probe.servedSha !== deps.config.hfModelRevision.toLowerCase()
+          ) {
+            console.warn(
+              `[revision_mismatch] expected=${deps.config.hfModelRevision} served=${probe.servedSha}`,
+            );
+            return jsonError(res, 503, "revision_mismatch",
+              "served checkpoint does not match the pinned revision");
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      // ── 8. Acquire session slot ─────────────────────────────────────
+      if (!deps.state.tryAcquire(escrowRefStr)) {
+        return jsonError(res, 409, "supplier_busy", "supplier is already working another job");
+      }
+      acquiredRef = escrowRefStr;
+
+      // ── 9. Claim tx: build + confirm as ONE wallet critical section ──
+      const claimOutcome = await deps.state.walletMutex.run(async () => {
+        let built;
+        try {
+          built = await buildClaimTx({
+            chain: deps.chain,
+            supplierKey: deps.supplierKey,
+            escrowRef,
+          });
+        } catch (err) {
+          return { kind: "build_failed" as const, err };
+        }
+        try {
+          await deps.chain.awaitTx(built.expectedTxHash, 60_000);
+        } catch (err) {
+          return { kind: "await_failed" as const, err };
+        }
+        return { kind: "ok" as const, built };
+      });
+      if (claimOutcome.kind === "build_failed") {
+        deps.state.release(escrowRefStr);
+        acquiredRef = null;
+        triggerOnFailureConsolidate({
+          chain: deps.chain,
+          state: deps.state,
+          supplierKey: deps.supplierKey,
+        });
+        return jsonError(res, 503, "chain_submit_failed",
+          `Claim tx submit failed: ${(claimOutcome.err as Error).message}`);
+      }
+      if (claimOutcome.kind === "await_failed") {
+        deps.state.release(escrowRefStr);
+        acquiredRef = null;
+        return jsonError(res, 504, "claim_timeout",
+          `Claim awaitTx failed: ${(claimOutcome.err as Error).message}`);
+      }
+
+      // ── 10. Spawn runner + 202 ──────────────────────────────────────
+      const claimedRef: OutputReference = {
+        txHash: claimOutcome.built.expectedTxHash,
+        index: 0,
+      };
+      const jobId = deps.jobs.create(escrowRefStr);
+
+      // Slot release now happens inside runOcrJob's finally.
+      acquiredRef = null;
+      void runOcrJob({
+        deps: {
+          chain: deps.chain,
+          state: deps.state,
+          config: deps.config,
+          supplierKey: deps.supplierKey,
+          jobs: deps.jobs,
+        },
+        jobId,
+        escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
+        claimedRef,
+        advert,
+        escrowDatum,
+        requestBody: ocrRequest,
+      });
+
+      return res.status(202).json({
+        job_id: jobId,
+        status: "accepted",
+        escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (acquiredRef) {
+        try { deps.state.release(acquiredRef); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      }
+      next(err);
+      return;
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// ─── GET /v1/ocr/extract/:jobId ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+function makeGetOcrJobHandler(deps: ResolvedDeps) {
+  return (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+    const rawJobId = req.params.jobId;
+    const jobId = typeof rawJobId === "string" ? rawJobId : "";
+    if (!UUID_V4_RE.test(jobId)) {
+      return jsonError(res, 400, "invalid_job_id", "jobId must be a UUIDv4 string");
+    }
+    const record = deps.jobs.get(jobId);
+    if (!record) {
+      return jsonError(res, 404, "job_not_found", `no job found with id ${jobId}`);
+    }
+    res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+    if (record.status === "accepted" || record.status === "running") {
+      return res.status(202).json({
+        status: record.status,
+        escrow_ref: record.escrowRef,
+      });
+    }
+    if (record.status === "done") {
+      const payload = record.responsePayload!;
+      if (!("kind" in payload) || payload.kind !== "ocr") {
+        return jsonError(res, 500, "wrong_payload_kind",
+          "non-ocr payload returned to ocr poll route");
+      }
+      return res.status(200).json({
+        output_format: payload.output_format,
+        content: payload.content,
+        usage: payload.usage,
+        receipt: payload.receipt,
+        receipt_signature: payload.receipt_signature,
+        escrow_ref: record.escrowRef,
+      });
+    }
+    // failed
+    const f = record.failure!;
+    return res.status(f.httpStatus).json({
+      status: "failed",
+      reason: f.reason,
+      message: f.message,
+      escrow_ref: record.escrowRef,
+    });
+  };
+}
+
 // ─── /v1/chat/{start,message,end} — multi-turn chat session (llm.chat.v1) ───
 //
 // Escrow bookends with off-chain turns:
@@ -1077,7 +1381,11 @@ export function createApp(deps: SupplierDeps): Application {
 
   const app = express();
   app.disable("x-powered-by");
-  app.use(express.json({ limit: "1mb" }));
+  // /v1/ocr carries a base64 page image and mounts its own larger parser
+  // below; every other route keeps the 1mb ceiling.
+  const jsonBody = express.json({ limit: "1mb" });
+  app.use((req, res, next) =>
+    req.path.startsWith("/v1/ocr/") ? next() : jsonBody(req, res, next));
 
   // /healthz is mounted FIRST and uses no deps — it must succeed regardless
   // of chain/state/config (independent of /status free/working/offline).
@@ -1095,6 +1403,11 @@ export function createApp(deps: SupplierDeps): Application {
   if (resolved.config.capabilityKind === "tts") {
     app.post("/v1/audio/synthesize", makeTtsHandler(resolved));
     app.get("/v1/audio/synthesize/:jobId", makeGetTtsJobHandler(resolved));
+  } else if (resolved.config.capabilityKind === "ocr") {
+    // MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS (~12M chars ≈ 9 MB binary) + JSON envelope
+    // fits comfortably under 16mb.
+    app.post("/v1/ocr/extract", express.json({ limit: "16mb" }), makeOcrHandler(resolved));
+    app.get("/v1/ocr/extract/:jobId", makeGetOcrJobHandler(resolved));
   } else if (resolved.config.capabilityKind === "chat-session") {
     const chat = makeChatSessionHandlers(resolved);
     app.post("/v1/chat/start", chat.start);

supplier/src/walletHealth.ts

@@ -7,15 +7,26 @@
  * and the lane stalls until an operator runs `tx:consolidate-wallet`.
  *
  * Two layers of self-healing:
- *   startWalletHealthTicker — periodic background tick (every N ms). When
- *     the supplier is idle, runs runConsolidateWallet. planConsolidate
- *     returns `already-healthy` cheaply for clean 2-UTxO wallets, so this
- *     is a no-op in steady state — no tx, no fee.
+ *   startWalletHealthTicker — periodic background tick (every N ms). Runs
+ *     runConsolidateWallet; planConsolidate's structural health predicate
+ *     short-circuits without a tx when a collateral candidate exists and
+ *     fragmentation is bounded. A tick on a healthy wallet costs one UTxO
+ *     query and nothing else.
  *   triggerOnFailureConsolidate — fire-and-forget consolidate from the
  *     Claim-failure path. Debounced so back-to-back failures don't queue
  *     multiple consolidates. Returns 503 to the buyer for THIS request; the
  *     next buyer retry (~30-60s later) finds the wallet healthy.
  *
+ * F7 guards (2026-08-08 incident: a non-idempotent health check made every
+ * tick consolidate, burning 0.5 AP3X per 45s until the wallet hit the
+ * floor — 116 AP3X in one soak). Two independent circuit breakers protect
+ * against ANY future non-convergence:
+ *   - consecutive guard: 3 consolidations in a row without ever reaching
+ *     `already-healthy` halts wallet-health for this process.
+ *   - budget guard: more than 6 consolidations inside 24h halts it too.
+ * A halt logs loudly once; consolidate manually and restart the supplier
+ * to re-arm.
+ *
  * Wallet-lock discipline: consolidation spends EVERY wallet UTxO, so it runs
  * inside state.walletMutex — the same mutex that serializes Claims/Submits —
  * queueing behind any in-flight chain op instead of skipping. Session slots
@@ -63,6 +74,29 @@ export interface WalletHealthTicker {
 const inFlight = new WeakSet<SupplierState>();
 const lastOnFailureAt = new WeakMap<SupplierState, number>();
 
+// ── F7 circuit breakers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+const MAX_CONSECUTIVE_CONSOLIDATIONS = 3;
+const MAX_CONSOLIDATIONS_PER_WINDOW = 6;
+const BUDGET_WINDOW_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+interface GuardCounters {
+  consecutive: number;
+  windowStart: number;
+  windowCount: number;
+  halted: boolean;
+}
+
+const guardCounters = new WeakMap<SupplierState, GuardCounters>();
+
+function guardsFor(state: SupplierState): GuardCounters {
+  let g = guardCounters.get(state);
+  if (!g) {
+    g = { consecutive: 0, windowStart: Date.now(), windowCount: 0, halted: false };
+    guardCounters.set(state, g);
+  }
+  return g;
+}
+
 function defaultLog(line: string): void {
   // eslint-disable-next-line no-console
   console.log(`[wallet-health] ${line}`);
@@ -73,6 +107,8 @@ async function consolidateOnce(
   opts: { collateralLovelace: bigint; awaitTimeoutMs: number; log: (line: string) => void },
 ): Promise<void> {
   const { state } = deps;
+  const guards = guardsFor(state);
+  if (guards.halted) return; // the halt already logged loudly, once
   if (inFlight.has(state)) {
     opts.log("skip: another consolidate already in flight");
     return;
@@ -92,11 +128,36 @@ async function consolidateOnce(
       }),
     );
     if (result.reason === "already-healthy") {
+      guards.consecutive = 0;
       opts.log("already-healthy");
     } else {
+      const now = Date.now();
+      if (now - guards.windowStart > BUDGET_WINDOW_MS) {
+        guards.windowStart = now;
+        guards.windowCount = 0;
+      }
+      guards.consecutive += 1;
+      guards.windowCount += 1;
       opts.log(`consolidated: ${result.reason} txHash=${result.txHash}`);
+      if (guards.consecutive >= MAX_CONSECUTIVE_CONSOLIDATIONS) {
+        guards.halted = true;
+        opts.log(
+          `HALT: ${guards.consecutive} consecutive consolidations without reaching a healthy shape — ` +
+            `wallet-health stopped to protect funds (F7 guard). Investigate planConsolidate vs the ` +
+            `builder's output shape, consolidate manually, restart the supplier to re-arm.`,
+        );
+      } else if (guards.windowCount >= MAX_CONSOLIDATIONS_PER_WINDOW) {
+        guards.halted = true;
+        opts.log(
+          `HALT: consolidation budget exhausted (${guards.windowCount} in 24h) — wallet-health ` +
+            `stopped to protect funds (F7 guard). Restart the supplier to re-arm.`,
+        );
+      }
     }
   } catch (err) {
+    // Neither healthy nor consolidated (e.g. balance too low): no fee was
+    // spent, so the guards don't move — but nothing converged either, so
+    // the consecutive counter is NOT reset.
     opts.log(`consolidate failed: ${(err as Error).message}`);
   } finally {
     inFlight.delete(state);
@@ -143,8 +204,9 @@ export function triggerOnFailureConsolidate(
   });
 }
 
-/** Test-only: reset the in-flight + debounce maps between tests. */
+/** Test-only: reset the in-flight + debounce + guard maps between tests. */
 export function _resetWalletHealthForTests(state: SupplierState): void {
   inFlight.delete(state);
   lastOnFailureAt.delete(state);
+  guardCounters.delete(state);
 }

tests/fixtures/supplier-side/sample-config.ts

@@ -47,6 +47,40 @@ export function buildSampleTtsConfig(): SupplierConfig {
   };
 }
 
+/** OCR variant: OpenAI-compatible vision upstream, capabilityKind="ocr". */
+export function buildSampleOcrConfig(): SupplierConfig {
+  return {
+    ...buildSampleConfig(),
+    ollamaUrl: "",
+    openaiBaseUrl: "http://vllm.fake:8000",
+    openaiApiKey: "",
+    openaiTimeoutMs: 180_000,
+    openaiMaxTokens: 0,
+    openaiReasoningDisabled: false,
+    capabilityKind: "ocr",
+    ocrUpstream: "openai-vision",
+    datalabApiKey: "",
+    datalabBaseUrl: "https://www.datalab.to",
+    datalabMode: "accurate",
+    datalabTimeoutMs: 120_000,
+    ocrPromptOverride: "",
+    hfModelRevision: "",
+    revisionProbeUrl: "",
+    revisionProbeMode: "off",
+  };
+}
+
+/** Datalab-hosted OCR variant (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab). */
+export function buildSampleDatalabOcrConfig(): SupplierConfig {
+  return {
+    ...buildSampleOcrConfig(),
+    openaiBaseUrl: "",
+    ocrUpstream: "datalab",
+    datalabApiKey: "dl-test-key",
+    revisionProbeMode: "per_job",
+  };
+}
+
 /** Env map matching the sample config above, for loadConfig() unit tests. */
 export function buildSampleEnv(): Record<string, string> {
   return {

tests/unit/supplier-datalab-ocr.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/**
+ * supplier-datalab-ocr.test.ts — coverage for the Datalab hosted-API OCR
+ * upstream (OCR_UPSTREAM="datalab").
+ *
+ * Pins the wire contract verified against documentation.datalab.to
+ * (2026-08-06): multipart POST /api/v1/convert with X-API-Key, then poll
+ * GET /api/v1/convert/{id} until status "complete"; result field named by
+ * output_format. Plus the error taxonomy and the health probe.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
+
+import {
+  callDatalabOcr,
+  probeDatalabHealth,
+  DatalabError,
+} from "../../supplier/src/datalabOcr.js";
+import { loadConfig } from "../../supplier/src/config.js";
+import { buildSampleEnv } from "../fixtures/supplier-side/sample-config.js";
+
+const IMG = Buffer.from("page bytes").toString("base64");
+
+function validParams(overrides?: Partial<Parameters<typeof callDatalabOcr>[0]>) {
+  return {
+    baseUrl: "https://dl.fake",
+    apiKey: "dl-key",
+    request: { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" },
+    timeoutMs: 5_000,
+    mode: "accurate",
+    pollIntervalMs: 5,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+});
+
+describe("callDatalabOcr — happy path + wire shape", () => {
+  it("submits multipart with X-API-Key, polls, returns the markdown content", async () => {
+    const calls: Array<{ url: string; init: RequestInit }> = [];
+    let polls = 0;
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      calls.push({ url, init: init ?? {} });
+      if (url.endsWith("/api/v1/convert")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+          success: true, error: null, request_id: "req-1",
+          request_check_url: "https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/req-1",
+        }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      polls += 1;
+      if (polls < 2) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "processing" }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        status: "complete", markdown: "# Registry page", page_count: 1, error: null,
+      }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+
+    const result = await callDatalabOcr(validParams());
+    expect(result.content).toBe("# Registry page");
+    expect(result.prompt_tokens).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.completion_tokens).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.wallclock_ms).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+
+    const submit = calls[0];
+    expect(submit.url).toBe("https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert");
+    expect((submit.init.headers as Record<string, string>)["X-API-Key"]).toBe("dl-key");
+    const form = submit.init.body as FormData;
+    expect(form).toBeInstanceOf(FormData);
+    expect(form.get("output_format")).toBe("markdown");
+    expect(form.get("mode")).toBe("accurate");
+    const file = form.get("file") as Blob;
+    expect(file).toBeInstanceOf(Blob);
+    expect(file.type).toBe("image/png");
+
+    // Poll used the check URL with the key.
+    const poll = calls[1];
+    expect(poll.url).toBe("https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/req-1");
+    expect((poll.init.headers as Record<string, string>)["X-API-Key"]).toBe("dl-key");
+  });
+
+  it("stringifies an object result for output_format=json", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string) => {
+      if (url.endsWith("/api/v1/convert")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: true, request_id: "r2", request_check_url: "https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/r2" }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        status: "complete", json: { blocks: [{ type: "Table" }] },
+      }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    const result = await callDatalabOcr(validParams({
+      request: { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "json" },
+    }));
+    expect(result.content).toBe(JSON.stringify({ blocks: [{ type: "Table" }] }));
+  });
+});
+
+describe("callDatalabOcr — error taxonomy", () => {
+  it("datalab_failure on submit HTTP error", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("no", { status: 500 }));
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      name: "DatalabError", reason: "datalab_failure",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("datalab_failure on success:false", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () =>
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: false, error: "no credits" }), { status: 200 }));
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams())).rejects.toThrow(/no credits/);
+  });
+
+  it("datalab_malformed when request_id missing", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () =>
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: true }), { status: 200 }));
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      reason: "datalab_malformed",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("datalab_failure when the job reports failed status", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string) => {
+      if (url.endsWith("/api/v1/convert")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: true, request_id: "r3", request_check_url: "https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/r3" }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "failed", error: "unreadable file" }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams())).rejects.toThrow(/unreadable file/);
+  });
+
+  it("datalab_malformed when the completed result lacks the requested format field", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string) => {
+      if (url.endsWith("/api/v1/convert")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: true, request_id: "r4", request_check_url: "https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/r4" }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "complete", html: "<p>x</p>" }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      reason: "datalab_malformed",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("datalab_timeout when polling never completes within the budget", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string) => {
+      if (url.endsWith("/api/v1/convert")) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ success: true, request_id: "r5", request_check_url: "https://dl.fake/api/v1/convert/r5" }), { status: 200 });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "processing" }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    await expect(callDatalabOcr(validParams({ timeoutMs: 60, pollIntervalMs: 10 })))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ reason: "datalab_timeout" });
+  });
+
+  it("exports the error class for instanceof checks", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("x", { status: 502 }));
+    try {
+      await callDatalabOcr(validParams());
+      expect.unreachable("should have thrown");
+    } catch (err) {
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(DatalabError);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("probeDatalabHealth", () => {
+  it("ok on 200 from /api/v1/health with the key header", async () => {
+    let captured: { url: string; init: RequestInit } | null = null;
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      captured = { url, init: init ?? {} };
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "ok" }), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    const result = await probeDatalabHealth({ baseUrl: "https://dl.fake", apiKey: "dl-key", timeoutMs: 1000 });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(captured!.url).toBe("https://dl.fake/api/v1/health");
+    expect((captured!.init.headers as Record<string, string>)["X-API-Key"]).toBe("dl-key");
+  });
+
+  it("not ok on HTTP error or network failure", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("x", { status: 503 }));
+    expect((await probeDatalabHealth({ baseUrl: "https://dl.fake", apiKey: "k", timeoutMs: 1000 })).ok).toBe(false);
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => { throw new Error("ECONNREFUSED"); });
+    expect((await probeDatalabHealth({ baseUrl: "https://dl.fake", apiKey: "k", timeoutMs: 1000 })).ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("loadConfig — datalab upstream validation", () => {
+  function ocrEnv(extra: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {
+    const env = buildSampleEnv();
+    delete (env as Record<string, string | undefined>).OLLAMA_URL;
+    return { ...env, CAPABILITY_KIND: "ocr", ...extra };
+  }
+
+  it("requires DATALAB_API_KEY when OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab", () => {
+    expect(() => loadConfig(ocrEnv({ OCR_UPSTREAM: "datalab" })))
+      .toThrow(/DATALAB_API_KEY/);
+  });
+
+  it("datalab upstream boots without OPENAI_BASE_URL and probes per_job by default", () => {
+    const config = loadConfig(ocrEnv({ OCR_UPSTREAM: "datalab", DATALAB_API_KEY: "dl-k" }));
+    expect(config.ocrUpstream).toBe("datalab");
+    expect(config.openaiBaseUrl).toBe("");
+    expect(config.revisionProbeMode).toBe("per_job");
+    expect(config.datalabBaseUrl).toBe("https://www.datalab.to");
+    expect(config.datalabMode).toBe("accurate");
+  });
+
+  it("openai-vision upstream still requires OPENAI_BASE_URL", () => {
+    expect(() => loadConfig(ocrEnv({})))
+      .toThrow(/OPENAI_BASE_URL/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an invalid DATALAB_MODE", () => {
+    expect(() => loadConfig(ocrEnv({
+      OCR_UPSTREAM: "datalab", DATALAB_API_KEY: "dl-k", DATALAB_MODE: "turbo",
+    }))).toThrow(/DATALAB_MODE/);
+  });
+});

tests/unit/supplier-ocr-vision.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/**
+ * supplier-ocr-vision.test.ts — coverage for the OpenAI-compatible VISION
+ * upstream client used by the `ocr` capability kind.
+ *
+ * Mirrors supplier-openai.test.ts: stub global fetch, pin the outbound wire
+ * shape (vision content parts, data-URL image), and the error taxonomy
+ * (ocr_failure / ocr_timeout / ocr_malformed).
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
+
+import {
+  callOcrVision,
+  probeRevision,
+  defaultOcrInstruction,
+  OcrVisionError,
+} from "../../supplier/src/ocrVision.js";
+
+const IMG = Buffer.from("some page bytes").toString("base64");
+
+function validParams() {
+  return {
+    baseUrl: "http://vllm.fake:8000",
+    model: "datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2",
+    request: { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" },
+    timeoutMs: 5_000,
+  };
+}
+
+function okBody(content = "# Page\ntext") {
+  return {
+    choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content }, finish_reason: "stop" }],
+    usage: { prompt_tokens: 900, completion_tokens: 120, total_tokens: 1020 },
+  };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+});
+
+describe("callOcrVision — happy path + wire shape", () => {
+  it("POSTs vision content parts with a data-URL image and returns the normalised result", async () => {
+    let captured: { url: string; init: RequestInit } | null = null;
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (url: string, init: RequestInit) => {
+      captured = { url, init };
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify(okBody()), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    });
+
+    const result = await callOcrVision(validParams());
+
+    expect(result.content).toBe("# Page\ntext");
+    expect(result.prompt_tokens).toBe(900);
+    expect(result.completion_tokens).toBe(120);
+    expect(result.wallclock_ms).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+
+    expect(captured).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(captured!.url).toBe("http://vllm.fake:8000/v1/chat/completions");
+    const sent = JSON.parse(String(captured!.init.body));
+    expect(sent.model).toBe("datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2");
+    expect(sent.stream).toBe(false);
+    expect(Array.isArray(sent.messages)).toBe(true);
+    const content = sent.messages[0].content;
+    expect(content[0].type).toBe("image_url");
+    expect(content[0].image_url.url).toBe(`data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`);
+    expect(content[1].type).toBe("text");
+    expect(content[1].text).toBe(defaultOcrInstruction("markdown"));
+  });
+
+  it("uses promptOverride verbatim when provided", async () => {
+    let sentText = "";
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (_url: string, init: RequestInit) => {
+      sentText = JSON.parse(String(init.body)).messages[0].content[1].text;
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify(okBody()), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    await callOcrVision({ ...validParams(), promptOverride: "OCR EXACTLY AS CHANDRA WANTS" });
+    expect(sentText).toBe("OCR EXACTLY AS CHANDRA WANTS");
+  });
+
+  it("forwards max_tokens when positive and the bearer key when set", async () => {
+    let sent: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    let auth = "";
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (_url: string, init: RequestInit) => {
+      sent = JSON.parse(String(init.body));
+      auth = (init.headers as Record<string, string>).authorization ?? "";
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify(okBody()), { status: 200 });
+    });
+    await callOcrVision({ ...validParams(), maxTokens: 4096, apiKey: "sk-test" });
+    expect(sent.max_tokens).toBe(4096);
+    expect(auth).toBe("Bearer sk-test");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("callOcrVision — error taxonomy", () => {
+  it("ocr_failure on non-2xx", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("boom", { status: 500 }));
+    await expect(callOcrVision(validParams())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      name: "OcrVisionError",
+      reason: "ocr_failure",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("ocr_malformed on missing content", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () =>
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ message: { role: "assistant", content: "" } }] }), { status: 200 }));
+    await expect(callOcrVision(validParams())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      reason: "ocr_malformed",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("ocr_timeout when the upstream exceeds timeoutMs", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", (_url: string, init: RequestInit) =>
+      new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+        const signal = init.signal as AbortSignal;
+        signal.addEventListener("abort", () => {
+          const err = new Error("aborted");
+          err.name = "AbortError";
+          reject(err);
+        });
+      }));
+    await expect(callOcrVision({ ...validParams(), timeoutMs: 30 })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      reason: "ocr_timeout",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("exports the error class for instanceof checks", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("nope", { status: 502 }));
+    try {
+      await callOcrVision(validParams());
+      expect.unreachable("should have thrown");
+    } catch (err) {
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(OcrVisionError);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("probeRevision — served-checkpoint probe", () => {
+  it("extracts a 40-hex sha from known runtime fields", async () => {
+    const sha = "a".repeat(40);
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () =>
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ model_sha: sha }), { status: 200 }));
+    const result = await probeRevision({ probeUrl: "http://vllm.fake:8000/info", timeoutMs: 1000 });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.servedSha).toBe(sha);
+  });
+
+  it("ok with empty sha when the runtime reports no revision field", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () =>
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ served_model: "chandra" }), { status: 200 }));
+    const result = await probeRevision({ probeUrl: "http://x/info", timeoutMs: 1000 });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.servedSha).toBe("");
+  });
+
+  it("not ok on HTTP error / network failure", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => new Response("x", { status: 503 }));
+    expect((await probeRevision({ probeUrl: "http://x/info", timeoutMs: 1000 })).ok).toBe(false);
+
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => { throw new Error("ECONNREFUSED"); });
+    expect((await probeRevision({ probeUrl: "http://x/info", timeoutMs: 1000 })).ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

tests/unit/supplier-routes-ocr.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/**
+ * supplier-routes-ocr.test.ts — coverage for the model-scoped OCR supplier
+ * route (`ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`).
+ *
+ * Focus (mirrors supplier-routes-tts.test.ts): the NEW validation logic in
+ * `makeOcrHandler` plus capability-routed mounting and the enlarged body
+ * limit. The shared lifecycle pieces (lock, claim tx, runner spawn) reuse
+ * the chat-handler implementation and are covered by the chat route tests.
+ *
+ * End-to-end happy-path (escrow seed → claim → run → submit) is exercised
+ * by the post-deploy smoke against the real testnet, not here.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
+import request from "supertest";
+import type { Application } from "express";
+
+import { MockChainProvider } from "../../packages/shared/src/chain/MockChainProvider.js";
+import { SupplierState } from "../../supplier/src/state.js";
+import { JobStore } from "../../supplier/src/jobs.js";
+import { createApp } from "../../supplier/src/server.js";
+import type { SupplierConfig } from "../../supplier/src/config.js";
+import {
+  buildSampleConfig,
+  buildSampleOcrConfig,
+} from "../fixtures/supplier-side/sample-config.js";
+import { buildSupplierWalletKey } from "../fixtures/supplier-side/wallet-keys.js";
+
+const ESCROW_REF_HEADER = `${"f".repeat(64)}#0`;
+const IMG = Buffer.from("page image bytes").toString("base64");
+
+function makeApp(config?: SupplierConfig): Application {
+  return createApp({
+    chain: new MockChainProvider(),
+    state: new SupplierState(),
+    config: config ?? buildSampleOcrConfig(),
+    supplierKey: buildSupplierWalletKey(),
+    jobs: new JobStore(),
+  });
+}
+
+function validBody() {
+  return { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+});
+
+describe("Capability-routed mounting", () => {
+  it("ocr supplier exposes /v1/ocr/extract and NOT the chat/tts routes", async () => {
+    const app = makeApp();
+    const ocr = await request(app).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER).send(validBody());
+    expect(ocr.status).not.toBe(404);
+
+    const chat = await request(app).post("/v1/chat/completions")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+      .send({ messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
+    expect(chat.status).toBe(404);
+
+    const tts = await request(app).post("/v1/audio/synthesize")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+      .send({ text: "x", voice: "nova", format: "mp3", speed: 1 });
+    expect(tts.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("chat supplier does NOT expose /v1/ocr/extract", async () => {
+    const app = makeApp(buildSampleConfig());
+    const res = await request(app).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER).send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — header + body validation", () => {
+  it("400 escrow_ref_required when X-Escrow-Ref header missing", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).post("/v1/ocr/extract").send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("escrow_ref_required");
+  });
+
+  it("400 escrow_ref_malformed when header is not <64hex>#<int>", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", "not-a-ref").send(validBody());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("escrow_ref_malformed");
+  });
+
+  it("400 image_required when image_b64 missing or empty", async () => {
+    const app = makeApp();
+    for (const body of [{}, { image_b64: "" }, { mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" }]) {
+      const res = await request(app).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+        .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER).send(body);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.reason).toBe("image_required");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("400 image_not_base64 for data-URL or whitespace payloads", async () => {
+    const app = makeApp();
+    for (const image_b64 of [`data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`, `${IMG} `, "has space"]) {
+      const res = await request(app).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+        .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+        .send({ ...validBody(), image_b64 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.reason).toBe("image_not_base64");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("400 mime_invalid for unsupported mime", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+      .send({ ...validBody(), mime: "image/tiff" });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("mime_invalid");
+  });
+
+  it("400 output_format_invalid for unsupported format", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+      .send({ ...validBody(), output_format: "yaml" });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("output_format_invalid");
+  });
+
+  it("accepts a 2MB body (over the 1mb global limit — OCR route has its own parser)", async () => {
+    // 2M chars of base64 ≈ 1.5 MB binary; global express.json would 413 this.
+    const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER)
+      .send({ ...validBody(), image_b64: big });
+    // Passes body parsing + validation, then fails on the unseeded chain
+    // (advert_unavailable 503) — anything but 413 proves the parser took it.
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(413);
+    expect([403, 404, 503]).toContain(res.status);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — revision-probe gate", () => {
+  it("503 advert_unavailable — chain validation runs before the revision probe fires", async () => {
+    // Advert/escrow would resolve AFTER the probe? No — probe runs at step
+    // 7.5, after chain checks. Seeding a full escrow in the mock provider is
+    // the chat-route suite's job; here we assert the config gate wiring by
+    // hitting the earlier chain-side failure with probing configured — the
+    // probe must NOT fire before chain validation (unseeded chain 503s
+    // first), keeping probe cost off the hot invalid path.
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async () => { throw new Error("probe must not be called yet"); });
+    const config: SupplierConfig = {
+      ...buildSampleOcrConfig(),
+      revisionProbeUrl: "http://vllm.fake:8000/info",
+      revisionProbeMode: "per_job",
+      hfModelRevision: "a".repeat(40),
+    };
+    const res = await request(makeApp(config)).post("/v1/ocr/extract")
+      .set("X-Escrow-Ref", ESCROW_REF_HEADER).send(validBody());
+    // Unseeded chain → advert_unavailable (503) BEFORE any probe fetch.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("advert_unavailable");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /v1/ocr/extract/:jobId", () => {
+  it("400 invalid_job_id for non-UUID", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp()).get("/v1/ocr/extract/not-a-uuid");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("invalid_job_id");
+  });
+
+  it("404 job_not_found for unknown UUID", async () => {
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .get("/v1/ocr/extract/123e4567-e89b-42d3-a456-426614174000");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.reason).toBe("job_not_found");
+  });
+});

tests/unit/supplier-walletHealth.test.ts

@@ -242,3 +242,115 @@ describe("walletHealth — triggerOnFailureConsolidate", () => {
     expect(state.snapshot().status).toBe("working");
   });
 });
+
+describe("walletHealth — F7 circuit breakers", () => {
+  let state: SupplierState;
+  let logLines: string[];
+  let log: (line: string) => void;
+  let consolidate: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> & ConsolidateFn;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    state = new SupplierState();
+    _resetWalletHealthForTests(state);
+    logLines = [];
+    log = (line) => logLines.push(line);
+    consolidate = vi.fn() as never;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.useRealTimers();
+  });
+
+  it("halts after 3 consecutive consolidations that never reach healthy", async () => {
+    // The 2026-08-07 pump: every tick consolidates, none lands healthy.
+    consolidate.mockResolvedValue(consolidatedResult);
+
+    const ticker = startWalletHealthTicker(
+      { chain: FAKE_CHAIN, state, supplierKey: FAKE_KEY, consolidate },
+      { intervalMs: 1_000, log },
+    );
+
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(3_000);
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3));
+    expect(logLines.some((l) => l.includes("HALT") && l.includes("consecutive"))).toBe(true);
+
+    // Two more ticks: the breaker holds, no further txs.
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2_000);
+    expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+
+    ticker.stop();
+  });
+
+  it("an already-healthy result resets the consecutive counter", async () => {
+    consolidate
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(healthyResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValue(healthyResult);
+
+    const ticker = startWalletHealthTicker(
+      { chain: FAKE_CHAIN, state, supplierKey: FAKE_KEY, consolidate },
+      { intervalMs: 1_000, log },
+    );
+
+    // 6 ticks: c,c,h,c,c,h — never 3 consecutive, so never halted.
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(6_000);
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(6));
+    expect(logLines.some((l) => l.includes("HALT"))).toBe(false);
+
+    ticker.stop();
+  });
+
+  it("halts when the 24h consolidation budget is exhausted", async () => {
+    // Interleave healthy results so the consecutive guard never fires:
+    // c,c,h,c,c,h,c,c -> 6 consolidations inside the window at tick 8.
+    consolidate
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(healthyResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(healthyResult)
+      .mockResolvedValue(consolidatedResult);
+
+    const ticker = startWalletHealthTicker(
+      { chain: FAKE_CHAIN, state, supplierKey: FAKE_KEY, consolidate },
+      { intervalMs: 1_000, log },
+    );
+
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(8_000);
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(8));
+    expect(logLines.some((l) => l.includes("HALT") && l.includes("budget"))).toBe(true);
+
+    // Breaker holds on subsequent ticks.
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2_000);
+    expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(8);
+
+    ticker.stop();
+  });
+
+  it("failed consolidations neither trip nor reset the breakers", async () => {
+    // Errors spend no fee: they must not count as consolidations, but they
+    // must not clear the consecutive count either.
+    consolidate
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(consolidatedResult)
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("balance too low to consolidate"))
+      .mockResolvedValue(consolidatedResult);
+
+    const ticker = startWalletHealthTicker(
+      { chain: FAKE_CHAIN, state, supplierKey: FAKE_KEY, consolidate },
+      { intervalMs: 1_000, log },
+    );
+
+    // c,c,error,c -> the 4th call is the 3rd consecutive consolidation.
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(4_000);
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(consolidate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4));
+    expect(logLines.some((l) => l.includes("HALT") && l.includes("consecutive"))).toBe(true);
+
+    ticker.stop();
+  });
+});

tests/unit/tx-consolidate-wallet.test.ts

@@ -64,14 +64,17 @@ describe("planConsolidate", () => {
     expect(plan.workingOutput).toBe(8_650_000n);
   });
 
-  it("consolidates a 2-UTxO wallet where the smaller is below collateral threshold", () => {
-    // Both fit budget but smaller (3 AP3X) is below 5 AP3X — needs reshape.
+  it("accepts a 2-UTxO wallet where the LARGER is the collateral candidate", () => {
+    // {3, 15}: the 15 qualifies as a pure >=5 candidate and the 3 covers
+    // fees — this wallet can run script txs as-is. The old exact-2-slot
+    // convention reshaped it for nothing (0.5 AP3X per pass).
     const utxos = [u(3_000_000n), u(15_000_000n)];
     const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
 
-    expect(plan.reason).toBe("consolidate");
-    expect(plan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(false);
-    expect(plan.inputCount).toBe(2);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("already-healthy");
+    expect(plan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(true);
+    expect(plan.collateralOutput).toBe(15_000_000n);
+    expect(plan.workingOutput).toBe(3_000_000n);
   });
 
   it("throws on 0 UTxOs", () => {
@@ -93,3 +96,93 @@ describe("planConsolidate", () => {
     expect(plan.workingOutput).toBe(20_000_000n - 10_000_000n - DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE);
   });
 });
+
+describe("planConsolidate — structural health predicate (F7)", () => {
+  // The tx buildConsolidateWalletTx actually lands: {collateral 5.0,
+  // working = total - 5.0 - 2.0 reserve, change = reserve - fee}. The fee
+  // observed on mainnet is exactly 501,628, so the change is 1,498,372.
+  const MAINNET_CONSOLIDATE_FEE = 501_628n;
+
+  it("REGRESSION: the exact shape consolidation produces is healthy", () => {
+    // This is the loop that burned 116 AP3X in the 2026-08-07 soak: the
+    // planner called its own output shape unhealthy and re-consolidated
+    // every 45s tick. Feed it precisely what the builder lands.
+    const utxos = [
+      u(5_000_000n),
+      u(91_000_000n),
+      u(DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE - MAINNET_CONSOLIDATE_FEE), // 1,498,372 change
+    ];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("already-healthy");
+    expect(plan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(true);
+    expect(plan.collateralOutput).toBe(5_000_000n);
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent: applying the builder's output model to any plan yields healthy", () => {
+    const fragmented = [u(2_400_750n), u(4_100_000n), u(1_679_301n), u(1_679_301n)];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(fragmented);
+    expect(plan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(false);
+
+    // Model of what buildConsolidateWalletTx lands for this plan.
+    const afterConsolidation = [
+      u(plan.collateralOutput),
+      u(plan.workingOutput),
+      u(DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE - MAINNET_CONSOLIDATE_FEE),
+    ];
+    const replan = planConsolidate(afterConsolidation);
+
+    expect(replan.reason).toBe("already-healthy");
+    expect(replan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("still consolidates when fragmentation exceeds the max UTxO bound", () => {
+    // Candidate present, but 7 UTxOs > DEFAULT_MAX_UTXOS (6).
+    const utxos = [
+      u(5_000_000n), u(1_100_000n), u(1_100_000n), u(1_100_000n),
+      u(1_100_000n), u(1_100_000n), u(1_100_000n),
+    ];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("consolidate");
+  });
+
+  it("still consolidates when no pure UTxO reaches the collateral threshold", () => {
+    // The 2026-08-07 batch-stall shape: fragments only, max 4,498,372.
+    const utxos = [u(4_498_372n), u(3_098_372n), u(1_498_372n)];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("consolidate");
+    expect(plan.alreadyHealthy).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("a UTxO 1,628 lovelace short of collateral is not a candidate", () => {
+    // Seen live: 4,998,372 (= 5.0 minus a 501,628 fee twice-shuffled).
+    const utxos = [u(4_998_372n), u(9_000_000n - 4_998_372n)];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("consolidate");
+  });
+
+  it("a UTxO carrying native assets is not a collateral candidate", () => {
+    const withToken: UtxoLike = {
+      assets: { lovelace: 6_000_000n, "deadbeef.72737456": 1n },
+    };
+    const utxos = [withToken, u(4_000_000n)];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("consolidate");
+  });
+
+  it("healthy shape below the reshape threshold is healthy, not an error", () => {
+    // {5.0, 2.5} = 7.5 total: under the 8.0 reshape minimum but perfectly
+    // able to run script txs. The old order threw "balance too low" here
+    // on every tick (1,744 log lines in the soak).
+    const utxos = [u(5_000_000n), u(2_500_000n)];
+    const plan = planConsolidate(utxos);
+    expect(plan.reason).toBe("already-healthy");
+  });
+
+  it("candidate with only dust outside it needs a reshape it cannot afford", () => {
+    // {5.0, 0.4}: no working money outside the candidate, and 5.4 total is
+    // below the reshape minimum — loud error, funds needed.
+    const utxos = [u(5_000_000n), u(400_000n)];
+    expect(() => planConsolidate(utxos)).toThrow(/balance too low/i);
+  });
+});

tests/unit/tx-post-ocr-escrow.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/**
+ * tx-post-ocr-escrow.test.ts — coverage for the OCR escrow builder added
+ * for model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1` capabilities.
+ *
+ * Focus: the NEW validation + hash logic in postOcrEscrow.ts. The shared
+ * escrow-construction pieces (advert resolution, datum assembly, mock tx
+ * encoding) mirror postTtsEscrow.ts and are covered by tx-post-escrow.test.ts
+ * for the chat shape; here we pin:
+ *   - ocrPromptHash canonicalisation (golden hash — buyer/supplier contract)
+ *   - envelope validation failures throw BEFORE any chain access
+ *   - the escrow datum carries the OCR prompt_hash on the happy path
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { createHash } from "crypto";
+
+import {
+  ocrPromptHash,
+  validateOcrRequest,
+  buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
+  MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
+  TxConstructionError,
+  type OcrRequest,
+} from "../../packages/shared/src/tx/index.js";
+import { canonicalize } from "../../packages/shared/src/cbor/canonical.js";
+import { MockChainProvider } from "../../packages/shared/src/chain/MockChainProvider.js";
+import { encodeAdvertDatum } from "../../packages/shared/src/cbor/AdvertDatum.js";
+import { decodeEscrowDatum } from "../../packages/shared/src/cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
+import { escrowLockFloor } from "../../packages/shared/src/tx/internal/minAdaFloor.js";
+import type { AdvertDatum } from "../../packages/shared/src/cbor/types.js";
+import type { Utxo, OutputReference } from "../../packages/shared/src/chain/ChainProvider.js";
+import { buildBuyerWalletKey } from "../fixtures/buyer-side/wallet-keys.js";
+import { buildSupplierWalletKey } from "../fixtures/supplier-side/wallet-keys.js";
+
+const IMG = Buffer.from("not really a png but bytes are bytes").toString("base64");
+
+function validRequest(): OcrRequest {
+  return { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" };
+}
+
+describe("ocrPromptHash — canonicalisation contract", () => {
+  it("equals sha256(canonicalize({image_b64, mime, output_format}))", () => {
+    const req = validRequest();
+    const expected = createHash("sha256")
+      .update(canonicalize({
+        image_b64: req.image_b64,
+        mime: req.mime,
+        output_format: req.output_format,
+      }), "utf8")
+      .digest("hex");
+    expect(ocrPromptHash(req)).toBe(expected);
+  });
+
+  it("is key-order independent (JCS canonicalisation)", () => {
+    const a = ocrPromptHash({ image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "json" });
+    const b = ocrPromptHash({ output_format: "json", mime: "image/png", image_b64: IMG } as OcrRequest);
+    expect(a).toBe(b);
+  });
+
+  it("changes when any field changes", () => {
+    const base = ocrPromptHash(validRequest());
+    expect(ocrPromptHash({ ...validRequest(), mime: "image/jpeg" })).not.toBe(base);
+    expect(ocrPromptHash({ ...validRequest(), output_format: "html" })).not.toBe(base);
+    expect(ocrPromptHash({ ...validRequest(), image_b64: IMG + "AA" })).not.toBe(base);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateOcrRequest — envelope gates", () => {
+  it("rejects empty image", () => {
+    expect(() => validateOcrRequest({ ...validRequest(), image_b64: "" }))
+      .toThrowError(TxConstructionError);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects oversized image", () => {
+    const big = "A".repeat(MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS + 4);
+    expect(() => validateOcrRequest({ ...validRequest(), image_b64: big }))
+      .toThrow(/exceeds/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects data-URL prefixes and whitespace (plain base64 only)", () => {
+    for (const bad of [`data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`, `${IMG} `, "with space AA"]) {
+      expect(() => validateOcrRequest({ ...validRequest(), image_b64: bad }))
+        .toThrow(/base64/);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects unknown mime and output_format", () => {
+    expect(() => validateOcrRequest({ ...validRequest(), mime: "image/tiff" }))
+      .toThrow(/mime/);
+    expect(() => validateOcrRequest({ ...validRequest(), output_format: "yaml" }))
+      .toThrow(/output_format/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildPostOcrEscrowTx — validation precedes chain access", () => {
+  it("throws the envelope error against an unseeded chain (no advert query first)", async () => {
+    const chain = new MockChainProvider();
+    const buyerKey = {
+      pubKeyHash: "ab".repeat(28),
+      pubKeyHex: "cd".repeat(32),
+      privateKeyHex: "ef".repeat(32),
+      address: "addr_test1fake",
+    };
+    await expect(buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
+      chain,
+      buyerKey,
+      advertRef: { txHash: "b".repeat(64), index: 0 },
+      request: { ...validRequest(), mime: "image/gif" },
+      payment_lovelace: 200000n,
+    })).rejects.toThrow(/mime/);
+  });
+
+  it("unseeded advert ref → 'advert ref not on chain' after a valid envelope", async () => {
+    const chain = new MockChainProvider();
+    const buyerKey = {
+      pubKeyHash: "ab".repeat(28),
+      pubKeyHex: "cd".repeat(32),
+      privateKeyHex: "ef".repeat(32),
+      address: "addr_test1fake",
+    };
+    await expect(buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
+      chain,
+      buyerKey,
+      advertRef: { txHash: "b".repeat(64), index: 0 },
+      request: validRequest(),
+      payment_lovelace: 200000n,
+    })).rejects.toMatchObject({ reason: "advert ref not on chain" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildPostOcrEscrowTx — happy path locks the min-ada floor (C1 regression)", () => {
+  // Guards packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts:205
+  // (`escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal)`). Without that call the
+  // escrow locks only the raw economic total, the Submit continuing output
+  // gets bumped to min-ada, value_equal fails, and the validator errors with
+  // an empty trace — the 2026-08-07 mainnet incident. Neither existing
+  // `buildPostOcrEscrowTx` test above reaches line 205 (both throw first),
+  // so this is the only test that would catch a regression back to a bare
+  // `economicTotal` assignment.
+  const ADVERT_SCRIPT_ADDRESS = "addr_test1wrqq9qqjzf3uh4w9hm0kqzrpvt60r4ryjp5rjf5epd3nptq7yscm6";
+  const ADVERT_REF: OutputReference = { txHash: "c".repeat(64), index: 0 };
+  const PRICE = 200_000n;
+  const BUYER_BOND = 1_000_000n;
+  const SUPPLIER_BOND = 1_000_000n;
+  const ECONOMIC_TOTAL = PRICE + BUYER_BOND + SUPPLIER_BOND; // 2_200_000n
+
+  function makeOcrAdvert(): AdvertDatum {
+    const supplier = buildSupplierWalletKey();
+    return {
+      supplier_pkh: supplier.pubKeyHash,
+      capability_id: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
+      model: "chandra-ocr-2",
+      max_output_tokens: 4096,
+      max_processing_ms: 60_000,
+      price_lovelace: PRICE,
+      supplier_bond_lovelace: SUPPLIER_BOND,
+      buyer_bond_lovelace: BUYER_BOND,
+      endpoint_url: "https://supplier.example.com/v1",
+      detail_uri: "ipfs://Qm000",
+      detail_hash: "a".repeat(64),
+      advertised_at: 1_745_500_000_000,
+      status: "Active",
+    };
+  }
+
+  function seedOcrAdvert(chain: MockChainProvider): void {
+    const utxo: Utxo = {
+      ref: ADVERT_REF,
+      address: ADVERT_SCRIPT_ADDRESS,
+      lovelace: 2_000_000n,
+      assets: {},
+      datumHex: encodeAdvertDatum(makeOcrAdvert()),
+      scriptRef: null,
+    };
+    chain.seed(utxo);
+  }
+
+  it("locks escrowLockFloor(datum, economicTotal), strictly above the raw economic total", async () => {
+    const chain = new MockChainProvider();
+    chain.advanceSlot(1_745_500_000);
+    seedOcrAdvert(chain);
+
+    const buyer = buildBuyerWalletKey();
+    const result = await buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
+      chain,
+      buyerKey: buyer,
+      advertRef: ADVERT_REF,
+      request: validRequest(),
+      payment_lovelace: PRICE,
+    });
+
+    const escrowUtxo = await chain.queryUtxo(result.escrowOutputRef);
+    expect(escrowUtxo).not.toBeNull();
+    const datum = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo!.datumHex!);
+
+    const expectedFloor = escrowLockFloor(datum, ECONOMIC_TOTAL);
+    expect(escrowUtxo!.lovelace).toBe(expectedFloor);
+    expect(escrowUtxo!.lovelace).toBeGreaterThan(ECONOMIC_TOTAL);
+  });
+});

wallet-monitor/Dockerfile

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
 # the whole workspace, so every package's manifest must be present even though
 # --filter only installs what wallet-monitor needs.
 COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
+# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
+COPY patches ./patches
 COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
 COPY wallet-monitor/package.json ./wallet-monitor/package.json
 COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json