36 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
FilipBl4gojevic
7d348e762f fix(ocr): live busy pre-check before posting a candidate's escrow
Some checks failed
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runOcrOneShot posted the escrow before calling the supplier, so a busy
supplier's 409 stranded an already-paid escrow until reclaim - and the
buyer-side busy-retry multiplies this into several stranded escrows per
page. Add a live /status check per candidate, immediately before its
escrow posts, mirroring sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: "working"
skips to the next candidate without posting, anything else (free,
unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as usable so the check is an
optimisation, never a gate. Bounded to a 2s timeout so a stalled
supplier cannot meaningfully delay the request.

Existing candidate-fallback, escrow-ref capture, usage recording, and
receipt labels are unchanged.
2026-08-10 19:31:22 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
7bf3252cdb fix(gateway): match both path separators in the direct-invocation guard
process.argv[1] arrives with backslashes on Windows, so the
forward-slash-only pattern never matched and `start` exited 0 without
starting the server, and without printing anything. Found while running
the gateway locally to verify this branch's OCR route end to end;
bundled here because it blocks that verification on Windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 18:44:41 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
feabd12876 fix(ocr): capture escrow_ref from the escrow_posted event, not just submitOcr's return
escrowRefStr was only assigned after submitOcr resolved, but submitOcr posts
the escrow internally and THEN calls the supplier over HTTP — a SupplierError
there (timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed response, receipt
mismatch) meant the escrow was already on chain while the failure path still
recorded escrow_ref: null. Given the OCR upstream's 120s timeout budget this
is likely the most common paid-but-failed shape, and the exact one the
reconciliation spine exists for.

Subscribe to the SDK's "progress" event (type "escrow_posted") around each
submitOcr attempt so the ref is captured the instant it lands, regardless of
whether submitOcr goes on to resolve or reject. Listener is scoped per
candidate and removed in a finally so it cannot accumulate.

Adds a regression test proving the failure-path usage row and the ocr_failed
structured log line both carry the real ref instead of null; verified it
fails without the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:34:55 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
2b2295b7ed fix(ocr): review pass — min-ada floor regression test, auth-before-parse, failure-path reconciliation, disclosure label coverage
Fixes 2 critical, 2 important, and 5 minor findings from review of 069edcb:

- C1: add a happy-path test that reaches postOcrEscrow.ts's escrowLockFloor
  call and asserts the locked amount; verified it fails against a bare
  economicTotal and passes against the real code.
- C2: gate /v1/ocr/extract (auth + rate limits) before the 16mb body parser
  so an unauthenticated caller can no longer force a full buffer/JSON.parse.
- I2: hoist result/used/escrowRef in the OCR one-shot handler so the failure
  path records escrow_ref/supplier/cost when an escrow was actually posted,
  and emit an ocr_failed structured log line mirroring ocr_settled.
- I3: export venueAttribution and cover its sanitization directly; add a
  stubbed happy-path route test asserting the first-party-brokered
  disclosure label reaches the response.
- Minor: drop unused hfWeightsSource end to end, rename a misleading test,
  make the OCR capability template's pinning language conditional on the
  self-hosted upstream, tighten the /v1/ocr path-prefix guard, and make
  preflight's required_lovelace use the same escrowLockFloor the builder
  locks (exported from the shared tx barrel for gateway use).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:12:12 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
069edcb076 feat(ocr): model-scoped OCR capability + gateway /v1/ocr/extract route
Adds the ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1 capability end to end: the
postOcrEscrow builder (locking the min-ada floor for the Submitted-state
datum, required since the min-ada fix), the gateway OCR route that selects
an OCR supplier by capability, posts a per-page escrow, calls the supplier,
verifies and settles, and returns content plus the signed receipt labelled
first-party-brokered. Supplier OCR handler with a hosted document-API
upstream and buyer-SDK OCR support included.

Squashed from the 2026-08-06 working subset; the deploy pack is
intentionally excluded (it lives in a private operator repo).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 16:40:00 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
d5349057b0 Merge pull request #9 from Apex-Fusion/fix/escrow-minada-floor
fix(escrow): min-ada floor so long-capability Submits settle
2026-08-10 15:08:11 +02:00
david
678ee862ea fix(docker): COPY patches/ into every builder stage
The lockfile gained patchedDependencies (libsodium-wrappers-sumo) in
2aa1688, and the package manager hashes the patch file during install —
every image build since then fails with ENOENT on /repo/patches. No
image had been rebuilt since, so it surfaced only on the next deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:30:49 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
c391b98af8 fix(escrow): lock min-ada for the largest future datum so long-capability Submits settle
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The escrow locks payment + both bonds and the validator requires exact
value preservation (value_equal) on Claim and Submit. Submit grows the
inline datum ~43 bytes (submitted_at None->Some, result_receipt_hash
None->Some 32 bytes). When capability_id is long enough, the
Submitted-state output's min-ada exceeds the locked total; lucid bumps
the continuing output, value_equal fails, and the validator errors with
no traces (opaque evaluateTransaction 3010/3012). Measured on mainnet at
utxoCostPerByte 4310: a 20-byte chat capability clears a 2.2M lock by
49,310, a 33-byte OCR capability is over by 11,030 - so short-capability
escrows settle and long ones never can, and because Claim's datum is
smaller it always passes, making a Submit-only failure look chain-side.

escrowLockFloor() computes min-ada for the Submitted state plus a margin
and locks max(economic total, that floor) in the post builders. Buyer-
side only, no contract or supplier changes; lucid never bumps once the
lock is sufficient, and the surplus returns through the >= terminal
distribution. postOcrEscrow's identical change ships with the OCR
feature branch. New unit test covers the floor across capability lengths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:22:02 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
6ca7f2927a Merge pull request #8 from Apex-Fusion/fix/wallet-health-idempotence
fix(wallet): make wallet-health idempotent - structural health predicate + circuit breakers
2026-08-10 14:11:59 +02:00
david
4d94aa5040 feat(deploy): Let's Encrypt TLS at traefik for all 17 mainnet supplier hosts
Same pattern as the gateway (a54fdcb): the mp-suppliers-* DNS records are no
longer Cloudflare-proxied, so each supplier gets a websecure router with the
letsencrypt resolver and its :80 router becomes a permanent HTTPS redirect.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:28:51 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
36c5cfc6be fix(wallet): make wallet-health idempotent - structural health predicate + circuit breakers
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planConsolidate returned already-healthy only for wallets with EXACTLY
2 UTxOs, but buildConsolidateWalletTx lands 3 (collateral + working +
the fee-reserve remainder as change). The shape consolidation produces
can never satisfy its own health check, so every wallet-health tick
re-consolidates and pays the ~0.5 AP3X min fee again. Measured in a
production deployment: a 45s ticker submitted 232 consolidations and
burned ~116 AP3X in about 2.5 idle hours; at the default 600s interval
the same loop leaks ~3 AP3X per hour whenever the wallet is not exactly
2 UTxOs.

Healthy is now structural: a pure-lovelace UTxO >= collateralLovelace
exists, at least 1 AP3X sits outside it, and fragmentation is bounded
(<= 6 UTxOs, new optional maxUtxos param). The health check also runs
BEFORE the low-balance guard, so a wallet that can already run script
transactions is never reshaped or refused. walletHealth gains two
independent circuit breakers - halt after 3 consecutive consolidations
that never reach healthy, halt past 6 consolidations per 24h - so any
future non-convergence costs at most ~1.5 AP3X instead of the whole
wallet, plus a docstring that matches reality.

Tests: the exact post-consolidation-shape regression, one-step
idempotence against the builder output model, candidate boundaries
(native assets, 1,628-lovelace-short), healthy-below-reshape-threshold,
and breaker behavior including error and reset paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:10:45 +02:00
david
a54fdcb24c feat(deploy): terminate TLS at traefik for the gateway host via Let's Encrypt
api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org is no longer Cloudflare-proxied, so
traefik now terminates TLS itself: a websecure router with the letsencrypt
ACME resolver, and the :80 router demoted to a permanent HTTPS redirect.
Other hosts on the box stay Cloudflare-terminated on :80.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 13:30:53 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
926300dee5 Merge pull request #6 from FilipBl4gojevic/brand-vocab-scrub
Brand vocabulary scrub: settlement framing, UI strings, retire M1-era design docs
2026-07-30 14:24:52 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
73700f983a Brand vocabulary scrub: settlement framing, UI strings, retire M1-era design docs
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md: settlement-asset framing (AP3X bonded in escrow,
  settles on accepted work); remove references to external network
  adapters that are not part of the project
- docs/buyer + docs/supplier READMEs: commission/bond/settle vocabulary
- Buyer web UI: "Accept & Settle", escrow-framed labels, gateway-managed
  wallet wording; gateway landing title punctuation
- Delete EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY and local-llm-marketplace docs + exports:
  M1-era internal design snapshots superseded by ARCHITECTURE.md and the
  public docs site

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:23:35 +02:00
david
2aa1688a17 fix(ci): green the test suite — pnpm 10 build scripts, libsodium ESM, stale time fixtures
CI has been red since the pnpm 10 migration. Four independent causes:

- better-sqlite3: pnpm 10 blocks dependency build scripts by default, so the
  native binding was never compiled on CI. Allowlist it via
  onlyBuiltDependencies in pnpm-workspace.yaml.
- libsodium-wrappers-sumo 0.7.16: the published ESM wrapper does
  `import "./libsodium-sumo.mjs"` but the tarball does not ship that file
  (it lives in the libsodium-sumo package). Patch the import to the bare
  specifier; local runs only worked because of a hand-copied file in
  node_modules.
- tx-accept/claim [live] tests: the live path checks deadlines against
  Date.now(), and the fixed fixture timestamps expired in June. Freeze the
  clock inside the fixture windows with vi.useFakeTimers.
- CML set_exunits panic ("RuntimeError: unreachable"): with
  localUPLCEval: false the provider asks Ogmios for ex-units; the test mocks
  answered `{}`, so the provider fell back to a spend redeemer at index 0
  while the escrow input sorts to index 1 — CML panics on the unknown
  redeemer key. Mock evaluateTransaction with the true index like real
  Ogmios.

Also regenerate the advert-datum golden: the fixture builders passed plain JS
numbers to cbor-x (minimal ints, float64 for the timestamp) while the
production codec — whose output is live on mainnet — emits full-width uint64.
Builders now encode integer fields as BigInt so builders, codec, and golden
agree byte-for-byte.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 11:16:19 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
3ae2a827c4 Merge pull request #5 from FilipBl4gojevic/gateway-ap3x-strings
Gateway: AP3X terminology in user-facing strings
2026-07-29 10:32:28 +02:00
dcejtlin-apex
fec0ac8d0a Merge pull request #4 from FilipBl4gojevic/dispute-resolution-naming
Naming: Dispute Resolution module
2026-07-29 10:32:16 +02:00
david
be9febffb1 fix(wallet-monitor): query wallets sequentially with retry to avoid Ogmios 500s
The public Ogmios endpoint only serves a few concurrent ledger-state
queries and returns 500 for the rest, so the Promise.all burst over the
(now 19-wallet) list reliably failed several wallets every run. Query
sequentially instead (full sweep ~2.5s) and retry each wallet once after
2s so a lone blip no longer posts a false "query failed" alert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:19:39 +00:00
david
e5793031f8 chore(deploy): track mainnet compose files for ds-flash-chat suppliers 1-3
These were live on the box but never committed. Chat-session replicas of
the deepseek-flash suppliers (OpenRouter deepseek-v4-flash, llm.chat.v1,
ticket settle mode); secrets stay in the gitignored supplier/.env files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:14:42 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
716a8bf2ef Gateway: AP3X terminology in user-facing strings and docs
The signup page said '~5 ADA collateral' and two API error messages
told agents to 'deposit a little more ADA' - the coin is AP3X. Strings,
comments, and docs/gateway.md updated; code identifiers unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:14:32 +02:00
david
b10706cf69 fix(wallet-monitor): post only on state changes, drop reminder re-alerts
Slack posts now fire only when a wallet newly drops below its threshold
or recovers above it; a wallet that stays low never re-posts. The
reminder_hours mechanism is removed entirely — per-wallet reminder
clocks drifted apart (Ogmios blips skip wallets from a run), so with
many chronically-low wallets some clock came due nearly every run,
collapsing the 6h cadence to the hourly cron interval.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 11:12:45 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
1f587867c6 README: Dispute Resolution naming
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 10:06:14 +02:00
HalukG
0b253c73bb Merge pull request #3 from FilipBl4gojevic/docs-consolidation-readme
README: marketplace front door - status, flow, layout, links
2026-07-24 13:46:46 +03:00
FilipBl4gojevic
1648edeba7 README: vocabulary pass on Related line
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:26:58 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
4090e064cb README: note internal audit coverage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:07:03 +02:00
FilipBl4gojevic
3fac04b00e README: marketplace front door - status, flow, layout, links
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 10:57:27 +02:00
david
2f7b0194a5 feat(supplier,gateway,buyer): N-slot chat suppliers + entry-ticket settle mode
Two structural fixes for demo concurrency (3 single-slot suppliers thrashed
under Open WebUI's ~3 conversations per message):

Multi-slot suppliers (MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS, default 1):
- SupplierState is now capacity-aware: a Set of active escrow refs with
  free-until-full status semantics, ref-scoped release(ref) (also fixes the
  latent bug where handler catch-alls released another request's slot), and
  a walletMutex serializing every wallet-spending chain op — Claim, Submit,
  and wallet-health consolidation queue instead of racing the single
  working/collateral UTxO. /status gains active_sessions/max_sessions.

Entry-ticket settle mode (CHAT_SETTLE_MODE=ticket, default full, both sides):
- The buyer's escrow post at session open is the ONLY chain op. The supplier
  verifies the Open escrow as an entry ticket but never Claims/Submits
  (/v1/chat/start → {status:"ticket"}; /v1/chat/end → receipt-less
  {status:"ended"}); no hard-cap timer, so sessions may outlive deliver_by.
  Used tickets can't reopen sessions (records retained; 409 session_exists).
- Buyer SDK: startChat/endChat are settle-mode aware, driven by the
  supplier's response — mixed-mode rollout windows settle correctly.
- Gateway: ticket closes bill cost 0; the sweeper Reclaims Open tickets
  after deliver_by WITHOUT closing live sessions (the conversation and its
  affinity mirror survive their reclaimed ticket), gates reclaims on
  deliver_by, and keeps an in-process settled-refs memory so terminal
  indexer rows aren't retried every sweep forever.

Deployment (kimi-chat trio + gateway): ticket mode, 8 slots per supplier,
idle policy gateway 10 min / supplier 15 min (fixes the inversion where the
supplier idle-closed before the gateway janitor).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 20:48:52 +02:00
david
9a4f9f0699 fix(gateway,supplier): demo sessions stick to their supplier; free pinned suppliers
The demo endpoint lost its session on nearly every second message: affinity
required clients to re-echo the assistant reply byte-identically, so clients
that strip <think> blocks or reshape whitespace (Open WebUI, litellm) missed
every turn, opened a fresh escrow session on the next free single-slot
supplier, and left the old one pinned. Open WebUI's background title/tag-gen
requests each pinned another supplier — one message could exhaust all three
kimi replicas ("no available chat supplier").

- affinity: lenient assistant-content matching (think-strip + whitespace
  collapse); user/system/tool messages and tool_calls stay byte-strict;
  strict prefixes outrank lenient ones. The mirror is never rewritten with
  client text, so receipt hashes stay valid.
- demoChat: trim trailing assistant/system messages (regenerate semantics)
  instead of 400 "the last message must have role user or tool".
- supplier: roll the transcript back when the LLM call fails so retries
  don't duplicate the delta (ChatSessionStore.truncateTranscript).
- demoChat: LRU-evict a demo session when no supplier is available (supplier
  /v1/chat/end frees the slot, sweeper Accepts the escrow) and retry the
  open with selectCandidates ignoreStatusFor to bypass the ~20s-stale
  indexer status poll. Max 2 evictions per request.
- sweeper: idle janitor closes demo sessions unused for DEMO_SESSION_IDLE_MS
  (default 3 min, below the supplier's 5 min CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS) so
  abandoned one-off sessions release their suppliers quickly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 02:29:10 +02:00
david
3d2b4bb203 chore(buyer): hide Book Summarizer tab from the nav
Route and all PDF summarize code preserved; only the nav link is
commented out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 10:30:18 +02:00
david
4ebe7c9683 feat(gateway,supplier,shared): shared demo key with session-backed OpenAI endpoint + tool-calling
MVP demo: one operator-funded API key anyone can plug into an IDE/harness,
running real escrow-per-session marketplace conversations (llm.chat.v1)
behind the standard OpenAI /chat/completions wire shape.

- shared: ChatMessage gains tool role + tool_calls; normalizeChatMessage/
  chatMessagesEquivalent keep supplier transcript and gateway mirror
  hash-identical for receipts (field presence is part of the identity)
- supplier: /v1/chat/message accepts {messages,tools,tool_choice} alongside
  legacy {content}; callOpenAiStream forwards tools, accumulates fragmented
  delta.tool_calls, allows content-less tool turns; done frame carries the
  assistant message verbatim + finish_reason + usage
- gateway: demo flag on api_keys (additive migration), create-demo-key CLI,
  withdraw 403 + hidden deposit address for demo keys, per-IP demo rate
  limit (demo keys skip the shared per-key limit), models filtered to chat
  capability
- gateway executor (demoChat.ts): transcript-prefix affinity maps stateless
  calls onto open sessions, forwards only unseen deltas, transparently
  reopens on supplier idle-close; never falls back to one-shot (its settle
  path assumes <=1 in-flight escrow per wallet)
- mutex scope: key mutex held only for chain work (open/close); off-chain
  turns serialize on per-session locks so replicas serve users concurrently
- sweeper: chat-aware reclaim guard (35min vs 11min) and abandoned-session
  cleanup; terminal state confirmed via on-chain queryUtxo (indexer keeps
  lineage rows at their old state forever)
- deploy: kimi-chat replicas 2+3 compose files; chat idle timeout 2.5min

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 10:30:17 +02:00
david
b92bff56a7 feat(supplier): env-gated OpenRouter reasoning-off + max_tokens
The supplier sent a bare {model,messages,stream} to the OpenAI/OpenRouter
endpoint — no max_tokens and no reasoning control — so reasoning ("thinking")
models like kimi-k2.6 emitted reasoning tokens that could consume the
completion budget and finish with reason=length (truncated/empty answer =
failed job). deepseek-v4-flash has no thinking; kimi-k2.6 does by default.

Add two optional, env-gated request params (defaults preserve current behavior,
so ChatMock/DeepSeek-direct suppliers are unaffected):
  - OPENAI_REASONING=off  -> send reasoning:{enabled:false} (disable thinking:
    faster, cheaper, straight answers; no reasoning-starved length truncation)
  - OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=N   -> forward max_tokens:N. Must stay below the model
    context (kimi context = 262144), so the advert's 262144 cap cannot be sent
    verbatim (provider 400s when prompt+max_tokens > context).

openai.ts builds the body conditionally; config.ts parses the env; wired
through jobRunner.ts (text) and server.ts (chat-session stream).

Deployed on the 4 kimi + 3 deepseek-flash suppliers with OPENAI_REASONING=off
and OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072 (env files are host-only/gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 16:47:30 +02:00
david
ab649c55da feat(supplier): add 3 OpenRouter deepseek-v4-flash suppliers (deepseek-flash-1/2/3)
Add 3 single-slot suppliers serving deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash via OpenRouter,
increasing concurrent capacity for the independent buyer machines. Same shape
as the kimi replicas: capability llm.text.generate.v1, price 200000 lovelace,
max_output_tokens=262144, max_processing_ms=3600000, OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS=3600000,
sharing the one OpenRouter key (accepted concurrency ceiling; no 429/backoff).

- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-{1,2,3}.yml (new)
- buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets.ts: register the 3 replica wallets

Per-instance wallets, .env files, and on-chain adverts are provisioned on the
mainnet host (gitignored); the 3 containers are live and Active on-chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 14:35:55 +02:00
david
99c44442e7 feat(supplier): add 3 kimi replicas + raise all kimi caps to OpenRouter max
Add 3 parallel-capacity replicas of supplier-kimi (kimi-2/3/4) so the
marketplace can serve more concurrent jobs from the independent buyer
machines. Each is a single-slot worker on the same capability
(llm.text.generate.v1) and model (moonshotai/kimi-k2.6) at the same 0.2 AP3X
flat price, sharing the one OpenRouter key (accepted concurrency ceiling).

Also bring the original supplier-kimi up to the same config: raise its advert
caps (re-posted on-chain) and OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS to match. All four kimi
suppliers now advertise max_output_tokens=262144, max_processing_ms=3600000
(OpenRouter's ceiling for kimi-k2.6), with OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS=3600000 so the
upstream call isn't cut short before the advertised deadline.

- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-{2,3,4}.yml (new)
- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi.yml: OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS 300000 -> 3600000
- buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets.ts: register the 3 replica wallets

Per-instance wallets, .env files, and on-chain adverts are provisioned on the
mainnet host (gitignored); all four containers are live and Active on-chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 14:11:55 +02:00
david
9b5e5b5710 feat(gateway,buyer): self-serve "Generate API key" page in the frontend
Add an "API Keys" page to the buyer SPA (marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org)
that mints a custodial gateway API key by POSTing directly to the gateway's
public /signup, then shows the key once + deposit address + a base_url/curl
usage snippet. Page lives behind the SPA's existing operator login; per-user
registration is a later feature.

Gateway:
- GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS env -> corsOrigins allowlist; corsMiddleware echoes
  Access-Control-* only for allowlisted Origins, answers OPTIONS preflight
  204, no credentials. Empty allowlist = CORS off (default safe).

Buyer:
- GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL env -> injected into __BUYER_BOOT__.gatewayUrl (only in
  the authenticated boot block). SPA resolveGatewayUrl() falls back to
  deriving "api." + location.host so the post-login-no-reload case (boot
  block absent) still works.
- New ApiKeys page + /api-keys route + nav link.

Deploy (mainnet compose): gateway GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS and buyer
GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL set to the marketplace/api hosts. NOTE: both images must be
REBUILT (gateway runs tsx from copied source; buyer SPA is vite-built at image
build) — an env-only recreate would silently ship the old code.

Typecheck + vite build clean; 205 tests pass. Adversarial multi-agent review
(4 dimensions, per-finding verification) surfaced only the rebuild-required
deploy note above; no code/security defects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 11:43:02 +02:00
david
f4f35866f5 fix(escrow): reserve pure-ADA collateral UTxO in PostEscrow coin selection
buildLiveTxForEscrow called .complete() with no presetWalletInputs, so lucid was
free to spend the dedicated 5-ADA collateral UTxO as an ordinary input. On
back-to-back requests this left the wallet with no collateral candidate and the
subsequent Accept failed with collateral_required, stranding the escrow.

Reserve the smallest pure-ADA UTxO >= 5 ADA and fund PostEscrow from the rest
(falls back to default selection for single/large-UTxO cases, which keep an
ample pure-ADA change UTxO anyway). Benefits the buyer too (same shared path).
Adds reserveCollateralInputs unit tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 11:05:08 +02:00
david
4ba074020c fix(gateway): set mainnet VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS + ref-script UTxOs in compose
Without VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS the live tx builder defaults to the testnet genesis,
placing PostEscrow validity bounds ~51 days in the future (Ogmios 3118). Escrow
spends (Accept/Reclaim) also need ESCROW_REF_UTXO. Mirror buyer/supplier mainnet env.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 10:48:20 +02:00
142 changed files with 9583 additions and 1349 deletions

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,36 @@
## Local Agents Marketplace
# Local Agents Marketplace
Local Agents Marketplace MVP. See `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` for the architecture spec. Monorepo managed with pnpm workspaces. Work-in-progress; not production-ready.
Bonded-escrow coordination for AI agent work on **Vector**, the Apex Fusion eUTXO L2.
Buyers commission work. Suppliers claim it. Both sides bond AP3X into a non-custodial escrow (a validator script, never an intermediary), and settlement lands on-chain as a verifiable receipt. Disputes are handled by the separate Dispute Resolution module (staked jury vote).
**Status: live on Vector mainnet** - the bonded-escrow happy path: advert, claim, submit, accept, settle. The contracts have been through the internal audit pipeline (methodology published in [vector-ai-agents](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/vector-ai-agents)); they have not yet undergone independent third-party audit.
## Flow
1. **Advert** - a buyer posts a job with escrow bonded
2. **Claim** - a supplier claims it, bonding their side
3. **Submit** - work is delivered
4. **Accept** - the buyer accepts the work
5. **Settle** - the escrow releases; the settlement is a signed on-chain receipt
## Repository layout
| Path | What |
|---|---|
| `contracts/advert`, `contracts/escrow`, `contracts/marketplace` | Aiken validators |
| `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` | Architecture spec |
| `docs/buyer/`, `docs/supplier/` | Role guides |
| `deploy/` | Deployment and simulation tooling |
Monorepo managed with pnpm workspaces.
## Getting started
Developer docs: [Vector AI documentation](https://apex-fusion.github.io/vector-ai-documentation/). For the contract-level picture, start with [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md).
## Related
- [mcp-server](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/mcp-server) - hosted MCP server for Vector (testnet and mainnet)
- [agent-sdk-py](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agent-sdk-py) / [agent-sdk-ts](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/agent-sdk-ts) - Python and TypeScript SDKs
- [vector-agent-modules](https://github.com/Apex-Fusion/vector-agent-modules) - dispute resolution, reputation staking, self-improvement

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
COPY supplier/package.json ./supplier/package.json

View File

@@ -83,6 +83,48 @@ const OPERATOR_SOURCES: OperatorSource[] = [
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-kimi-2@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.kimi-2",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-kimi-3@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.kimi-3",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-kimi-4@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.kimi-4",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-deepseek-flash-1@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-1",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-deepseek-flash-2@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-2",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "supplier-deepseek-flash-3@vector-marketplace",
host: "root@91.98.147.172",
envPath: "/root/agents-marketplace/supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-3",
keyVar: "SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX",
role: "supplier",
},
{
label: "buyer@open-webui",
host: "open-webui",

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@
* Defaults to "./data/archive" relative to cwd.
* When unset, archive is disabled (responses are
* not persisted; /v1/responses* return 503).
* GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL — Public base URL of the OpenAI-compatible gateway
* (e.g. https://api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org).
* Injected into the SPA boot block so the "Generate
* API key" page knows where to POST /signup. When
* unset, the SPA falls back to deriving "api." +
* current host.
*/
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
@@ -56,6 +62,7 @@ export interface BuyerConfig {
password: string;
sessionSecret: string;
cookieSecure: boolean;
gatewayPublicUrl: string;
}
function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): string {
@@ -141,6 +148,11 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): BuyerConfig
cookieSecure = cookieSecureStr === "1";
}
// GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL — optional. Public base URL of the gateway, surfaced to
// the SPA via the boot block (no trailing slash). Empty string means the SPA
// derives the URL from its own host ("api." + location.host).
const gatewayPublicUrl = (env.GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL ?? "").trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
return {
privKeyHex,
indexerUrl,
@@ -155,5 +167,6 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): BuyerConfig
password,
sessionSecret,
cookieSecure,
gatewayPublicUrl,
};
}

View File

@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ export async function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): Promise<
password: config.password,
sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret,
cookieSecure: config.cookieSecure,
gatewayPublicUrl: config.gatewayPublicUrl,
jobStore,
pdfCaps,
});

View File

@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ import {
buildPostEscrowTx,
buildPostTtsEscrowTx,
buildPostChatEscrowTx,
buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
ttsPromptHash,
chatSessionPromptHash,
ocrPromptHash,
buildAcceptTx,
buildReclaimTx,
TxConstructionError,
@@ -88,8 +90,11 @@ import type {
SubmitPromptResult,
SubmitTtsOptions,
SubmitTtsResult,
SubmitOcrOptions,
SubmitOcrResult,
StartChatOptions,
StartChatResult,
ChatSettleMode,
EndChatOptions,
EndChatResult,
AcceptResultOptions,
@@ -806,6 +811,278 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
};
}
// ─── submitOcr — full lifecycle for ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1 ──
async submitOcr(opts: SubmitOcrOptions): Promise<SubmitOcrResult> {
const { advertRef, image_b64, mime, output_format, payment_lovelace } = opts;
const request = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
let advertDatum: AdvertDatum | null = null;
let escrowOutputRef: OutputReference | null = null;
let escrowRefStr = "";
let postedAtMs = Date.now();
const previewStr = `[ocr:${mime} ${output_format} ${image_b64.length}b64]`;
const recordFailure = (reason: string): void => {
this.historyStore.save({
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr || `${"0".repeat(64)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum?.supplier_pkh ?? "",
capability_id: advertDatum?.capability_id ?? "",
prompt_preview: previewStr,
posted_at: postedAtMs,
status: "failed",
failure_reason: reason,
});
};
// ── 1. Resolve advert + post escrow (OCR prompt_hash) ─────────────
let escrowResult;
try {
const utxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
if (utxo && utxo.datumHex) {
try {
advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(utxo.datumHex);
} catch { /* builder will re-throw structurally */ }
}
escrowResult = await buildPostOcrEscrowTx({
chain: this.chain,
buyerKey: this.walletKey,
advertRef,
request,
payment_lovelace,
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) {
recordFailure(err.reason);
throw err;
}
this.emitProgress({ type: "chain_submit_failed", detail: (err as Error).message });
recordFailure((err as Error).message);
throw err;
}
escrowOutputRef = escrowResult.escrowOutputRef;
escrowRefStr = refToString(escrowOutputRef);
this.emitProgress({ type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
// ── 2. Wait for the escrow tx to confirm ──────────────────────────
try {
await this.chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
} catch { /* mock providers / tests */ }
// ── 3. Re-fetch escrow datum to capture posted_at ─────────────────
try {
const escrowUtxo = await this.chain.queryUtxo(escrowOutputRef);
if (escrowUtxo && escrowUtxo.datumHex) {
const ed = decodeEscrowDatum(escrowUtxo.datumHex);
postedAtMs = ed.posted_at;
}
} catch { /* metadata best-effort */ }
if (!advertDatum) {
const reason = "advert datum unavailable after escrow post";
recordFailure(reason);
throw new ReceiptVerificationError(reason);
}
// ── 4. Call supplier /v1/ocr/extract ──────────────────────────────
const supplierBaseUrl = advertDatum.endpoint_url;
const supplierHttp = new HttpClient({
baseUrl: supplierBaseUrl,
fetch: this.fetchImpl,
});
const ocrBody = { image_b64, mime, output_format };
let ocrResult;
try {
ocrResult = await supplierHttp.postJson("/v1/ocr/extract", ocrBody, {
headers: { "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpError) {
const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
recordFailure(reason);
throw sErr;
}
recordFailure((err as Error).message);
throw err;
}
// 202 + poll mirror of submitTts's async handling. OCR inference for a
// page runs seconds; the long tail is the Submit tx confirmation.
if (ocrResult.status === 202 && ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object") {
const jobId = (ocrResult.body as { job_id?: string }).job_id;
if (typeof jobId !== "string" || jobId.length === 0) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier 202 response missing job_id",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;
const POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
const pollDeadline = Date.now() + POLL_TIMEOUT_MS;
let polled = ocrResult;
let firstIter = true;
while (Date.now() < pollDeadline) {
if (!firstIter) {
await new Promise<void>((r) => setTimeout(r, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
}
firstIter = false;
try {
polled = await supplierHttp.getJson(`/v1/ocr/extract/${jobId}`);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpError) {
const reason = err.kind === "timeout" ? "timeout" : "network_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(reason, { message: err.message });
recordFailure(reason);
throw sErr;
}
throw err;
}
if (polled.status === 200) break;
if (polled.status === 202) continue;
const failBody = (polled.body && typeof polled.body === "object")
? polled.body as { reason?: string; message?: string }
: {};
const sErr = new SupplierError(failBody.reason ?? "supplier_http_error", {
status: polled.status,
message: failBody.message ?? `supplier returned ${polled.status}`,
});
recordFailure(sErr.reason);
throw sErr;
}
if (polled.status !== 200) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("timeout", {
status: polled.status,
message: `supplier job ${jobId} not done within ${POLL_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`,
});
recordFailure("timeout");
throw sErr;
}
ocrResult = polled;
}
if (!ocrResult.ok) {
const bodyReason =
ocrResult.body && typeof ocrResult.body === "object"
? ((ocrResult.body as { reason?: string }).reason ?? "supplier_http_error")
: "supplier_http_error";
const sErr = new SupplierError(bodyReason, {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: `supplier returned ${ocrResult.status}`,
});
recordFailure(bodyReason);
throw sErr;
}
if (ocrResult.parseError || !ocrResult.body || typeof ocrResult.body !== "object") {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier body is not valid JSON",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const responseBody = ocrResult.body as {
output_format?: string;
content?: string;
usage?: { prompt_tokens?: number; completion_tokens?: number; total_tokens?: number };
receipt?: import("@marketplace/shared/receipt").Receipt;
receipt_signature?: string;
};
if (!responseBody.content || !responseBody.receipt || !responseBody.receipt_signature) {
const sErr = new SupplierError("malformed_response", {
status: ocrResult.status,
message: "supplier response is missing content / receipt / receipt_signature",
});
recordFailure("malformed_response");
throw sErr;
}
const receipt = responseBody.receipt;
const receiptSignature = responseBody.receipt_signature;
this.emitProgress({ type: "supplier_called", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
// ── 5. Receipt verification ───────────────────────────────────────
if (receipt.supplier_pkh !== advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
recordFailure("wrong_supplier");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_supplier");
}
if (receipt.escrow_ref !== escrowRefStr) {
recordFailure("wrong_escrow_ref");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("wrong_escrow_ref");
}
// The OCR prompt commitment uses the SAME canonical hash the supplier
// validated against the escrow datum. Recompute from the envelope we
// sent; a mismatch means the supplier signed a different request.
const expectedPromptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
if (receipt.prompt_hash !== expectedPromptHash) {
recordFailure("prompt_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("prompt_hash_mismatch");
}
if (receipt.model !== advertDatum.model) {
recordFailure("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("request_spec_hash_mismatch");
}
// The receipt's response_hash must commit the content we actually
// received in the requested output shape.
const expectedResponseHash = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256")
.update(canonicalize({
content: responseBody.content,
output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
}), "utf8")
.digest("hex");
if (receipt.response_hash !== expectedResponseHash) {
recordFailure("response_hash_mismatch");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("response_hash_mismatch");
}
if (typeof receiptSignature !== "string" || !SIG_RE.test(receiptSignature)) {
recordFailure("invalid_signature");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
}
if (receiptSignature === ZERO_SIGNATURE) {
recordFailure("invalid_signature");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("invalid_signature");
}
if (!HEX64_RE.test(receipt.prompt_hash) || !HEX64_RE.test(receipt.response_hash)) {
recordFailure("malformed_receipt");
throw new ReceiptVerificationError("malformed_receipt");
}
this.emitProgress({ type: "receipt_verified", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
this.historyStore.save({
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
prompt_preview: previewStr,
posted_at: postedAtMs,
status: "completed",
response: responseBody.content.length <= 200
? responseBody.content
: responseBody.content.slice(0, 200),
receipt,
receipt_signature: receiptSignature,
});
return {
output_format: responseBody.output_format ?? output_format,
content: responseBody.content,
usage: {
prompt_tokens: responseBody.usage?.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
completion_tokens: responseBody.usage?.completion_tokens ?? 0,
total_tokens: responseBody.usage?.total_tokens ?? 0,
},
receipt,
receiptSignature,
escrowRef: escrowOutputRef,
};
}
// ─── startChat / endChat — multi-turn llm.chat.v1 lifecycle ────────────
/**
@@ -899,7 +1176,13 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
}
this.emitProgress({ type: "chat_started", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
return { escrowRef: escrowOutputRef, sessionNonce, supplierBaseUrl: advertDatum.endpoint_url };
// Ticket-mode suppliers answer {status:"ticket"} (no Claim); anything else
// — "claimed" or an older supplier without the field — is full settlement.
const startStatus = startRes.body && typeof startRes.body === "object"
? (startRes.body as { status?: string }).status
: undefined;
const settleMode: ChatSettleMode = startStatus === "ticket" ? "ticket" : "full";
return { escrowRef: escrowOutputRef, sessionNonce, supplierBaseUrl: advertDatum.endpoint_url, settleMode };
}
/**
@@ -937,10 +1220,20 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
});
}
const endBody = endRes.body as {
status?: string;
settle_mode?: string;
receipt?: import("@marketplace/shared/receipt").Receipt;
receipt_signature?: string;
submitted_ref?: string;
};
// Ticket sessions produce no receipt and nothing to Accept — the Open
// escrow returns via reclaim after deliver_by. Trusting the supplier's
// response is incentive-safe: lying in either direction only forfeits the
// supplier's own payout (the buyer's sweeper reclaims unsettled escrows).
if (endBody.settle_mode === "ticket") {
this.emitProgress({ type: "chat_ended", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
return { settleMode: "ticket", escrowRef };
}
if (!endBody.receipt || !endBody.receipt_signature) {
throw new SupplierError("malformed_response", { message: "supplier end response missing receipt" });
}
@@ -1022,7 +1315,7 @@ export class Marketplace extends EventEmitterBase {
this.emitProgress({ type: "accept_submitted", escrow_ref: refToString(acceptedRef) });
this.emitProgress({ type: "chat_ended", escrow_ref: escrowRefStr });
return { receipt, receiptSignature, escrowRef, acceptedRef };
return { settleMode: "full", receipt, receiptSignature, escrowRef, acceptedRef };
}
// ─── acceptResult / reclaim ───────────────────────────────────────────

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ export type {
AcceptResultOptions,
ReclaimOptions,
GetTaskHistoryOptions,
ChatSettleMode,
StartChatResult,
EndChatResult,
} from "./types.js";
export { ReceiptVerificationError, IndexerError, SupplierError } from "./types.js";
export type { TaskHistoryStore } from "./history.js";

View File

@@ -187,6 +187,35 @@ export interface SubmitTtsResult {
escrowRef: OutputReference;
}
/**
* SubmitOcrOptions — arguments to Marketplace.submitOcr() for model-scoped
* `ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1` capabilities. The same `{image_b64,
* mime, output_format}` envelope is hashed (sha256 ∘ canonical) into the
* escrow datum's `prompt_hash` AND posted to the supplier's /v1/ocr/extract
* body, so the supplier can verify the request matches the on-chain commit.
*/
export interface SubmitOcrOptions {
advertRef: OutputReference;
image_b64: string; // plain base64, no data: prefix
mime: string; // image/png | image/jpeg | image/webp
output_format: string; // markdown | html | json
payment_lovelace: bigint;
}
/**
* SubmitOcrResult — returned from Marketplace.submitOcr() on success.
* `content` is the extraction in the requested output_format; the receipt's
* response_hash commits sha256(canonical({content, output_format})).
*/
export interface SubmitOcrResult {
output_format: string;
content: string;
usage: { prompt_tokens: number; completion_tokens: number; total_tokens: number };
receipt: Receipt;
receiptSignature: string;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
}
/**
* StartChatOptions / StartChatResult — Marketplace.startChat() for the
* `llm.chat.v1` capability. Opens the escrow (session-init prompt_hash) and
@@ -197,6 +226,11 @@ export interface StartChatOptions {
advertRef: OutputReference;
payment_lovelace: bigint;
}
/** Chain settlement mode a chat session runs under (reported by the supplier
* at /v1/chat/start): "full" = Claim/Submit/Accept lifecycle; "ticket" = the
* buyer's escrow post is the only chain op (reclaimed after deliver_by). */
export type ChatSettleMode = "full" | "ticket";
export interface StartChatResult {
escrowRef: OutputReference;
/** Random nonce committed into the escrow's session-init prompt_hash. The
@@ -204,6 +238,8 @@ export interface StartChatResult {
sessionNonce: string;
/** Supplier endpoint_url, cached by the buyer-app for message routing. */
supplierBaseUrl: string;
/** How the supplier settles this session ("full" when it Claimed). */
settleMode: ChatSettleMode;
}
/**
@@ -220,13 +256,21 @@ export interface EndChatOptions {
/** The browser's local transcript mirror, used to verify response_hash. */
transcript?: import("@marketplace/shared/tx").ChatMessage[];
}
export interface EndChatResult {
receipt: Receipt;
receiptSignature: string;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
/** The Submitted escrow UTxO that was Accepted. */
acceptedRef: OutputReference;
}
export type EndChatResult =
| {
settleMode: "full";
receipt: Receipt;
receiptSignature: string;
escrowRef: OutputReference;
/** The Submitted escrow UTxO that was Accepted. */
acceptedRef: OutputReference;
}
| {
/** Ticket session: nothing was Submitted/Accepted — no receipt exists.
* The Open escrow returns to the buyer via reclaim after deliver_by. */
settleMode: "ticket";
escrowRef: OutputReference;
};
/**
* AcceptResultOptions — arguments to Marketplace.acceptResult().

View File

@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ export interface AppDeps {
* brute-force rate-limit window. Defaults to Date.now. Tests use a fake
* clock to drive expiry and rolling-renewal assertions deterministically. */
nowMs?: () => number;
/** Public base URL of the OpenAI-compatible gateway, injected into the SPA
* boot block so the "Generate API key" page can POST cross-origin to
* `${gatewayUrl}/signup`. Public, non-secret value. When empty/omitted the
* SPA derives "api." + its own host. */
gatewayPublicUrl?: string;
/** PDF book summarizer job registry. When provided, the /v1/pdf-* routes
* are live; when omitted they respond 503 (feature disabled). Built in
* runMain from the same marketplace/chain/wallet/archive deps. */
@@ -680,9 +685,11 @@ export function createApp(deps: AppDeps): Express {
const DEMO_CHAT_MODEL = "moonshotai/kimi-k2.6";
function isChatMessageArray(v: unknown): v is ChatMessage[] {
// The free chat demo stays text-only: the `tool` role (added to
// ChatMessage for the gateway demo endpoint) is not accepted here.
return Array.isArray(v) && v.length > 0 && v.every(
(m) => m && typeof m === "object"
&& (["system", "user", "assistant"] as const).includes((m as ChatMessage).role)
&& ["system", "user", "assistant"].includes((m as ChatMessage).role)
&& typeof (m as ChatMessage).content === "string",
);
}
@@ -927,6 +934,14 @@ export function createApp(deps: AppDeps): Express {
supplierBaseUrl: state.supplierBaseUrl,
});
chatRouteState.delete(rawRef);
if (result.settleMode === "ticket") {
// Ticket session: no receipt/Accept — funds return via reclaim.
return res.status(200).json({
status: "ended",
escrow_ref: rawRef,
settle_mode: "ticket",
});
}
return res.status(200).json({
status: "accepted",
escrow_ref: rawRef,
@@ -1310,6 +1325,9 @@ export function createApp(deps: AppDeps): Express {
pubKeyHash: resolved.walletKey.pubKeyHash,
address: displayAddress,
},
// Public gateway base URL for the "Generate API key" page. Empty
// string when unconfigured — the SPA then derives "api." + host.
gatewayUrl: deps.gatewayPublicUrl ?? "",
})};</script>`
: "";
const indexWithBoot = cachedTemplate.replace(

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
* /tasks → <TaskHistory />
* /pending → <PendingReceipts /> UX-1: buyer-side Accept button
* /wallet → <Wallet />
* /api-keys → <ApiKeys /> self-serve gateway API key generation
*/
import { Routes, Route, Link } from "react-router-dom";
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import TaskHistory from "./pages/TaskHistory.js";
import Wallet from "./pages/Wallet.js";
import PendingReceipts from "./pages/PendingReceipts.js";
import BookSummarizer from "./pages/BookSummarizer.js";
import ApiKeys from "./pages/ApiKeys.js";
import { RequireAuth, useAuth } from "./state/AuthContext.js";
function SignOutButton() {
@@ -35,10 +37,13 @@ export default function App() {
<div className="min-h-screen bg-gray-50 text-gray-900">
<nav className="bg-white border-b border-gray-200 px-6 py-3 flex items-center gap-6">
<Link to="/" className="font-medium hover:underline">Dashboard</Link>
<Link to="/book" className="font-medium hover:underline">Book Summarizer</Link>
{/* Book Summarizer tab hidden for now — the /book route and all PDF
summarize code remain intact; restore by re-adding this link:
<Link to="/book" className="font-medium hover:underline">Book Summarizer</Link> */}
<Link to="/tasks" className="font-medium hover:underline">Tasks</Link>
<Link to="/pending" className="font-medium hover:underline">Pending</Link>
<Link to="/wallet" className="font-medium hover:underline">Wallet</Link>
<Link to="/api-keys" className="font-medium hover:underline">API Keys</Link>
<SignOutButton />
</nav>
<main className="p-6">
@@ -48,6 +53,7 @@ export default function App() {
<Route path="/tasks" element={<TaskHistory />} />
<Route path="/pending" element={<PendingReceipts />} />
<Route path="/wallet" element={<Wallet />} />
<Route path="/api-keys" element={<ApiKeys />} />
</Routes>
</main>
</div>

View File

@@ -267,7 +267,18 @@ export default function ChatForm({ advertRef, payment_lovelace }: ChatFormProps
} catch { /* keep fallback */ }
throw new Error(msg);
}
setCharged(payment_lovelace !== undefined ? ap3x(payment_lovelace) : "0");
let endBody: { settle_mode?: string } = {};
try {
endBody = (await resp.json()) as { settle_mode?: string };
} catch { /* older buyer-app responses stay full-settle */ }
// Ticket sessions never charge — the escrow returns via reclaim.
setCharged(
endBody.settle_mode === "ticket"
? "0 (ticket session — escrow reclaimed)"
: payment_lovelace !== undefined
? ap3x(payment_lovelace)
: "0",
);
} catch (err) {
setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
} finally {

View File

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ export default function JobEstimate({
<dd className="text-right">{est.mapCalls}</dd>
<dt>Reduce calls</dt>
<dd className="text-right">{est.reduceCalls}</dd>
<dt className="font-medium">Total paid calls</dt>
<dt className="font-medium">Total escrowed calls</dt>
<dd className="text-right font-medium">{est.totalCalls}</dd>
<dt className="font-medium">Est. max cost</dt>
<dd className="text-right font-medium">{est.totalAp3x} AP3X</dd>
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ export default function JobEstimate({
disabled={blocked || starting}
className="rounded bg-indigo-600 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white hover:bg-indigo-700 disabled:bg-gray-400"
>
{starting ? "Starting…" : `Proceed & pay (~${est.totalAp3x} AP3X)`}
{starting ? "Starting…" : `Proceed (locks ~${est.totalAp3x} AP3X in escrow)`}
</button>
</div>
);

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export default function PdfUploadForm({ onUploaded }: { onUploaded: (info: Uploa
return (
<form onSubmit={handleSubmit} className="space-y-4">
<p className="text-sm text-gray-600">
Upload a text-based PDF book. The buyer will chunk it and pay marketplace
Upload a text-based PDF book. The buyer will chunk it and commission marketplace
suppliers to summarize each chunk, then synthesize a full-book summary.
</p>
<input

32
buyer/src/ui/gateway.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
/**
* buyer/src/ui/gateway.ts — resolve the OpenAI-compatible gateway base URL the
* SPA should call for the "Generate API key" page.
*
* Resolution order:
* 1. window.__BUYER_BOOT__.gatewayUrl — injected by the buyer server from the
* GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL env (the configured value). Present on any page load
* made while the buyer_session cookie is valid.
* 2. Derived "api." + current host — the deploy convention is exactly
* api.<buyer-host> (marketplace.… → api.marketplace.…). This covers the
* gap right after a fresh login, when the SPA flips auth state WITHOUT a
* page reload so the boot block (which is only injected into
* server-rendered HTML) hasn't been re-fetched yet.
*
* The result never has a trailing slash.
*/
interface BuyerBootMaybeGateway {
gatewayUrl?: string;
}
function stripTrailingSlashes(url: string): string {
return url.replace(/\/+$/, "");
}
export function resolveGatewayUrl(): string {
const boot = (window as unknown as { __BUYER_BOOT__?: BuyerBootMaybeGateway })
.__BUYER_BOOT__;
const configured = boot?.gatewayUrl?.trim();
if (configured) return stripTrailingSlashes(configured);
return `${window.location.protocol}//api.${window.location.host}`;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
/**
* buyer/src/ui/pages/ApiKeys.tsx — self-serve "Generate API key" page.
*
* Mints a custodial gateway API key by POSTing directly to the gateway's
* public /signup endpoint (cross-origin; the gateway CORS-allows this origin).
* The raw key is shown ONCE — it is never stored server-side in retrievable
* form, so it cannot be listed or recovered later. The page also surfaces the
* funding deposit address and a ready-to-paste usage snippet.
*
* Access is gated by the SPA's existing operator login (this page only renders
* inside <RequireAuth>). The gateway /signup itself stays public + IP
* rate-limited; per-user accounts are a later feature.
*/
import { useState } from "react";
import { resolveGatewayUrl } from "../gateway.js";
interface SignupResult {
api_key: string;
key_prefix: string;
deposit_address: string;
}
/** Pull a human-readable message out of whatever error shape the gateway
* returns (OpenAI `{error:{message}}`, plain `{error|message}`, or neither). */
function errorMessage(body: unknown, status: number, statusText: string): string {
if (body && typeof body === "object") {
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
const err = b.error;
if (err && typeof err === "object" && typeof (err as Record<string, unknown>).message === "string") {
return (err as Record<string, string>).message;
}
if (typeof err === "string") return err;
if (typeof b.message === "string") return b.message;
}
return `${status} ${statusText}`.trim() || "request failed";
}
function CopyButton({ value, label }: { value: string; label?: string }) {
const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
return (
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => {
void navigator.clipboard
?.writeText(value)
.then(() => {
setCopied(true);
setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1500);
})
.catch(() => {
/* clipboard blocked (insecure context / permissions) — no-op */
});
}}
className="rounded border border-gray-300 px-2 py-0.5 text-xs text-gray-600 hover:bg-gray-50"
>
{copied ? "Copied!" : (label ?? "Copy")}
</button>
);
}
export default function ApiKeys() {
const [label, setLabel] = useState("");
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [result, setResult] = useState<SignupResult | null>(null);
const gatewayUrl = resolveGatewayUrl();
const baseUrl = `${gatewayUrl}/openai/v1`;
async function generate() {
setLoading(true);
setError(null);
setResult(null);
try {
const res = await fetch(`${gatewayUrl}/signup`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(label.trim() ? { label: label.trim() } : {}),
});
const body = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as unknown;
if (!res.ok) {
throw new Error(errorMessage(body, res.status, res.statusText));
}
const r = body as Partial<SignupResult> | null;
if (!r || typeof r.api_key !== "string" || typeof r.deposit_address !== "string") {
throw new Error("unexpected response from gateway");
}
setResult({
api_key: r.api_key,
key_prefix: r.key_prefix ?? r.api_key.slice(0, 12),
deposit_address: r.deposit_address,
});
} catch (e) {
setError(e instanceof Error ? e.message : "could not reach the gateway");
} finally {
setLoading(false);
}
}
const curlSnippet =
result === null
? ""
: [
`curl ${baseUrl}/chat/completions \\`,
` -H "Authorization: Bearer ${result.api_key}" \\`,
` -H "Content-Type: application/json" \\`,
` -d '{"model": "<model>", "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]}'`,
].join("\n");
return (
<div className="max-w-3xl space-y-6">
<div className="space-y-1">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">API Keys</h1>
<p className="text-sm text-gray-600">
Generate an OpenAI-compatible API key for the marketplace gateway. Each key has its own
gateway-managed wallet (the gateway holds this wallet's key) - fund its deposit address with AP3X, then point any OpenAI SDK at{" "}
<code className="font-mono text-xs">{baseUrl}</code>.
</p>
</div>
<div className="rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white p-4 space-y-3">
<label className="block text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">
Label <span className="font-normal text-gray-400">(optional)</span>
<input
type="text"
value={label}
onChange={(e) => setLabel(e.target.value)}
placeholder="e.g. my-laptop"
maxLength={120}
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded border border-gray-300 px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:border-gray-400 focus:outline-none disabled:opacity-50"
/>
</label>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => void generate()}
disabled={loading}
className="rounded bg-gray-900 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white hover:bg-gray-700 disabled:opacity-50"
data-testid="generate-api-key"
>
{loading ? "Generating…" : "Generate API key"}
</button>
{error !== null && (
<p className="text-sm text-red-600" data-testid="api-key-error">
{error}
</p>
)}
</div>
{result !== null && (
<div className="space-y-4 rounded-lg border border-amber-300 bg-amber-50 p-4" data-testid="api-key-result">
<div className="rounded border border-amber-400 bg-amber-100 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-amber-900">
Copy your API key now — it is shown <strong>only once</strong> and cannot be recovered. If you
lose it, generate a new one.
</div>
<div>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<span className="text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">API key</span>
<CopyButton value={result.api_key} />
</div>
<code className="mt-1 block break-all rounded bg-white px-3 py-2 font-mono text-sm">
{result.api_key}
</code>
</div>
<div>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<span className="text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">Deposit address (fund with AP3X)</span>
<CopyButton value={result.deposit_address} />
</div>
<code className="mt-1 block break-all rounded bg-white px-3 py-2 font-mono text-sm">
{result.deposit_address}
</code>
</div>
<div>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<span className="text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">Base URL</span>
<CopyButton value={baseUrl} />
</div>
<code className="mt-1 block break-all rounded bg-white px-3 py-2 font-mono text-sm">
{baseUrl}
</code>
</div>
<div>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<span className="text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">Quick start</span>
<CopyButton value={curlSnippet} />
</div>
<pre className="mt-1 overflow-x-auto rounded bg-gray-900 px-3 py-2 font-mono text-xs text-gray-100">
{curlSnippet}
</pre>
<p className="mt-1 text-xs text-gray-500">
Replace <code className="font-mono">&lt;model&gt;</code> with a model from{" "}
<code className="font-mono">{baseUrl}/models</code>.
</p>
</div>
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}

View File

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ export default function BookSummarizer() {
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Book Summarizer</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-500">
Upload a PDF → pay suppliers to summarize each chunk → get a full-book summary.
Upload a PDF → commission suppliers to summarize each chunk → get a full-book summary.
Jobs keep running if you navigate away; reopen them below.
</p>
</div>

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/**
* buyer/src/ui/pages/PendingReceipts.tsx — list of currently-Submitted escrows
* for this buyer, with an "Accept & Pay" action per row.
* for this buyer, with an "Accept & Settle" action per row.
*
* Data flow:
* GET /v1/pending-receipts → buyer-app server proxies indexer /escrows?buyer=<pkh>
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ export default function PendingReceipts() {
<th className="px-2 py-2">Submitted</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Supplier</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Capability</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Payment</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Escrowed</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Window left</th>
<th className="px-2 py-2">Action</th>
</tr>
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ export default function PendingReceipts() {
: "bg-indigo-600 text-white hover:bg-indigo-700")
}
>
{isAccepting ? "accepting…" : expired ? "expired" : "Accept & Pay"}
{isAccepting ? "accepting…" : expired ? "expired" : "Accept & Settle"}
</button>
)}
</td>

View File

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function LifecycleCard({ lc }: { lc: Lifecycle }): JSX.Element {
</>
)}
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.payment_lovelace)} payment</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.payment_lovelace)} escrowed</span>
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>
<span>{fmtAda(lc.buyer_bond_lovelace)} bond</span>
<span className="text-gray-500">·</span>

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ services:
# the response archive + PDF job store (past summaries) across container
# recreation/redeploys.
ARCHIVE_DIR: /repo/data/archive
# Public base URL of the OpenAI gateway, surfaced to the SPA boot block so
# the "API Keys" page can POST cross-origin to ${gatewayUrl}/signup. The
# gateway must CORS-allow https://marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org (see
# GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS in docker-compose.gateway.yml).
GATEWAY_PUBLIC_URL: https://api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org
# NETWORK_ID intentionally not pinned — see supplier compose comment.
volumes:
- buyer-mainnet-archive:/repo/data/archive

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,24 @@ services:
NETWORK_ID: "1"
GATEWAY_PORT: "8080"
GATEWAY_DB_DIR: /repo/data/gateway
# Mainnet chain genesis (slot↔wallclock). MUST match buyer/supplier or
# PostEscrow validity bounds land ~51 days off and Ogmios rejects (code 3118).
VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS: "1756485600000"
# On-chain reference-script UTxOs (escrow spending validator) used by
# Accept/Reclaim/Submit. Same values the buyer/suppliers use on mainnet.
ESCROW_REF_UTXO: c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#0
ADVERT_REF_UTXO: c8d84c6d67ec67a1efe5e9c6c06d53020e05d1bb96d1c55ecb1eb7d5010c4d54#1
# Browser Origins allowed to call the gateway cross-origin. The buyer
# frontend's "API Keys" page (served from marketplace.vector…) POSTs to
# /signup here. Comma-separated; empty disables CORS entirely.
GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS: https://marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org
# Ticket mode: the escrow post at session open is the only chain op;
# the sweeper reclaims Open escrows after deliver_by. Must match the
# kimi-chat suppliers' CHAT_SETTLE_MODE.
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
# Demo janitor closes idle sessions BEFORE the suppliers' 15 min
# CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS backstop.
DEMO_SESSION_IDLE_MS: "600000"
volumes:
- gateway-mainnet-data:/repo/data/gateway
healthcheck:
@@ -41,8 +59,18 @@ services:
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
# This host is NOT Cloudflare-proxied: traefik terminates TLS itself with
# a Let's Encrypt cert (resolver defined in /root/traefik/traefik.yml on
# the box). The :80 router only redirects; ACME HTTP-01 challenges are
# answered by traefik before the redirect applies.
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.rule=Host(`api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet.middlewares=mp-gateway-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-gateway-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-gateway-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`api.marketplace.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-gateway-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-gateway-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-1.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / DeepSeek V4 Flash #1)
#
# Parallel-capacity supplier for deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash via OpenRouter's
# OpenAI-compatible API. Same shape as the kimi replicas; distinct only in
# instance name, container, env file, Traefik host/router, and advert model.
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the kimi suppliers (accepted ceiling;
# supplier has no 429/backoff). Advert caps: max_output_tokens=262144,
# max_processing_ms=3600000; OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS matched.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-1 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX,
# OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-1
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-1
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-1
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Matches the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-1.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-2.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / DeepSeek V4 Flash #2)
#
# Parallel-capacity supplier for deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash via OpenRouter's
# OpenAI-compatible API. Same shape as the kimi replicas; distinct only in
# instance name, container, env file, Traefik host/router, and advert model.
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the kimi suppliers (accepted ceiling;
# supplier has no 429/backoff). Advert caps: max_output_tokens=262144,
# max_processing_ms=3600000; OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS matched.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-2 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX,
# OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-2
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-2
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-2
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Matches the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-2.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek-flash-3.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / DeepSeek V4 Flash #3)
#
# Parallel-capacity supplier for deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash via OpenRouter's
# OpenAI-compatible API. Same shape as the kimi replicas; distinct only in
# instance name, container, env file, Traefik host/router, and advert model.
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the kimi suppliers (accepted ceiling;
# supplier has no 429/backoff). Advert caps: max_output_tokens=262144,
# max_processing_ms=3600000; OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS matched.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-3 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX,
# OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS,
# ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-3
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-deepseek-flash-3
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-3
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Matches the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.deepseek-flash-3.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-flash-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-deepseek-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-1.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 1)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-1
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-1
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-1.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-1-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-2.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 2)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-2
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-2
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-2.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-ds-flash-chat-3.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / deepseek-v4-flash — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 3)
#
# Chat-session sibling of the deepseek-flash one-off suppliers. Same OpenRouter
# backend (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) but CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session so it
# mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}. Ticket settle mode (matches the mainnet
# gateway): the buyer's Open escrow post is the only chain op; the supplier
# never Claims/Submits; the gateway sweeper reclaims after deliver_by.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org -> host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded (advert post + fee float).
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 --price-lovelace 200000
# 4. supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3 written on host (chmod 600) with at least:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1, OPENAI_REASONING=off, OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=131072
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-3
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-ds-flash-chat-3
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so wallet-health/consolidate can broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL come from supplier/.env.ds-flash-chat-3.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-ds-flash-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-gpt-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-2.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / Kimi K2.6 replica #2)
#
# Parallel-capacity replica of supplier-kimi (OpenRouter, moonshotai/kimi-k2.6).
# Identical to docker-compose.supplier-kimi.yml except for the instance name,
# container name, env file, Traefik host/router, and OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS (raised
# to 3600000 to match this advert's max_processing_ms=3600000, max_output_tokens=262144).
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the other kimi suppliers (accepted
# concurrency ceiling; supplier has no 429/backoff).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.kimi-2 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY,
# OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-2
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-2
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.kimi-2
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Raised to match the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min) so the
# upstream call isn't aborted before the advertised processing deadline.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from supplier/.env.kimi-2 on the mainnet host (footgun avoidance).
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-3.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / Kimi K2.6 replica #3)
#
# Parallel-capacity replica of supplier-kimi (OpenRouter, moonshotai/kimi-k2.6).
# Identical to docker-compose.supplier-kimi.yml except for the instance name,
# container name, env file, Traefik host/router, and OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS (raised
# to 3600000 to match this advert's max_processing_ms=3600000, max_output_tokens=262144).
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the other kimi suppliers (accepted
# concurrency ceiling; supplier has no 429/backoff).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.kimi-3 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY,
# OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-3
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-3
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.kimi-3
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Raised to match the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min) so the
# upstream call isn't aborted before the advertised processing deadline.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from supplier/.env.kimi-3 on the mainnet host (footgun avoidance).
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-4.yml — Supplier — MAINNET (OpenRouter / Kimi K2.6 replica #4)
#
# Parallel-capacity replica of supplier-kimi (OpenRouter, moonshotai/kimi-k2.6).
# Identical to docker-compose.supplier-kimi.yml except for the instance name,
# container name, env file, Traefik host/router, and OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS (raised
# to 3600000 to match this advert's max_processing_ms=3600000, max_output_tokens=262144).
# Shares the same OpenRouter API key as the other kimi suppliers (accepted
# concurrency ceiling; supplier has no 429/backoff).
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS (proxied): mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org → host
# 2. supplier/.env.kimi-4 on host (chmod 600): SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY,
# OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1, VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO,
# ADVERT_REF, LIVE_CHAIN=1
# 3. Networks marketplace-mainnet-net + traefik-net already exist.
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-4
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-4
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.kimi-4
required: false
environment:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Raised to match the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min) so the
# upstream call isn't aborted before the advertised processing deadline.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from supplier/.env.kimi-4 on the mainnet host (footgun avoidance).
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-4.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-4-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat-2.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / Kimi K2.6 — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 2)
#
# Second llm.chat.v1 replica: a chat session holds a supplier's single slot for
# the whole conversation, so concurrent chat users = number of chat suppliers.
# Deployed for the shared-demo-key endpoint (session-backed /chat/completions).
# Identical to docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat.yml except for its own wallet,
# advert, env file and hostname.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org → host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded with advert bond + fee float.
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model moonshotai/kimi-k2.6
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 (same price as the primary chat advert)
# 4. supplier/.env.kimi-chat-2 written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-chat-2
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-chat-2
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.kimi-chat-2
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Kimi K2.6 generations can be slow; mirror the one-off Kimi compose.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# 2.5 min idle end: single-slot suppliers must free up quickly for the
# shared demo endpoint (the gateway transparently reopens on next turn).
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so Claim/Submit actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.kimi-chat-2 on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-2-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
# deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat-3.yml — Supplier — MAINNET
# (OpenRouter / Kimi K2.6 — MULTI-TURN CHAT capability `llm.chat.v1`, REPLICA 3)
#
# Third llm.chat.v1 replica: a chat session holds a supplier's single slot for
# the whole conversation, so concurrent chat users = number of chat suppliers.
# Deployed for the shared-demo-key endpoint (session-backed /chat/completions).
# Identical to docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat.yml except for its own wallet,
# advert, env file and hostname.
#
# Pre-flight:
# 1. DNS A-record: mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org → host IP
# 2. New supplier wallet (gen-keypair), funded with advert bond + fee float.
# 3. Post a fresh llm.chat.v1 advert for this wallet:
# --capability-id llm.chat.v1 --model moonshotai/kimi-k2.6
# --max-processing-ms 1800000 (same price as the primary chat advert)
# 4. supplier/.env.kimi-chat-3 written on host (chmod 600) with at minimum:
# SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, OPENAI_API_KEY, OGMIOS_URL, NETWORK_ID=1,
# VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS, ESCROW_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF_UTXO, ADVERT_REF,
# LIVE_CHAIN=1
name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-chat-3
services:
supplier:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: supplier/Dockerfile
container_name: marketplace-mainnet-supplier-kimi-chat-3
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- path: ../../supplier/.env.kimi-chat-3
required: false
environment:
# Multi-turn chat session capability (mounts /v1/chat/{start,message,end}).
CAPABILITY_KIND: chat-session
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Kimi K2.6 generations can be slow; mirror the one-off Kimi compose.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# 2.5 min idle end: single-slot suppliers must free up quickly for the
# shared demo endpoint (the gateway transparently reopens on next turn).
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so Claim/Submit actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
# NETWORK_ID and OGMIOS_URL intentionally not pinned here — they MUST
# come from the operator-provided supplier/.env.kimi-chat-3 on a mainnet host.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null || exit 1"]
interval: 20s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
networks:
- marketplace-mainnet-net
- traefik-net
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-3-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
networks:
marketplace-mainnet-net:
external: true
name: marketplace-mainnet-net
traefik-net:
external: true
name: traefik-net

View File

@@ -49,8 +49,12 @@ services:
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Kimi K2.6 generations can be slow; mirror the one-off Kimi compose.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# Auto-end an idle session after 5 min (supplier Submits the transcript).
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# 2.5 min idle end (supplier Submits the transcript): single-slot
# suppliers must free up quickly for the shared demo endpoint (the
# gateway transparently reopens a session on the next turn).
CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: "900000"
CHAT_SETTLE_MODE: ticket
MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS: "8"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so Claim/Submit actually broadcast.
LIVE_CHAIN: "1"
@@ -70,6 +74,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi-chat.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-chat-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ services:
LLM_BACKEND: openai
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/openai.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://openrouter.ai/api
# Kimi K2.6 generations can be slow; mirror the DeepSeek/GPT composes.
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "300000"
# Raised to match the advert's max_processing_ms=3600000 (60 min) so the
# upstream call isn't aborted before the advertised processing deadline
# (matches the kimi-2/3/4 replicas).
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"
PORT: "8080"
# Enable LiveOgmiosProvider so submitTx/awaitTx actually broadcast.
# Without this the supplier silently falls back to ReadOnlyOgmiosProvider
@@ -73,6 +75,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-kimi.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-kimi-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers-tts.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-tts-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ services:
- "traefik.docker.network=traefik-net"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.entrypoints=web"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet.middlewares=mp-suppliers-mainnet-https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https"
- "traefik.http.middlewares.mp-suppliers-mainnet-https.redirectscheme.permanent=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.rule=Host(`mp-suppliers.vector.apexfusion.org`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.mp-suppliers-mainnet-tls.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
- "traefik.http.services.mp-suppliers-mainnet.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
logging:
driver: json-file

View File

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
## 1. Goal and scope
**What this is.** A two-sided marketplace where buyers (agents or humans) submit prompts to suppliers running inference on their own hardware, pay with AP3X via on-chain bonded escrow on Vector L2, and receive signed-receipt responses. The primary validation goal is **technical feasibility + lifecycle** ("can it be done end-to-end"), not demand modelling or economic stress testing.
**What this is.** A two-sided marketplace where buyers (agents or humans) submit prompts to suppliers running inference on their own hardware, with each job settled in AP3X through on-chain bonded escrow on Vector L2, and receive signed-receipt responses. The primary validation goal is **technical feasibility + lifecycle** ("can it be done end-to-end"), not demand modelling or economic stress testing.
**What v1 is NOT.**
- Not agentic on the supplier side. Suppliers answer single prompts. Buyer agents drive multiple prompts.
- Not LLM-only in design. Capability model is open from day 1 (whisper / kokoro / image generation are planned siblings), but the first supplier is an LLM.
- Not multi-slot. Single-slot per supplier process. Multi-capability operators run multiple processes.
- Not multi-chain. Vector testnet first, mainnet later. Masumi / Sokosumi / USDM is target #2 (adapter, not fork).
- Not multi-chain. Vector only (testnet and mainnet).
- Not disputed. M1 ships happy-path escrow only. Module-1 disputes wire in M2.
- Not streaming. `stream: true` is rejected by suppliers.
- Not tool-calling. `tools` / `tool_choice` / `functions` are rejected by suppliers.
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
| # | Decision |
|---|---|
| 1 | Payment token: **AP3X** (Vector testnet, later mainnet). Masumi = USDM, target #2. |
| 1 | Settlement asset: **AP3X**, bonded in escrow; jobs settle in AP3X on accepted work. |
| 2 | v1 scope: **Option C** — happy-path escrow only, no disputes. Module-1 wiring is milestone 2. |
| 3 | Module-1 contract source: TBD — to be located or restored before M2. Not blocking M0–M1. |
| 4 | Evidence: **signed receipt** `{prompt_hash, response_hash, model, tokens, wallclock}` + Ed25519 supplier signature. Hash on-chain, plaintext off-chain. |
@@ -283,7 +283,6 @@ Malformed datum · escrow to wrong script · supplier claims escrow addressed to
| **M1** | Happy-path end-to-end, Hetzner CPU supplier | 2–3 wks | `qwen2.5:0.5b` on Hetzner, buyer posts → supplier claims → submits → buyer accepts; full Vector testnet lifecycle; indexer serves discovery |
| **M2** | Module-1 dispute wiring | 2–3 wks post-M1 | Contract source located; supplier=claimer / buyer=auditor mapping; Dispute state; evidence URI; mainnet-dry-run lifecycle |
| **M3** | Capability expansion + local lab | 2–4 wks (may overlap M2) | `speech.transcribe.v1` via Whisper live; local-lab GPU supplier with larger model; heterogeneous discovery validated |
| **M4** | Masumi / Sokosumi adapter | later | MIP-003 HTTP shim; MIP-002 NFT registration; USDM payment path; Sokosumi listing |
## 9. Open follow-ups (not blocking M0 / M1)
@@ -310,5 +309,3 @@ Malformed datum · escrow to wrong script · supplier claims escrow addressed to
- Apex-dashboard CBOR decoders: `apex-dashboard/server/cbor-decoder.ts`
- Apex-dashboard test discipline: `apex-dashboard/tests/`
- Prior Python reference (AP3X buyer/supplier): `./docs/buyer/`, `./docs/supplier/`
- Masumi docs: https://docs.masumi.network/
- MIP-003 spec: https://docs.masumi.network/mips/_mip-003

View File

@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
---
marp: true
paginate: true
size: 16:9
---
<!--
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.md — slide-style overview of the Local Agents Marketplace.
Build PDF + PPTX with: bash docs/build-deck.sh
Edit this file; mermaid blocks are pre-rendered to docs/img/diagram-*.png.
-->
<style>
/* ── Local Agents Marketplace — unified dark theme ────────────────────
* Every slide uses the same navy→indigo gradient as the title slide so
* the deck reads as one continuous document. Title and closing slides
* keep the centered hero treatment; content slides stay top-aligned but
* share the same palette and accent rules. */
:root {
--ink: #f1f5f9; /* primary text on dark gradient */
--muted: #94a3b8;
--accent: #818cf8; /* indigo-400, readable on the dark gradient */
--accent-deep: #4f46e5; /* used for solid accents (h2 bar, table head) */
--accent-soft: rgba(129,140,248,0.12);
--gradient: linear-gradient(135deg, #0f172a 0%, #1e293b 50%, #312e81 100%);
--row-even: rgba(255,255,255,0.04);
--row-odd: rgba(255,255,255,0.02);
--border: rgba(255,255,255,0.10);
}
section {
background: var(--gradient);
color: var(--ink);
font-family: 'Inter', 'Segoe UI', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
font-size: 22px;
padding: 40px 60px;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
justify-content: flex-start;
}
section::after {
content: attr(data-marpit-pagination) ' / ' attr(data-marpit-pagination-total);
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 13px;
}
h1 {
font-size: 48px;
font-weight: 700;
color: #ffffff;
border-bottom: 4px solid var(--accent);
padding-bottom: 10px;
margin: 0 0 18px 0;
}
h2 {
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object-fit: contain;
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</style>
<!-- _class: title -->
# Local Agents Marketplace
### A trust-minimised, on-chain marketplace for LLM inference
Buy and sell prompt → response with **bonded escrow** on **Vector** (UTxO).
No platform fee. No central rate-limiter. Verifiable receipts on chain.
> *Status: M1 lifecycle proven end-to-end on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05.*
---
## The problem
* AI inference is **centralised** — a handful of providers, opaque pricing, account-level rate limits.
* Local-AI hardware is **idle most of the time** — GPUs and CPUs sit unused between user prompts.
* Buyers and sellers can't transact directly without a **trusted intermediary** taking a cut.
* "Verifiable" claims about which model ran are usually nothing more than the provider's word.
We need a **two-sided marketplace** where:
1. Sellers monetise spare compute,
2. Buyers get a **cryptographic receipt** of what was actually computed,
3. **Neither side has to trust the other** — bonds + on-chain settlement enforce honesty.
---
## How it works — three actors, one chain
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph CHAIN[Vector — UTxO]
ADV[Advert UTxO<br/>capability, price, bonds]
ESC[Escrow UTxO<br/>locked funds + state]
end
SUP[🧠 Supplier<br/>local LLM node]
BUY[💼 Buyer<br/>app or agent]
IDX[🔭 Indexer<br/>read-only bulletin board]
SUP -->|publish advert| ADV
BUY -->|discover| IDX
IDX -.->|index events| CHAIN
BUY -->|post escrow| ESC
BUY -->|prompt + escrow_ref| SUP
SUP -->|signed receipt| BUY
SUP -->|claim & submit| ESC
BUY -->|accept & pay| ESC
```
* **Supplier** runs the inference and publishes a price.
* **Buyer** posts the work as a bonded escrow, sends the prompt, accepts the receipt.
* **Indexer** is a public mirror of chain state — anyone can run one. No platform middleman.
---
## The bonded-escrow lifecycle
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant B as Buyer
participant Chain as Vector
participant S as Supplier
participant LLM as Local LLM<br/>(OpenAI-compatible)
S->>Chain: PostAdvert (locks supplier_bond)
B->>Chain: PostEscrow → Open<br/>(locks payment + bonds)
B->>S: POST /v1/chat/completions
S->>Chain: ClaimEscrow → Claimed
S->>LLM: run inference
LLM-->>S: assistant message
S->>Chain: SubmitEscrow → Submitted
S-->>B: 200 OK + signed receipt
B->>Chain: AcceptEscrow — supplier paid
```
Every transition is on-chain, validated by an Aiken Plutus V3 script. The receipt is signed by the supplier's advert key; prompt and response hashes are bound on chain.
---
## What if someone misbehaves?
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPEN[Open]:::norm --> CLAIMED[Claimed]:::norm --> SUBMITTED[Submitted]:::norm --> ACCEPTED[Accepted ✓]:::good
OPEN -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM[Reclaimed<br/>buyer recovers funds]:::warn
CLAIMED -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM
SUBMITTED -->|accept_window passed| RELEASE[Released<br/>supplier collects]:::warn
classDef norm fill:#e0e7ff,stroke:#4f46e5
classDef good fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a
classDef warn fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706
```
| Failure mode | Recovery | Loss bearer |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier never claims/submits | Buyer **Reclaim** after `deliver_by` | Supplier — forfeits supplier_bond |
| Buyer disappears after Submit | Supplier **Release** after `submitted_at + 10 min` | Buyer — forfeits buyer_bond |
Bonds make honesty cheaper than running away. Both sides have skin in the game; no third-party arbiter is needed for the M1 happy/timeout paths.
---
## Local-agent versatility — any OpenAI-compatible engine
<div class="pipeline">
<span>💼 Buyer</span> →
<span>🧠 Supplier (OpenAI-compatible HTTP wrapper)</span> →
<span>backend ↓</span>
</div>
<div class="backends">
<div class="tile">Ollama<br/><small>local model runner</small></div>
<div class="tile">vLLM<br/><small>high-throughput GPU</small></div>
<div class="tile">llama.cpp<br/><small>CPU · Metal · ROCm</small></div>
<div class="tile">OpenRouter<br/><small>cloud API mux</small></div>
<div class="tile">openclaw / custom<br/><small>arbitrary stack</small></div>
<div class="tile dots">…<br/><small>any OpenAI-shaped API</small></div>
</div>
The supplier service is a thin HTTP wrapper — it forwards `/v1/chat/completions` to whatever backend is configured. Each supplier picks its own model, hardware, and engine, then advertises a `capability_id`. Buyers shop on capability + model + price.
---
## Capability + model = task selection
| Capability ID | Example models | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| `llm.text.generate.v1` | Llama 3 · Qwen 2.5 · Mistral · GPT-4 | Q&A, drafts, summarisation |
| `code.completion.v1` | Codestral · DeepSeek-Coder · StarCoder | IDE tab-complete, refactor |
| `vision.describe.v1` | LLaVA · Qwen-VL · Pixtral | Image captioning, OCR |
| `embedding.text.v1` | nomic-embed · BGE · ada-002 | RAG indexing |
| `audio.transcribe.v1` | whisper-large-v3 · distil-whisper | Voice-to-text |
| `…` | … | … |
* New capabilities = **just publish a new advert**. No marketplace governance gate.
* Today's deploy uses Ollama + Qwen 2.5; switching to vLLM with Llama 3 70B is a config change, not a code change.
---
## OpenClaw — agentic teams on your existing OpenAI seat
<div class="pipeline">
<span>🧠 Supplier wrapper</span> →
<span>🦾 OpenClaw</span> →
<span>🪪 OpenAI ChatGPT seat (flat-rate)</span>
</div>
* **Cost-efficient by default.** OpenClaw exposes your existing **OpenAI ChatGPT subscription** as an OpenAI-compatible API. The marketplace supplier dispatches its inference against it, so an entire **agentic team** (coders, QA automation testers, release curators…) draws from the **flat-rate seat you already pay for** — no per-token metering, no surprise invoices.
* **Reliability layer (optional, marginal cost).** OpenClaw can fall back to the **Anthropic API** or **OpenRouter** model pool when the primary seat is rate-limited, the prompt requires a different model, or you want a **second-layer hardening** of responses (e.g. cross-provider consensus on critical outputs). You only pay metered tokens for the requests that actually fall through.
---
## Proven on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05
| Step | Tx hash |
|---|---|
| Buyer posts escrow | `af762561…c2f7bc5` |
| Supplier claims | (lifecycle tx) |
| Supplier submits receipt | (lifecycle tx) |
| Buyer accepts | `125e3cfe…7dc100d` |
Funds flowed correctly: supplier received `payment + supplier_bond` (3 ADA); buyer got `buyer_bond` back.
* **Browser demo:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Live event stream:** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Test suite:** 1098 unit tests passing, full lifecycle exercised in CI.
---
## Why UTxO + Vector
* **Bonded escrow is native** — Plutus validators enforce the state machine without a custom token or oracle.
* **Vector settles in seconds** — the buyer→claim→submit→accept loop fits inside a single chat-completion's wall clock.
* **AP3X token** for fees and bonds — fungible, transparent, on-chain.
* **No custom rollup, no bridge** — runs on a production chain today.
---
<!-- _class: closing -->
## The pitch in one sentence
> Local Agents Marketplace turns any OpenAI-compatible inference endpoint into a **trustlessly billable service** — buyer and supplier exchange prompt, response, and payment with on-chain proof that what was paid for is what was delivered.
### Try it
* **Indexer (live event stream):** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Buyer:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Supplier:** https://mp-suppliers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org/capability

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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# Vector Buyer App
A self-contained app for purchasing AI compute on the Vector L2 testnet (Cardano). You submit prompts, pay with AP3X tokens via on-chain escrow, and receive LLM responses from supplier nodes.
A self-contained app for commissioning AI compute on the Vector L2 testnet. You submit prompts, bond AP3X in on-chain escrow, and receive LLM responses from supplier nodes; the escrow settles in AP3X on accepted work.
## How It Works
1. You type a **prompt** and set a **payment** amount in the web UI
2. The app posts an **escrow transaction** on-chain, locking your payment + bond
1. You type a **prompt** and set a **price** in the web UI
2. The app posts an **escrow transaction** on-chain, locking price + bond
3. The app sends the task to a **supplier node** via HTTP
4. The supplier calls an LLM, **claims** the escrow, and **submits** the result hash on-chain
5. You see the response in the UI and can **accept** to release payment, or **dispute**
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ If you accept the result, you get your 1 AP3X bond back. Total cost = payment +
- **Never share your .env file** - it contains your wallet seed phrase
- **Never share your data/ folder** - it contains task history
- The seed phrase controls your wallet funds. Back it up securely.
- Escrow protects you: the supplier cannot take your funds without delivering a result
- The seed phrase controls your wallet. Back it up securely.
- Escrow protects you: the supplier cannot take your escrowed value without delivering a result
- You have a 10-minute dispute window after receiving a result
## Troubleshooting

View File

@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ The audit confirmed 39 holes in the first draft (10 distinct themes). This docum
| One-shot | `/openai/v1/chat/completions` → `llm.text.generate.v1`, 1 escrow/call, buffered (+ pseudo-stream) |
| Chat session | `/openai/v1/chat/sessions*` → `llm.chat.v1`, 1 escrow/**session**, real SSE per turn, settle at close |
| Routing | match `model` + required capability; pick an available supplier (status `free`\|`unknown`); **not cheapest**; fallback to next match on busy/offline |
| Pricing | cost = matched supplier `price_lovelace`; **required balance = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5 ADA collateral + fee reserve** |
| Wallet health | gateway **auto-consolidates** each wallet to `{5-ADA collateral, working}` after settle / on a tick |
| Pricing | cost = matched supplier `price_lovelace`; **required balance = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5 AP3X collateral + fee reserve** |
| Wallet health | gateway **auto-consolidates** each wallet to `{5-AP3X collateral, working}` after settle / on a tick |
| Settlement | resolve the **Submitted** ref via indexer, `acceptResult`, **await confirm** before returning success; sweeper is backstop |
| Sweeper | state-aware: Open/Claimed past `deliver_by` → reclaim; Submitted → retry Accept in-window; never blind-reclaim Submitted |
| Response | OpenAI object `{id, object, created, model, choices, usage}` + `x_vector:{receipt, receipt_signature, escrow_ref}`; full streaming chunk transform + final usage chunk |
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ New standalone pnpm package `gateway/` (add to `pnpm-workspace.yaml`). Boots **o
- SDK methods: `discoverSuppliers`, `submitPrompt` (`Marketplace.ts:242`, verifies receipt but **does not settle**), `startChat`/`endChat` (chat session; `endChat` returns `acceptedRef` and awaits Accept), `acceptResult`, `reclaim`.
- Escrow value/bonds: buyer funds `totalLocked = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond` at PostEscrow — `packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postEscrow.ts:132-200`. On Accept supplier gets `payment+supplier_bond`, buyer gets `buyer_bond` back.
- Submitted-ref resolution: the buyer `/v1/accept` queries the indexer and matches the Submitted row by `posted_at` — `buyer/src/server.ts` `/v1/accept`. Gateway must mirror this.
- Wallet health: `planConsolidate` / `consolidateWallet` (`{collateral, working}` shape, `DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5 ADA`) — `packages/shared/src/tx/wallet/`. Collateral assertion: `assertCollateralCandidate` — `packages/shared/src/tx/internal/liveCbor.ts`.
- Wallet health: `planConsolidate` / `consolidateWallet` (`{collateral, working}` shape, `DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5 AP3X`) — `packages/shared/src/tx/wallet/`. Collateral assertion: `assertCollateralCandidate` — `packages/shared/src/tx/internal/liveCbor.ts`.
- Supplier chat-session SSE `{type:"token"|"done"|"error"}` + headers — `supplier/src/server.ts` `makeChatSessionHandlers`; buyer relay in `buyer/src/server.ts` `/v1/chat/message` (note: **verbatim** passthrough — the gateway must transform to OpenAI chunks).
- SQLite pattern (`better-sqlite3`, WAL) — `buyer/src/db/archive.ts`. Auth helpers `timingSafeCompareStrings`, `createRateLimiter` — `buyer/src/auth.ts`.
- Indexer `SupplierView` (`model`, `capability_id`, `price_lovelace`, `buyer_bond_lovelace`, `supplier_bond_lovelace`, `status` free/working/offline/unknown, `advert_status`) — `indexer/src/routes/suppliers.ts`.
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Raw API key never persisted (only `sha256(key)`); `key_prefix` for display. `mas
## Request lifecycle — one-shot `/chat/completions`
All on-chain steps run inside the per-key `mutex.run(...)`.
1. **Route** (`selectSupplier`): indexer rows where `model` matches, `capability_id==="llm.text.generate.v1"`, `advert_status==="Active"`, live `status ∈ {free, unknown}`. Pick an available one (not cheapest). No match → 404 `model_not_found` (`type: invalid_request_error`).
2. **Pre-flight**: required = `price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5_000_000 (collateral) + ~2 AP3X fee`. Verify total balance **and** a pure-ADA UTxO ≥5 ADA exists (`assertCollateralCandidate`-style). Else 402 `insufficient_funds` + `x_vector:{required_lovelace, available_lovelace, collateral_ok, deposit_address}`.
2. **Pre-flight**: required = `price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + 5_000_000 (collateral) + ~2 AP3X fee`. Verify total balance **and** a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥5 AP3X exists (`assertCollateralCandidate`-style). Else 402 `insufficient_funds` + `x_vector:{required_lovelace, available_lovelace, collateral_ok, deposit_address}`.
3. **Execute**: `submitPrompt({advertRef, messages, payment_lovelace:price, max_output_tokens})` (posts escrow → supplier → verifies receipt).
4. **Settle**: resolve the **Submitted** escrow ref via the indexer (mirror buyer `/v1/accept`: match by buyer pkh + `posted_at`), `acceptResult(submittedRef)`, **await confirmation**. On 409/offline mid-route, retry next matching supplier (bounded). On any post-escrow failure, record + leave for the sweeper (don't block the response on reclaim).
5. **Respond**: `{id:"chatcmpl-…", object:"chat.completion", created:<sec>, model, choices:[{index:0,message:{role:"assistant",content},finish_reason:"stop"}], usage:{prompt_tokens,completion_tokens,total_tokens}, x_vector:{receipt,receipt_signature,escrow_ref}}`. Record `usage`.
@@ -113,9 +113,15 @@ All on-chain steps run inside the per-key `mutex.run(...)`.
- **close** → `endChat` (Submit + Accept, awaits) → settle + bond refund; record usage; wallet-health.
- Sessions are reclaimable by the sweeper if abandoned before close.
### Settle modes (`CHAT_SETTLE_MODE`, gateway + supplier, default `full`)
- **full** — the lifecycle above: supplier Claims at start, Submits a transcript receipt at end, gateway Accepts (buyer charged).
- **ticket** — the buyer's escrow post at open is the ONLY chain op. The supplier verifies the Open escrow as an entry ticket (`/v1/chat/start` → `{status:"ticket"}`) but never Claims/Submits; `/v1/chat/end` → `{status:"ended", settle_mode:"ticket"}` with no receipt; the sweeper Reclaims the Open escrow after `deliver_by`, returning all locked funds (net cost ≈ tx fees). Usage rows record `cost_lovelace: 0`. Sessions may outlive `deliver_by` (no hard-cap) — a live session whose ticket got reclaimed keeps running; only the idle janitor/close ends it. Close behavior is driven per-session by the supplier's `/end` response, so mixed-mode rollout windows settle correctly.
- Ticket caveats (accepted, demo-grade): a supplier restart forgets used tickets, so an unexpired un-reclaimed escrow ref could reopen a session (bounded by `deliver_by` + the sweep); `/account.locked_in_escrow_lovelace` over-reports because the indexer never updates spent rows.
- Suppliers additionally take `MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS` (default 1) — concurrent session slots; `/status` reports `active_sessions`/`max_sessions` and stays `free` until all slots are taken.
## Sweeper & wallet-health
- **Sweeper** (interval ~60s): per key, classify escrows. Open/Claimed past `deliver_by` → `reclaim`. Submitted **with a verified receipt** still in accept-window → retry `acceptResult`. Submitted past accept-window → leave for supplier Release (log). Never blind-`reclaim` Submitted.
- **Wallet-health tick**: periodically + after each settle, `planConsolidate` → `consolidateWallet` so every wallet keeps a ≥5 ADA collateral UTxO. Skip if already healthy.
- **Wallet-health tick**: periodically + after each settle, `planConsolidate` → `consolidateWallet` so every wallet keeps a ≥5 AP3X collateral UTxO. Skip if already healthy.
## Errors (OpenAI shape `{error:{message, type, code, param:null}}`)
no supplier → 404 `invalid_request_error`/`model_not_found`; underfunded/no-collateral → 402 `invalid_request_error`/`insufficient_funds`; bad/missing key → 401 `authentication_error`/`invalid_api_key`; rate limit → 429 `rate_limit_error` + `Retry-After`; supplier timeout → 504 `server_error`; supplier busy race (after retries) → 503 `server_error`/`overloaded`; receipt verify → 502 `server_error`/`receipt_verification_failed`; tx build → 409/502 `server_error`/`escrow_failed`; unsupported `tools`/`functions` → 400 `invalid_request_error`/`unsupported_parameter`.
@@ -139,7 +145,7 @@ Real billing/markup & fee hook; trustless/self-custody recovery; multi-funding-U
## Verification (testnet, end-to-end)
1. Indexer + Ogmios + ≥1 `llm.text.generate.v1` and ≥1 `llm.chat.v1` supplier for the same `model`, Active.
2. Boot gateway: `LIVE_CHAIN=1`, `GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)`, `OGMIOS_URL`, `INDEXER_URL`, `NETWORK_ID`, `GATEWAY_DB_DIR`, `GATEWAY_PORT`.
3. `POST /signup` → key + deposit address. Fund ≥ price + both bonds + 5 ADA collateral + ~2 ADA fees; confirm via `GET /account` (`collateral_ok:true`).
3. `POST /signup` → key + deposit address. Fund ≥ price + both bonds + 5 AP3X collateral + ~2 AP3X fees; confirm via `GET /account` (`collateral_ok:true`).
4. One-shot non-stream via curl and via the OpenAI Python/JS SDK (`base_url=…/openai/v1`) → valid `chat.completion` + `x_vector`; confirm the escrow **settled (Accepted)** and a `usage` row exists.
5. **Run a 2nd and 3rd request** → confirm wallet-health kept `collateral_ok` and they succeed (the audit's request-#2 failure must not reproduce).
6. One-shot `stream:true` → chunks + final usage + `[DONE]`.

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@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
---
marp: true
paginate: true
size: 16:9
---
<!--
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.md — slide-style overview of the Local Agents Marketplace.
Build PDF + PPTX with: bash docs/build-deck.sh
Edit this file; mermaid blocks are pre-rendered to docs/img/diagram-*.png.
-->
<style>
/* ── Local Agents Marketplace — unified dark theme ────────────────────
* Every slide uses the same navy→indigo gradient as the title slide so
* the deck reads as one continuous document. Title and closing slides
* keep the centered hero treatment; content slides stay top-aligned but
* share the same palette and accent rules. */
:root {
--ink: #f1f5f9; /* primary text on dark gradient */
--muted: #94a3b8;
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--accent-deep: #4f46e5; /* used for solid accents (h2 bar, table head) */
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color: var(--ink);
font-family: 'Inter', 'Segoe UI', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
font-size: 22px;
padding: 40px 60px;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
justify-content: flex-start;
}
section::after {
content: attr(data-marpit-pagination) ' / ' attr(data-marpit-pagination-total);
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 13px;
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h1 {
font-size: 48px;
font-weight: 700;
color: #ffffff;
border-bottom: 4px solid var(--accent);
padding-bottom: 10px;
margin: 0 0 18px 0;
}
h2 {
font-size: 34px;
font-weight: 700;
color: #ffffff;
margin: 0 0 14px 0;
}
h2::before {
content: '';
display: inline-block;
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height: 28px;
background: var(--accent);
margin-right: 14px;
vertical-align: middle;
border-radius: 2px;
}
h3 { color: #c7d2fe; font-weight: 600; font-size: 24px; margin: 8px 0; }
p, li { margin: 6px 0; line-height: 1.45; }
ul, ol { margin: 8px 0 12px 0; padding-left: 28px; }
strong { color: #ffffff; }
a { color: #a5b4fc; }
blockquote {
border-left: 4px solid var(--accent);
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.06);
padding: 10px 18px;
color: #e0e7ff;
border-radius: 0 8px 8px 0;
margin: 10px 0;
}
code {
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.10);
color: #e0e7ff;
padding: 2px 6px;
border-radius: 4px;
font-size: 0.9em;
}
/* Constrain mermaid images so they always fit on a 720px-tall slide
* (16:9 @ 1280×720 default). Soft white card behind the diagram so the
* mermaid SVG (which renders on a transparent canvas with dark ink)
* stays readable on the navy gradient. */
img {
display: block;
margin: 8px auto;
max-width: 92%;
max-height: 420px;
object-fit: contain;
background: #ffffff;
border-radius: 10px;
padding: 10px;
box-shadow: 0 4px 16px rgba(0,0,0,0.25);
}
/* Tile grid for the local-agent versatility slide. */
.backends {
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr);
gap: 14px;
margin: 14px 0 12px 0;
}
.tile {
background: var(--accent-soft);
border: 2px solid var(--accent);
border-radius: 10px;
padding: 14px 16px;
text-align: center;
font-weight: 600;
color: #ffffff;
}
.tile small {
display: block;
margin-top: 4px;
font-weight: 400;
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 0.8em;
}
.tile.dots {
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.04);
border-style: dashed;
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 28px;
}
.pipeline {
text-align: center;
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.08);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
color: #f8fafc;
padding: 12px 18px;
border-radius: 10px;
margin: 6px auto 14px auto;
max-width: 760px;
font-weight: 600;
}
.pipeline span {
display: inline-block;
margin: 0 10px;
}
/* Tables sit on a solid white card so cell text reads cleanly against
* the dark gradient backdrop. Rounded outer corners + shadow match the
* mermaid card styling. `display:table` + `table-layout:fixed` are
* needed so the table actually consumes the full slide width — Marp's
* default theme leaves tables at content-natural width, which left
* blank gutters on either side. */
table {
display: table !important;
width: 100% !important;
table-layout: fixed;
border-collapse: collapse;
margin: 12px 0;
font-size: 0.82em;
color: #0f172a;
background: #ffffff;
border-radius: 10px;
overflow: hidden;
box-shadow: 0 4px 16px rgba(0,0,0,0.25);
}
td, th { word-wrap: break-word; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
th {
background: var(--accent-deep);
color: #ffffff;
text-align: left;
padding: 9px 12px;
font-weight: 700;
}
td {
padding: 7px 12px;
border-bottom: 1px solid #e2e8f0;
color: #0f172a;
}
tr:nth-child(even) td { background: #ffffff; }
tr:nth-child(odd) td { background: #f8fafc; }
/* code spans inside table cells need a light pill, not the dark one
* defined globally — otherwise they'd disappear into the white row. */
td code {
background: #eef2ff;
color: #1e293b;
}
/* Bold/strong inside cells must stay dark — the global rule paints
* <strong> white for the dark-gradient body text, which would render
* invisible against the white table card. */
td strong, th strong {
color: #0f172a;
}
th strong {
color: #ffffff;
}
/* Title slide — centered hero treatment on the same gradient. */
section.title {
text-align: center;
padding: 100px 80px;
justify-content: center;
}
section.title h1 {
display: inline-block;
font-size: 64px;
margin: 0 auto 20px auto;
}
section.title blockquote {
margin: 28px auto;
max-width: 900px;
}
/* Closing slide — same centered treatment. */
section.closing {
text-align: center;
padding: 100px 80px;
justify-content: center;
}
section.closing h2::before { display: none; }
section.closing blockquote { font-size: 26px; max-width: 900px; }
</style>
<!-- _class: title -->
# Local Agents Marketplace
### A trust-minimised, on-chain marketplace for LLM inference
Buy and sell prompt → response with **bonded escrow** on **Vector** (UTxO).
No platform fee. No central rate-limiter. Verifiable receipts on chain.
> *Status: M1 lifecycle proven end-to-end on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05.*
---
## The problem
* AI inference is **centralised** — a handful of providers, opaque pricing, account-level rate limits.
* Local-AI hardware is **idle most of the time** — GPUs and CPUs sit unused between user prompts.
* Buyers and sellers can't transact directly without a **trusted intermediary** taking a cut.
* "Verifiable" claims about which model ran are usually nothing more than the provider's word.
We need a **two-sided marketplace** where:
1. Sellers monetise spare compute,
2. Buyers get a **cryptographic receipt** of what was actually computed,
3. **Neither side has to trust the other** — bonds + on-chain settlement enforce honesty.
---
## How it works — three actors, one chain
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph CHAIN[Vector — UTxO]
ADV[Advert UTxO<br/>capability, price, bonds]
ESC[Escrow UTxO<br/>locked funds + state]
end
SUP[🧠 Supplier<br/>local LLM node]
BUY[💼 Buyer<br/>app or agent]
IDX[🔭 Indexer<br/>read-only bulletin board]
SUP -->|publish advert| ADV
BUY -->|discover| IDX
IDX -.->|index events| CHAIN
BUY -->|post escrow| ESC
BUY -->|prompt + escrow_ref| SUP
SUP -->|signed receipt| BUY
SUP -->|claim & submit| ESC
BUY -->|accept & pay| ESC
```
* **Supplier** runs the inference and publishes a price.
* **Buyer** posts the work as a bonded escrow, sends the prompt, accepts the receipt.
* **Indexer** is a public mirror of chain state — anyone can run one. No platform middleman.
---
## The bonded-escrow lifecycle
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant B as Buyer
participant Chain as Vector
participant S as Supplier
participant LLM as Local LLM<br/>(OpenAI-compatible)
S->>Chain: PostAdvert (locks supplier_bond)
B->>Chain: PostEscrow → Open<br/>(locks payment + bonds)
B->>S: POST /v1/chat/completions
S->>Chain: ClaimEscrow → Claimed
S->>LLM: run inference
LLM-->>S: assistant message
S->>Chain: SubmitEscrow → Submitted
S-->>B: 200 OK + signed receipt
B->>Chain: AcceptEscrow — supplier paid
```
Every transition is on-chain, validated by an Aiken Plutus V3 script. The receipt is signed by the supplier's advert key; prompt and response hashes are bound on chain.
---
## What if someone misbehaves?
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPEN[Open]:::norm --> CLAIMED[Claimed]:::norm --> SUBMITTED[Submitted]:::norm --> ACCEPTED[Accepted ✓]:::good
OPEN -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM[Reclaimed<br/>buyer recovers funds]:::warn
CLAIMED -->|deliver_by passed| RECLAIM
SUBMITTED -->|accept_window passed| RELEASE[Released<br/>supplier collects]:::warn
classDef norm fill:#e0e7ff,stroke:#4f46e5
classDef good fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a
classDef warn fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706
```
| Failure mode | Recovery | Loss bearer |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier never claims/submits | Buyer **Reclaim** after `deliver_by` | Supplier — forfeits supplier_bond |
| Buyer disappears after Submit | Supplier **Release** after `submitted_at + 10 min` | Buyer — forfeits buyer_bond |
Bonds make honesty cheaper than running away. Both sides have skin in the game; no third-party arbiter is needed for the M1 happy/timeout paths.
---
## Local-agent versatility — any OpenAI-compatible engine
<div class="pipeline">
<span>💼 Buyer</span> →
<span>🧠 Supplier (OpenAI-compatible HTTP wrapper)</span> →
<span>backend ↓</span>
</div>
<div class="backends">
<div class="tile">Ollama<br/><small>local model runner</small></div>
<div class="tile">vLLM<br/><small>high-throughput GPU</small></div>
<div class="tile">llama.cpp<br/><small>CPU · Metal · ROCm</small></div>
<div class="tile">OpenRouter<br/><small>cloud API mux</small></div>
<div class="tile">openclaw / custom<br/><small>arbitrary stack</small></div>
<div class="tile dots">…<br/><small>any OpenAI-shaped API</small></div>
</div>
The supplier service is a thin HTTP wrapper — it forwards `/v1/chat/completions` to whatever backend is configured. Each supplier picks its own model, hardware, and engine, then advertises a `capability_id`. Buyers shop on capability + model + price.
---
## Capability + model = task selection
| Capability ID | Example models | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| `llm.text.generate.v1` | Llama 3 · Qwen 2.5 · Mistral · GPT-4 | Q&A, drafts, summarisation |
| `code.completion.v1` | Codestral · DeepSeek-Coder · StarCoder | IDE tab-complete, refactor |
| `vision.describe.v1` | LLaVA · Qwen-VL · Pixtral | Image captioning, OCR |
| `embedding.text.v1` | nomic-embed · BGE · ada-002 | RAG indexing |
| `audio.transcribe.v1` | whisper-large-v3 · distil-whisper | Voice-to-text |
| `…` | … | … |
* New capabilities = **just publish a new advert**. No marketplace governance gate.
* Today's deploy uses Ollama + Qwen 2.5; switching to vLLM with Llama 3 70B is a config change, not a code change.
---
## OpenClaw — agentic teams on your existing OpenAI seat
<div class="pipeline">
<span>🧠 Supplier wrapper</span> →
<span>🦾 OpenClaw</span> →
<span>🪪 OpenAI ChatGPT seat (flat-rate)</span>
</div>
* **Cost-efficient by default.** OpenClaw exposes your existing **OpenAI ChatGPT subscription** as an OpenAI-compatible API. The marketplace supplier dispatches its inference against it, so an entire **agentic team** (coders, QA automation testers, release curators…) draws from the **flat-rate seat you already pay for** — no per-token metering, no surprise invoices.
* **Reliability layer (optional, marginal cost).** OpenClaw can fall back to the **Anthropic API** or **OpenRouter** model pool when the primary seat is rate-limited, the prompt requires a different model, or you want a **second-layer hardening** of responses (e.g. cross-provider consensus on critical outputs). You only pay metered tokens for the requests that actually fall through.
---
## Proven on Vector testnet — 2026-05-05
| Step | Tx hash |
|---|---|
| Buyer posts escrow | `af762561…c2f7bc5` |
| Supplier claims | (lifecycle tx) |
| Supplier submits receipt | (lifecycle tx) |
| Buyer accepts | `125e3cfe…7dc100d` |
Funds flowed correctly: supplier received `payment + supplier_bond` (3 ADA); buyer got `buyer_bond` back.
* **Browser demo:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Live event stream:** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Test suite:** 1098 unit tests passing, full lifecycle exercised in CI.
---
## Why UTxO + Vector
* **Bonded escrow is native** — Plutus validators enforce the state machine without a custom token or oracle.
* **Vector settles in seconds** — the buyer→claim→submit→accept loop fits inside a single chat-completion's wall clock.
* **AP3X token** for fees and bonds — fungible, transparent, on-chain.
* **No custom rollup, no bridge** — runs on a production chain today.
---
<!-- _class: closing -->
## The pitch in one sentence
> Local Agents Marketplace turns any OpenAI-compatible inference endpoint into a **trustlessly billable service** — buyer and supplier exchange prompt, response, and payment with on-chain proof that what was paid for is what was delivered.
### Try it
* **Indexer (live event stream):** https://mp-indexer.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Buyer:** https://mp-buyers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
* **Supplier:** https://mp-suppliers.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org/capability

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@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ If the buyer does NOT accept within the dispute window (10 minutes), you can col
- **Never share your .env file** - it contains your wallet seed phrase
- **Never share your data/ folder** - it contains task history
- The seed phrase controls your wallet funds. Back it up securely.
- The node only responds to buyers who have already locked funds on-chain, so you cannot be scammed out of compute.
- The seed phrase controls your wallet. Back it up securely.
- The node only responds to buyers who have already locked value on-chain, so you cannot be scammed out of compute.
## Troubleshooting

View File

@@ -30,5 +30,7 @@ GATEWAY_DB_DIR=./data/gateway
# KEY_RATE_MAX=60 # requests per API key per window
# KEY_RATE_WINDOW_MS=60000
# SWEEPER_INTERVAL_MS=60000
# DEMO_SESSION_IDLE_MS=180000 # close demo chat sessions idle this long (frees the supplier slot)
# CHAT_SETTLE_MODE=full # "full" (Claim/Submit/Accept) or "ticket" (escrow post only; sweeper reclaims) — must match suppliers
# WALLET_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS=600000
# SDK_REGISTRY_MAX=500 # max cached per-key Marketplace instances

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY buyer/package.json ./buyer/package.json
COPY gateway/package.json ./gateway/package.json

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"start": "tsx src/index.ts",
"dev": "tsx src/index.ts",
"rotate-master-key": "tsx src/cli/rotate-master-key.ts"
"rotate-master-key": "tsx src/cli/rotate-master-key.ts",
"create-demo-key": "tsx src/cli/create-demo-key.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"@marketplace/buyer": "workspace:*",

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { seal } from "../crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey, requireKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { asyncHandler } from "../middleware/http.js";
import { totalLovelace, hasCollateral } from "../onchain/preflight.js";
import { badRequest } from "../openai/errors.js";
import { badRequest, forbidden } from "../openai/errors.js";
const ACTIVE_ESCROW_STATES = new Set(["Open", "Claimed", "Submitted"]);
@@ -89,7 +89,10 @@ export function makeAccountHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
res.status(200).json({
key_prefix: keyRow.key_prefix,
deposit_address: keyRow.deposit_address,
// The shared demo key's wallet is operator-funded; hiding the deposit
// address keeps strangers from confusing it with their own wallet.
deposit_address: keyRow.demo ? null : keyRow.deposit_address,
...(keyRow.demo ? { demo: true } : {}),
balance: {
available_lovelace: available.toString(),
locked_in_escrow_lovelace: lockedInEscrow.toString(),
@@ -118,6 +121,11 @@ export function makeAccountHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
export function makeWithdrawHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const keyRow = requireKey(req);
if (keyRow.demo) {
// The demo key is shared publicly; without this, anyone holding it
// could drain the operator-funded wallet to their own address.
throw forbidden("demo_key_restricted", "withdrawals are disabled for the shared demo key");
}
const body = (req.body ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
const toAddress = body.to_address;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
/**
* gateway/src/cli/create-demo-key.ts — mint the shared demo API key.
*
* Same custodial machinery as POST /signup, but sets demo=1: withdraw is
* blocked, /account hides the deposit address, chat completions run through
* the session-backed demo executor, and per-IP rate limits apply. Public
* signup can never mint a demo key — this CLI is the only path.
*
* Run inside the gateway container (hits the volume-mounted DB):
* docker exec <gateway> pnpm --filter @marketplace/gateway create-demo-key
* Or locally:
* GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY=<64hex> GATEWAY_DB_DIR=./data/gateway NETWORK_ID=1 \
* pnpm --filter @marketplace/gateway create-demo-key [--label shared-demo]
*
* The raw key is printed ONCE and never stored (only its sha256).
*/
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import { GatewayStore } from "../db/store.js";
import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../wallet.js";
import { seal } from "../crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
const HEX64 = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
function arg(name: string): string | undefined {
const i = process.argv.indexOf(`--${name}`);
return i >= 0 ? process.argv[i + 1] : undefined;
}
function main(): void {
const masterKey = process.env.GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY;
if (!masterKey || !HEX64.test(masterKey)) {
throw new Error("create-demo-key: GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY must be 64 hex chars");
}
const dbDir = arg("db") ?? process.env.GATEWAY_DB_DIR ?? "./data/gateway";
const networkId: 0 | 1 = process.env.NETWORK_ID === "1" ? 1 : 0;
const label = arg("label") ?? "shared-demo";
const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, networkId);
const sealed = seal(privHex, masterKey);
const rawKey = `vk_${networkId === 1 ? "live" : "test"}_${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
store.insertKey({
id: randomUUID(),
key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
label,
wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
deposit_address: walletKey.address,
enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
demo: 1,
});
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(
[
`[gateway] demo key created (label=${label}, network=${networkId === 1 ? "mainnet" : "testnet"})`,
``,
` api_key: ${rawKey}`,
` deposit_address: ${walletKey.address}`,
``,
`Save the api_key now — it is shown only once. Fund the deposit address`,
`with the demo float (withdrawals are disabled for this key).`,
].join("\n"),
);
}
main();

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
* KEY_RATE_MAX / KEY_RATE_WINDOW_MS — per-key request limiter.
* SWEEPER_INTERVAL_MS / WALLET_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS — background tick cadences.
* SDK_REGISTRY_MAX — max cached per-key Marketplace instances (LRU).
* GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS — comma-separated allowlist of browser Origins that may
* call the gateway cross-origin (e.g. the marketplace
* frontend's "Generate API key" page). Default empty =
* CORS off (no Access-Control-* headers emitted).
*/
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
@@ -35,9 +39,23 @@ export interface GatewayConfig {
dbDir: string;
signupRate: { max: number; windowMs: number };
keyRate: { max: number; windowMs: number };
demoIpRate: { max: number; windowMs: number };
sweeperIntervalMs: number;
/** Close demo chat sessions idle this long (frees the supplier slot).
* Keep below the supplier's CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS so the gateway closes
* first and records usage. */
demoSessionIdleMs: number;
/** Chat-session settlement mode this deployment runs. "full" = suppliers
* Claim/Submit and the gateway Accepts; "ticket" = the escrow post at open
* is the only chain op and the sweeper Reclaims it after deliver_by.
* Must agree with the suppliers' CHAT_SETTLE_MODE. */
chatSettleMode: "full" | "ticket";
walletHealthIntervalMs: number;
sdkRegistryMax: number;
corsOrigins: string[];
/** Capability id the /v1/ocr/extract route escrows against. Model-scoped
* per the marketplace convention (one model, one id). Env: OCR_CAPABILITY_ID. */
ocrCapabilityId: string;
}
function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): string {
@@ -48,6 +66,14 @@ function requireField(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, name: string): st
return v;
}
function chatSettleMode(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): "full" | "ticket" {
const v = env.CHAT_SETTLE_MODE ?? "full";
if (v !== "full" && v !== "ticket") {
throw new Error('loadConfig: CHAT_SETTLE_MODE must be "full" or "ticket"');
}
return v;
}
function posInt(
env: Record<string, string | undefined>,
name: string,
@@ -106,8 +132,19 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): GatewayConf
max: posInt(env, "KEY_RATE_MAX", 60),
windowMs: posInt(env, "KEY_RATE_WINDOW_MS", 60 * 1000),
},
demoIpRate: {
max: posInt(env, "DEMO_IP_RATE_MAX", 20),
windowMs: posInt(env, "DEMO_IP_RATE_WINDOW_MS", 60 * 1000),
},
sweeperIntervalMs: posInt(env, "SWEEPER_INTERVAL_MS", 60 * 1000),
demoSessionIdleMs: posInt(env, "DEMO_SESSION_IDLE_MS", 3 * 60 * 1000),
chatSettleMode: chatSettleMode(env),
walletHealthIntervalMs: posInt(env, "WALLET_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS", 10 * 60 * 1000),
sdkRegistryMax: posInt(env, "SDK_REGISTRY_MAX", 500),
ocrCapabilityId: env.OCR_CAPABILITY_ID ?? "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: (env.GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS ?? "")
.split(",")
.map((o) => o.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""))
.filter((o) => o !== ""),
};
}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_keys (
enc_priv_tag TEXT NOT NULL,
master_key_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
disabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
disabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
demo INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_keys_hash ON api_keys(key_hash);

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ export interface ApiKeyRow {
master_key_version: number;
created_at: number;
disabled: number;
/** 1 = shared demo key: withdraw blocked, session-backed completions, per-IP limits. */
demo: number;
}
export interface UsageRow {
@@ -81,13 +83,20 @@ export class GatewayStore {
this.db.pragma("journal_mode = WAL");
this.db.exec(CREATE_TABLES_SQL);
// Additive migration for DBs created before the demo flag existed
// (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS won't alter an existing table).
const keyCols = this.db.pragma("table_info(api_keys)") as Array<{ name: string }>;
if (!keyCols.some((c) => c.name === "demo")) {
this.db.exec("ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN demo INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0");
}
this.sInsertKey = this.db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO api_keys (
id, key_hash, key_prefix, label, wallet_pkh, deposit_address,
enc_priv_nonce, enc_priv_ct, enc_priv_tag, master_key_version, created_at, disabled
enc_priv_nonce, enc_priv_ct, enc_priv_tag, master_key_version, created_at, disabled, demo
) VALUES (
@id, @key_hash, @key_prefix, @label, @wallet_pkh, @deposit_address,
@enc_priv_nonce, @enc_priv_ct, @enc_priv_tag, @master_key_version, @created_at, 0
@enc_priv_nonce, @enc_priv_ct, @enc_priv_tag, @master_key_version, @created_at, 0, @demo
)
`);
this.sGetKeyByHash = this.db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM api_keys WHERE key_hash = @key_hash`);
@@ -133,8 +142,8 @@ export class GatewayStore {
this.sListOpenSessions = this.db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE state = 'open'`);
}
insertKey(row: Omit<ApiKeyRow, "disabled">): void {
this.sInsertKey.run({ ...row, label: row.label ?? null });
insertKey(row: Omit<ApiKeyRow, "disabled" | "demo"> & { demo?: number }): void {
this.sInsertKey.run({ ...row, label: row.label ?? null, demo: row.demo ?? 0 });
}
getKeyByHash(keyHash: string): ApiKeyRow | undefined {
@@ -193,4 +202,8 @@ export class GatewayStore {
listOpenSessions(): SessionRow[] {
return this.sListOpenSessions.all() as SessionRow[];
}
listOpenSessionsByKey(keyId: string): SessionRow[] {
return this.listOpenSessions().filter((s) => s.key_id === keyId);
}
}

View File

@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@ export function runMain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
const invokedDirectly =
typeof process !== "undefined" &&
process.argv?.[1] !== undefined &&
/gateway\/(src|dist)\/index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
// Accept both path separators: on Windows process.argv[1] arrives with
// backslashes, so a forward-slash-only pattern silently never matches and
// the process exits 0 without ever starting the server.
/gateway[\\/](src|dist)[\\/]index\.(t|j)s$/.test(process.argv[1]);
if (invokedDirectly) {
try {

View File

@@ -60,7 +60,28 @@ export function ipRateLimit(opts: { max: number; windowMs: number }) {
return makeLimiter(opts, (req) => req.ip ?? "unknown");
}
/** Per-API-key limiter (apply AFTER apiKeyAuth). */
/** Per-API-key limiter (apply AFTER apiKeyAuth). Demo keys are exempt: the
* shared demo key would let one abusive IP exhaust everyone's budget — the
* per-IP demoIpRateLimit is the demo control instead. */
export function keyRateLimit(opts: { max: number; windowMs: number }) {
return makeLimiter(opts, (req) => requireKey(req).id);
const limit = makeLimiter(opts, (req) => requireKey(req).id);
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {
if (requireKey(req).demo) {
next();
return;
}
limit(req, res, next);
};
}
/** Per-IP limiter that applies ONLY to demo-key requests (after apiKeyAuth). */
export function demoIpRateLimit(opts: { max: number; windowMs: number }) {
const limit = makeLimiter(opts, (req) => req.ip ?? "unknown");
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {
if (!requireKey(req).demo) {
next();
return;
}
limit(req, res, next);
};
}

402
gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
/**
* gateway/src/ocr/extract.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract.
*
* One escrow per page against a model-scoped `ocr.page.extract.<model>.v1`
* supplier (config.ocrCapabilityId). Lifecycle mirrors the one-shot chat
* path, all inside the per-key mutex: parse → select supplier → preflight →
* per-candidate live busy pre-check → submitOcr (escrow → supplier call →
* receipt verify) → resolve Submitted ref → Accept (awaited) → record usage
* → wallet-health → respond.
*
* Response (200):
* {
* output_format, content,
* usage: { prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, total_tokens },
* x_vector: {
* receipt, receipt_signature, escrow_ref,
* receipt_labels: ["first-party-brokered"]
* }
* }
*
* Venue attribution: the caller MAY send
* X-Venue: venue slug (e.g. "apify"), ≤ 32 chars
* X-Run-User-Hash: sha256 of the venue-side runner id, 64 hex
* Both are logged on a structured line per settled job. The wedge-ledger
* emitter consumes these lines; a usage-table venue
* column is deliberately deferred to later work so this route stays
* schema-additive. payer_class is derived at ledger time from the hash
* (known first-party hashes vs the rest), never asserted here.
*
* Demo keys are rejected: the demo executor is chat-session-shaped and its
* wallet holds one escrow per session; OCR needs a funded per-key wallet.
*/
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import { TxConstructionError } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import {
ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
} from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { SupplierError, type ProgressEvent } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
import type { GatewayStore } from "../db/store.js";
import { requireKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { asyncHandler } from "../middleware/http.js";
import { selectCandidates, type SupplierCandidate } from "../routing/selectSupplier.js";
import { preflight } from "../onchain/preflight.js";
import { resolveSubmittedRef, acceptAndConfirm } from "../onchain/settle.js";
import { ensureWalletHealthy } from "../walletHealth.js";
import { badRequest, forbidden, notFound, paymentRequired, toGatewayError } from "../openai/errors.js";
/** Operator-model v0: HAL8 operates both the custodial buyer and the
* supplier fleet, so every receipt this route returns is first-party
* brokered. Becomes per-supplier metadata when
* control-independent supply exists. */
const RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 = ["first-party-brokered"] as const;
const B64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
const HEX64_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;
const VENUE_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;
/** Bound on the live busy pre-check below - cheap enough that a stalled
* supplier never meaningfully delays the request. */
const SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
interface ParsedOcrRequest {
image_b64: string;
mime: string;
output_format: string;
/** "" = any model under the capability (single-model ids). */
model: string;
}
function parseOcrRequest(body: unknown): ParsedOcrRequest {
if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) {
throw badRequest("invalid_body", "request body must be a JSON object");
}
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
const image = b.image_b64;
if (typeof image !== "string" || image.length === 0) {
throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` is required and must be a non-empty base64 string");
}
if (image.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
throw badRequest("image_too_large", `\`image_b64\` exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} characters`);
}
if (!B64_RE.test(image)) {
throw badRequest("invalid_image", "`image_b64` must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
}
const mime = b.mime;
if (typeof mime !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(mime)) {
throw badRequest("invalid_mime", `\`mime\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
}
const rawFormat = b.output_format ?? "markdown";
if (typeof rawFormat !== "string" || !ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(rawFormat)) {
throw badRequest(
"invalid_output_format",
`\`output_format\` must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`,
);
}
let model = "";
if (b.model !== undefined && b.model !== null) {
if (typeof b.model !== "string" || b.model === "") {
throw badRequest("invalid_model", "`model` must be a non-empty string when provided");
}
model = b.model;
}
return { image_b64: image, mime, output_format: rawFormat, model };
}
/** Sanitized venue-attribution headers. Invalid values drop to "".
* Exported for direct unit testing (I3 review finding) — it is the only
* gate on what lands in the ocr_settled/ocr_failed structured log lines the
* wedge-ledger emitter reads, so it needs coverage independent of the HTTP
* route. */
export function venueAttribution(req: Request): { venue: string; runUserHash: string } {
const venueRaw = req.header("X-Venue") ?? "";
const hashRaw = req.header("X-Run-User-Hash") ?? "";
return {
venue: VENUE_RE.test(venueRaw) ? venueRaw : "",
runUserHash: HEX64_RE.test(hashRaw) ? hashRaw.toLowerCase() : "",
};
}
/**
* Live busy pre-check, run immediately before a candidate's escrow posts.
* Mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check: same signal ("working" on the
* supplier's own /status), same best-effort posture. Posting an escrow only
* to have the supplier reject as busy strands the escrow until reclaim and
* burns the tx fee, so this is worth a bounded, cheap HTTP round trip.
*
* Never a gate: the indexer already filters candidates on advert status, so
* a timeout, network error, non-2xx, or malformed body all resolve to "not
* busy" (unknown, not blocking) - a briefly-unreachable /status must never
* stop the candidate from being attempted.
*/
async function isSupplierBusy(
endpointUrl: string,
fetchFn: typeof globalThis.fetch,
): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const res = await fetchFn(`${endpointUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/status`, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SUPPLIER_STATUS_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS),
});
if (!res.ok) return false;
const body = (await res.json()) as unknown;
const status = body && typeof body === "object" ? (body as { status?: unknown }).status : undefined;
return status === "working";
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function recordOcrUsage(
store: GatewayStore,
p: {
keyId: string;
capabilityId: string;
model: string;
supplierPkh: string | null;
escrowRef: string | null;
costLovelace: bigint | null;
promptTokens: number;
completionTokens: number;
status: "completed" | "failed";
failureReason?: string;
},
): void {
store.insertUsage({
id: randomUUID(),
key_id: p.keyId,
created_at: Date.now(),
kind: "ocr",
model: p.model,
capability_id: p.capabilityId,
supplier_pkh: p.supplierPkh,
escrow_ref: p.escrowRef,
cost_lovelace: p.costLovelace !== null ? p.costLovelace.toString() : null,
prompt_tokens: p.promptTokens,
completion_tokens: p.completionTokens,
status: p.status,
failure_reason: p.failureReason ?? null,
});
}
export function makeOcrExtractHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const keyRow = requireKey(req);
if (keyRow.demo) {
throw forbidden("demo_key_unsupported", "demo keys cannot use /v1/ocr/extract; create a funded API key");
}
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const parsed = parseOcrRequest(req.body);
const attribution = venueAttribution(req);
await ctx.mutex.run(() => runOcrOneShot(deps, keyRow.id, ctx, parsed, attribution, res));
});
}
async function runOcrOneShot(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyId: string,
ctx: ReturnType<GatewayDeps["registry"]["getContext"]>,
parsed: ParsedOcrRequest,
attribution: { venue: string; runUserHash: string },
res: Response,
): Promise<void> {
const { config, store, chain, fetchFn } = deps;
const capabilityId = config.ocrCapabilityId;
// Hoisted above the try so the catch block can report whatever is known
// even when the failure happens AFTER an escrow was posted (e.g. the
// supplier call or settle step fails) — these fields are the
// reconciliation spine that joins on-chain settlement to platform
// billing, and losing them makes paid-but-failed jobs unreconcilable
// (I2 review finding).
let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.sdk.submitOcr>> | undefined;
let used: SupplierCandidate | undefined;
let escrowRefStr: string | null = null;
try {
const candidates = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
model: parsed.model,
capabilityId,
fetchFn,
});
if (candidates.length === 0) {
throw notFound(
"model_not_found",
parsed.model === ""
? `no available supplier for capability "${capabilityId}"`
: `no available supplier for model "${parsed.model}" under "${capabilityId}"`,
);
}
const primary = candidates[0];
const pf = await preflight(chain, ctx.walletKey.address, primary);
if (!pf.ok) {
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk
? "insufficient balance for this request"
: "wallet has no pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X for collateral; deposit a little more AP3X",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),
available_lovelace: pf.availableLovelace.toString(),
collateral_ok: pf.collateralOk,
deposit_address: ctx.walletKey.address,
},
},
);
}
// Submit. Fall back to the next supplier ONLY on a pre-post
// TxConstructionError (no escrow was posted). A SupplierError means the
// escrow is already posted — do not retry (the sweeper recovers it).
//
// submitOcr posts the escrow internally and only returns escrowRef when
// it resolves. When the supplier call AFTER the post throws
// (SupplierError: timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed
// response, receipt mismatch) the escrow already landed on chain but
// escrowRefStr below would otherwise stay null — the OCR upstream has a
// 120s budget, so this is likely the most common paid-but-failed shape.
// The SDK emits a "progress" event of type "escrow_posted" (carrying
// escrow_ref) the instant the tx confirms, so listen for it around each
// attempt and capture the ref from the event rather than only from
// submitOcr's return value (I2 follow-up).
let lastErr: unknown;
for (const cand of candidates) {
// Live pre-check, run right here (not once at the top of the request):
// skip a candidate that is busy right now instead of paying to find
// out. See isSupplierBusy's docstring for the exact signal + posture.
if (await isSupplierBusy(cand.endpointUrl, fetchFn)) {
lastErr = new SupplierError("supplier_busy", {
status: 409,
message: "supplier is busy with another job",
});
continue;
}
const onProgress = (ev: unknown): void => {
const e = ev as ProgressEvent;
if (e.type === "escrow_posted" && e.escrow_ref) escrowRefStr = e.escrow_ref;
};
ctx.sdk.on("progress", onProgress);
try {
result = await ctx.sdk.submitOcr({
advertRef: cand.advertRef,
image_b64: parsed.image_b64,
mime: parsed.mime,
output_format: parsed.output_format,
payment_lovelace: cand.priceLovelace,
});
used = cand;
break;
} catch (err) {
lastErr = err;
if (err instanceof TxConstructionError) continue;
throw err;
} finally {
ctx.sdk.off("progress", onProgress);
}
}
if (!result || !used) {
throw toGatewayError(lastErr ?? new Error("no supplier could be engaged"));
}
// Settle: resolve the live Submitted ref, Accept, await confirmation.
escrowRefStr = `${result.escrowRef.txHash}#${result.escrowRef.index}`;
const submittedRef = await resolveSubmittedRef({
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
buyerPkh: ctx.walletKey.pubKeyHash,
originalRefStr: escrowRefStr,
fetchFn,
});
await acceptAndConfirm(chain, ctx.walletKey, submittedRef);
recordOcrUsage(store, {
keyId,
capabilityId,
model: used.model,
supplierPkh: used.supplierPkh,
escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
costLovelace: used.priceLovelace,
promptTokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens,
completionTokens: result.usage.completion_tokens,
status: "completed",
});
// Structured settle line for the wedge-ledger emitter. One line per
// settled job; venue/run_user_hash empty when the
// caller sent none.
console.log(JSON.stringify({
evt: "ocr_settled",
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
capability_id: capabilityId,
model: used.model,
supplier_pkh: used.supplierPkh,
cost_lovelace: used.priceLovelace.toString(),
receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
venue: attribution.venue,
run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
}));
// Re-shape the wallet ({collateral, working}) so the next request keeps
// a valid collateral UTxO. Best-effort; serialized by the mutex.
await ensureWalletHealthy(chain, ctx.walletKey).catch((e) =>
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.error("[gateway] wallet-health after ocr:", e instanceof Error ? e.message : e),
);
res.status(200).json({
output_format: result.output_format,
content: result.content,
usage: result.usage,
x_vector: {
receipt: result.receipt,
receipt_signature: result.receiptSignature,
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
receipt_labels: RECEIPT_LABELS_V0,
},
});
} catch (err) {
recordOcrUsage(store, {
keyId,
capabilityId,
model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
supplierPkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
escrowRef: escrowRefStr,
costLovelace: used?.priceLovelace ?? null,
promptTokens: result?.usage.prompt_tokens ?? 0,
completionTokens: result?.usage.completion_tokens ?? 0,
status: "failed",
failureReason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
});
// Structured failure line mirroring ocr_settled's shape (same venue /
// run_user_hash / escrow_ref fields) so paid-but-failed jobs — an
// escrow posted on-chain, then a later step (supplier call, settle)
// failed — can still be reconciled against on-chain state instead of
// vanishing from the wedge-ledger emitter's input (I2 review finding).
console.log(JSON.stringify({
evt: "ocr_failed",
escrow_ref: escrowRefStr,
capability_id: capabilityId,
model: used?.model ?? parsed.model,
supplier_pkh: used?.supplierPkh ?? null,
venue: attribution.venue,
run_user_hash: attribution.runUserHash,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
}));
throw err;
}
}

View File

@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@
* gateway/src/onchain/preflight.ts — balance + collateral pre-flight.
*
* The buyer wallet funds the FULL escrow at PostEscrow: price + buyer_bond +
* supplier_bond (postEscrow.ts:132). Accept/Reclaim are Plutus script-spends
* that also need a pure-ADA collateral UTxO ≥ 5 ADA (assertCollateralCandidate).
* So required = price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond + collateral + fee reserve,
* AND the wallet must currently hold a pure-ADA UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both
* up front and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
* supplier_bond, raised to the Submitted-state min-ada floor so long
* capability ids (e.g. the 33-byte OCR one) don't get bumped mid-flight —
* see escrowLockFloor (packages/shared/.../minAdaFloor.ts) and
* postOcrEscrow.ts:205, the SAME floor a POST actually locks. Accept/Reclaim
* are Plutus script-spends that also need a pure-AP3X collateral UTxO ≥ 5
* AP3X (assertCollateralCandidate). So required = escrowLockFloor(price +
* buyer_bond + supplier_bond) + collateral + fee reserve, AND the wallet
* must currently hold a pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ collateral. We check both up front
* and return a clean 402 instead of failing mid-flight.
*/
import type { ChainProvider, Utxo } from "@marketplace/shared/chain";
import type { EscrowDatum } from "@marketplace/shared/cbor";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
export const COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
export const FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE = 2_000_000n;
@@ -18,7 +24,7 @@ export function totalLovelace(utxos: Utxo[]): bigint {
return utxos.reduce((sum, u) => sum + u.lovelace, 0n);
}
/** True iff some UTxO is pure-ADA (no native assets) and ≥ collateral floor. */
/** True iff some UTxO is pure-AP3X (no native assets) and ≥ collateral floor. */
export function hasCollateral(utxos: Utxo[]): boolean {
return utxos.some(
(u) => u.lovelace >= COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE && Object.keys(u.assets).length === 0,
@@ -32,20 +38,48 @@ export interface PreflightResult {
collateralOk: boolean;
}
export interface PreflightCost {
capabilityId: string;
priceLovelace: bigint;
buyerBondLovelace: bigint;
supplierBondLovelace: bigint;
}
/** Placeholder datum used only to size-estimate the Submitted-state min-ada
* floor. Every field except capability_id and the cost amounts is a
* fixed-size stand-in (real hash/pkh byte widths, a realistic 13-digit
* POSIX-ms timestamp) — capability_id's actual length is what drives the
* estimate, exactly as in escrowLockFloor's own contract. */
function representativeEscrowDatum(cost: PreflightCost): EscrowDatum {
return {
buyer_pkh: "3b2fdaed0398485ff35887fb7d0ad2025348864407854f7831dc6a55",
supplier_pkh: "401af418a7e6fb106277292881fcdeaa1cc15b5b112e9c8bdb2d46c9",
advert_ref: { txHash: "a6".repeat(32), index: 0 },
capability_id: cost.capabilityId,
request_spec_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
prompt_hash: "23".repeat(32),
payment_lovelace: cost.priceLovelace,
buyer_bond_lovelace: cost.buyerBondLovelace,
supplier_bond_lovelace: cost.supplierBondLovelace,
deliver_by: 1_786_105_955_257,
posted_at: 1_786_105_625_257,
submitted_at: null,
result_receipt_hash: null,
state: "Open",
};
}
export async function preflight(
chain: ChainProvider,
address: string,
cost: { priceLovelace: bigint; buyerBondLovelace: bigint; supplierBondLovelace: bigint },
cost: PreflightCost,
): Promise<PreflightResult> {
const utxos = await chain.queryUtxosByAddress(address);
const available = totalLovelace(utxos);
const collateralOk = hasCollateral(utxos);
const required =
cost.priceLovelace +
cost.buyerBondLovelace +
cost.supplierBondLovelace +
COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE +
FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
const economicTotal = cost.priceLovelace + cost.buyerBondLovelace + cost.supplierBondLovelace;
const escrowFloor = escrowLockFloor(representativeEscrowDatum(cost), economicTotal);
const required = escrowFloor + COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE + FEE_RESERVE_LOVELACE;
return {
ok: available >= required && collateralOk,
availableLovelace: available,

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ export interface EscrowRow {
utxo_ref: string;
state: string;
posted_at: number;
/** Validator reclaim floor (indexer serves it; absent on very old rows). */
deliver_by?: number;
}
export async function fetchEscrows(

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
/**
* gateway/src/openai/affinity.ts — transcript-prefix session matching.
*
* Stateless OpenAI clients resend the FULL message history each call; sessions
* are stateful. An incoming request belongs to an open session when that
* session's mirrored transcript is a prefix of the incoming messages — the
* suffix (delta) is the next turn. Client-authored messages (user/system/tool)
* must match byte-exactly, but clients routinely reshape ASSISTANT text when
* echoing it back (strip <think> reasoning, re-render whitespace), so
* assistant content is compared normalized. Strict (byte-exact) matches are
* preferred over lenient ones to disambiguate concurrent threads that share a
* user-message prefix. The mirror itself is NEVER rewritten with client text:
* the delta is forwarded verbatim and mirrored only after a successful turn,
* so the gateway mirror and the supplier transcript stay hash-identical for
* the receipt response_hash.
*
* Pure module — no I/O — so the matching rules are unit-testable.
*/
import { chatMessagesEquivalent, toolCallsEqual, type ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
export interface AffinityCandidate {
sessionId: string;
model: string;
mirror: ChatMessage[];
lastUsedAt: number;
}
export interface AffinityMatch {
sessionId: string;
/** Messages the session has not seen yet — forwarded as the next turn. */
delta: ChatMessage[];
}
/** Canonicalize assistant text the way clients mangle it when re-echoing
* history: drop <think>…</think> reasoning blocks, collapse whitespace runs,
* trim. Exported for tests. */
export function normalizeAssistantContent(content: string): string {
return content
.replace(/<think>[\s\S]*?<\/think>/gi, "")
.replace(/\s+/g, " ")
.trim();
}
/** Lenient equality: strict for client-authored roles (the client sends the
* same bytes both times); assistant content is compared normalized while
* assistant tool_calls stay strict (ids anchor tool-result turns). */
function chatMessagesLenientEquivalent(a: ChatMessage, b: ChatMessage): boolean {
if (a.role !== b.role) return false;
if (a.role !== "assistant") return chatMessagesEquivalent(a, b);
return (
normalizeAssistantContent(a.content) === normalizeAssistantContent(b.content) &&
toolCallsEqual(a.tool_calls, b.tool_calls)
);
}
type PrefixQuality = "strict" | "lenient";
function classifyPrefix(mirror: ChatMessage[], incoming: ChatMessage[]): PrefixQuality | null {
if (mirror.length >= incoming.length) return null;
let strict = true;
for (let i = 0; i < mirror.length; i++) {
if (chatMessagesEquivalent(mirror[i], incoming[i])) continue;
if (!chatMessagesLenientEquivalent(mirror[i], incoming[i])) return null;
strict = false;
}
return strict ? "strict" : "lenient";
}
function deltaRespondable(delta: ChatMessage[]): boolean {
const last = delta[delta.length - 1];
return last !== undefined && (last.role === "user" || last.role === "tool");
}
/** Drop trailing assistant/system messages so the history ends with a
* respondable message (regenerate semantics for clients that send a trailing
* assistant turn). Empty result = nothing to answer. */
export function trimToRespondable(messages: ChatMessage[]): ChatMessage[] {
let end = messages.length;
while (end > 0 && messages[end - 1].role !== "user" && messages[end - 1].role !== "tool") end--;
return messages.slice(0, end);
}
/**
* Pick the open session whose mirror best matches the incoming history.
* Strict prefixes beat lenient ones; then longest mirror wins (most
* conversation reuse); ties go to the most recently used session. Returns
* null when nothing matches — caller opens a new session and replays the full
* history. Note `incoming.length <= mirror.length` never matches (a client
* retry of an already-answered request is a miss by design: the session
* transcript must stay append-only).
*/
export function matchSessionPrefix(
candidates: AffinityCandidate[],
incoming: ChatMessage[],
model: string,
): AffinityMatch | null {
let best: { cand: AffinityCandidate; quality: PrefixQuality } | null = null;
for (const cand of candidates) {
if (cand.model !== model) continue;
const quality = classifyPrefix(cand.mirror, incoming);
if (quality === null) continue;
if (!deltaRespondable(incoming.slice(cand.mirror.length))) continue;
if (
best === null ||
(quality === "strict" && best.quality === "lenient") ||
(quality === best.quality &&
(cand.mirror.length > best.cand.mirror.length ||
(cand.mirror.length === best.cand.mirror.length && cand.lastUsedAt > best.cand.lastUsedAt)))
) {
best = { cand, quality };
}
}
if (!best) return null;
return { sessionId: best.cand.sessionId, delta: incoming.slice(best.cand.mirror.length) };
}

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { preflight } from "../onchain/preflight.js";
import { resolveSubmittedRef, acceptAndConfirm } from "../onchain/settle.js";
import { ensureWalletHealthy } from "../walletHealth.js";
import { parseChatRequest, type ParsedChatRequest } from "./validate.js";
import { runDemoChat } from "./demoChat.js";
import {
genId,
buildChatCompletion,
@@ -67,8 +68,17 @@ function recordUsage(
export function makeChatCompletionsHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const keyRow = requireKey(req);
const parsed = parseChatRequest(req.body);
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
if (keyRow.demo) {
// Demo keys run session-backed with tools passthrough, and never fall
// back to one-shot (its settle path assumes ≤1 in-flight escrow per
// wallet; the demo wallet holds one escrow per concurrent session).
// Not under the key mutex — runDemoChat takes it only for session opens.
const parsed = parseChatRequest(req.body, { allowTools: true });
await runDemoChat(deps, keyRow, ctx, parsed, res);
return;
}
const parsed = parseChatRequest(req.body);
await ctx.mutex.run(() => runOneShot(deps, keyRow, ctx, parsed, res));
});
}
@@ -98,7 +108,7 @@ async function runOneShot(
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk
? "insufficient balance for this request"
: "wallet has no pure-ADA UTxO ≥ 5 ADA for collateral; deposit a little more ADA",
: "wallet has no pure-AP3X UTxO ≥ 5 AP3X for collateral; deposit a little more AP3X",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
/**
* gateway/src/openai/demoChat.ts — session-backed /chat/completions for the
* shared demo key.
*
* Demo requests keep the standard OpenAI wire shape (tools included) but run
* against real escrow-per-session marketplace conversations: transcript-prefix
* affinity maps each stateless request onto an open session and forwards only
* the unseen delta; a miss transparently opens a new session (escrow post —
* the only chain work, under the key mutex) and replays the full history as
* the first turn. Supplier idle-closes are healed by reopening; the sweeper
* settles the abandoned escrow.
*
* Demo keys NEVER fall back to the one-shot path: resolveSubmittedRef's
* lone-Submitted-row fallback assumes ≤1 in-flight escrow per wallet, and the
* demo wallet holds one escrow per concurrent session.
*/
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import type { Response } from "express";
import type { ChatMessage, ToolCall } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
import type { ApiKeyRow, SessionRow } from "../db/store.js";
import type { KeyContext } from "../sdk/registry.js";
import { transcripts, getSessionLock, dropSessionState } from "./transcripts.js";
import { matchSessionPrefix, trimToRespondable, type AffinityCandidate } from "./affinity.js";
import {
CAPABILITY,
SessionGoneError,
openSessionCore,
streamSupplierTurn,
type TurnResult,
} from "./sessions.js";
import type { ParsedChatRequest } from "./validate.js";
import { genId, buildChatCompletion, buildChunk, sseData, SSE_DONE, type Usage } from "./shapes.js";
import { GatewayError, badRequest, toGatewayError, toErrorBody } from "./errors.js";
interface DemoSessionMeta {
keyId: string;
model: string;
lastUsedAt: number;
}
/** Open sessions owned by the demo executor (sessionId → meta). Mirrors live
* in transcripts.ts; this map scopes affinity to demo-opened sessions. */
const demoSessions = new Map<string, DemoSessionMeta>();
/** Forget a session (closed/settled elsewhere, e.g. by the sweeper). */
export function dropDemoSession(sessionId: string): void {
demoSessions.delete(sessionId);
}
function candidatesFor(keyId: string, model: string): AffinityCandidate[] {
const out: AffinityCandidate[] = [];
for (const [sessionId, meta] of demoSessions) {
if (meta.keyId !== keyId || meta.model !== model) continue;
const mirror = transcripts.get(sessionId);
if (!mirror) continue;
out.push({ sessionId, model: meta.model, mirror, lastUsedAt: meta.lastUsedAt });
}
return out;
}
/** Record the session's cost when the demo executor closes its row. Full
* mode: the flat session fee (supplier Submitted; the sweeper Accepts the
* escrow afterwards). Ticket mode: 0 — nothing settles, the sweeper reclaims
* the escrow and the wallet is made whole minus fees. */
function recordSessionCost(deps: GatewayDeps, session: SessionRow): void {
deps.store.insertUsage({
id: randomUUID(),
key_id: session.key_id,
created_at: Date.now(),
kind: "chat_session",
model: session.model,
capability_id: CAPABILITY,
supplier_pkh: session.supplier_pkh,
escrow_ref: session.escrow_ref,
cost_lovelace: deps.config.chatSettleMode === "ticket" ? "0" : session.price_lovelace,
prompt_tokens: 0,
completion_tokens: 0,
status: "completed",
failure_reason: null,
});
}
function markSessionGone(deps: GatewayDeps, session: SessionRow): void {
deps.store.setSessionState(session.id, "closed", Date.now());
dropSessionState(session.id);
dropDemoSession(session.id);
recordSessionCost(deps, session);
}
/** Ask the supplier to settle (Submit) the session. NO gateway chain work —
* the sweeper Accepts the resulting Submitted escrow. The supplier releases
* its single slot as part of ending, so a truthy return means the supplier is
* free again. Best-effort: on failure the sweeper reclaims later. */
async function requestSupplierEnd(deps: GatewayDeps, session: SessionRow): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const res = await deps.fetchFn(`${session.supplier_base_url.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/v1/chat/end`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": session.escrow_ref },
body: JSON.stringify({}),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(90_000),
});
await res.text().catch(() => "");
return res.ok;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/** Close one demo session (evicted for capacity, or idle-janitored). Runs
* under the session lock so an in-flight turn finishes first; takes NO key
* mutex (no chain work here — see requestSupplierEnd). Returns the freed
* supplier_pkh, or null when the session was already gone or (janitor) was
* used again while we waited for the lock. */
async function closeDemoSession(
deps: GatewayDeps,
sessionId: string,
opts: { reason: "evicted" | "idle"; idleCutoffMs?: number; nowMs?: number },
): Promise<string | null> {
if (!demoSessions.has(sessionId)) return null;
return getSessionLock(sessionId).run(async () => {
const meta = demoSessions.get(sessionId);
if (!meta) return null; // lost a race with another closer
// Re-check idleness inside the lock: a turn that won the lock first has
// bumped lastUsedAt past the sweep's reference clock.
if (opts.idleCutoffMs !== undefined && (opts.nowMs ?? Date.now()) - meta.lastUsedAt < opts.idleCutoffMs) {
return null;
}
const session = deps.store.getSession(sessionId);
if (!session || session.state !== "open") {
dropDemoSession(sessionId);
return null;
}
await requestSupplierEnd(deps, session);
markSessionGone(deps, session);
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[gateway:demo] closed session ${sessionId} (${opts.reason}), freed supplier ${session.supplier_pkh}`);
return session.supplier_pkh;
});
}
/** Least-recently-used open demo session for (key, model), excluding prior
* victims. Same-model scoping doubles as a guard: a bogus model name has no
* demo sessions, so eviction can never loop on a genuine model_not_found. */
function pickLruDemoSession(keyId: string, model: string, exclude: ReadonlySet<string>): string | null {
let lruId: string | null = null;
let lruAt = Infinity;
for (const [sessionId, meta] of demoSessions) {
if (meta.keyId !== keyId || meta.model !== model || exclude.has(sessionId)) continue;
if (meta.lastUsedAt < lruAt) {
lruAt = meta.lastUsedAt;
lruId = sessionId;
}
}
return lruId;
}
/** Close demo sessions idle past deps.config.demoSessionIdleMs so abandoned
* conversations (client gone, title-gen one-offs) release their single-slot
* suppliers. Called from the sweeper tick; sequential to keep supplier
* /v1/chat/end calls orderly. */
export async function sweepIdleDemoSessions(deps: GatewayDeps, nowMs = Date.now()): Promise<void> {
const idleMs = deps.config.demoSessionIdleMs;
for (const [sessionId, meta] of [...demoSessions]) {
if (nowMs - meta.lastUsedAt < idleMs) continue;
try {
await closeDemoSession(deps, sessionId, { reason: "idle", idleCutoffMs: idleMs, nowMs });
} catch (err) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.error(`[gateway:demo] idle close of ${sessionId} failed:`, err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);
}
}
}
const MAX_EVICTIONS = 2;
function isNoSupplierError(err: unknown): boolean {
return err instanceof GatewayError && (err.code === "model_not_found" || err.code === "overloaded");
}
/** Open a session, evicting up to MAX_EVICTIONS LRU demo sessions when every
* supplier is pinned. Eviction frees the supplier immediately (its slot
* releases at Submit) but the indexer's status poll lags, so the retry passes
* the freed pkhs through selectCandidates' ignoreStatusFor. Lock ordering is
* safe: eviction holds only the session lock, the open holds only the key
* mutex — never nested. */
async function openSessionWithEviction(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyRow: ApiKeyRow,
ctx: KeyContext,
model: string,
): Promise<SessionRow> {
const freedPkhs = new Set<string>();
const evicted = new Set<string>();
for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
try {
return await ctx.mutex.run(() =>
openSessionCore(deps, keyRow, ctx, model, freedPkhs.size > 0 ? { ignoreStatusFor: freedPkhs } : undefined),
);
} catch (err) {
if (attempt >= MAX_EVICTIONS || !isNoSupplierError(err)) throw err;
const victimId = pickLruDemoSession(keyRow.id, model, evicted);
if (!victimId) throw err;
evicted.add(victimId);
const pkh = await closeDemoSession(deps, victimId, { reason: "evicted" });
if (!pkh) throw err; // nothing actually freed — don't loop
freedPkhs.add(pkh);
}
}
}
type LockedTurnOutcome =
| { kind: "done"; result: TurnResult }
| { kind: "retry" } // candidate no longer valid — re-run the match
| { kind: "gone" }; // supplier lost the session — open a fresh one
/** Streaming sink shared across turn attempts on one response. */
interface StreamSink {
onToken: (token: string) => void;
emitToolCalls: (toolCalls: ToolCall[]) => void;
}
export async function runDemoChat(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyRow: ApiKeyRow,
ctx: KeyContext,
parsed: ParsedChatRequest,
res: Response,
): Promise<void> {
// Clients sometimes send histories ending in an assistant (continue/retry
// flows) or system message; the chat.v1 supplier can only respond to a
// user/tool-terminated turn. Trim trailing unrespondable messages
// (regenerate semantics) and reject — before any chain work — only when
// nothing respondable remains.
const trimmed = trimToRespondable(parsed.messages);
if (trimmed.length === 0) {
throw badRequest("invalid_messages", "no user or tool message to respond to");
}
const effective: ParsedChatRequest =
trimmed.length === parsed.messages.length ? parsed : { ...parsed, messages: trimmed };
const id = genId();
let keepalive: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | undefined;
let roleSent = false;
if (parsed.stream) {
res.status(200);
res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/event-stream");
res.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache, no-transform");
res.setHeader("Connection", "keep-alive");
res.setHeader("X-Accel-Buffering", "no");
res.write(": connected\n\n");
keepalive = setInterval(() => {
try {
res.write(": keepalive\n\n");
} catch {
/* client gone */
}
}, 10_000);
}
const ensureRole = (): void => {
if (roleSent) return;
roleSent = true;
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: parsed.model, delta: { role: "assistant" }, finishReason: null })));
};
const sink: StreamSink = {
onToken: (token) => {
if (!parsed.stream) return;
ensureRole();
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: parsed.model, delta: { content: token }, finishReason: null })));
},
emitToolCalls: (toolCalls) => {
if (!parsed.stream) return;
ensureRole();
res.write(
sseData(
buildChunk({
id,
model: parsed.model,
delta: { tool_calls: toolCalls.map((tc, index) => ({ index, ...tc })) },
finishReason: null,
}),
),
);
},
};
try {
const result = await runWithAffinity(deps, keyRow, ctx, effective, sink);
if (keepalive) clearInterval(keepalive);
const usage: Usage = {
prompt_tokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens,
completion_tokens: result.usage.completion_tokens,
total_tokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens + result.usage.completion_tokens,
};
if (parsed.stream) {
if (result.assistantMessage.tool_calls?.length) sink.emitToolCalls(result.assistantMessage.tool_calls);
ensureRole();
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: parsed.model, delta: {}, finishReason: result.finishReason, usage })));
res.write(SSE_DONE);
res.end();
} else {
res.status(200).json(
buildChatCompletion({
id,
model: parsed.model,
content: result.assistantMessage.content,
toolCalls: result.assistantMessage.tool_calls,
finishReason: result.finishReason,
usage,
}),
);
}
} catch (err) {
if (keepalive) clearInterval(keepalive);
if (parsed.stream && res.headersSent) {
try {
res.write(sseData(toErrorBody(toGatewayError(err))));
} catch {
/* client gone */
}
res.end();
return;
}
throw err;
}
}
async function runWithAffinity(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyRow: ApiKeyRow,
ctx: KeyContext,
parsed: ParsedChatRequest,
sink: StreamSink,
): Promise<TurnResult> {
// Affinity: try matching sessions until one serves the turn. The match runs
// synchronously (no await between match and lock acquire, so the candidate
// set can't shift underneath us); the prefix is re-checked inside the lock
// because a concurrent request may have advanced the session first.
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
const match = matchSessionPrefix(candidatesFor(keyRow.id, parsed.model), parsed.messages, parsed.model);
if (!match) break;
const outcome: LockedTurnOutcome = await getSessionLock(match.sessionId).run(async () => {
const meta = demoSessions.get(match.sessionId);
const mirror = transcripts.get(match.sessionId);
const session = deps.store.getSession(match.sessionId);
if (!meta || !mirror || !session || session.state !== "open") {
dropDemoSession(match.sessionId);
return { kind: "retry" };
}
const recheck = matchSessionPrefix(
[{ sessionId: session.id, model: meta.model, mirror, lastUsedAt: meta.lastUsedAt }],
parsed.messages,
parsed.model,
);
if (!recheck) return { kind: "retry" };
try {
const result = await streamSupplierTurn(
deps,
session,
{ messages: recheck.delta, tools: parsed.tools, tool_choice: parsed.toolChoice },
sink.onToken,
);
meta.lastUsedAt = Date.now();
return { kind: "done", result };
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof SessionGoneError) {
// Supplier idle-closed (or restarted). Close our row, record the
// fee (the escrow settles via the sweeper) and reopen fresh.
markSessionGone(deps, session);
return { kind: "gone" };
}
throw err;
}
});
if (outcome.kind === "done") return outcome.result;
if (outcome.kind === "gone") break;
// retry: candidate vanished/advanced — re-match against current state.
}
// Miss: open a new session (chain work → key mutex; evicts an LRU demo
// session when every supplier is pinned) and replay the full history as its
// first turn.
const session = await openSessionWithEviction(deps, keyRow, ctx, parsed.model);
demoSessions.set(session.id, { keyId: keyRow.id, model: parsed.model, lastUsedAt: Date.now() });
return getSessionLock(session.id).run(async () => {
try {
const result = await streamSupplierTurn(
deps,
session,
{ messages: parsed.messages, tools: parsed.tools, tool_choice: parsed.toolChoice },
sink.onToken,
);
// Refresh recency after the (possibly long) first stream so this live
// thread isn't the LRU/janitor's first victim.
const meta = demoSessions.get(session.id);
if (meta) meta.lastUsedAt = Date.now();
return result;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof SessionGoneError) {
// Freshly opened yet already gone (supplier crashed mid-claim).
// Surface as an upstream error rather than looping.
markSessionGone(deps, session);
}
throw err;
}
});
}

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export const unauthorized = (message = "invalid API key"): GatewayError =>
new GatewayError(401, "authentication_error", "invalid_api_key", message);
export const paymentRequired = (message: string, extra?: Record<string, unknown>): GatewayError =>
new GatewayError(402, "invalid_request_error", "insufficient_funds", message, extra);
export const forbidden = (code: string, message: string): GatewayError =>
new GatewayError(403, "invalid_request_error", code, message);
export const notFound = (code: string, message: string): GatewayError =>
new GatewayError(404, "invalid_request_error", code, message);
export const rateLimited = (message: string): GatewayError =>

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,20 @@
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
import { asyncHandler } from "../middleware/http.js";
import { requireKey } from "../middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { listModels } from "../routing/selectSupplier.js";
import { buildModelsList } from "./shapes.js";
import { CAPABILITY as CHAT_CAPABILITY } from "./sessions.js";
export function makeModelsHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
return asyncHandler(async (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
const models = await listModels({ indexerUrl: deps.config.indexerUrl, fetchFn: deps.fetchFn });
return asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const keyRow = requireKey(req);
// Demo keys only reach chat-capable suppliers (session-backed executor).
const models = await listModels({
indexerUrl: deps.config.indexerUrl,
capabilityId: keyRow.demo ? CHAT_CAPABILITY : undefined,
fetchFn: deps.fetchFn,
});
res.status(200).json(buildModelsList(models));
});
}

View File

@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import { TxConstructionError, type ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { TxConstructionError, normalizeChatMessage, type ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { SupplierError } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
import { transcripts, getSessionLock, dropSessionState } from "./transcripts.js";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../deps.js";
import type { ApiKeyRow, GatewayStore, SessionRow } from "../db/store.js";
import type { KeyContext } from "../sdk/registry.js";
@@ -36,10 +37,15 @@ import {
type Usage,
} from "./shapes.js";
const CAPABILITY = "llm.chat.v1";
export const CAPABILITY = "llm.chat.v1";
/** In-memory per-session transcript mirror (sessionId → messages). */
const transcripts = new Map<string, ChatMessage[]>();
/** Thrown when the supplier no longer knows the session (idle-closed/restart). */
export class SessionGoneError extends Error {
constructor(sessionId: string) {
super(`supplier no longer has session ${sessionId}`);
this.name = "SessionGoneError";
}
}
function refStr(ref: { txHash: string; index: number }): string {
return `${ref.txHash}#${ref.index}`;
@@ -56,22 +62,29 @@ export function makeOpenSessionHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
throw badRequest("invalid_model", "`model` is required");
}
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
await ctx.mutex.run(() => openSession(deps, keyRow, ctx, model, res));
const session = await ctx.mutex.run(() => openSessionCore(deps, keyRow, ctx, model));
res.status(200).json({ id: session.id, object: "chat.session", model, created: nowSec() });
});
}
async function openSession(
/**
* Select a supplier, preflight the wallet, post+claim the session escrow and
* persist the SessionRow. Chain work — the CALLER must hold the key mutex
* (concurrent PostEscrow from one wallet double-spends the same UTxO).
*/
export async function openSessionCore(
deps: GatewayDeps,
keyRow: ApiKeyRow,
ctx: KeyContext,
model: string,
res: Response,
): Promise<void> {
opts?: { ignoreStatusFor?: ReadonlySet<string> },
): Promise<SessionRow> {
const candidates = await selectCandidates({
indexerUrl: deps.config.indexerUrl,
model,
capabilityId: CAPABILITY,
fetchFn: deps.fetchFn,
ignoreStatusFor: opts?.ignoreStatusFor,
});
if (candidates.length === 0) {
throw notFound("model_not_found", `no available chat (llm.chat.v1) supplier for model "${model}"`);
@@ -80,7 +93,7 @@ async function openSession(
const pf = await preflight(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey.address, primary);
if (!pf.ok) {
throw paymentRequired(
pf.collateralOk ? "insufficient balance to open a session" : "wallet has no ≥5 ADA pure-ADA collateral UTxO",
pf.collateralOk ? "insufficient balance to open a session" : "wallet has no ≥5 AP3X pure-AP3X collateral UTxO",
{
x_vector: {
required_lovelace: pf.requiredLovelace.toString(),
@@ -112,6 +125,16 @@ async function openSession(
}
if (!started || !used) throw toGatewayError(lastErr ?? new Error("no chat supplier could be engaged"));
// Deployment sanity: supplier and gateway must agree on the settle mode.
// Close behavior is driven per-session by the supplier's /end response, so
// a mismatch (rollout window) still settles correctly — just warn.
if ((started.settleMode === "ticket") !== (deps.config.chatSettleMode === "ticket")) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.warn(
`[gateway] settle-mode mismatch: supplier ${used.supplierPkh.slice(0, 8)} ran "${started.settleMode}" but gateway is configured "${deps.config.chatSettleMode}"`,
);
}
const sessionId = randomUUID();
deps.store.insertSession({
id: sessionId,
@@ -127,7 +150,9 @@ async function openSession(
});
transcripts.set(sessionId, []);
res.status(200).json({ id: sessionId, object: "chat.session", model, created: nowSec() });
const session = deps.store.getSession(sessionId);
if (!session) throw new Error(`session ${sessionId} vanished after insert`);
return session;
}
// ─── messages (one streamed turn) ────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -144,8 +169,12 @@ export function makeSessionMessageHandler(deps: GatewayDeps) {
const content = resolveTurnContent(session.id, body);
if (content === "") throw badRequest("content_required", "no user content in this turn");
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
await ctx.mutex.run(() => streamTurn(deps, session, content, stream, res));
// Turns are chain-free (one HTTP POST to the supplier + SSE relay), so the
// per-key mutex — which exists to serialize wallet UTxO spends — is NOT
// held here. What needs serialization is this session's transcript:
// concurrent turns would interleave supplier appends and corrupt both the
// mirror and the receipt hash. Hence a per-session lock.
await getSessionLock(session.id).run(() => streamTurn(deps, session, content, stream, res));
});
}
@@ -176,6 +205,88 @@ function foldSystem(sessionId: string, content: string, body: Record<string, unk
return content;
}
/** One turn's payload to the supplier: legacy single user string, or a
* multi-message delta (e.g. tool results) with optional tools passthrough. */
export type TurnPayload =
| { content: string }
| { messages: ChatMessage[]; tools?: unknown[]; tool_choice?: unknown };
export interface TurnResult {
assistantMessage: ChatMessage;
finishReason: "stop" | "tool_calls";
usage: { prompt_tokens: number; completion_tokens: number };
}
/**
* Drive one off-chain turn against the session's supplier and mirror the
* result into the session transcript. Caller must hold the session lock.
* Throws SessionGoneError when the supplier no longer knows the session
* (idle-closed or restarted) so callers can transparently reopen.
*/
export async function streamSupplierTurn(
deps: GatewayDeps,
session: SessionRow,
payload: TurnPayload,
onToken?: (token: string) => void,
): Promise<TurnResult> {
const upstream = await deps.fetchFn(`${session.supplier_base_url.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/v1/chat/message`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", accept: "text/event-stream", "X-Escrow-Ref": session.escrow_ref },
body: JSON.stringify(payload),
});
if (upstream.status === 404) {
await upstream.text().catch(() => "");
throw new SessionGoneError(session.id);
}
if (!upstream.ok || !upstream.body) {
const detail = await upstream.text().catch(() => "");
throw toGatewayError(new SupplierError("supplier_http_error", { status: upstream.status, message: detail.slice(0, 200) }));
}
let assistant = "";
let errored: string | undefined;
let doneMessage: ChatMessage | null = null;
let doneFinish: string | undefined;
let usage = { prompt_tokens: 0, completion_tokens: 0 };
await readSupplierSse(upstream.body as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>, (frame) => {
if (frame.type === "token" && typeof frame.value === "string") {
assistant += frame.value;
onToken?.(frame.value);
} else if (frame.type === "done") {
// Upgraded suppliers echo the final assistant message verbatim; mirror
// that exact object so both transcripts stay hash-identical.
doneMessage = normalizeChatMessage(frame.message);
if (typeof frame.finish_reason === "string") doneFinish = frame.finish_reason;
if (frame.usage && typeof frame.usage === "object") {
const u = frame.usage as Record<string, unknown>;
usage = {
prompt_tokens: typeof u.prompt_tokens === "number" ? u.prompt_tokens : 0,
completion_tokens: typeof u.completion_tokens === "number" ? u.completion_tokens : 0,
};
}
} else if (frame.type === "error") {
errored = typeof frame.message === "string" ? frame.message : "supplier stream error";
}
});
if (errored !== undefined) {
throw toGatewayError(new SupplierError("upstream_error", { message: errored }));
}
const assistantMessage: ChatMessage = doneMessage ?? { role: "assistant", content: assistant };
const finishReason: TurnResult["finishReason"] =
doneFinish === "tool_calls" || (assistantMessage.tool_calls?.length ?? 0) > 0 ? "tool_calls" : "stop";
// Mirror the turn for endChat's response_hash verification / affinity matching.
const mirror = transcripts.get(session.id) ?? [];
if ("content" in payload) mirror.push({ role: "user", content: payload.content });
else mirror.push(...payload.messages);
mirror.push(assistantMessage);
transcripts.set(session.id, mirror);
return { assistantMessage, finishReason, usage };
}
async function streamTurn(
deps: GatewayDeps,
session: SessionRow,
@@ -184,15 +295,6 @@ async function streamTurn(
res: Response,
): Promise<void> {
const id = genId();
const upstream = await deps.fetchFn(`${session.supplier_base_url.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/v1/chat/message`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", accept: "text/event-stream", "X-Escrow-Ref": session.escrow_ref },
body: JSON.stringify({ content }),
});
if (!upstream.ok || !upstream.body) {
const detail = await upstream.text().catch(() => "");
throw toGatewayError(new SupplierError("supplier_http_error", { status: upstream.status, message: detail.slice(0, 200) }));
}
if (stream) {
res.status(200);
@@ -203,46 +305,43 @@ async function streamTurn(
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: session.model, delta: { role: "assistant" }, finishReason: null })));
}
let assistant = "";
let errored: string | undefined;
await readSupplierSse(upstream.body as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>, (frame) => {
if (frame.type === "token" && typeof frame.value === "string") {
assistant += frame.value;
if (stream) res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: session.model, delta: { content: frame.value }, finishReason: null })));
} else if (frame.type === "error") {
errored = typeof frame.message === "string" ? frame.message : "supplier stream error";
let result: TurnResult;
try {
result = await streamSupplierTurn(deps, session, { content }, (token) => {
if (stream) res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: session.model, delta: { content: token }, finishReason: null })));
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof SessionGoneError) {
err = toGatewayError(new SupplierError("supplier_http_error", { status: 404, message: err.message }));
}
});
if (errored !== undefined) {
if (stream) {
res.write(sseData(toErrorBody(toGatewayError(new SupplierError("upstream_error", { message: errored })))));
res.write(sseData(toErrorBody(toGatewayError(err))));
res.end();
return;
}
throw toGatewayError(new SupplierError("upstream_error", { message: errored }));
throw toGatewayError(err);
}
// Mirror the transcript for endChat's response_hash verification.
const mirror = transcripts.get(session.id) ?? [];
mirror.push({ role: "user", content });
mirror.push({ role: "assistant", content: assistant });
transcripts.set(session.id, mirror);
if (stream) {
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: session.model, delta: {}, finishReason: "stop" })));
res.write(sseData(buildChunk({ id, model: session.model, delta: {}, finishReason: result.finishReason })));
res.write(SSE_DONE);
res.end();
} else {
const usage: Usage = { prompt_tokens: 0, completion_tokens: 0, total_tokens: 0 };
res.status(200).json(buildChatCompletion({ id, model: session.model, content: assistant, usage }));
const usage: Usage = {
prompt_tokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens,
completion_tokens: result.usage.completion_tokens,
total_tokens: result.usage.prompt_tokens + result.usage.completion_tokens,
};
res.status(200).json(buildChatCompletion({ id, model: session.model, content: result.assistantMessage.content, usage }));
}
}
interface SupplierFrame {
type?: string;
value?: string;
message?: string;
message?: unknown;
finish_reason?: unknown;
usage?: unknown;
}
/** Read a supplier SSE stream of {type:token|done|error} frames. */
@@ -308,7 +407,34 @@ async function closeSession(
});
deps.store.setSessionState(session.id, "closed", Date.now());
transcripts.delete(session.id);
dropSessionState(session.id);
if (result.settleMode === "ticket") {
// Nothing was Submitted/Accepted: no receipt, no charge (the escrow
// returns via the sweeper's reclaim), and no wallet churn to tidy up.
deps.store.insertUsage({
id: randomUUID(),
key_id: keyRow.id,
created_at: Date.now(),
kind: "chat_session",
model: session.model,
capability_id: CAPABILITY,
supplier_pkh: session.supplier_pkh,
escrow_ref: session.escrow_ref,
cost_lovelace: "0",
prompt_tokens: 0,
completion_tokens: 0,
status: "completed",
failure_reason: null,
});
res.status(200).json({
status: "ended",
escrow_ref: session.escrow_ref,
settle_mode: "ticket",
model: session.model,
});
return;
}
const prompt = result.receipt.prompt_tokens ?? 0;
const completion = result.receipt.completion_tokens ?? 0;

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
import { randomBytes } from "crypto";
import type { Receipt } from "@marketplace/shared/receipt";
import type { ToolCall } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
export function genId(): string {
return `chatcmpl-${randomBytes(16).toString("hex")}`;
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ export function buildChatCompletion(args: {
model: string;
content: string;
usage: Usage;
toolCalls?: ToolCall[];
finishReason?: "stop" | "tool_calls";
vector?: VectorReceipt;
}): Record<string, unknown> {
return {
@@ -50,8 +53,12 @@ export function buildChatCompletion(args: {
choices: [
{
index: 0,
message: { role: "assistant", content: args.content },
finish_reason: "stop",
message: {
role: "assistant",
content: args.content,
...(args.toolCalls?.length ? { tool_calls: args.toolCalls } : {}),
},
finish_reason: args.finishReason ?? "stop",
},
],
usage: args.usage,
@@ -63,8 +70,10 @@ export function buildChatCompletion(args: {
export function buildChunk(args: {
id: string;
model: string;
delta: { role?: string; content?: string } | Record<string, never>;
finishReason: "stop" | null;
delta:
| { role?: string; content?: string; tool_calls?: Array<{ index: number } & ToolCall> }
| Record<string, never>;
finishReason: "stop" | "tool_calls" | null;
usage?: Usage;
vector?: VectorReceipt;
}): Record<string, unknown> {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* gateway/src/openai/transcripts.ts — in-memory per-session state shared by
* the session routes (sessions.ts), the demo affinity executor (demoChat.ts)
* and the sweeper's housekeeping.
*
* transcripts: mirror of each open session's transcript (sessionId → messages).
* Kept hash-identical to the supplier's authoritative transcript (endChat's
* response_hash check). Lost on restart — abandoned sessions are recovered
* by the supplier idle watchdog + gateway sweeper.
* sessionLocks: per-session Mutex serializing turns on ONE session (concurrent
* turns would interleave supplier transcript appends). Distinct from the
* per-key Mutex, which only serializes on-chain wallet work.
*/
import type { ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { Mutex } from "../sdk/registry.js";
export const transcripts = new Map<string, ChatMessage[]>();
const sessionLocks = new Map<string, Mutex>();
export function getSessionLock(sessionId: string): Mutex {
let lock = sessionLocks.get(sessionId);
if (!lock) {
lock = new Mutex();
sessionLocks.set(sessionId, lock);
}
return lock;
}
/** Forget all in-memory state for a session (closed/gone). */
export function dropSessionState(sessionId: string): void {
transcripts.delete(sessionId);
sessionLocks.delete(sessionId);
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* gateway/src/openai/validate.ts — request body validation for chat endpoints.
*/
import type { ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { normalizeChatMessage, type ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
import { badRequest } from "./errors.js";
export interface ParsedChatRequest {
@@ -10,21 +10,30 @@ export interface ParsedChatRequest {
messages: ChatMessage[];
maxTokens?: number;
stream: boolean;
tools?: unknown[];
toolChoice?: unknown;
}
const ROLES = new Set(["system", "user", "assistant"]);
/** Validate an OpenAI chat.completions-style body. Rejects tools/functions;
* silently ignores temperature/n/stop/top_p/etc (documented). */
export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown): ParsedChatRequest {
/** Validate an OpenAI chat.completions-style body. Default path rejects
* tools/functions; `allowTools` (demo keys) accepts tools/tool_choice, the
* `tool` role, null content and assistant tool_calls, normalizing every
* message into canonical mirror shape. Silently ignores temperature/n/stop/
* top_p/etc (documented). */
export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown, opts?: { allowTools?: boolean }): ParsedChatRequest {
const allowTools = opts?.allowTools === true;
if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) {
throw badRequest("invalid_body", "request body must be a JSON object");
}
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
if ("tools" in b || "tool_choice" in b || "functions" in b || "function_call" in b) {
if (!allowTools && ("tools" in b || "tool_choice" in b || "functions" in b || "function_call" in b)) {
throw badRequest("unsupported_parameter", "tools and function-calling are not supported by this gateway");
}
if (allowTools && ("functions" in b || "function_call" in b)) {
throw badRequest("unsupported_parameter", "legacy functions/function_call are not supported; use tools");
}
const model = b.model;
if (typeof model !== "string" || model === "") {
@@ -37,6 +46,14 @@ export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown): ParsedChatRequest {
}
const messages: ChatMessage[] = [];
for (const m of rawMessages) {
if (allowTools) {
const msg = normalizeChatMessage(m);
if (!msg) {
throw badRequest("invalid_messages", "each message must be OpenAI-shaped {role, content, tool_calls?, tool_call_id?}");
}
messages.push(msg);
continue;
}
if (
typeof m !== "object" ||
m === null ||
@@ -50,6 +67,13 @@ export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown): ParsedChatRequest {
messages.push({ role: mm.role, content: mm.content });
}
let tools: unknown[] | undefined;
let toolChoice: unknown;
if (allowTools && Array.isArray(b.tools) && b.tools.length > 0) {
tools = b.tools;
toolChoice = b.tool_choice;
}
let maxTokens: number | undefined;
const mt = b.max_tokens ?? b.max_completion_tokens;
if (mt !== undefined && mt !== null) {
@@ -60,5 +84,5 @@ export function parseChatRequest(body: unknown): ParsedChatRequest {
}
const stream = b.stream === true;
return { model, messages, maxTokens, stream };
return { model, messages, maxTokens, stream, tools, toolChoice };
}

View File

@@ -53,9 +53,17 @@ export function parseRef(ref: string): OutputReference | null {
export interface SelectSupplierOpts {
indexerUrl: string;
/** Exact model match; "" matches ANY model under the capability (used by
* single-model capabilities like the ocr.* ids, where the capability
* already pins the model). */
model: string;
capabilityId: string;
fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch;
/** supplier_pkhs eligible regardless of polled status — used after the demo
* executor frees a supplier the indexer poller (~20 s cadence) still reports
* busy. sdk.startChat's live /status pre-check still guards genuinely-busy
* suppliers. */
ignoreStatusFor?: ReadonlySet<string>;
}
/**
@@ -77,9 +85,11 @@ export async function selectCandidates(opts: SelectSupplierOpts): Promise<Suppli
const candidates: SupplierCandidate[] = [];
for (const raw of body as SupplierView[]) {
if (raw.capability_id !== opts.capabilityId) continue;
if (raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
if (opts.model !== "" && raw.model !== opts.model) continue;
if (raw.advert_status !== "Active") continue;
if (raw.status !== "free" && raw.status !== "unknown") continue;
if (raw.status !== "free" && raw.status !== "unknown" && !opts.ignoreStatusFor?.has(raw.supplier_pkh)) {
continue;
}
const advertRef = parseRef(raw.utxo_ref);
if (!advertRef) continue;
candidates.push({
@@ -101,19 +111,27 @@ export async function selectCandidates(opts: SelectSupplierOpts): Promise<Suppli
return candidates;
}
/** Distinct models across Active suppliers (for GET /openai/v1/models). */
/** Distinct models across Active suppliers (for GET /openai/v1/models).
* Pass capabilityId to list only models under one capability (demo keys see
* only llm.chat.v1 models — the session-backed executor's routing target). */
export async function listModels(opts: {
indexerUrl: string;
capabilityId?: string;
fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch;
}): Promise<string[]> {
const fetchFn = opts.fetchFn ?? globalThis.fetch;
const res = await fetchFn(`${opts.indexerUrl}/suppliers`);
const url = opts.capabilityId
? `${opts.indexerUrl}/suppliers?capability_id=${encodeURIComponent(opts.capabilityId)}`
: `${opts.indexerUrl}/suppliers`;
const res = await fetchFn(url);
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`indexer /suppliers returned ${res.status}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as unknown;
if (!Array.isArray(body)) throw new Error("indexer /suppliers did not return an array");
const models = new Set<string>();
for (const raw of body as SupplierView[]) {
if (raw.advert_status === "Active" && typeof raw.model === "string") models.add(raw.model);
if (raw.advert_status !== "Active" || typeof raw.model !== "string") continue;
if (opts.capabilityId !== undefined && raw.capability_id !== opts.capabilityId) continue;
models.add(raw.model);
}
return [...models].sort();
}

View File

@@ -7,13 +7,14 @@
* POST /openai/v1/chat/sessions[/:id/messages|/close].
*/
import express, { type Express, type Request, type Response } from "express";
import express, { type Express, type NextFunction, type Request, type Response } from "express";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "./deps.js";
import { makeApiKeyAuth } from "./middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { ipRateLimit, keyRateLimit } from "./middleware/rateLimit.js";
import { ipRateLimit, keyRateLimit, demoIpRateLimit } from "./middleware/rateLimit.js";
import { sendError } from "./middleware/http.js";
import { notFound } from "./openai/errors.js";
import { makeChatCompletionsHandler } from "./openai/chatCompletions.js";
import { makeOcrExtractHandler } from "./ocr/extract.js";
import { makeModelsHandler } from "./openai/models.js";
import {
makeOpenSessionHandler,
@@ -23,11 +24,44 @@ import {
import { makeSignupHandler, makeAccountHandler, makeWithdrawHandler } from "./account/routes.js";
import { INDEX_HTML } from "./ui/page.js";
/**
* CORS for browser clients on an allowlisted Origin (e.g. the marketplace
* frontend's "Generate API key" page, served from a different host than the
* gateway). Only echoes Access-Control-* headers when the request's Origin is
* in the configured allowlist; an empty allowlist disables CORS entirely.
* No credentials are allowed — the signup call is a plain bearer-less POST, so
* cookies never ride along cross-origin. Preflight OPTIONS is answered 204.
*/
function corsMiddleware(allowOrigins: string[]) {
const allow = new Set(allowOrigins);
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {
const origin = req.headers.origin;
if (typeof origin === "string" && allow.has(origin)) {
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin);
res.setHeader("Vary", "Origin");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization");
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Max-Age", "600");
}
if (req.method === "OPTIONS") {
res.status(204).end();
return;
}
next();
};
}
export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
const app = express();
// Behind traefik/Cloudflare — trust the proxy chain so req.ip is the client.
app.set("trust proxy", true);
app.use(express.json({ limit: "1mb" }));
// CORS before body-parsing so preflight OPTIONS short-circuits cheaply.
app.use(corsMiddleware(deps.config.corsOrigins));
// /v1/ocr carries a base64 page image and mounts its own larger parser on
// the route; every other path keeps the 1mb ceiling.
const jsonBody = express.json({ limit: "1mb" });
app.use((req, res, next) =>
req.path.startsWith("/v1/ocr/") ? next() : jsonBody(req, res, next));
app.get("/healthz", (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
res.json({ ok: true });
@@ -40,15 +74,23 @@ export function createApp(deps: GatewayDeps): Express {
// Public signup, rate-limited per IP.
app.post("/signup", ipRateLimit(deps.config.signupRate), makeSignupHandler(deps));
// Bearer-gated routes: auth → per-key rate limit → handler.
// Bearer-gated routes: auth → per-key rate limit (skips demo keys) →
// per-IP demo limit (demo keys only) → handler.
const auth = makeApiKeyAuth(deps.store);
const krl = keyRateLimit(deps.config.keyRate);
const gated = [auth, krl] as const;
const dirl = demoIpRateLimit(deps.config.demoIpRate);
const gated = [auth, krl, dirl] as const;
app.get("/account", auth, makeAccountHandler(deps));
app.post("/account/withdraw", auth, makeWithdrawHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions", ...gated, makeChatCompletionsHandler(deps));
// Model-scoped OCR: 16mb parser covers MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS
// (~12M chars ≈ 9 MB binary) plus JSON envelope. Gates (auth + rate
// limits) run BEFORE the parser so an unauthenticated caller cannot
// buffer/JSON.parse up to 16mb before getting a 401, and rate limiting
// can actually throttle the request (2026-08 review finding C2).
app.post("/v1/ocr/extract", ...gated, express.json({ limit: "16mb" }), makeOcrExtractHandler(deps));
app.get("/openai/v1/models", auth, makeModelsHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions", ...gated, makeOpenSessionHandler(deps));
app.post("/openai/v1/chat/sessions/:id/messages", ...gated, makeSessionMessageHandler(deps));

View File

@@ -10,26 +10,120 @@
* state and never blind-reclaim a Submitted escrow. The on-chain validator is
* the source of truth for deadlines, so premature/late attempts simply fail and
* are caught here; the age thresholds just avoid racing in-flight requests.
*
* Chat sessions get special handling:
* - Their deliver_by is ~30 min (vs ~10 min one-shot), so rows belonging to
* an OPEN session use CHAT_RECLAIM_AFTER_MS — otherwise every open session
* older than 11 min would trigger a doomed Reclaim attempt per sweep while
* holding the key's mutex.
* - When a session's escrow reaches a terminal state (Accepted here, spent
* elsewhere, or Reclaimed), the session row is closed, its in-memory state
* dropped, and a usage row recorded — abandoned demo sessions (nobody calls
* /close) settle and get billed through this path.
*
* Escrow↔session lineage: the indexer keeps one row per utxo_ref per state
* (terminal spends update nothing), and the validator preserves posted_at
* across states — so a session's lineage is "rows sharing the posted_at of the
* session's original Open ref row".
*
* Because terminal spends never update indexer rows, every settled escrow
* would be retried (one doomed chain query each) on every sweep forever. The
* in-process `settledRefs` memory skips refs this process has already settled
* or found spent; a restart just causes one harmless retry burst.
*
* Ticket mode (config.chatSettleMode === "ticket"): session escrows are never
* Claimed — they sit Open until reclaimed here after deliver_by. Reclaiming
* an Open ticket does NOT close a still-open session row: nothing re-checks
* the escrow after /v1/chat/start, so the conversation (and its affinity
* mirror) lives on, bounded only by the idle janitor.
*/
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "./deps.js";
import { fetchEscrows, acceptAndConfirm, reclaimAndConfirm } from "./onchain/settle.js";
import type { SessionRow } from "./db/store.js";
import { fetchEscrows, acceptAndConfirm, reclaimAndConfirm, type EscrowRow } from "./onchain/settle.js";
import { parseRef } from "./routing/selectSupplier.js";
import { dropSessionState } from "./openai/transcripts.js";
import { dropDemoSession, sweepIdleDemoSessions } from "./openai/demoChat.js";
import { CAPABILITY as CHAT_CAPABILITY } from "./openai/sessions.js";
// Don't touch escrows newer than this — an in-flight request is settling them.
const MIN_AGE_MS = 90_000;
// Reclaim Open/Claimed escrows older than this (past deliver_by ~10m + buffer).
const RECLAIM_AFTER_MS = 11 * 60 * 1000;
// Chat-session escrows: deliver_by ≈ posted_at + 30 min, so wait longer.
const CHAT_RECLAIM_AFTER_MS = 35 * 60 * 1000;
// Reclaim only fires once the validator allows it (validity lower bound >=
// deliver_by); attempting earlier is a guaranteed-doomed tx build.
const DELIVER_BY_BUFFER_MS = 60_000;
/** Refs this process already settled (Accepted/Reclaimed) or found spent.
* The indexer never updates terminal rows, so without this every historical
* escrow is retried each sweep. Bounded FIFO; restart = one retry burst. */
const settledRefs = new Set<string>();
const SETTLED_REFS_MAX = 5_000;
function markSettled(ref: string): void {
settledRefs.add(ref);
if (settledRefs.size > SETTLED_REFS_MAX) {
const first = settledRefs.values().next().value;
if (first !== undefined) settledRefs.delete(first);
}
}
function log(msg: string): void {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[gateway:sweeper] ${msg}`);
}
export async function runSweepOnce(deps: GatewayDeps): Promise<void> {
function closeSessionRow(
deps: GatewayDeps,
session: SessionRow,
outcome: { status: "completed" | "reclaimed"; costLovelace: string | null },
): void {
// Re-read: an in-flight close (route handler or demo executor) may have won.
const current = deps.store.getSession(session.id);
if (!current || current.state !== "open") return;
deps.store.setSessionState(session.id, "closed", Date.now());
dropSessionState(session.id);
dropDemoSession(session.id);
deps.store.insertUsage({
id: randomUUID(),
key_id: session.key_id,
created_at: Date.now(),
kind: "chat_session",
model: session.model,
capability_id: CHAT_CAPABILITY,
supplier_pkh: session.supplier_pkh,
escrow_ref: session.escrow_ref,
cost_lovelace: outcome.costLovelace,
prompt_tokens: 0,
completion_tokens: 0,
status: outcome.status,
failure_reason: null,
});
log(`closed abandoned session ${session.id} (${outcome.status})`);
}
/** Chain-settle functions, injectable for tests. */
export interface SweepSettleFns {
accept: typeof acceptAndConfirm;
reclaim: typeof reclaimAndConfirm;
}
export async function runSweepOnce(
deps: GatewayDeps,
settle: SweepSettleFns = { accept: acceptAndConfirm, reclaim: reclaimAndConfirm },
): Promise<void> {
// Idle demo sessions first: closing them makes the supplier Submit, so this
// sweep (or the next) can Accept the escrow right after.
await sweepIdleDemoSessions(deps).catch((err) =>
log(`demo idle janitor: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`),
);
const now = Date.now();
for (const keyRow of deps.store.listKeys()) {
let rows;
let rows: EscrowRow[];
try {
rows = await fetchEscrows(deps.config.indexerUrl, keyRow.wallet_pkh, deps.fetchFn);
} catch (err) {
@@ -37,20 +131,71 @@ export async function runSweepOnce(deps: GatewayDeps): Promise<void> {
continue;
}
// Lineage-match open sessions: the session stores its ORIGINAL Open ref;
// rows sharing that row's posted_at are the same escrow in later states.
const sessionByPostedAt = new Map<number, SessionRow>();
for (const session of deps.store.listOpenSessionsByKey(keyRow.id)) {
const origin = rows.find((r) => r.utxo_ref === session.escrow_ref);
if (origin) sessionByPostedAt.set(origin.posted_at, session);
}
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
for (const row of rows) {
const ref = parseRef(row.utxo_ref);
if (!ref) continue;
if (settledRefs.has(row.utxo_ref)) continue;
const ageMs = now - (row.posted_at ?? 0);
if (ageMs < MIN_AGE_MS) continue;
const chatSession = sessionByPostedAt.get(row.posted_at);
try {
if (row.state === "Submitted") {
await ctx.mutex.run(() => acceptAndConfirm(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey, ref));
log(`accepted stranded Submitted escrow ${row.utxo_ref}`);
} else if ((row.state === "Open" || row.state === "Claimed") && ageMs > RECLAIM_AFTER_MS) {
await ctx.mutex.run(() => reclaimAndConfirm(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey, ref));
log(`reclaimed stranded ${row.state} escrow ${row.utxo_ref}`);
try {
await ctx.mutex.run(() => settle.accept(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey, ref));
log(`accepted stranded Submitted escrow ${row.utxo_ref}`);
markSettled(row.utxo_ref);
if (chatSession) {
closeSessionRow(deps, chatSession, { status: "completed", costLovelace: chatSession.price_lovelace });
}
} catch (err) {
// Accept fails routinely when the UTxO is already spent (settled
// by an in-flight request, an earlier sweep, or supplier Release).
// For session lineages, confirm the spend on-chain before closing
// the row — an Accept that failed for another reason (timeout)
// must leave the session open for the next sweep.
if ((await deps.chain.queryUtxo(ref)) === null) {
markSettled(row.utxo_ref);
if (chatSession) {
closeSessionRow(deps, chatSession, { status: "completed", costLovelace: chatSession.price_lovelace });
}
} else if (!chatSession) {
// Preserve the historical quiet-skip for one-shot escrows.
void err;
}
}
} else if (row.state === "Open" || row.state === "Claimed") {
const reclaimAfterMs = chatSession ? CHAT_RECLAIM_AFTER_MS : RECLAIM_AFTER_MS;
// The validator only allows Reclaim at/after deliver_by — skip
// attempts that cannot succeed yet (early-closed ticket sessions).
const pastDeliverBy =
typeof row.deliver_by === "number" ? now > row.deliver_by + DELIVER_BY_BUFFER_MS : true;
if (ageMs > reclaimAfterMs && pastDeliverBy) {
await ctx.mutex.run(() => settle.reclaim(deps.chain, ctx.walletKey, ref));
log(`reclaimed stranded ${row.state} escrow ${row.utxo_ref}`);
markSettled(row.utxo_ref);
if (chatSession) {
const ticketOpen = deps.config.chatSettleMode === "ticket" && row.state === "Open";
if (ticketOpen) {
// Ticket escrow reclaimed out from under a LIVE session —
// by design. Keep the session row + mirror; only the idle
// janitor / close paths end ticket sessions.
log(`ticket mode: escrow reclaimed, session ${chatSession.id} stays open`);
} else {
// Funds returned — the session never settled; record no cost.
closeSessionRow(deps, chatSession, { status: "reclaimed", costLovelace: null });
}
}
}
}
} catch {
// Expected when the validator rejects (wrong window/state) or the UTxO
@@ -58,9 +203,6 @@ export async function runSweepOnce(deps: GatewayDeps): Promise<void> {
}
}
}
// Mark closed/settled chat sessions whose escrow is no longer active.
// (Best-effort housekeeping; the escrow recovery above is the load-bearing part.)
}
/** Start the periodic sweeper. Returns a stop() function. */

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>Vector Marketplace — OpenAI Gateway</title>
<title>Vector Marketplace - OpenAI Gateway</title>
<style>
body { font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; max-width: 760px; margin: 2rem auto; padding: 0 1rem; line-height: 1.5; }
h1 { font-size: 1.5rem; } h2 { font-size: 1.1rem; margin-top: 2rem; }
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Vector Marketplace — OpenAI-compatible Gateway</h1>
<h1>Vector Marketplace - OpenAI-compatible Gateway</h1>
<p class="muted">Point any OpenAI SDK at <code id="base"></code> using your API key as the bearer token.</p>
<h2>1. Create an API key</h2>
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ export const INDEX_HTML = `<!doctype html>
<div id="signupOut"></div>
<h2>2. Fund your wallet</h2>
<p class="muted">Send AP3X to your deposit address (you need price + bonds + ~5 ADA collateral + fees).</p>
<p class="muted">Send AP3X to your deposit address (you need price + bonds + ~5 AP3X collateral + fees).</p>
<h2>3. Account</h2>
<div class="row">

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* gateway/src/walletHealth.ts — keep each custodial wallet usable.
*
* After every settled request (and on a periodic tick) we re-shape the wallet to
* {≥5 ADA collateral UTxO, working UTxO} via the shared consolidate builder, so
* the NEXT request's Accept/Reclaim script-spend always finds a pure-ADA
* {≥5 AP3X collateral UTxO, working UTxO} via the shared consolidate builder, so
* the NEXT request's Accept/Reclaim script-spend always finds a pure-AP3X
* collateral candidate. No-op when the wallet is already healthy.
*/

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
/**
* affinity.test.ts — transcript-prefix session matching rules.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import {
matchSessionPrefix,
normalizeAssistantContent,
trimToRespondable,
type AffinityCandidate,
} from "../src/openai/affinity.js";
import type { ChatMessage } from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
const u = (content: string): ChatMessage => ({ role: "user", content });
const a = (content: string): ChatMessage => ({ role: "assistant", content });
const TOOL_CALL = { id: "call_1", type: "function" as const, function: { name: "get_time", arguments: "{}" } };
function cand(sessionId: string, mirror: ChatMessage[], lastUsedAt = 0, model = "m"): AffinityCandidate {
return { sessionId, model, mirror, lastUsedAt };
}
describe("matchSessionPrefix", () => {
it("matches an exact prefix and returns the delta", () => {
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", [u("hi"), a("hello")])], [u("hi"), a("hello"), u("more")], "m");
expect(got).toEqual({ sessionId: "s1", delta: [u("more")] });
});
it("accepts a multi-message tool delta ending with a tool result", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi"), { role: "assistant" as const, content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] }];
const incoming = [...mirror, { role: "tool" as const, content: "3pm", tool_call_id: "call_1" }];
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], incoming, "m");
expect(got?.sessionId).toBe("s1");
expect(got?.delta).toHaveLength(1);
expect(got?.delta[0].role).toBe("tool");
});
it("rejects deltas that end with a non-respondable role", () => {
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", [u("hi")])], [u("hi"), a("stray assistant")], "m");
expect(got).toBeNull();
});
it("never matches when incoming is not longer than the mirror (retry of answered request)", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi"), a("hello")];
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], mirror, "m")).toBeNull();
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], [u("hi")], "m")).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects diverged histories (prefix mismatch)", () => {
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", [u("hi"), a("hello")])], [u("hi"), a("DIFFERENT"), u("more")], "m");
expect(got).toBeNull();
});
it("requires the model to match", () => {
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", [u("hi")], 0, "other")], [u("hi"), u("more")], "m")).toBeNull();
});
it("prefers the longest mirror, then most recently used", () => {
const incoming = [u("hi"), a("hello"), u("more")];
const longest = matchSessionPrefix(
[cand("short", [u("hi")], 99), cand("long", [u("hi"), a("hello")], 0)],
incoming,
"m",
);
expect(longest?.sessionId).toBe("long");
const tie = matchSessionPrefix(
[cand("old", [u("hi"), a("hello")], 1), cand("recent", [u("hi"), a("hello")], 2)],
incoming,
"m",
);
expect(tie?.sessionId).toBe("recent");
});
it("matches an empty mirror (fresh session) against any respondable history", () => {
const incoming = [{ role: "system" as const, content: "be nice" }, u("hi")];
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("fresh", [])], incoming, "m");
expect(got).toEqual({ sessionId: "fresh", delta: incoming });
});
it("treats content null-normalization as equivalent (tool-call assistant echo)", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi"), { role: "assistant" as const, content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] }];
// Client echoes the assistant message back with content:"" (normalized from null upstream).
const incoming = [u("hi"), { role: "assistant" as const, content: "", tool_calls: [{ ...TOOL_CALL }] }, { role: "tool" as const, content: "x", tool_call_id: "call_1" }];
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], incoming, "m")?.sessionId).toBe("s1");
});
it("matches leniently when the client reshapes the assistant echo (think-strip + whitespace)", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi"), a("<think>plan it</think>Hello there\n")];
const got = matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], [u("hi"), a("Hello there"), u("more")], "m");
expect(got).toEqual({ sessionId: "s1", delta: [u("more")] });
});
it("stays strict on user/tool divergence even with lenient assistant matching", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi "), a("Hello")];
// User content differs by whitespace — client-authored roles must be byte-exact.
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], [u("hi"), a("Hello"), u("more")], "m")).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects assistant tool_calls divergence under lenient matching", () => {
const mirror = [u("hi"), { role: "assistant" as const, content: "x", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] }];
const changed = { ...TOOL_CALL, function: { name: "get_time", arguments: '{"tz":"utc"}' } };
const incoming = [u("hi"), { role: "assistant" as const, content: "x ", tool_calls: [changed] }, { role: "tool" as const, content: "t", tool_call_id: "call_1" }];
expect(matchSessionPrefix([cand("s1", mirror)], incoming, "m")).toBeNull();
});
it("prefers a strict match over a lenient one regardless of recency", () => {
const incoming = [u("hi"), a("Hello"), u("more")];
const got = matchSessionPrefix(
[
cand("lenient", [u("hi"), a("Hello ")], 99),
cand("strict", [u("hi"), a("Hello")], 1),
],
incoming,
"m",
);
expect(got?.sessionId).toBe("strict");
});
});
describe("normalizeAssistantContent", () => {
it("strips think blocks, collapses whitespace and trims", () => {
expect(normalizeAssistantContent("<think>a\nb</think> Hi\n\nthere friend ")).toBe("Hi there friend");
expect(normalizeAssistantContent("<THINK>x</THINK>ok")).toBe("ok");
expect(normalizeAssistantContent("plain")).toBe("plain");
});
});
describe("trimToRespondable", () => {
it("drops trailing assistant/system messages", () => {
expect(trimToRespondable([u("hi"), a("partial")])).toEqual([u("hi")]);
expect(trimToRespondable([u("hi"), a("x"), { role: "system" as const, content: "nudge" }])).toEqual([u("hi")]);
});
it("returns empty when nothing respondable remains", () => {
expect(trimToRespondable([a("hello")])).toEqual([]);
expect(trimToRespondable([])).toEqual([]);
});
it("keeps already-respondable histories unchanged", () => {
const msgs = [u("hi"), a("x"), u("more")];
expect(trimToRespondable(msgs)).toEqual(msgs);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,37 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import request from "supertest";
import { createApp } from "../src/server.js";
import { sweepIdleDemoSessions } from "../src/openai/demoChat.js";
import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
import { SdkRegistry } from "../src/sdk/registry.js";
import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../src/wallet.js";
import { seal } from "../src/crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey } from "../src/middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import type { GatewayConfig } from "../src/config.js";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../src/deps.js";
const MASTER = "ab".repeat(32);
const SUPPLIERS = [
{ utxo_ref: "aa".repeat(32) + "#0", supplier_pkh: "s1", capability_id: "llm.text.generate.v1", model: "qwen", max_output_tokens: 256, price_lovelace: "1000000", supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000", buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000", endpoint_url: "http://sup", advert_status: "Active", status: "free" },
{ utxo_ref: "bb".repeat(32) + "#0", supplier_pkh: "s2", capability_id: "llm.chat.v1", model: "kimi", max_output_tokens: 256, price_lovelace: "1000000", supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000", buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000", endpoint_url: "http://sup", advert_status: "Active", status: "free" },
];
function makeDeps(fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch): GatewayDeps {
function makeDeps(
fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch,
overrides?: {
demoIpRate?: { max: number; windowMs: number };
chain?: GatewayDeps["chain"];
chatSettleMode?: "full" | "ticket";
},
): GatewayDeps {
const dbDir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-test-${randomUUID()}`);
const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
const config: GatewayConfig = {
masterKeyHex: "ab".repeat(32),
masterKeyHex: MASTER,
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
ogmiosUrl: "http://og",
networkId: 0,
@@ -26,11 +40,16 @@ function makeDeps(fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch): GatewayDeps {
dbDir,
signupRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
keyRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
demoIpRate: overrides?.demoIpRate ?? { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
sweeperIntervalMs: 60_000,
demoSessionIdleMs: 180_000,
chatSettleMode: overrides?.chatSettleMode ?? "full",
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = { queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);
const registry = new SdkRegistry({
chain,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
@@ -103,3 +122,450 @@ describe("gateway HTTP", () => {
expect(res.body.error.code).toBe("unsupported_parameter");
});
});
// ─── Shared demo key (session-backed completions) ───────────────────────────
const TOOLS = [{ type: "function", function: { name: "get_time", parameters: {} } }];
const TOOL_CALL = { id: "call_1", type: "function", function: { name: "get_time", arguments: "{}" } };
/** A funded wallet: covers price+bonds+collateral+fee and has pure-ADA ≥ 5. */
const fundedChain = {
queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [
{ ref: { txHash: "ff".repeat(32), index: 0 }, address: "a", lovelace: 20_000_000n, assets: {}, datumHex: null, scriptRef: null },
],
} as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
function supplierSse(frames: unknown[]): Response {
const body = frames.map((f) => `data: ${JSON.stringify(f)}\n\n`).join("");
return new Response(body, { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" } });
}
function doneFrame(message: Record<string, unknown>, finishReason: string, usage = { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 }) {
return { type: "done", message, finish_reason: finishReason, usage };
}
/** fetchFn serving the indexer supplier list and scripted /v1/chat/message
* responses. Pass `suppliers` to serve a mutable list (eviction tests flip
* status mid-test); /v1/chat/end calls are recorded and 200-acked. */
function demoFetch(messageResponses: Array<() => Response>, suppliers?: () => unknown[]) {
const messageCalls: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
const endCalls: string[] = [];
let i = 0;
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown, init?: { body?: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/v1/chat/message")) {
messageCalls.push(init?.body ? (JSON.parse(init.body) as Record<string, unknown>) : {});
const make = messageResponses[Math.min(i, messageResponses.length - 1)];
i += 1;
return make();
}
if (u.includes("/v1/chat/end")) {
endCalls.push(init?.headers?.["X-Escrow-Ref"] ?? "");
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "submitted" }), { status: 200 });
}
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) return new Response(JSON.stringify(suppliers ? suppliers() : SUPPLIERS), { status: 200 });
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
return { fetchFn, messageCalls, endCalls };
}
/** Insert a demo-flagged key directly (public signup can't mint one) and stub
* the SDK's chain-touching startChat on the pre-warmed per-key context. */
function setupDemoKey(deps: GatewayDeps) {
const rawKey = `vk_test_${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, 0);
const sealed = seal(privHex, MASTER);
deps.store.insertKey({
id: randomUUID(),
key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
label: "shared-demo",
wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
deposit_address: walletKey.address,
enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
demo: 1,
});
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const startChat = vi.fn(async () => ({
escrowRef: { txHash: randomBytes(32).toString("hex"), index: 0 },
sessionNonce: "nonce",
supplierBaseUrl: "http://sup",
}));
(ctx.sdk as { startChat: unknown }).startChat = startChat;
return { rawKey, keyRow, startChat };
}
describe("gateway demo key", () => {
it("runs a session-backed completion with tools and reuses the session via affinity", async () => {
const { fetchFn, messageCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] }, "tool_calls")]),
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "It is 3pm" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "It is 3pm" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
// Turn 1: model asks for a tool call.
const history: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [{ role: "user", content: "what time is it?" }];
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: history, tools: TOOLS });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
expect(res1.body.choices[0].message.tool_calls).toEqual([TOOL_CALL]);
expect(res1.body.choices[0].finish_reason).toBe("tool_calls");
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// First turn replays the full history and forwards tools.
expect((messageCalls[0].messages as unknown[]).length).toBe(1);
expect(messageCalls[0].tools).toEqual(TOOLS);
// Turn 2: client echoes the assistant tool_calls + tool result.
history.push({ role: "assistant", content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] });
history.push({ role: "tool", content: "3pm", tool_call_id: "call_1" });
const res2 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: history, tools: TOOLS });
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.choices[0].message.content).toBe("It is 3pm");
expect(res2.body.choices[0].finish_reason).toBe("stop");
// Affinity hit: no new session, only the unseen delta is forwarded.
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const delta = messageCalls[1].messages as Array<{ role: string }>;
expect(delta).toHaveLength(1);
expect(delta[0].role).toBe("tool");
});
it("streams tool_calls chunks with finish_reason tool_calls", async () => {
const { fetchFn } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] }, "tool_calls")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "time?" }], tools: TOOLS, stream: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const chunks = res.text
.split("\n\n")
.filter((l) => l.startsWith("data: ") && !l.includes("[DONE]"))
.map((l) => JSON.parse(l.slice(6)));
const toolChunk = chunks.find((c) => c.choices?.[0]?.delta?.tool_calls);
expect(toolChunk.choices[0].delta.tool_calls[0].function.name).toBe("get_time");
expect(chunks.at(-1).choices[0].finish_reason).toBe("tool_calls");
expect(res.text).toContain("data: [DONE]");
});
it("transparently reopens when the supplier lost the session (idle-close)", async () => {
const { fetchFn, messageCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Hi" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" }, "stop")]),
() => new Response("not found", { status: 404 }),
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Sure" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Sure" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
// Extended history matches the session, but the supplier 404s the turn →
// the executor closes the session and reopens, replaying full history.
const history = [
{ role: "user", content: "hi" },
{ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" },
{ role: "user", content: "more please" },
];
const res2 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: history });
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.choices[0].message.content).toBe("Sure");
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect((messageCalls[2].messages as unknown[]).length).toBe(3);
// The dead session's fee was recorded for spend audit.
const usage = deps.store.listUsage(deps.store.listAllKeys().find((k) => k.demo === 1)!.id, 10);
expect(usage.some((u) => u.kind === "chat_session" && u.cost_lovelace === "1000000")).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects histories with nothing respondable before any chain work", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps(undefined, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "assistant", content: "hello" }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error.code).toBe("invalid_messages");
expect(startChat).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("answers a trailing-assistant history by trimming to the last user message (regenerate)", async () => {
const { fetchFn, messageCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Again" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Again" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({
model: "kimi",
messages: [
{ role: "user", content: "hi" },
{ role: "assistant", content: "partial answer" },
],
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.choices[0].message.content).toBe("Again");
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// The trailing assistant message is dropped from the replay.
expect((messageCalls[0].messages as Array<{ role: string }>).map((m) => m.role)).toEqual(["user"]);
});
it("keeps the session when the client reshapes the assistant echo (lenient affinity)", async () => {
const { fetchFn, messageCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "<think>hm</think>Hi there" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "<think>hm</think>Hi there" }, "stop")]),
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Sure" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Sure" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
// Client echoes the assistant reply with the think block stripped and
// whitespace collapsed — still the same session, delta only.
const res2 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({
model: "kimi",
messages: [
{ role: "user", content: "hi" },
{ role: "assistant", content: "Hi there" },
{ role: "user", content: "more" },
],
});
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.choices[0].message.content).toBe("Sure");
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect((messageCalls[1].messages as unknown[]).length).toBe(1);
});
it("evicts the LRU demo session when every supplier is pinned", async () => {
const suppliers = [{ ...SUPPLIERS[1] }]; // single chat supplier, mutable status
const { fetchFn, messageCalls, endCalls } = demoFetch(
[
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Hi" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" }, "stop")]),
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "New" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "New" }, "stop")]),
],
() => suppliers,
);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
// The lone supplier is now pinned by session 1 (indexer sees it working).
suppliers[0] = { ...suppliers[0], status: "working" };
// Unrelated history → affinity miss → no free supplier → evict session 1
// (supplier /v1/chat/end) and retry, bypassing the stale indexer status.
const res2 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "different topic" }] });
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.choices[0].message.content).toBe("New");
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(endCalls).toHaveLength(1);
expect((messageCalls[1].messages as unknown[]).length).toBe(1);
// Evicted session closed + billed.
const keyId = deps.store.listAllKeys().find((k) => k.demo === 1)!.id;
const usage = deps.store.listUsage(keyId, 10);
expect(usage.some((u) => u.kind === "chat_session" && u.cost_lovelace === "1000000")).toBe(true);
expect(deps.store.listOpenSessionsByKey(keyId)).toHaveLength(1); // only session 2
});
it("surfaces the original no-supplier error when there is nothing to evict", async () => {
const suppliers = [{ ...SUPPLIERS[1], status: "working" }];
const { fetchFn, endCalls } = demoFetch([() => new Response("unused", { status: 500 })], () => suppliers);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.error.code).toBe("model_not_found");
expect(startChat).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(endCalls).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("ticket mode: session close settles nothing and bills zero", async () => {
const { fetchFn } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Hi" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain, chatSettleMode: "ticket" });
const { rawKey, keyRow } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const endChat = vi.fn(async (opts: { escrowRef: unknown }) => ({
settleMode: "ticket" as const,
escrowRef: opts.escrowRef,
}));
(ctx.sdk as { endChat: unknown }).endChat = endChat;
const app = createApp(deps);
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
const session = deps.store.listOpenSessionsByKey(keyRow.id)[0];
const close = await request(app)
.post(`/openai/v1/chat/sessions/${session.id}/close`)
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({});
expect(close.status).toBe(200);
expect(close.body.settle_mode).toBe("ticket");
expect(close.body.accepted_ref).toBeUndefined();
expect(endChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const usage = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(usage.some((u) => u.kind === "chat_session" && u.cost_lovelace === "0")).toBe(true);
});
it("ticket mode: janitor-closed demo sessions bill zero", async () => {
const { fetchFn, endCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Hi" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain, chatSettleMode: "ticket" });
const { rawKey, keyRow } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const res = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await sweepIdleDemoSessions(deps, Date.now() + deps.config.demoSessionIdleMs + 1);
expect(endCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const usage = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(usage.some((u) => u.kind === "chat_session" && u.cost_lovelace === "0")).toBe(true);
});
it("janitor closes idle demo sessions so the next request opens fresh", async () => {
const { fetchFn, messageCalls, endCalls } = demoFetch([
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Hi" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" }, "stop")]),
() => supplierSse([{ type: "token", value: "Fresh" }, doneFrame({ role: "assistant", content: "Fresh" }, "stop")]),
]);
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const { rawKey, startChat } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const res1 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "kimi", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] });
expect(res1.status).toBe(200);
// Pretend demoSessionIdleMs elapsed: the sweeper tick closes the session.
await sweepIdleDemoSessions(deps, Date.now() + deps.config.demoSessionIdleMs + 1);
expect(endCalls).toHaveLength(1);
const keyId = deps.store.listAllKeys().find((k) => k.demo === 1)!.id;
expect(deps.store.listOpenSessionsByKey(keyId)).toHaveLength(0);
// Continuing the thread now misses affinity and reopens with full replay.
const res2 = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({
model: "kimi",
messages: [
{ role: "user", content: "hi" },
{ role: "assistant", content: "Hi" },
{ role: "user", content: "more" },
],
});
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(startChat).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect((messageCalls[1].messages as unknown[]).length).toBe(3);
});
it("blocks withdraw and hides the deposit address for demo keys", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const { rawKey } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const wd = await request(app)
.post("/account/withdraw")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ to_address: "addr_test1abc" });
expect(wd.status).toBe(403);
expect(wd.body.error.code).toBe("demo_key_restricted");
const acct = await request(app).get("/account").set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`);
expect(acct.status).toBe(200);
expect(acct.body.deposit_address).toBeNull();
expect(acct.body.demo).toBe(true);
});
it("lists only chat-capable models for demo keys", async () => {
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(String(url).includes("/suppliers") ? SUPPLIERS.filter((s) => !String(url).includes("capability_id") || s.capability_id === "llm.chat.v1") : []), { status: 200 })) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn);
const { rawKey } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
const demoModels = await request(app).get("/openai/v1/models").set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`);
expect(demoModels.body.data.map((m: { id: string }) => m.id)).toEqual(["kimi"]);
const signup = await request(app).post("/signup").send({});
const normalModels = await request(app).get("/openai/v1/models").set("authorization", `Bearer ${signup.body.api_key as string}`);
expect(normalModels.body.data.map((m: { id: string }) => m.id).sort()).toEqual(["kimi", "qwen"]);
});
it("rate-limits demo requests per IP (and not per key)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps(undefined, { demoIpRate: { max: 1, windowMs: 60_000 } });
const { rawKey } = setupDemoKey(deps);
const app = createApp(deps);
// Model with no chat suppliers → cheap 404 AFTER passing the limiter.
const body = { model: "nope", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] };
const first = await request(app).post("/openai/v1/chat/completions").set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`).send(body);
expect(first.status).toBe(404);
const second = await request(app).post("/openai/v1/chat/completions").set("authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`).send(body);
expect(second.status).toBe(429);
// Non-demo keys are untouched by the demo IP limiter.
const signup = await request(app).post("/signup").send({});
const normal = await request(app)
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("authorization", `Bearer ${signup.body.api_key as string}`)
.send(body);
expect(normal.status).not.toBe(429);
});
});

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/**
* migration.test.ts — the demo-column migration on pre-existing databases.
*
* GatewayStore has no migration framework (pure CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS),
* so opening a DB created before the `demo` column must ALTER it in place.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { mkdirSync } from "fs";
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
import Database from "better-sqlite3";
import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
const LEGACY_API_KEYS_SQL = `
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_keys (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
key_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
key_prefix TEXT NOT NULL,
label TEXT,
wallet_pkh TEXT NOT NULL,
deposit_address TEXT NOT NULL,
enc_priv_nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
enc_priv_ct TEXT NOT NULL,
enc_priv_tag TEXT NOT NULL,
master_key_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
disabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
`;
function keyRow(id: string) {
return {
id,
key_hash: `hash-${id}`,
key_prefix: "vk_test_xxxx",
label: null,
wallet_pkh: "pkh",
deposit_address: "addr_test1x",
enc_priv_nonce: "n",
enc_priv_ct: "c",
enc_priv_tag: "t",
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
};
}
describe("GatewayStore demo-column migration", () => {
it("adds the demo column to a legacy DB and defaults existing keys to 0", () => {
const dir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-mig-${randomUUID()}`);
mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
const raw = new Database(join(dir, "gateway.db"));
raw.exec(LEGACY_API_KEYS_SQL);
raw
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO api_keys (id, key_hash, key_prefix, label, wallet_pkh, deposit_address,
enc_priv_nonce, enc_priv_ct, enc_priv_tag, master_key_version, created_at, disabled)
VALUES (@id, @key_hash, @key_prefix, @label, @wallet_pkh, @deposit_address,
@enc_priv_nonce, @enc_priv_ct, @enc_priv_tag, @master_key_version, @created_at, 0)`,
)
.run(keyRow("legacy"));
raw.close();
const store = new GatewayStore(dir);
const legacy = store.getKeyByHash("hash-legacy");
expect(legacy?.demo).toBe(0);
store.insertKey({ ...keyRow("demo-key"), demo: 1 });
expect(store.getKeyByHash("hash-demo-key")?.demo).toBe(1);
});
it("persists the demo flag on fresh databases (default 0)", () => {
const dir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-fresh-${randomUUID()}`);
const store = new GatewayStore(dir);
store.insertKey(keyRow("plain"));
expect(store.getKeyByHash("hash-plain")?.demo).toBe(0);
});
});

572
gateway/test/ocr.test.ts Normal file
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/**
* gateway/test/ocr.test.ts — POST /v1/ocr/extract route coverage.
*
* Focus: auth gating, demo-key rejection, body validation, capability-based
* supplier lookup, and the enlarged body limit. The settle path (submitOcr →
* resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) reuses the one-shot chat plumbing
* covered by http.test.ts + the SDK suites; end-to-end runs live on testnet.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import request from "supertest";
import { createApp } from "../src/server.js";
import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
import { SdkRegistry } from "../src/sdk/registry.js";
import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../src/wallet.js";
import { seal } from "../src/crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey } from "../src/middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { venueAttribution } from "../src/ocr/extract.js";
import type { GatewayConfig } from "../src/config.js";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../src/deps.js";
import { SupplierError } from "@marketplace/buyer/sdk";
// The one-shot settle step (resolveSubmittedRef → acceptAndConfirm) talks to
// the live indexer + chain; the happy-path route test below only needs to
// prove that a successful submitOcr reaches the response with the
// first-party-brokered disclosure label (I3), so it stubs just those two
// chain-touching steps and keeps every other export real.
vi.mock("../src/onchain/settle.js", async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("../src/onchain/settle.js")>();
return {
...actual,
resolveSubmittedRef: vi.fn(async () => ({ txHash: "e".repeat(64), index: 0 })),
acceptAndConfirm: vi.fn(async () => "f".repeat(64)),
};
});
const MASTER = "ab".repeat(32);
const IMG = Buffer.from("page bytes").toString("base64");
/** A funded wallet: covers price+bonds+collateral+fee and has pure-ADA ≥ 5. */
const fundedChain = {
queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [
{ ref: { txHash: "ff".repeat(32), index: 0 }, address: "a", lovelace: 20_000_000n, assets: {}, datumHex: null, scriptRef: null },
],
} as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
const OCR_SUPPLIER = {
utxo_ref: `${"cc".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "s3",
capability_id: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
max_output_tokens: 4096,
price_lovelace: "200000",
supplier_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
buyer_bond_lovelace: "1000000",
endpoint_url: "http://sup",
advert_status: "Active",
status: "free",
};
function makeDeps(fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch, overrides?: { chain?: GatewayDeps["chain"] }): GatewayDeps {
const dbDir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-ocr-test-${randomUUID()}`);
const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
const config: GatewayConfig = {
masterKeyHex: MASTER,
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
ogmiosUrl: "http://og",
networkId: 0,
liveChain: true,
port: 0,
dbDir,
signupRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
keyRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
demoIpRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
sweeperIntervalMs: 60_000,
demoSessionIdleMs: 180_000,
chatSettleMode: "full",
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = overrides?.chain ?? ({ queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [] } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"]);
const registry = new SdkRegistry({
chain,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
networkId: config.networkId,
masterKeyHex: config.masterKeyHex,
max: config.sdkRegistryMax,
});
const defaultFetch = (async () => new Response("[]", { status: 200 })) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
return { config, store, chain, registry, fetchFn: fetchFn ?? defaultFetch };
}
/** Insert a key row (demo or funded) and return the raw bearer token. */
function makeKey(deps: GatewayDeps, demo: 0 | 1): string {
const rawKey = `vk-${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, 0);
const sealed = seal(privHex, MASTER);
deps.store.insertKey({
id: randomUUID(),
key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
label: demo ? "demo" : "funded",
wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
deposit_address: walletKey.address,
enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
demo,
});
return rawKey;
}
function validBody() {
return { image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png", output_format: "markdown" };
}
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — auth + demo gating", () => {
it("401 without a bearer key, OpenAI error shape", async () => {
const res = await request(createApp(makeDeps()))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract").send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.body.error?.type).toBe("authentication_error");
});
it("403 demo_key_unsupported for demo keys", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 1);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("demo_key_unsupported");
});
});
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — body validation", () => {
async function post(body: unknown) {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
return request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(body as object);
}
it("400 invalid_image on missing/empty/data-URL image_b64", async () => {
for (const image_b64 of [undefined, "", `data:image/png;base64,${IMG}`]) {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), image_b64 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_image");
}
});
it("400 invalid_mime on unsupported mime", async () => {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), mime: "image/gif" });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_mime");
});
it("400 invalid_output_format on unsupported format", async () => {
const res = await post({ ...validBody(), output_format: "yaml" });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("invalid_output_format");
});
it("output_format defaults to markdown (reaches supplier lookup)", async () => {
const res = await post({ image_b64: IMG, mime: "image/png" });
// Passes validation, then the empty indexer answer → 404 model_not_found.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
});
});
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — supplier lookup + body limit", () => {
it("404 model_not_found when no supplier advertises the capability", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("model_not_found");
});
it("queries the indexer with the configured ocr capability id", async () => {
let queried = "";
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
queried = String(url);
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn);
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(queried).toContain("capability_id=ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1");
});
it("accepts a 2MB body (over the 1mb global limit — OCR route has its own parser)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ ...validBody(), image_b64: big });
expect(res.status).not.toBe(413);
// Valid base64 + no suppliers → 404 model_not_found.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it("chat completions keep the 1mb ceiling (413 on a 2MB body)", async () => {
const deps = makeDeps();
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const big = "A".repeat(2_000_000);
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/openai/v1/chat/completions")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send({ model: "qwen", messages: [{ role: "user", content: big }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(413);
});
});
// ─── venueAttribution — pure-function header sanitization (I3) ──────────────
//
// grep for "first-party-brokered" used to return only source lines: nothing
// exercised venueAttribution's regex gates or RECEIPT_LABELS_V0 reaching the
// wire. These two blocks close that gap.
function fakeReq(headers: Record<string, string>): Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0] {
return { header: (name: string) => headers[name] } as unknown as Parameters<typeof venueAttribution>[0];
}
describe("venueAttribution — header sanitization", () => {
it("passes through a valid venue slug and a valid lowercase hash", () => {
const hash = "a".repeat(64);
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": hash }));
expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "apify", runUserHash: hash });
});
it("lowercases a valid but uppercase hex hash", () => {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": "A".repeat(64) }));
expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("a".repeat(64));
});
it("drops an invalid venue to empty string (uppercase, bad chars, oversized)", () => {
for (const bad of ["Apify", "apify!", "apify_venue", "a".repeat(33)]) {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": bad, "X-Run-User-Hash": "a".repeat(64) }));
expect(out.venue).toBe("");
}
});
it("drops an invalid run-user-hash to empty string (wrong length, non-hex)", () => {
for (const bad of ["a".repeat(63), "a".repeat(65), "z".repeat(64), "not-hex-at-all"]) {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({ "X-Venue": "apify", "X-Run-User-Hash": bad }));
expect(out.runUserHash).toBe("");
}
});
it("defaults both fields to empty string when headers are missing", () => {
const out = venueAttribution(fakeReq({}));
expect(out).toEqual({ venue: "", runUserHash: "" });
});
});
// ─── Happy path — receipt disclosure label reaches the response (I3) ────────
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — happy path", () => {
it("200 response x_vector.receipt_labels contains first-party-brokered", async () => {
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
// Stub only the chain-touching supplier call; escrow ref shape matches
// what resolveSubmittedRef's mock (module-level, top of file) expects.
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => ({
output_format: "markdown",
content: "extracted text",
usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
receipt: {
prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
prompt_tokens: 10,
completion_tokens: 5,
wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
supplier_pkh: "s3",
escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
},
receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
}));
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
// escrow_ref in the response comes from submitOcr's returned escrowRef
// (the ORIGINAL Open ref), not the mocked resolveSubmittedRef's answer —
// see settle.ts's docstring on why those two refs differ on-chain.
expect(res.body.x_vector.escrow_ref).toBe(`${"d".repeat(64)}#0`);
});
});
// ─── Failure path — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError (I2) ────
//
// submitOcr posts the escrow, THEN calls the supplier. A SupplierError
// (timeout, network failure, non-2xx, malformed response, receipt mismatch)
// means the escrow already landed on chain even though submitOcr rejects —
// per the OCR route's 120s supplier budget, this is likely the MOST common
// paid-but-failed shape. Before this fix, escrowRefStr was only assigned
// from submitOcr's *return value*, so this exact case recorded escrow_ref:
// null. The route now also listens for the SDK's "escrow_posted" progress
// event around each attempt, so the ref survives regardless of whether
// submitOcr goes on to resolve or reject.
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract — escrow ref survives a post-escrow SupplierError", () => {
it("records the escrow_ref from the escrow_posted progress event, not null, when submitOcr posts an escrow then rejects", async () => {
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify([OCR_SUPPLIER]), { status: 200 });
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
// Same monkeypatch pattern as the happy-path test above: fetch the real
// per-key Marketplace instance from the registry BEFORE the request so
// its real EventEmitter (on/off/emit) stays live, then replace only
// submitOcr. The stub mirrors what Marketplace.submitOcr actually does
// on this failure shape: emit "escrow_posted" the instant the tx
// confirms, then throw once the supplier call fails.
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const knownEscrowRef = `${"9".repeat(64)}#0`;
const submitOcr = vi.fn(async () => {
ctx.sdk.emit("progress", { type: "escrow_posted", escrow_ref: knownEscrowRef });
throw new SupplierError("timeout", { message: "supplier did not respond within budget" });
});
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// Snapshot the recorded calls BEFORE restoring — mockRestore() also
// clears .mock.calls (it runs mockReset()/mockClear() first), so
// reading logSpy.mock.calls after restore always sees [].
const loggedLines = logSpy.mock.calls.map((args) => String(args[0]));
logSpy.mockRestore();
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// toGatewayError maps SupplierError("timeout") to 504 supplier_timeout —
// confirms the request actually took the failure path this test targets.
expect(res.status).toBe(504);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("supplier_timeout");
// The reconciliation spine: the usage row recorded in the catch block
// must carry the real ref, not null.
const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
// The structured ocr_failed log line (wedge-ledger emitter input) must
// carry the same ref.
const failedLine = loggedLines
.filter((line) => line.includes('"evt":"ocr_failed"'))
.map((line) => JSON.parse(line) as { escrow_ref: string | null });
expect(failedLine).toHaveLength(1);
expect(failedLine[0].escrow_ref).toBe(knownEscrowRef);
});
});
// ─── Busy pre-check - never post an escrow to a candidate that is busy ──────
//
// runOcrOneShot now checks each candidate's live /status immediately before
// calling submitOcr for it (mirrors sessions.ts's startChat pre-check):
// "working" means busy and moves on to the next candidate WITHOUT posting an
// escrow; anything else (free, unreachable, malformed, slow) is treated as
// usable. submitOcr is the escrow-posting path in these tests (same
// monkeypatch pattern as the suites above), so asserting its call count is
// exactly how "no escrow was posted" is observed.
const OCR_SUPPLIER_A = {
...OCR_SUPPLIER,
utxo_ref: `${"aa".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "sA",
endpoint_url: "http://sup-a",
};
const OCR_SUPPLIER_B = {
...OCR_SUPPLIER,
utxo_ref: `${"bb".repeat(32)}#0`,
supplier_pkh: "sB",
endpoint_url: "http://sup-b",
};
/** Indexer /suppliers lookup plus a per-endpoint /status responder, on one
* fetchFn - everything else falls back to the suite's usual empty array. */
function makeFetchWithStatus(
suppliers: Array<typeof OCR_SUPPLIER>,
statusByEndpoint: Record<string, () => Response>,
): typeof globalThis.fetch {
return (async (url: unknown) => {
const u = String(url);
if (u.includes("/suppliers")) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(suppliers), { status: 200 });
}
for (const [endpoint, respond] of Object.entries(statusByEndpoint)) {
if (u === `${endpoint}/status`) return respond();
}
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
}
/** Same successful submitOcr shape as the happy-path suite above, reused
* across the busy pre-check tests. */
function makeSubmitOcrStub() {
return vi.fn(async (_opts: { advertRef: { txHash: string; index: number } }) => ({
output_format: "markdown",
content: "extracted text",
usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 5, total_tokens: 15 },
receipt: {
prompt_hash: "1b".repeat(32),
response_hash: "2c".repeat(32),
model: "chandra-ocr-2",
prompt_tokens: 10,
completion_tokens: 5,
wallclock_ms: Date.now(),
supplier_pkh: "s3",
escrow_ref: `${"d".repeat(64)}#0`,
},
receiptSignature: "sig".repeat(20),
escrowRef: { txHash: "d".repeat(64), index: 0 },
}));
}
describe("POST /v1/ocr/extract - busy pre-check", () => {
it("a busy supplier is never sent an escrow; the route returns the busy response", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// The escrow-posting path was never invoked.
expect(submitOcr).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// toGatewayError maps SupplierError("supplier_busy") to 503 overloaded -
// the same busy response a post-escrow 409 would have produced.
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
expect(res.body.error?.code).toBe("overloaded");
const rows = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].status).toBe("failed");
expect(rows[0].escrow_ref).toBeNull();
});
it("a free supplier proceeds to post and settle exactly as before", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.x_vector.receipt_labels).toContain("first-party-brokered");
});
it("falls back to the second candidate when the first is busy, posting exactly one escrow", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER_A, OCR_SUPPLIER_B], {
"http://sup-a": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "working" }), { status: 200 }),
"http://sup-b": () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: "free" }), { status: 200 }),
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Exactly one escrow posted, and it is the second (free) candidate's -
// the busy first candidate was skipped, not retried after failing.
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(submitOcr.mock.calls[0][0].advertRef).toEqual({ txHash: "bb".repeat(32), index: 0 });
});
it("a status check that errors does not block the attempt", async () => {
const fetchFn = makeFetchWithStatus([OCR_SUPPLIER], {
"http://sup": () => {
// Simulates both a network error and an aborted (timed-out) request -
// isSupplierBusy's catch block treats every failure mode the same
// way: unknown, not busy, proceed. A real AbortSignal timeout is not
// exercised here to keep the suite fast; the outcome is identical.
throw new Error("simulated network failure reaching /status");
},
});
const deps = makeDeps(fetchFn, { chain: fundedChain });
const rawKey = makeKey(deps, 0);
const keyRow = deps.store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
const ctx = deps.registry.getContext(keyRow);
const submitOcr = makeSubmitOcrStub();
(ctx.sdk as { submitOcr: unknown }).submitOcr = submitOcr;
const res = await request(createApp(deps))
.post("/v1/ocr/extract")
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${rawKey}`)
.send(validBody());
// The candidate was still tried despite the failed pre-check.
expect(submitOcr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
/**
* sweeper.test.ts — reclaim/close decoupling + settled-refs memory.
*
* Ticket mode: reclaiming a live session's Open escrow must NOT close the
* session row or drop its transcript mirror (the conversation continues on a
* spent ticket). Full mode keeps close-on-reclaim. Claimed rows close even
* under ticket config (they can only come from full-mode suppliers). The
* settled-refs memory prevents re-attempting refs already settled, and the
* deliver_by gate skips reclaims the validator would reject.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import { GatewayStore } from "../src/db/store.js";
import { SdkRegistry } from "../src/sdk/registry.js";
import { genPrivKeyHex, deriveWalletKey } from "../src/wallet.js";
import { seal } from "../src/crypto/seal.js";
import { hashApiKey } from "../src/middleware/apiKeyAuth.js";
import { runSweepOnce } from "../src/sweeper.js";
import { transcripts } from "../src/openai/transcripts.js";
import type { GatewayConfig } from "../src/config.js";
import type { GatewayDeps } from "../src/deps.js";
import type { EscrowRow } from "../src/onchain/settle.js";
const MASTER = "ab".repeat(32);
function makeSweepDeps(opts: { chatSettleMode: "full" | "ticket"; escrows: EscrowRow[] }) {
const dbDir = join(tmpdir(), `gw-sweep-${randomUUID()}`);
const store = new GatewayStore(dbDir);
const config: GatewayConfig = {
masterKeyHex: MASTER,
indexerUrl: "http://ix",
ogmiosUrl: "http://og",
networkId: 0,
liveChain: true,
port: 0,
dbDir,
signupRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
keyRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
demoIpRate: { max: 1000, windowMs: 60_000 },
sweeperIntervalMs: 60_000,
demoSessionIdleMs: 180_000,
chatSettleMode: opts.chatSettleMode,
walletHealthIntervalMs: 600_000,
sdkRegistryMax: 100,
ocrCapabilityId: "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
corsOrigins: [],
};
const chain = { queryUtxo: async () => null } as unknown as GatewayDeps["chain"];
const registry = new SdkRegistry({
chain,
indexerUrl: config.indexerUrl,
networkId: config.networkId,
masterKeyHex: config.masterKeyHex,
max: config.sdkRegistryMax,
});
const fetchFn = (async (url: unknown) => {
if (String(url).includes("/escrows")) return new Response(JSON.stringify(opts.escrows), { status: 200 });
return new Response("[]", { status: 200 });
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const deps: GatewayDeps = { config, store, chain, registry, fetchFn };
const rawKey = `vk_test_${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const privHex = genPrivKeyHex();
const walletKey = deriveWalletKey(privHex, 0);
const sealed = seal(privHex, MASTER);
store.insertKey({
id: randomUUID(),
key_hash: hashApiKey(rawKey),
key_prefix: rawKey.slice(0, 12),
label: "sweep-test",
wallet_pkh: walletKey.pubKeyHash,
deposit_address: walletKey.address,
enc_priv_nonce: sealed.nonce,
enc_priv_ct: sealed.ct,
enc_priv_tag: sealed.tag,
master_key_version: 1,
created_at: Date.now(),
demo: 1,
});
const keyRow = store.getKeyByHash(hashApiKey(rawKey))!;
return { deps, keyRow };
}
function insertOpenSession(deps: GatewayDeps, keyId: string, escrowRef: string): string {
const id = randomUUID();
deps.store.insertSession({
id,
key_id: keyId,
escrow_ref: escrowRef,
session_nonce: "nonce",
supplier_base_url: "http://sup",
supplier_pkh: "s1",
model: "kimi",
price_lovelace: "200000",
state: "open",
opened_at: Date.now() - 40 * 60 * 1000,
});
return id;
}
function openRow(refChar: string, opts?: Partial<EscrowRow>): EscrowRow {
return {
utxo_ref: `${refChar.repeat(64)}#0`,
state: "Open",
posted_at: Date.now() - 40 * 60 * 1000,
deliver_by: Date.now() - 5 * 60 * 1000,
...opts,
};
}
const settleOk = () => ({
accept: vi.fn(async () => undefined) as never,
reclaim: vi.fn(async () => undefined) as never,
});
describe("sweeper — ticket-mode reclaim/close decoupling", () => {
it("reclaims a live session's Open ticket but keeps the session (and mirror) alive", async () => {
const row = openRow("1");
const { deps, keyRow } = makeSweepDeps({ chatSettleMode: "ticket", escrows: [row] });
const sessionId = insertOpenSession(deps, keyRow.id, row.utxo_ref);
transcripts.set(sessionId, [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }]);
const settle = settleOk();
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
expect(settle.reclaim).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(deps.store.getSession(sessionId)!.state).toBe("open"); // NOT closed
expect(transcripts.get(sessionId)).toBeDefined(); // mirror intact
expect(deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10)).toHaveLength(0); // nothing billed
transcripts.delete(sessionId);
});
it("full mode: reclaim closes the session row", async () => {
const row = openRow("2");
const { deps, keyRow } = makeSweepDeps({ chatSettleMode: "full", escrows: [row] });
const sessionId = insertOpenSession(deps, keyRow.id, row.utxo_ref);
const settle = settleOk();
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
expect(settle.reclaim).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(deps.store.getSession(sessionId)!.state).toBe("closed");
const usage = deps.store.listUsage(keyRow.id, 10);
expect(usage.some((u) => u.status === "reclaimed")).toBe(true);
});
it("ticket config still closes sessions behind Claimed rows (full-mode suppliers)", async () => {
const row = openRow("3", { state: "Claimed" });
const { deps, keyRow } = makeSweepDeps({ chatSettleMode: "ticket", escrows: [row] });
const sessionId = insertOpenSession(deps, keyRow.id, row.utxo_ref);
const settle = settleOk();
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
expect(settle.reclaim).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(deps.store.getSession(sessionId)!.state).toBe("closed");
});
});
describe("sweeper — reclaim gating + settled-refs memory", () => {
it("skips reclaim while deliver_by has not passed", async () => {
const row = openRow("4", { deliver_by: Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000 });
const { deps, keyRow } = makeSweepDeps({ chatSettleMode: "ticket", escrows: [row] });
insertOpenSession(deps, keyRow.id, row.utxo_ref);
const settle = settleOk();
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
expect(settle.reclaim).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("does not re-attempt refs it already settled (in-process memory)", async () => {
const row = openRow("5");
const { deps, keyRow } = makeSweepDeps({ chatSettleMode: "ticket", escrows: [row] });
insertOpenSession(deps, keyRow.id, row.utxo_ref);
const settle = settleOk();
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
await runSweepOnce(deps, settle);
expect(settle.reclaim).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});

View File

@@ -84,10 +84,31 @@ describe("routing/selectSupplier", () => {
expect(await listModels({ indexerUrl: "http://ix", fetchFn: jsonResponse(rows) })).toEqual(["m", "other"]);
});
it("lists only one capability's models when capabilityId is given", async () => {
expect(await listModels({ indexerUrl: "http://ix", capabilityId: "llm.chat.v1", fetchFn: jsonResponse(rows) })).toEqual(["m"]);
});
it("parseRef", () => {
expect(parseRef("aa".repeat(32) + "#3")).toEqual({ txHash: "aa".repeat(32), index: 3 });
expect(parseRef("nope")).toBeNull();
});
it("ignoreStatusFor readmits a busy supplier by pkh (stale indexer status)", async () => {
const busy = [
{ ...rows[0], status: "working" },
{ ...rows[1], status: "offline" },
];
const base = { indexerUrl: "http://ix", model: "m", capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1" };
const excluded = await selectCandidates({ ...base, fetchFn: jsonResponse(busy) });
expect(excluded).toEqual([]);
const readmitted = await selectCandidates({
...base,
fetchFn: jsonResponse(busy),
ignoreStatusFor: new Set(["s1"]),
});
expect(readmitted.map((c) => c.supplierPkh)).toEqual(["s1"]);
});
});
describe("openai/validate", () => {
@@ -104,6 +125,37 @@ describe("openai/validate", () => {
expect(() => parseChatRequest({ model: "m", messages: [] })).toThrow();
expect(() => parseChatRequest({ messages: [{ role: "user", content: "x" }] })).toThrow();
});
const TOOL_CALL = { id: "call_1", type: "function", function: { name: "get_time", arguments: "{}" } };
it("allowTools accepts tools, tool role, null content and assistant tool_calls", () => {
const p = parseChatRequest(
{
model: "m",
messages: [
{ role: "user", content: "hi" },
{ role: "assistant", content: null, tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] },
{ role: "tool", content: "3pm", tool_call_id: "call_1" },
],
tools: [{ type: "function", function: { name: "get_time", parameters: {} } }],
tool_choice: "auto",
},
{ allowTools: true },
);
expect(p.tools).toHaveLength(1);
expect(p.toolChoice).toBe("auto");
expect(p.messages[1]).toEqual({ role: "assistant", content: "", tool_calls: [TOOL_CALL] });
expect(p.messages[2]).toEqual({ role: "tool", content: "3pm", tool_call_id: "call_1" });
});
it("allowTools still rejects legacy functions and the default path still rejects tool role", () => {
expect(() =>
parseChatRequest({ model: "m", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "x" }], functions: [] }, { allowTools: true }),
).toThrow(GatewayError);
expect(() =>
parseChatRequest({ model: "m", messages: [{ role: "tool", content: "x", tool_call_id: "c" }] }),
).toThrow(GatewayError);
});
});
describe("openai/shapes", () => {
@@ -121,6 +173,24 @@ describe("openai/shapes", () => {
expect(ch.object).toBe("chat.completion.chunk");
expect((ch.choices as any)[0].delta.content).toBe("tok");
});
it("tool_calls chunk + finish_reason tool_calls", () => {
const tc = { index: 0, id: "call_1", type: "function" as const, function: { name: "f", arguments: "{}" } };
const ch = buildChunk({ id: "id", model: "m", delta: { tool_calls: [tc] }, finishReason: "tool_calls" });
expect((ch.choices as any)[0].delta.tool_calls).toEqual([tc]);
expect((ch.choices as any)[0].finish_reason).toBe("tool_calls");
});
it("completion with tool_calls and finish_reason", () => {
const cc = buildChatCompletion({
id: "id",
model: "m",
content: "",
usage: { prompt_tokens: 1, completion_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 2 },
toolCalls: [{ id: "call_1", type: "function", function: { name: "f", arguments: "{}" } }],
finishReason: "tool_calls",
});
expect((cc.choices as any)[0].message.tool_calls).toHaveLength(1);
expect((cc.choices as any)[0].finish_reason).toBe("tool_calls");
});
it("renderMessages folds roles", () => {
expect(renderMessages([{ role: "system", content: "be nice" }, { role: "user", content: "hi" }])).toBe("System: be nice\n\nUser: hi");
});
@@ -138,8 +208,16 @@ describe("onchain/preflight", () => {
});
it("preflight requires balance AND collateral", async () => {
const cost = { priceLovelace: 2_000_000n, buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n, supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n };
// required = 2 + 1 + 1 + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
const cost = {
capabilityId: "llm.text.generate.v1",
priceLovelace: 2_000_000n,
buyerBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
supplierBondLovelace: 1_000_000n,
};
// required = escrowLockFloor(2 + 1 + 1) + 5 (collateral) + 2 (fee) = 11 ADA
// — at this economic total (4 ADA) the Submitted-state min-ada floor for a
// short capability id (~2.2 ADA) stays well under the raw total, so the
// floor is a no-op here; tx-minada-floor.test.ts covers the lifted case.
const fakeChain = { queryUtxosByAddress: async () => [pure(20_000_000n)] } as any;
const ok = await preflight(fakeChain, "a", cost);
expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY indexer/package.json ./indexer/package.json
COPY indexer-ui/package.json ./indexer-ui/package.json

View File

@@ -37,5 +37,10 @@
"tsx": "^4.19.2",
"typescript": "^5.7.2",
"vitest": "^2.1.8"
},
"pnpm": {
"patchedDependencies": {
"libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16": "patches/libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16.patch"
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
/**
* tx/chatMessage.ts — canonical ChatMessage normalization + equivalence.
*
* The supplier's session transcript and the gateway's in-memory mirror must be
* hash-identical (receipt response_hash = sha256(canonicalize(transcript))),
* so both sides build messages through normalizeChatMessage: optional fields
* are truly absent when empty, content is never null, and vendor extras are
* stripped. chatMessagesEquivalent is the tolerant comparison used by the
* demo-endpoint transcript-prefix affinity matcher.
*/
import type { ChatMessage, ToolCall } from "./types.js";
const ROLES = new Set(["system", "user", "assistant", "tool"]);
function normalizeToolCall(raw: unknown): ToolCall | null {
if (typeof raw !== "object" || raw === null) return null;
const tc = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
const fn = tc.function as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (typeof tc.id !== "string" || tc.id === "") return null;
if (tc.type !== "function") return null;
if (typeof fn !== "object" || fn === null) return null;
if (typeof fn.name !== "string" || fn.name === "") return null;
if (typeof fn.arguments !== "string") return null;
return { id: tc.id, type: "function", function: { name: fn.name, arguments: fn.arguments } };
}
/**
* Validate and canonicalize an untrusted message-shaped value.
* Returns null when the value is not a usable ChatMessage.
*/
export function normalizeChatMessage(raw: unknown): ChatMessage | null {
if (typeof raw !== "object" || raw === null) return null;
const m = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
if (typeof m.role !== "string" || !ROLES.has(m.role)) return null;
const role = m.role as ChatMessage["role"];
let content: string;
if (typeof m.content === "string") content = m.content;
else if (m.content === null || m.content === undefined) content = "";
else return null;
const msg: ChatMessage = { role, content };
if (m.tool_calls !== undefined && m.tool_calls !== null) {
if (role !== "assistant" || !Array.isArray(m.tool_calls)) return null;
const calls: ToolCall[] = [];
for (const raw of m.tool_calls) {
const tc = normalizeToolCall(raw);
if (!tc) return null;
calls.push(tc);
}
if (calls.length > 0) msg.tool_calls = calls;
}
if (m.tool_call_id !== undefined && m.tool_call_id !== null) {
if (role !== "tool" || typeof m.tool_call_id !== "string" || m.tool_call_id === "") return null;
msg.tool_call_id = m.tool_call_id;
}
if (role === "tool" && msg.tool_call_id === undefined) return null;
return msg;
}
export function toolCallsEqual(a?: ToolCall[], b?: ToolCall[]): boolean {
const la = a ?? [];
const lb = b ?? [];
if (la.length !== lb.length) return false;
return la.every((tc, i) =>
tc.id === lb[i].id &&
tc.function.name === lb[i].function.name &&
tc.function.arguments === lb[i].function.arguments,
);
}
/**
* Tolerant equality for affinity prefix matching. Both sides are expected to
* already be normalized; comparison ignores incidental key order and treats
* missing tool fields as empty.
*/
export function chatMessagesEquivalent(a: ChatMessage, b: ChatMessage): boolean {
return (
a.role === b.role &&
a.content === b.content &&
(a.tool_call_id ?? "") === (b.tool_call_id ?? "") &&
toolCallsEqual(a.tool_calls, b.tool_calls)
);
}

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
export interface PostChatEscrowParams {
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ export async function buildPostChatEscrowTx(
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = chatSessionPromptHash({ session_nonce });
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -154,6 +155,11 @@ export async function buildPostChatEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the capability-agnostic chat builder (messages = []).
// The on-chain commitment is the escrowDatum (carrying our session-init
// prompt_hash); messages are only used for the mock cbor body, which we omit.

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
export interface PostEscrowParams {
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ export async function buildPostEscrowTx(
// supplier-side validation in M1-C can verify role/content/system integrity.
const promptHash = sha256Utf8Hex(canonicalize(messages));
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -151,6 +152,11 @@ export async function buildPostEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: produce real Cardano CBOR via lucid-evolution.
if (detectCborBackend(chain) === "live") {
const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
/**
* tx/escrow/postOcrEscrow.ts — PostEscrow tx builder for model-scoped OCR
* capabilities (`ocr.page.extract.<model-slug>.v1`, one page per job).
*
* Mirrors `postTtsEscrow.ts` but commits an OCR-shaped prompt_hash over the
* canonicalised request envelope `{image_b64, mime, output_format}` — the
* SAME object the supplier hashes when validating the incoming
* POST /v1/ocr/extract body. Any mismatch on either side fails the
* supplier-side prompt_mismatch gate.
*
* The image travels off-chain (buyer → supplier HTTP body); the chain only
* ever carries prompt_hash. Never place image bytes or extracted text in a
* datum.
*
* Off-chain invariants (mirror TTS's, with OCR-shaped body validation):
* 1. advert UTxO exists at advertRef
* 2. advert datum.status === "Active"
* 3. payment_lovelace === advert.price_lovelace
* 4. buyerKey.pubKeyHash !== advert.supplier_pkh
* 5. body.image_b64 is a non-empty plain-base64 string within size bounds
* (no data-URL prefix — the mime rides in its own field)
* 6. body.mime ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES
* 7. body.output_format ∈ ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS
*/
import * as nodeCrypto from "crypto";
import type { ChainProvider, OutputReference } from "../../chain/ChainProvider.js";
import type { EscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/types.js";
import { decodeAdvertDatum } from "../../cbor/AdvertDatum.js";
import { encodeEscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
import { canonicalize } from "../../cbor/canonical.js";
import type { WalletKey, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "../types.js";
import { TxConstructionError } from "../types.js";
import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
/** OCR request envelope. The buyer-side hash and the supplier-side hash
* MUST agree on this exact set of keys, in this exact JCS-canonical
* encoding, or the supplier will reject with `prompt_mismatch`. */
export interface OcrRequest {
/** Plain base64 of the page image bytes. No `data:` prefix. */
image_b64: string;
/** Image content type. */
mime: string;
/** Requested extraction output shape. */
output_format: string;
}
export const ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES = new Set([
"image/png", "image/jpeg", "image/webp",
]);
export const ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS = new Set(["markdown", "html", "json"]);
/**
* Upper bound on the base64 payload, in characters (~9 MB of image bytes).
* A 300-DPI page scan lands around 0.5–3 MB binary; this cap protects the
* supplier's JSON body parser and the off-chain transport, not the chain
* (the chain only sees the 32-byte hash).
*/
export const MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS = 12_000_000;
/** Plain base64 (standard alphabet, optional padding). Rejects data URLs,
* whitespace and base64url — one canonical encoding, one hash. */
const BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
export interface PostOcrEscrowParams {
chain: ChainProvider;
buyerKey: WalletKey;
advertRef: OutputReference;
request: OcrRequest;
payment_lovelace: bigint;
}
function sha256Utf8Hex(s: string): string {
return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(s, "utf8").digest("hex");
}
/** Hash function shared between buyer (here) and supplier (server.ts).
* Exported so unit tests on either side can pin the canonicalisation. */
export function ocrPromptHash(req: OcrRequest): string {
return sha256Utf8Hex(canonicalize({
image_b64: req.image_b64,
mime: req.mime,
output_format: req.output_format,
}));
}
/** Body validation shared conceptually with the supplier route. Throws
* TxConstructionError with a machine-readable reason. */
export function validateOcrRequest(request: OcrRequest): void {
if (typeof request?.image_b64 !== "string" || request.image_b64.length === 0) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image required",
"request.image_b64 must be a non-empty base64 string");
}
if (request.image_b64.length > MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image too large",
`request.image_b64 exceeds ${MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS} chars`);
}
if (!BASE64_RE.test(request.image_b64)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("image not base64",
"request.image_b64 must be plain base64 (no data: prefix, no whitespace)");
}
if (!ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES.has(request.mime)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("mime invalid",
`mime must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES].join(", ")}`);
}
if (!ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS.has(request.output_format)) {
throw new TxConstructionError("output_format invalid",
`output_format must be one of: ${[...ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS].join(", ")}`);
}
}
export async function buildPostOcrEscrowTx(
params: PostOcrEscrowParams,
): Promise<PostEscrowBuildResult> {
const { chain, buyerKey, advertRef, request, payment_lovelace } = params;
// 5–7. Body validation before any chain access.
validateOcrRequest(request);
// 1. Advert UTxO must exist.
const advertUtxo = await chain.queryUtxo(advertRef);
if (advertUtxo === null) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert ref not on chain",
`no UTxO at ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index}`,
);
}
if (!advertUtxo.datumHex) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert datum missing",
`UTxO ${advertRef.txHash}#${advertRef.index} has no inline datum`,
);
}
const advertDatum = decodeAdvertDatum(advertUtxo.datumHex);
// 2. Advert must be Active.
if (advertDatum.status !== "Active") {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"advert is retired",
`advert.status is ${advertDatum.status}, expected Active`,
);
}
// 3. Payment must equal advertised price.
if (payment_lovelace !== advertDatum.price_lovelace) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"payment must equal advertised price",
`payment ${payment_lovelace} != advert.price ${advertDatum.price_lovelace}`,
);
}
// 4. Buyer cannot be supplier.
if (buyerKey.pubKeyHash === advertDatum.supplier_pkh) {
throw new TxConstructionError(
"buyer cannot be supplier",
`buyerKey pkh ${buyerKey.pubKeyHash} equals advert.supplier_pkh`,
);
}
// Time source: same convention as chat/TTS.
const tipSlot = await chain.tip();
const isLive = detectCborBackend(chain) === "live";
const postedAt = isLive ? Date.now() : mockSlotToWallclockMs(tipSlot);
const deliverBy = postedAt + advertDatum.max_processing_ms + NETWORK_BUFFER_MS;
const requestSpecCanonical = canonicalize({
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
max_output_tokens: advertDatum.max_output_tokens,
model: advertDatum.model,
});
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = ocrPromptHash(request);
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
const escrowDatum: EscrowDatum = {
buyer_pkh: buyerKey.pubKeyHash,
supplier_pkh: advertDatum.supplier_pkh,
advert_ref: advertRef,
capability_id: advertDatum.capability_id,
request_spec_hash: requestSpecHash,
prompt_hash: promptHash,
payment_lovelace: advertDatum.price_lovelace,
buyer_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace,
supplier_bond_lovelace: advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace,
deliver_by: deliverBy,
posted_at: postedAt,
submitted_at: null,
result_receipt_hash: null,
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (2026-08-07 min-ada incident).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the capability-agnostic live builder (messages is
// void-marked there; the on-chain commitment is the escrowDatum, which
// carries our OCR prompt_hash).
if (isLive) {
const liveCborPath = "../internal/liveCbor.js";
const { buildLiveTxForEscrow } = await import(/* @vite-ignore */ liveCborPath);
return buildLiveTxForEscrow({
chain: chain as LiveOgmiosProvider,
buyerKey,
advertRef,
messages: [],
escrowDatum,
totalLocked,
deliverBy,
postedAt,
});
}
// Mock backend path (synthetic JSON-in-hex tx body).
const blueprint = loadBlueprint();
const escrowAddress = blueprint.escrowScriptAddress(0);
const body = {
type: "post-escrow",
inputs: [],
outputs: [
{
ref: { txHash: "$self", index: 0 },
address: escrowAddress,
lovelace: totalLocked,
assets: {},
datumHex: encodeEscrowDatum(escrowDatum),
scriptRef: null,
},
],
requiredSigners: [buyerKey.pubKeyHash],
validityRange: { lowerBoundMs: postedAt, upperBoundMs: deliverBy },
meta: { script_hash: blueprint.escrowScriptHash, advert_ref: advertRef },
};
const txCborHex = encodeTxBody(body);
const expectedTxHash = sha256Hex(txCborHex);
await chain.submitTx(txCborHex);
return {
txCborHex,
expectedTxHash,
escrowOutputRef: { txHash: expectedTxHash, index: 0 },
};
}

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import { loadBlueprint } from "../blueprint.js";
import { encodeTxBody, sha256Hex } from "../internal/testTxBody.js";
import { mockSlotToWallclockMs, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "../internal/constants.js";
import { detectCborBackend } from "../internal/cborBackend.js";
import { escrowLockFloor } from "../internal/minAdaFloor.js";
import type { LiveOgmiosProvider } from "../../chain/LiveOgmiosProvider.js";
/** TTS request envelope. The buyer-side hash and the supplier-side hash
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ export async function buildPostTtsEscrowTx(
const requestSpecHash = sha256Utf8Hex(requestSpecCanonical);
const promptHash = ttsPromptHash(request);
const totalLocked =
const economicTotal =
advertDatum.price_lovelace +
advertDatum.buyer_bond_lovelace +
advertDatum.supplier_bond_lovelace;
@@ -171,6 +172,11 @@ export async function buildPostTtsEscrowTx(
state: "Open",
};
// Lock enough that the escrow output satisfies min-ada in its LARGEST
// future state (Submitted) - value_equal on Claim/Submit forbids any
// later bump (min-ada floor).
const totalLocked = escrowLockFloor(escrowDatum, economicTotal);
// Live path: reuse the chat builder. The live cbor path is already
// capability-agnostic — `messages` is `void`-marked there. We pass an
// empty array so the type checker is satisfied; the actual on-chain

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
* tx/index.ts — public exports for M1-B tx builders.
*/
export type { ChatMessage, WalletKey, BuildResult, PostAdvertBuildResult, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "./types.js";
export type { ChatMessage, ToolCall, WalletKey, BuildResult, PostAdvertBuildResult, PostEscrowBuildResult } from "./types.js";
export { TxConstructionError } from "./types.js";
export { normalizeChatMessage, chatMessagesEquivalent, toolCallsEqual } from "./chatMessage.js";
export { mockSlotToWallclockMs, mockWallclockMsToSlot, NETWORK_BUFFER_MS } from "./internal/constants.js";
export { detectCborBackend, type CborBackend } from "./internal/cborBackend.js";
export { escrowLockFloor, minAdaForEscrowDatum } from "./internal/minAdaFloor.js";
export type { Signer } from "./signer.js";
export { MockSigner } from "./signer.js";
export type { Blueprint } from "./blueprint.js";
@@ -36,6 +38,15 @@ export {
} from "./escrow/postTtsEscrow.js";
export type { PostChatEscrowParams } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
export { buildPostChatEscrowTx, chatSessionPromptHash } from "./escrow/postChatEscrow.js";
export type { PostOcrEscrowParams, OcrRequest } from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
export {
buildPostOcrEscrowTx,
ocrPromptHash,
validateOcrRequest,
ALLOWED_OCR_MIMES,
ALLOWED_OCR_OUTPUT_FORMATS,
MAX_OCR_IMAGE_B64_CHARS,
} from "./escrow/postOcrEscrow.js";
export type { ClaimParams } from "./escrow/claim.js";
export { buildClaimTx } from "./escrow/claim.js";
export type { SubmitParams } from "./escrow/submit.js";

View File

@@ -358,6 +358,45 @@ function rethrowAsTxError(err: unknown, fallback: string): never {
throw new TxConstructionError(fallback, msg);
}
/** Choose PostEscrow inputs that PRESERVE a pure-ADA collateral UTxO for the
* later Accept/Reclaim script-spend. PostEscrow is NOT a script spend, so lucid
* is otherwise free to consume the dedicated ≥5-ADA collateral UTxO as an
* ordinary input — leaving the wallet with no collateral candidate and
* stranding the escrow when Accept later runs (the fragmentation bug observed
* on back-to-back requests).
*
* Reserve the SMALLEST pure-ADA UTxO ≥ collateral floor and fund the escrow
* from the remaining UTxOs. Returns null (→ default lucid coin selection) when
* reservation isn't possible or needed:
* - a single UTxO (nothing to reserve),
* - no qualifying pure-ADA collateral UTxO, or
* - excluding it would underfund the escrow. The large-single-UTxO case is
* safe under default selection anyway: the change output is itself a
* pure-ADA UTxO well above the collateral floor. */
export function reserveCollateralInputs(
utxos: LucidUTxO[],
lockedLovelace: bigint,
): LucidUTxO[] | null {
if (utxos.length < 2) return null;
const candidates = utxos
.filter(
(u) =>
u.assets.lovelace >= COLLATERAL_MIN_LOVELACE &&
Object.keys(u.assets).every((k) => k === "lovelace"),
)
.sort((a, b) => (a.assets.lovelace < b.assets.lovelace ? -1 : 1));
if (candidates.length === 0) return null;
const reserved = candidates[0];
const remaining = utxos.filter(
(u) => !(u.txHash === reserved.txHash && u.outputIndex === reserved.outputIndex),
);
if (remaining.length === 0) return null;
const remainingLovelace = remaining.reduce((s, u) => s + u.assets.lovelace, 0n);
// Cover the locked output + tx fee + a min-change cushion; else fall back.
if (remainingLovelace < lockedLovelace + 2_000_000n) return null;
return remaining;
}
// ─── PostEscrow ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function buildLiveTxForEscrow(
@@ -382,6 +421,12 @@ export async function buildLiveTxForEscrow(
const lockedLovelace = totalLocked < MIN_UTXO_LOVELACE ? MIN_UTXO_LOVELACE : totalLocked;
// Preserve a pure-ADA collateral UTxO so the buyer's later Accept/Reclaim
// script-spend can find collateral. Without this, PostEscrow coin selection
// can consume the 5-ADA collateral UTxO and strand the escrow at Accept.
const walletUtxos = await lucid.wallet().getUtxos();
const reservedInputs = reserveCollateralInputs(walletUtxos, lockedLovelace);
let signed;
try {
const txBuilder = lucid
@@ -404,7 +449,12 @@ export async function buildLiveTxForEscrow(
// becomes change. Same fix as Claim/Submit/Accept paths.
.setMinFee(500_000n);
const completed = await txBuilder.complete();
// When we can reserve collateral, restrict coin selection to the remaining
// (working) UTxOs so the collateral candidate survives for Accept. Else
// fall back to lucid's default selection (single/large-UTxO cases are safe).
const completed = reservedInputs
? await txBuilder.complete({ presetWalletInputs: reservedInputs, localUPLCEval: false })
: await txBuilder.complete();
signed = await completed.sign.withWallet().complete();
} catch (err) {
rethrowAsTxError(err, "post-escrow build failed");

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/**
* minAdaFloor.ts — min-ada floor for the escrow's LARGEST future datum.
*
* The escrow validator requires value_equal(continuing, in) on Claim and
* Submit, so the lovelace locked at POST time must already satisfy min-ada
* for every datum the output will ever carry. The largest is the Submitted
* state: submitted_at None -> Some(POSIX ms) and result_receipt_hash
* None -> Some(32 bytes) add ~43 bytes over Open/Claimed. If the posted
* lovelace sits below that state's min-ada, lucid bumps the Submit
* continuing output to min-ada, value_equal fails, and the validator
* errors with no traces (the 2026-08-07 mainnet incident: the 33-byte
* "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1" capability_id pushed the Submitted
* output 11,030 lovelace over a 2,200,000 lock; the 20-byte chat
* capability stayed 49,310 under, which is why only OCR Submits failed).
*
* escrowLockFloor() returns the lovelace to lock: the economic total
* (payment + both bonds), raised to the Submitted-state min-ada plus a
* safety margin when the total alone is too small.
*/
import type { EscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/types.js";
import { encodeEscrowDatum } from "../../cbor/EscrowDatum.js";
/** Conway/Babbage utxoCostPerByte on Vector mainnet (protocol params). */
const UTXO_COST_PER_BYTE = 4310n;
/** Ledger constant: min-ada = (160 + serialized output bytes) * costPerByte. */
const OUTPUT_OVERHEAD_BYTES = 160n;
/** Covers CBOR framing drift between this estimate and the ledger's exact
* serialization (address, coin width, datum wrapper). Generous on purpose:
* 50k lovelace = 0.05 AP3X, dwarfed by per-leg tx fees. */
const SAFETY_MARGIN_LOVELACE = 50_000n;
/** Serialized-output byte estimate for an enterprise script address output
* carrying `lovelace` and an inline datum of `datumBytes`. Mirrors the
* arithmetic validated against mainnet on 2026-08-07 (minada-calc). */
function estimateOutputBytes(datumBytes: number, lovelace: bigint): bigint {
const addr = 1n + 29n;
const coin = 1n + (lovelace > 0xffffffffn ? 8n : 4n);
const datumField = 1n + 2n + 3n + BigInt(datumBytes);
const mapOverhead = 3n;
return addr + coin + datumField + mapOverhead;
}
/** Min-ada for the escrow output when it carries `datum`. */
export function minAdaForEscrowDatum(datum: EscrowDatum, lovelace: bigint): bigint {
const datumBytes = encodeEscrowDatum(datum).length / 2;
const size = estimateOutputBytes(datumBytes, lovelace);
return (OUTPUT_OVERHEAD_BYTES + size) * UTXO_COST_PER_BYTE;
}
/** The lovelace a POST must lock so the escrow output satisfies min-ada in
* every reachable state, including Submitted. `economicTotal` is
* payment + buyer_bond + supplier_bond. */
export function escrowLockFloor(openDatum: EscrowDatum, economicTotal: bigint): bigint {
const submittedShape: EscrowDatum = {
...openDatum,
// Representative worst-case Submit fields: a 13-digit POSIX ms stamp
// and a 32-byte receipt hash — sizes, not values, matter here.
submitted_at: openDatum.deliver_by,
result_receipt_hash: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
state: "Submitted",
};
const floor = minAdaForEscrowDatum(submittedShape, economicTotal) + SAFETY_MARGIN_LOVELACE;
return floor > economicTotal ? floor : economicTotal;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { reserveCollateralInputs } from "./liveCbor.js";
// Minimal LucidUTxO-shaped fixtures (the helper only reads txHash/outputIndex/assets).
const pure = (id: string, lovelace: bigint) =>
({ txHash: id, outputIndex: 0, assets: { lovelace } }) as never;
const mixed = (id: string, lovelace: bigint) =>
({ txHash: id, outputIndex: 0, assets: { lovelace, "policy.tok": 1n } }) as never;
const LOCKED = 2_200_000n; // price + buyer_bond + supplier_bond
const ids = (r: ReturnType<typeof reserveCollateralInputs>) =>
(r ?? []).map((u: { txHash: string }) => u.txHash);
describe("reserveCollateralInputs", () => {
it("reserves a 5-ADA collateral UTxO and funds from the rest", () => {
const r = reserveCollateralInputs([pure("collat", 5_000_000n), pure("work", 6_000_000n)], LOCKED);
expect(ids(r)).toEqual(["work"]); // collat (smallest ≥5) reserved
});
it("reserves the SMALLEST qualifying candidate", () => {
const r = reserveCollateralInputs([pure("big", 9_000_000n), pure("small", 5_000_000n)], LOCKED);
expect(ids(r)).toEqual(["big"]); // small reserved as collateral
});
it("only reserves PURE-ADA UTxOs (ignores ones carrying native assets)", () => {
const r = reserveCollateralInputs([mixed("mixed", 10_000_000n), pure("purecol", 6_000_000n)], LOCKED);
expect(ids(r)).toEqual(["mixed"]); // purecol reserved, fund from the mixed UTxO
});
it("returns null for a single UTxO (large change stays as collateral under default selection)", () => {
expect(reserveCollateralInputs([pure("only", 12_000_000n)], LOCKED)).toBeNull();
});
it("returns null when no UTxO qualifies as collateral", () => {
expect(reserveCollateralInputs([pure("a", 4_000_000n), pure("b", 4_000_000n)], LOCKED)).toBeNull();
});
it("returns null when reserving collateral would underfund the escrow", () => {
// {5 collateral, 3 working}: working can't cover locked + cushion → fall back.
expect(reserveCollateralInputs([pure("collat", 5_000_000n), pure("work", 3_000_000n)], LOCKED)).toBeNull();
});
});

View File

@@ -11,14 +11,29 @@
import type { OutputReference } from "../chain/ChainProvider.js";
/**
* ToolCall — OpenAI-compatible function tool call emitted by an assistant turn.
* `function.arguments` is the raw JSON string as produced by the model.
*/
export interface ToolCall {
id: string;
type: "function";
function: { name: string; arguments: string };
}
/**
* ChatMessage — OpenAI-compatible chat message.
* v1 supports user/system/assistant roles. The wire shape is intentionally
* narrow; future capabilities (tools, multimodal) will extend or replace it.
* `content` is always a string ("" for tool-call-only assistant messages —
* OpenAI's `content: null` is normalized on ingest). `tool_calls` /
* `tool_call_id` MUST be omitted (not set to undefined) when absent: the
* receipt hash canonicalizes the transcript objects, so field presence is
* part of the identity shared between supplier transcript and gateway mirror.
*/
export interface ChatMessage {
role: "system" | "user" | "assistant";
role: "system" | "user" | "assistant" | "tool";
content: string;
tool_calls?: ToolCall[];
tool_call_id?: string;
}
/**

View File

@@ -2,9 +2,22 @@
* planConsolidate.ts — pure pre-flight planner for the wallet-consolidate flow.
*
* Given a wallet's current UTxO set + a target collateral lovelace, decide
* whether to consolidate (many → 2), split (1 → 2), or skip (already at
* {≥collateral, working}). The same downstream tx-builder handles
* consolidate and split — only the "reason" tag differs for logging.
* whether the wallet needs reshaping or is already usable for script spends.
*
* Healthy is a STRUCTURAL predicate, not a UTxO count (F7, 2026-08-08):
* (a) some pure-lovelace UTxO >= collateralLovelace exists (the collateral
* candidate lucid's setCollateral needs), AND
* (b) at least MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE sits OUTSIDE that candidate (fee and
* spend money that is not the candidate), AND
* (c) fragmentation is bounded (utxos.length <= maxUtxos).
*
* The earlier revision returned `already-healthy` only for EXACTLY 2 UTxOs.
* The consolidate tx itself lands 3 (collateral + working + the fee-reserve
* remainder as change), so the shape consolidation produced could never
* satisfy its own health check — the wallet-health ticker re-consolidated
* every tick and burned 0.5 AP3X per pass (116 AP3X in one 24h soak).
* The health check also runs BEFORE the low-balance guard now: a wallet that
* can already transact must never be told "balance too low to consolidate".
*
* No lucid / WASM deps so this is unit-testable from a vanilla vitest.
*/
@@ -26,12 +39,24 @@ export interface PlannedConsolidate {
export const DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
export const DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE = 2_000_000n;
/** Reshape only when fragmentation passes this; receipt/change UTxOs
* accumulating between jobs are fine as long as a candidate exists. */
export const DEFAULT_MAX_UTXOS = 6;
const MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE = 1_000_000n;
/** Lovelace of a UTxO iff it carries no native assets; null otherwise. */
function pureLovelace(u: UtxoLike): bigint | null {
for (const [unit, amount] of Object.entries(u.assets)) {
if (unit !== "lovelace" && (amount ?? 0n) > 0n) return null;
}
return u.assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
}
export function planConsolidate(
utxos: UtxoLike[],
collateralLovelace: bigint = DEFAULT_COLLATERAL_LOVELACE,
feeReserve: bigint = DEFAULT_FEE_RESERVE,
maxUtxos: number = DEFAULT_MAX_UTXOS,
): PlannedConsolidate {
if (utxos.length === 0) {
throw new Error("wallet has no UTxOs — fund the address first");
@@ -42,6 +67,32 @@ export function planConsolidate(
0n,
);
// Structural health check first — reshaping a usable wallet wastes a fee.
if (utxos.length <= maxUtxos) {
// Smallest qualifying candidate: leave larger UTxOs as working funds.
let candidate: bigint | null = null;
for (const u of utxos) {
const pure = pureLovelace(u);
if (pure !== null && pure >= collateralLovelace) {
if (candidate === null || pure < candidate) candidate = pure;
}
}
if (candidate !== null) {
const workingOutside = totalLovelaceIn - candidate;
if (workingOutside >= MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE) {
return {
inputCount: utxos.length,
totalLovelaceIn,
collateralOutput: candidate,
workingOutput: workingOutside,
alreadyHealthy: true,
reason: "already-healthy",
};
}
}
}
// Reshape needed — only an actual reshape has a funds threshold.
const required = collateralLovelace + feeReserve + MIN_WORKING_LOVELACE;
if (totalLovelaceIn < required) {
throw new Error(
@@ -51,23 +102,6 @@ export function planConsolidate(
);
}
if (utxos.length === 2) {
const lov0 = utxos[0].assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
const lov1 = utxos[1].assets.lovelace ?? 0n;
const smaller = lov0 < lov1 ? lov0 : lov1;
const larger = lov0 < lov1 ? lov1 : lov0;
if (smaller >= collateralLovelace) {
return {
inputCount: 2,
totalLovelaceIn,
collateralOutput: smaller,
workingOutput: larger,
alreadyHealthy: true,
reason: "already-healthy",
};
}
}
const workingOutput = totalLovelaceIn - collateralLovelace - feeReserve;
return {

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

9
pnpm-lock.yaml generated
View File

@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ settings:
autoInstallPeers: true
excludeLinksFromLockfile: false
patchedDependencies:
libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16:
hash: 761a204004f889b65fdf148159f4bd90733703d63a0ff00eb0671c92ea085096
path: patches/libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16.patch
importers:
.:
@@ -3166,7 +3171,7 @@ snapshots:
'@cardano-sdk/util': 0.16.0
blake2b: 2.1.4
i: 0.3.7
libsodium-wrappers-sumo: 0.7.16
libsodium-wrappers-sumo: 0.7.16(patch_hash=761a204004f889b65fdf148159f4bd90733703d63a0ff00eb0671c92ea085096)
lodash: 4.18.1
npm: 9.9.4
pbkdf2: 3.1.5
@@ -4743,7 +4748,7 @@ snapshots:
libsodium-sumo@0.7.16: {}
libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16:
libsodium-wrappers-sumo@0.7.16(patch_hash=761a204004f889b65fdf148159f4bd90733703d63a0ff00eb0671c92ea085096):
dependencies:
libsodium-sumo: 0.7.16

View File

@@ -6,3 +6,6 @@ packages:
- "indexer"
- "indexer-ui"
- "wallet-monitor"
onlyBuiltDependencies:
- better-sqlite3

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# supplier/.env.chandra.example — Chandra OCR-2 supplier (ocr capability)
#
# Copy to supplier/.env.chandra on the host, chmod 600, fill the blanks.
# TESTNET FIRST: run the full lifecycle (advert → escrow → claim → submit →
# accept) on testnet before any mainnet value enters this file. Mainnet ops
# (funding, advert post, container start) are operator-executed.
#
# The upstream is any OpenAI-compatible VISION endpoint serving
# datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2 (vLLM recommended; `chandra_vllm` docker or
# `vllm serve datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2 --revision <sha>`).
# LICENSING: the model weights and the hosted API each carry their own
# terms. Confirm your own licensing position with the model provider before
# serving commercially.
# ── Identity / chain ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX= # gen-keypair output; NEW wallet, working float only
NETWORK_ID= # 0 testnet | 1 mainnet — set explicitly, never default
OGMIOS_URL= # wss://ogmios.vector.testnet... | mainnet equivalent
ADVERT_REF= # <txHash>#<index> from tx:post-advert (below)
LIVE_CHAIN= # 1 only when submitting for real
VECTOR_ZERO_TIME_MS= # per deploy/README (mainnet 1756485600000)
# ── Capability ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
CAPABILITY_KIND=ocr
# ── Upstream selection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# "datalab" = Datalab hosted document API (v0 deployment, decided 2026-08-06)
# "openai-vision" = self-hosted vLLM (the attestation upgrade path)
OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab
# ── Datalab upstream (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab) ───────────────────────────────
# TERMS: the upstream provider's end-user terms govern how you may use and
# redistribute output, and they vary by account and plan. Confirm your own
# position with the provider before serving third parties.
DATALAB_API_KEY= # provider account key; never commit
DATALAB_BASE_URL=https://www.datalab.to
DATALAB_MODE=accurate # fast | balanced | accurate
DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS=120000 # submit + poll budget; keep < advert max_processing_ms
# ── OpenAI-compatible vision upstream (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) ────────
# No /v1 suffix — supplier/src/ocrVision.ts appends /v1/chat/completions.
# OPENAI_BASE_URL= # e.g. http://chandra-vllm:8000
# OPENAI_API_KEY= # empty for a local vLLM; token for hosted endpoints
OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS=120000 # page inference is seconds; keep < advert max_processing_ms
# OPENAI_MAX_TOKENS=8192 # optional output ceiling (advert cap applies regardless)
# ── OCR extras ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Datalab upstream: the pre-Claim probe defaults to per_job liveness against
# {DATALAB_BASE_URL}/api/v1/health - no further config needed. Set
# REVISION_PROBE_MODE=off only if you want claims without the health gate.
#
# openai-vision upstream only (attestation upgrade path):
# OCR_PROMPT_OVERRIDE= # exact serving prompt, pinned at integration
# HF_MODEL_REVISION= # 40-hex checkpoint SHA; mismatch refuses Claim
# REVISION_PROBE_URL= # e.g. http://chandra-vllm:8000/info
# ── Service ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PORT=8080
# ── Advert posting (run once per network, testnet first) ──────────────────
# Model string convention: datalab upstream = "datalab/convert-accurate"
# (honest: hosted engine + mode); self-hosted = "datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2@<sha7>".
# Endpoint host: your deployed supplier's public HTTPS endpoint (deploy
# target tracked outside this repo, not in this file).
#
# pnpm --filter @marketplace/supplier tx:post-advert -- \
# --ogmios-url $OGMIOS_URL \
# --priv-key $SUPPLIER_PRIV_KEY_HEX \
# --capability-id ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1 \
# --model "datalab/convert-accurate" \
# --max-output-tokens 8192 \
# --max-processing-ms 150000 \
# --price-lovelace 200000 \
# --endpoint-url https://<your-supplier-host> \
# --detail-uri https://<your-supplier-host>/chandra-detail.json \
# --detail-hash <sha256 of the detail JSON>
#
# max_processing_ms 150000 covers DATALAB_TIMEOUT_MS (120s) + chain legs.
# Price 200000 (0.2 AP3X) is the fleet convention placeholder — a future
# pricing decision supersedes it. Bonds default to 1 AP3X each.
# The detail JSON template lives at supplier/chandra-detail.example.json.
# Testnet: DNS is not required — a direct http://<host-ip>:<port> endpoint
# works for the testnet advert (retire it after the drills).

View File

@@ -126,3 +126,9 @@ ADVERT_DETAIL_HASH=
# `docker compose down && up -d` to apply.
# ESCROW_REF_UTXO=<txhash>#0
# ADVERT_REF_UTXO=<txhash>#1
# ─── Optional: chat-session tuning (CAPABILITY_KIND=chat-session only) ─────
# CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=300000 # auto-end sessions idle this long
# MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS=1 # concurrent session slots (default 1)
# CHAT_SETTLE_MODE=full # "full" (Claim/Submit) or "ticket" (no supplier
# # chain ops; buyer reclaims the Open escrow)

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.2 --activate
# Workspace manifests first to maximise layer cache reuse.
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json .npmrc ./
# pnpm-lock.yaml's patchedDependencies hash the patch files at install time.
COPY patches ./patches
COPY packages/shared/package.json ./packages/shared/package.json
COPY supplier/package.json ./supplier/package.json
# Buyer + indexer manifests are needed because pnpm-lock.yaml indexes the

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"capability_id": "ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1",
"weights_source": "hf:datalab-to/chandra-ocr-2",
"model_revision": "<40-hex commit SHA; self-hosted (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) deployments only — the Datalab-hosted default (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab) is a third-party API with no pinnable checkpoint, so this is unset there>",
"license": "modified OpenRAIL-M (weights); Apache-2.0 (code)",
"request_shape": {
"route": "POST /v1/ocr/extract",
"body": { "image_b64": "plain base64, no data: prefix", "mime": "image/png | image/jpeg | image/webp", "output_format": "markdown | html | json" },
"one_page_per_job": true
},
"receipt": {
"schema": "v1 (8 fields, Ed25519-signed)",
"response_hash": "sha256(canonical({content, output_format}))",
"verify": "GET /capability → pub_key_hex; verify signature over canonical(receipt)"
},
"revision_probe": {
"route": "<runtime info route reporting the loaded checkpoint; self-hosted (openai-vision) upstream only>",
"policy": "self-hosted (OCR_UPSTREAM=openai-vision) upstream: probe before every Claim, mismatch refuses the job. Datalab-hosted default (OCR_UPSTREAM=datalab): per-job liveness probe only, no checkpoint pin."
},
"operator_disclosure": "first-party (HAL8-operated supplier)"
}

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