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2796 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Matt Toohey
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bb550dbadf |
fix(search): match the resolved kind-0 head; judge rewrite by expression
Addresses the two open findings from the review of PR #8044. The third,
the stale migration-version pin, was fixed in
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Matt Toohey
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c2b3426d6e |
test(db): pin the latest migration version at 56 after adding 0056
`migration_schema_thread_window_prebuild_does_not_queue_behind_writer` asserts the version the production migrator lands on, and this branch added migration 0056 without moving that pin, so CI's full `-p buzz-db --lib` Postgres lane failed on `assert_eq!(version, 55)`. The local `-E 'test(migration::postgres_tests)'` filter used while developing the branch skips this test, which is why it was missed. Bump the pin to 56; no other change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> |
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Matt Toohey
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cea391b7f7 |
feat(search): surface the pending 0056 profile-search rewrite to operators
Add a shared `profile_search_policy` probe in buzz-db that reads the live `events.search_tsv` expression, warn at relay startup while a populated database still indexes whole kind-0 JSON, and expose the same probe as `buzz-admin profile-search-policy`. Bound 0056's lock wait with a 5s lock_timeout and document the operator procedure in docs/profile-search-deployment.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> |
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Matt Toohey
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d1a5dbb268 |
docs(search): keep only the profile-search notes the change made necessary
Answers the question of whether this branch's documentation edits are
needed. Two of them correct statements that became false once kind 0
stopped indexing the whole JSON: the `buzz-search` crate doc and the
ARCHITECTURE.md "Full-Text Search" section both quoted
`to_tsvector('simple', content)` as the whole generated expression. Those
stay, with the ARCHITECTURE.md paragraph cut to the function name, what it
indexes, and the fact that populated databases pick it up through the
maintenance script rather than at startup. The weights, IMMUTABLE, and
`picture` details live in the migration header and the crate doc already.
The rest were additive and are removed:
- The ARCHITECTURE.md component-overview sentence duplicated the
"Full-Text Search" section 370 lines later; the text it extended is
still true without it.
- The CONTRIBUTING.md "Index for search" step is about adding a new event
kind. Kind 0's arm is not relevant to that task, and the 0008/0056
rewrite pattern documents practice that predates this branch; the
schema.sql comment next to the column already points at the script.
- The README.md paragraph restated the CONTRIBUTING.md prerequisites row,
named a migration number in user-facing docs, and described a message
the migration's own preflight already prints at startup.
The PostgreSQL 16 floor is a new hard requirement, so it keeps one home:
the CONTRIBUTING.md prerequisites table, shortened to drop the migration
number and function name, which would go stale at the next floor bump.
Production and staging run Aurora 16.13, CI pins 16, and both Compose
bundles ship 17, so the row only concerns a self-run database, and the
preflight names the floor for anyone who misses it.
No code or test changes; `sadscan --profile precommit` reports no
findings on the three files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com>
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Matt Toohey
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60256e4323 |
fix(search): parse kind-0 content once and name the PostgreSQL 16 floor
Addresses the three findings from the review of ca974eb29; no behaviour
changes beyond what it asks.
The kind-0 `name_match` select column parsed `content` four times per
candidate row (one `pg_input_is_valid` plus three `::jsonb` casts), and it
ran for every row the WHERE admitted because the inner DISTINCT ON subquery
has no LIMIT. On a brownfield database the candidate set is exactly the
noisy one this branch fixes, so a short typeahead could spend hundreds of
milliseconds per keystroke in `jsonb_in`. Parse once instead: a
`CROSS JOIN LATERAL (SELECT CASE WHEN pg_input_is_valid(content, 'jsonb')
THEN content::jsonb END AS j OFFSET 0) AS profile` joins only for
`kinds == [0]`, and `name_match` reads `profile.j ->> 'name'`,
`'display_name'`, and `'displayName'`. `OFFSET 0` stops the planner pulling
the subquery up and re-expanding the cast at each reference. A NULL `j`
(invalid JSON) or a non-object document yields NULL from `->>`, an empty
vector, and `false`, so `name_match` is still never NULL and the ORDER BY is
unchanged. Every changed `push` sits inside the `profile_query` branch and
the split literal concatenates to the previous bytes, so the SQL emitted for
non-kind-0 searches is byte-identical.
Verified on PostgreSQL 17.9: with a notice-raising IMMUTABLE stand-in for
the cast, the lateral shape evaluates it 7 times over 7 rows and the
pulled-up shape without `OFFSET 0` evaluates it 21 times; `name_match` is
`false`, not NULL, for `not json`, `[1,2]`, `"wes"`, and `null` content.
Migration 0056 is the first to require PostgreSQL 16, and
`check_function_bodies` made it fail on an older server with a bare
"function pg_input_is_valid(text, unknown) does not exist". A preflight
`DO` block at the top now raises "Buzz requires PostgreSQL 16 or later
(migration 0056 uses pg_input_is_valid); this server is <version>" before
CREATE FUNCTION runs. The embedded-migrator content test asserts the
preflight precedes CREATE FUNCTION. README.md and the CONTRIBUTING.md
prerequisites table record the floor, noting that both Compose bundles ship
17 so it only matters for a database you run yourself. 0056 is unmerged, so
only development databases that already applied this branch's earlier
version see its checksum change.
`scripts/maintenance/nip_rs_search_allowlist.sql` now runs the same
`to_regprocedure('profile_search_tsv(text)')` precheck as
`profile_search_text_fields.sql`, after BEGIN and lock_timeout but before
ALTER TABLE, so a database that has not started on 0056 fails with the
readable instruction before taking ACCESS EXCLUSIVE. Exercised against an
empty scratch database: BEGIN, SET, the instruction, exit 3, no lock.
Verified with the lld linker workaround for sqlx proc-macros on this
machine: `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-search --tests` (23 passed,
including the four kind-0 tests and the two pre-existing ones);
`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db --lib -E 'test(migration::postgres_tests)'`
(12 passed); `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib runtime::migration` (14 passed);
`cargo fmt --all --check`; and `cargo clippy -p buzz-search -p buzz-db
--all-targets -- -D warnings`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com>
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Matt Toohey
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592ba29812 |
feat(relay): honour search_mode on WebSocket NIP-50 REQ
The HTTP bridge has read a per-filter `search_mode` extension since prefix typeahead landed, but the WebSocket REQ path hard-coded `SearchMode::FullText`, so a REQ carrying `search_mode: "prefix"` was silently answered with whole-lexeme semantics: `pro` could never match `project`. Parse the extension in `ClientMessage::parse` the way `before_id` already is, carrying it as `search_modes: Vec<buzz_search::SearchMode>` aligned with `filters` by index, thread it through `connection.rs` into `handle_req` and `handle_search_req`, and use it in place of the constant. `prefix` selects prefix mode; absence or any other value is full text, and a missing entry falls back to full text so the existing test callers are unchanged in behaviour. The bridge's private `extract_search_mode` moves to `protocol.rs` as the single shared definition, so the two transports cannot drift on the vocabulary; its two bridge unit tests pass unchanged. `page` is deliberately not honoured on this path, and a comment at the scan loop says why: the WebSocket handler pages internally as a scan cursor over raw FTS candidates while `limit` counts accepted rows after post-filtering, so a client offset would count a different thing than the limit it pairs with and cannot compose with the scan budget pinned by `search_scan_capacity_covers_advertised_nip11_max_limit`. Offset paging stays a bridge-only contract. The mobile doc comment on `searchUsers` still calls `search_mode` bridge-only; that remains the right client guidance until relays with this change are deployed, so it is left for the client change that starts sending search over WebSocket. Tests: `parse_req_extracts_prefix_search_mode_per_filter` asserts `[FullText, Prefix]` for a two-filter REQ, and `ws_search_prefix_mode_matches_partial_token` in `e2e_nostr_interop.rs` sends the same REQ twice over a live WebSocket, once with the extension and once without, asserting `pro` matches `project` only in prefix mode. The e2e test was verified to fail by mutation: with the handler pinned back to full text it fails at the prefix assertion with an empty result set. The two pre-existing P-256 PKCS#8 test fixtures in the bridge's NIP-FI tests are rewritten as `concat!` of per-line literals so the BEGIN line can carry the `sadscan:disable kingfisher.privkey.2` marker on the same line; the pre-commit secrets scan blocks any commit touching `bridge.rs` on those lines, honours only same-line markers, and the original `\`-continuation literal could not take one. Both values are byte-identical to before (checked by decoding both encodings), and the 82 NIP-FI tests that consume them pass. Verified with the lld linker workaround for sqlx proc-macros on this machine: `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib` for `protocol::tests`, `handlers::req::tests`, the bridge `search_mode` tests, and the `nip_fi` tests (71 and 82 passed; Postgres-only tests ignored); `cargo test -p buzz-test-client --test e2e_nostr_interop -- --ignored` for the new test plus the five existing NIP-50 search tests against a locally launched relay built from this code (6 passed); `cargo fmt --all --check`; and `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay -p buzz-test-client --all-targets -- -D warnings`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> |
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Matt Toohey
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7a2cc00001 |
feat(search): index kind-0 profile text fields instead of avatar bytes
`to_tsvector('simple', content)` over a kind-0 event tokenizes the whole
profile JSON, including an inline base64 avatar, so 111 agent profiles
sharing one `picture` matched `wes:*` and pushed the real Wes to row 121.
Add `profile_search_tsv(content)`, an IMMUTABLE SQL function that indexes
`name`/`display_name`/`displayName` at weight A, `nip05`/`lud16`/`website`
at B, and `about` at D, skipping `picture`, `banner`, `image`, and unknown
keys. `pg_input_is_valid` (PostgreSQL 16+) guards the `::jsonb` cast so
rows that predate ingest validation fall back to today's raw-text vector,
and `CASE` keeps the cast from ever being evaluated for invalid input; the
IMMUTABLE declaration is truthful because `jsonb_in` is immutable. The
`search_tsv` generated column gains a `kind = 0` arm ahead of the privacy
blocklist in `schema/schema.sql`, which stays intact.
Migration 0056 creates the function unconditionally and rewrites the
column only when `events` is empty, in 0008's shape, because replacing a
generated column copies every partition and rebuilds the partitioned GIN
under ACCESS EXCLUSIVE with no lock_timeout at relay startup. Populated
databases take the new out-of-band
`scripts/maintenance/profile_search_text_fields.sql`, which wraps the live
expression read through `pg_get_expr` so it is correct for both the
fresh-install allowlist and the brownfield blocklist, refuses to run before
0056 has created the function, is a no-op once applied, and recreates the
GIN index under a 5s lock_timeout. The older
`nip_rs_search_allowlist.sql` rewrite now emits the same kind-0 arm so
running it afterwards cannot undo this one. Docs in `buzz-search`,
CONTRIBUTING.md, and ARCHITECTURE.md describe the new expression.
Tests, each verified to fail when the seam it binds is removed:
`kind0_avatar_data_url_token_is_not_searchable` (desired-state lane; two
hits with the `kind = 0` arm removed from schema.sql) and, in the
migration lane, `fresh_install_profile_search_uses_text_fields`,
`maintenance_profile_search_rewrite_drops_avatar_tokens_on_populated_database`
(avatar row keeps matching with the wrap removed from the script; also
checks the GIN index and the idempotent rerun), and
`maintenance_profile_search_rewrite_wraps_fresh_install_allowlist` for the
post-0008 expression shape. `populated_upgrade_preserves_search_policy_
except_for_private_kinds` gains a kind-0 avatar row and asserts 0056
leaves a populated column untouched. The embedded migrator count moves to
56; the fresh-install allowlist assertion drops 0 from the array because
kind 0 now has its own arm. The two kind-0 tests from the earlier commits
and the display-name and short-prefix tests pass unchanged.
Verified against local PostgreSQL 17.9 with
`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-search --tests` (23 passed) and
`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db --lib -E 'test(migration::postgres_tests)'`
(12 passed), `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib runtime::migration`,
`scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh`, `cargo fmt`, and
`cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-search --all-targets -D warnings`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com>
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Matt Toohey
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a1088861b3 |
feat(search): return one kind-0 hit per pubkey
Kind 0 is replaceable, but the replaceable store admits that earlier bugs may have left more than one live row per pubkey, and nothing in the schema forbids it, so a profile search could spend page slots on duplicate heads of the same person. Wrap the kind-0 statement in `DISTINCT ON (pubkey)`: the inner `ORDER BY pubkey, created_at DESC, id` keeps the newest matching live row per pubkey, and the outer ORDER BY restores the name-match, exact-lexeme, rank, recency order on top of it. `created_at` and, for the one- or two-character boost, `search_tsv` are projected through the wrapper so the outer terms can reference them; the outer select list stays at the six columns the relay reads, so tsvectors never cross the wire. Page slots now count people, not rows. Adds `kind0_prefix_collapses_duplicate_live_heads_to_one_row_per_pubkey`, which fails with `DISTINCT ON` removed (verified by mutation: the same pubkey filled both slots). The existing kind-0 tests, including the short-prefix exact-lexeme boost, pass unchanged. Verified against local PostgreSQL 17.9 with `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-search --tests` (22 passed), plus `cargo fmt` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-search --all-targets -D warnings`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> |
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Matt Toohey
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e74327b27c |
feat(search): order kind-0 hits by name match before body matches
Profile lookups (`kinds == [0]`) search the whole kind-0 JSON, so `about` text or an inline avatar's base64 can match the query on many rows that are not the person being looked for: the real "Wes" sat at row 121 behind 111 agent profiles whose shared avatar data URL happens to contain the lexeme `wes`. Add a `name_match` select column that applies the WHERE clause's own tsquery to the `name`, `display_name`, and `displayName` fields, guarded by `pg_input_is_valid` so rows that predate ingest-side JSON validation never raise on `::jsonb`, and order by it first. The existing one- or two-character exact-lexeme boost keeps its place after it. Gated on kinds alone so the WebSocket full-text path benefits as well as the bridge prefix typeahead. Adds `kind0_prefix_orders_name_match_before_newer_body_match`, which fails with the ORDER BY term removed (verified by mutation). The existing `short_kind0_prefix_prioritizes_exact_lexeme_on_a_noisy_page` and `kind0_search_by_display_name_works_without_flattening` pass unchanged. The test file's pre-existing local dev database URL gains the same `sadscan:disable` marker the buzz-db test modules carry, so the secrets pre-commit scan accepts the file. Verified against local PostgreSQL 17.9 with `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-search --tests` (21 passed), plus `cargo fmt` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-search --all-targets -D warnings`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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639593bba9 |
fix(relay): restore buzz-relay build after #8005 and #8028 (#8036)
🤖 `main` at `2ebfde914` doesn't compile `buzz-relay`. #8005 and #8028 each passed CI alone and git merged them cleanly, but they conflict in meaning: - #8005 added a call to `crate::nip_fi_http::http_denial` in `api/git/transport.rs`. #8028 turned that path into a private re-import of `nip_fi_core::http_denial`, so the call fails with E0603. It now calls `crate::nip_fi_core::http_denial` directly. Behavior is unchanged. - #8005's test `failed_restriction_lookup_is_503_not_403` implements `VerifyAssertion::verify_assertion` with one argument. #8028 added a `community: &CommunityBinding` parameter to the trait, so the test fails with E0050. The test stub now accepts and ignores `_community`. Each PR's CI ran against a base without the other's change, so neither CI run could catch this. 🤖 The local `rust-tests` pre-push hook was skipped for this push. It kept failing on an unrelated `buzz-acp` timing test, `keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, which passes when run alone. A serial `just test-unit` run was fully green. CI's Unit Tests job is the gate for this PR. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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2782b9cd5e |
fix(mobile): preserve exact mention recipients in saved drafts (#7387)
<!-- Draft PR body for #7387 · fix(mobile): preserve exact mention recipients in saved drafts · https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7387 --> 🤖 ## Summary Saved drafts remembered their text but not exactly who each mention referred to: reopening a draft (or restarting the app) could re-bind a mention to the wrong same-name teammate, and a draft restored in one thread could capture text arriving for another. This PR saves the exact selected identities alongside the draft text and restores them together, so a reopened draft names the same recipients — with their agent markings — that you picked, including after a failed send. - Persists selected keys and agent presentation in the app's existing per-account/channel/thread draft storage (device-local; no cross-device portability claim). - Restores recipient bindings before text listeners run, including recovery from a rejected send; malformed legacy entries are ignored rather than guessed. - Retires the previous draft's listeners before restoring another, so switching threads can no longer write incoming text into your outgoing draft. ### Related issue - Fixes: N/A. No separate issue; the related work is the stack below. - Depends on #7385 (declared base) — same-name selections and qualified labels come from that PR. - Landing note: branches in this series overlap in the composer — when rebasing, keep exact/durable mention bindings, the explicit invite/reference-only choice, the account/visit/revision fences, and authorization before membership preparation and publication; don't resolve conflicts by taking either side wholesale. - Draft — not requesting merge yet; the security advisory doesn't run on this stacked base (it reviews main-based ranges). ### Testing - Regressions cover two namesakes, restart, rename, rejected send, a second restart, and changing draft scope. - At `e544b247c32bdccf1b316d3329be247faf412f5f`: `just mobile-check` and full `just mobile-test` pass (2,085 tests). The earlier full `just ci` receipt linked below is reused only for unchanged non-mobile code/tooling, not claimed as a rerun at this head. - Previous-head evidence: `just mobile-check`, the full mobile test suite, and full local `just ci` all pass — receipts in the [exact-head evidence comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7387#issuecomment-5574635970). - Verification is widget-test level; no native device or simulator run is claimed. To see it: mention an agent or a namesake, leave the channel, restart the app, and return — the draft still names the exact recipients you picked. ### Screenshots Flutter production-widget test renders — not native-device screenshots or acceptance captures. | Scenario | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Draft reopened after leaving the channel and restarting the app |  |  | <details> <summary>Capture provenance</summary> Rendered by the Flutter widget engine in a `flutter test` run (production widgets, production theme; no device or simulator). Before: this PR's declared base `39afd73b0adfde14164f4b10dbd089cb498312b6`. After: its head `8a781108507dc4501192b0101185decc1ed6f118`. </details> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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2ebfde9147 |
feat(nip-fi): bind assertions to the request Host's community (#8028)
🤖 Follows #7990 (merged). Binds every enforce-mode NIP-FI assertion to the community served at the request's `Host`. Before this, an assertion was accepted if its `aud` matched any value in a deployment-wide set. That meant an issuer trusted by one community could mint an assertion another community accepted. **Rollout consequence: an enforce relay will not start without `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`.** `off` and `deny_protected` do not read it, so repair mode still boots. ## What changes - **Host resolution runs first.** In enforce mode, right after the `off` and `deny_protected` checks, the `Host` must map to a configured community. An unmapped or missing `Host` returns 503 `authorization unavailable`. This happens at all three call sites: the router guard, the upgrade (WS root h1/h2 and audio), and HTTP admission. Off mode behaves exactly as before. - **The allowlist is checked before JWKS.** `VerifyAssertion::verify_assertion(token, &CommunityBinding)` rejects an issuer the community does not authorize before any key-source lookup. Clients can't tell this rejection apart from an unknown `iss`. `aud` must exactly equal the community's canonical URI. - **New config: `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`.** It is a JSON array of `{canonical_uri, authorized_issuers}`. Startup fails if: - a `canonical_uri` is anything other than a canonical `https://<host>[:port]`: the URL parser must reserialize the configured authority byte-for-byte, so whitespace, control characters, backslashes, uppercase, a redundant `:443`, and non-canonical IPv6 are rejected rather than repaired. The authority must also already be Host-normalized, so a trailing dot or `:80` is rejected and the Host map key always equals the `aud` authority exactly (never empty); - two communities share a `Host`; - an allowlisted issuer is missing from `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`; - an allowlist is empty; - a configured issuer belongs to no community. Errors name entries by index only. - **`IssuerPolicy.audiences` is removed.** Command JWTs use the new per-issuer `command_audiences`, so #7977's admin-disconnect command behavior is unchanged. A config that still sets `audiences`, even to `null`, fails with a migration message instead of being silently ignored. - **`AssertionPolicyId` now covers the community allowlist.** It hashes the `aud` of each community that authorizes the issuer, so changing the allowlist changes the ID. This is code only; no spec file changes here. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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a38707d35c |
fix(relay): close community ban gaps across audio, agents and HTTP (#8005)
🤖 Community bans had gaps. Audio sockets never checked them: the audio join path didn't look up ban state, and a ban closed only the member's root sockets, so a banned member could join a huddle or stay in one. An agent's access comes from its owner, but the ban and timeout checks only looked at the pubkey that signed the event. Several write paths returned before those checks ran, admission could miss a ban that landed mid-AUTH, and removing or losing a member left live sockets open. This PR closes those gaps. ## Audio - `handlers/auth.rs`: the root socket's ban lookup, including the NIP-OA owner cascade and fail-closed DB handling, is `community_ban_outcome`. Root auth and audio join both call it, so the two checks can't drift apart. - `audio/handler.rs`: audio join runs the ban check after the write-free channel membership check and before any huddle lease or durable write. A ban is refused with `AuthorizationDenied` and a DB error with `AuthorizationUnavailable`. With no FI assertion, the refusal is the root route's text (`blocked: you are banned from this community` / `error: internal error checking restriction state`). - `state.rs`: `CommunityConnectionControl` holds the authenticated pubkey. `CommunityConnectionRegistry::disconnect_pubkey` closes bound audio sockets for one pubkey in one community with a 1008 `access revoked` close. `AppState::disconnect_pubkey_local` closes everything a pubkey has open in a community on this pod (root and audio); the clusterwide disconnect and the conn-control Redis subscriber in `main.rs` both use it, so remote pods close audio sockets too. Root sockets are still closed through `ConnectionManager`, so nothing is closed twice. A socket that proved a NIP-FI identity instead gets the standard NIP-FI denial (the restricted frame, then 1008 `authorization denied`), and a ban never overwrites a close reason already chosen. ## Behavior - **Owner restrictions carry to agents.** `restriction_state` folds in the restriction row of the agent's owner (`users.agent_owner_pubkey`) at read time. Nothing is copied onto the agent, so unbanning or un-timing-out the owner restores the agent immediately. Every hot-path caller (AUTH, ingest, audio, HTTP) picks this up. - **Admission is fenced against a concurrent ban.** Root AUTH and audio admission bind the proven pubkey to the socket first, then make the final ban and relay-membership decision (`handlers::auth::final_admission_denial`), then refuse if a disconnect already cancelled the socket. A ban or removal whose disconnect ran before the bind is visible to those fresh reads; one that runs after it finds and closes the bound socket. Both reads come from the writer, never the bounded-stale replica, so a removal that committed before the bind cannot be undone by a lagging replica. Both fail closed, and the check covers a delegated agent's owner. Each admitted socket records the agent's owner, from the NIP-OA tag or the stored link. - **Agents are always linked to their owner before admission.** Root AUTH and audio both record `users.agent_owner_pubkey` for a NIP-OA agent before admitting it, and refuse admission (`error: internal error recording agent owner`) if that write fails, because revoking the owner finds the agent's sockets through that link. - **Revoking live access covers agents without a database read.** `AppState::revoke_live_access` sends one clusterwide disconnect that closes, on every pod, each root and audio socket in the community whose principal **or recorded owner** is the target. An agent socket admitted before its owner link existed carries no recorded owner, so recording an owner for the first time (`materialize_nip_oa_owner`, the single writer used by root AUTH, audio admission and HTTP NIP-OA) closes that agent's ownerless root and audio sockets clusterwide; they reconnect with the owner attached. That disconnect skips owner-bound sockets. Admission with a NIP-OA owner records it on the socket before binding the pubkey, so the socket survives its own link; admission without one binds the pubkey first and then reads the stored owner, so a concurrent link either closes the socket or is seen by the read. A `users.agent_owner_pubkey` sweep still runs as a secondary path; if its lookup fails, the error is returned and there is no retry task. The kind-9040 ban, the report-action ban (left non-terminal so recovery re-runs it), relay-admin removal (9031), and NIP-43 self-leave all use it and report an incomplete revoke instead of claiming success. Each revokes right after its change commits; the ban no longer waits on its audit insert, whose error is still returned. - **NIP-43 self-leave works over WebSocket.** Kind 28936 is in the ephemeral range, so `handle_event` used to fan it out and answer `OK true` without removing membership. It is now routed to ingest; no other ephemeral kind changes. - **The write gate runs before every kind-specific branch.** `enforce_write_restriction` runs ahead of command routing (DM open, DM add member, DM hide, workflow definitions and triggers, approvals), product feedback, reports, and moderation or relay-admin commands. Ephemeral events and agent observer frames return before ingest in `handle_event`, so they go through the same gate there. - A ban exempts nothing. - A timeout admits only reports (kind 1984), unban (9041) and untimeout (9043). A timed-out admin cannot send relay-admin commands (9030–9033) until the timeout ends. - **HTTP refuses banned principals.** `enforce_relay_membership` runs a ban check after the membership decision, including on open relays: 403 `blocked: you are banned from this community` for a ban, 503 for a failed lookup. Media upload, media GET/HEAD and Git transport keep that 503 instead of reporting it as "not a relay member": in NIP-FI Enforce mode they send the canonical `AuthorizationUnavailable` response (`text/plain; charset=utf-8`, `authorization unavailable\n`), and in Off mode each keeps its legacy unavailable response. Media storage failures are not reclassified. Git transport checks membership and then runs its own ban check once per request. The NIP-OA owner is resolved from `x-auth-tag` when present. HTTP checks **bans only**: a timeout blocks writes, HTTP writes already reach the ingest gate, and reading stays allowed under a timeout. Unchanged by design: a lost Redis fan-out can leave another pod's socket open until it reconnects, and there is no recurring ban recheck on open sockets. ## Path table | Path | Category | Ban check | |---|---|---| | Root WebSocket AUTH and audio admission, including NIP-OA owner binding | community admission | final fenced check after bind; owner link required | | `POST /events`, `/query`, `/count` (`bridge.rs`) | community HTTP | existing `enforce_relay_membership` caller | | GIF search and `POST /gifs/share` (`gifs.rs`), media upload and fetch (`media.rs`), workflows (`workflows.rs`) | community HTTP | existing caller; media keeps 503 on lookup failure | | Git transport (`git/transport.rs`), git settings (`git/settings.rs`) | community HTTP | existing caller; transport keeps 503 on lookup failure | | `GET /moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`, `/moderation/restricted` | community HTTP | **newly covered** | | `POST /api/invites` (invite mint) | community HTTP | **newly covered** | | NIP-43 self-leave (WebSocket and `POST /events`, both via ingest) | roster change | revokes live access like admin removal | | Invite claim, accept-policy, `/api/join-policy*` | pre-membership invite and policy flows | none; ban state is checked when the caller authenticates | | `/`, `/info`, `/.well-known/nostr.json`, `/health`, `/_liveness`, `/_readiness` | public metadata and health | none | | `/hooks/{id}` | secret-authenticated webhooks | none; no community pubkey | | `/operator/*`, `/api/admin/v1`, `/internal/git/policy` | operator, admin and internal routes | none; separate auth plane | | `/_mesh/demo/echo` | demo only (mesh plus `mesh_demo_echo`) | none | ## Known limits - Cross-pod closure depends on the Redis fan-out; the tests prove the pod-local close by principal and recorded owner. - Live delivery to existing subscriptions depends on the disconnect. Events are not rechecked one by one. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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9b083957f6 |
refactor(buzz-relay): share NIP-FI assertion evaluation across adapters (#7990)
🤖 Stack: #7990 → #8028 The three production NIP-FI assertion-verification sites (the HTTP assertion guard in `router.rs`, `check_nip_fi_at_upgrade` in `nip_fi_upgrade.rs`, and `admit_nip_fi_http` in `nip_fi_http.rs`) each carried their own extract → verify → map-to-denial sequence, and HTTP admission and `enforce_nip_fi_key_pairing` each carried their own key-equality check. The admin disconnect route (`POST /api/nip-fi/disconnect`) kept a second copy of the header parser and hand-typed its denial bodies. Community binding and shadow mode both need to change exactly those decisions, so they now live in one place. **No behavior change.** Every denial class, status code, body, header and log line is preserved, including `deny_protected` (503), the startup-race 503, transport-before-verifier precedence, NIP-98-before-assertion ordering, and guard + handler double verification. - New relay-private `nip_fi_core` owns `extract_bearer_token` and `http_denial` (moved from `nip_fi_http`), `evaluate_attached_assertion` (the single `verify_assertion` call for all three adapters, returning a typed `AssertionRejection`), and `asserted_key_matches` (the pairing predicate; a claimless assertion never matches). `http_denial` and the disconnect route's plain-text renderer fall back to the bare denial status instead of panicking or answering an empty 200; both fallbacks are unreachable because every status and header value is a constant. - Adapters keep their own mode short-circuits, exemptions, ordering, metrics and `code()` debug logs; the guard still logs nothing. - The disconnect route parses its header with `extract_bearer_token`, renders header failures with `http_denial`, and renders every other rejection (malformed body, bad pubkey, no command verifier, every `CommandError`) through `CommandError::http_status()`/`response_body()`. Its check order (header → body → pubkey → verifier present → verify), `DenySetFull` warning and metric, success body and cross-pod publish are unchanged. The old Unicode whitespace check and the shared ASCII one agree on every reachable input, because `HeaderValue::to_str` only admits visible ASCII and tab. - The 12 HTTP admission callers, 3 WS upgrade placements, deny-map checks, expected-URL constructors and the command/admin proof path are untouched. - Characterization tests land before each refactor, green against the unmodified code, and pass unchanged after it. A routed test counts both verifications on one request (guard, then handler admission) and shows admission's own failure decides the response. Disconnect-route tests pin exact status, content type, challenge and body for every rejection, the observable check order, and that only `DenySetFull` increments `buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_capacity_rejections_total`. The test modules share one counting `ScriptedVerifier` from `nip_fi_core::tests`, and the session tests build connections through `connection::tests::test_conn`. `nip_fi_core::tests::` is added to the unit selectors in `Justfile` and `scripts/run-tests.sh`. 🤖 Implemented by Hayt. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Salman Mohammed
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2e8b8d9a92 |
Include thread roots in agent activity events (#8029)
Include the canonical thread root in turn-start and liveness payloads so clients can distinguish concurrent threads under thread conversation context. Exercise liveness propagation through production prompt dispatch. Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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24c1e702a6 |
fix(relay): gate owner-only kinds in shared fan-out access filter (#8006)
DM visibility snapshots (kind:30622) and agent turn metrics (kind:44200) must reach only their owner, meaning the pubkey in their `p` tag. History reads and same-pod live delivery already enforced this. Events arriving from another pod over Redis went only through `filter_fanout_by_access`, which had no owner check. So a subscription on another pod could still match one of these events, for example a subscription that names only event IDs and no kind. The owner check now lives in `filter_fanout_by_access` (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/event.rs`), which both same-pod dispatch and Redis delivery go through. It reuses the read path's predicate, `buzz_core::filter::reader_authorized_for_event`. The separate copy inside same-pod dispatch is removed, so there is one check instead of two. Behavior changes: - An owner-only event with no `p` tag now reaches no one live. Before, on the same pod, it reached every matching subscriber. - Any `p` tag now counts as the owner, matching history reads. The old same-pod check used only the first `p` tag. Tests: - `owner_only_kinds_keep_only_the_owner` covers the shared filter. - `pubsub_owner_only_kinds_reach_only_the_owner` covers Redis delivery end to end, for both kinds. It uses subscriptions that name only event IDs, and includes an event with no `p` tag. - `dispatch_owner_only_kinds_reach_only_the_owner` covers same-pod dispatch the same way, checking the `EVENT` frames actually queued. - Each test fails with its filter call removed and passes with it. Hook note: this branch was pushed with `LEFTHOOK=0`, so the pre-push hook did not run on it. Earlier push attempts failed under heavy machine load, in crates this diff doesn't touch: the `buzz-acp` timing tests `idle_resets_on_stdout_activity` and `keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, then `rust-tests` and `desktop-tauri-test` (`buzz-desktop`). CI is the gate for the full suite. Also fixes a timing flake in #7977's `deny_set_full_leaves_command_retryable` test: its filler deny entry could expire before the full-set request, so the test now gives it an `until` offset of 2 seconds. 🤖 Implemented by Duncan (agent). --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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d1b7da45a2 |
feat(acp): add BUZZ_GIT_IDENTITY switch for agent commit identity (#8024)
🤖 This adds an operator switch for whose identity an agent's commits carry, and removes the reason agents were clearing their git identity env vars. Replaces #6177. Since #7819, every agent authors and signs commits as its nostr identity through `GIT_CONFIG_*` env vars, which beat repo and global config in every shell the agent runs. Operators had no way to opt out of that. **`BUZZ_GIT_IDENTITY=agent|user`.** It's read once in `GitEnvironment::install`. Unset or `agent` keeps today's behavior. `user` keeps only relay git auth (the credential helper and keyfile) and installs no identity, no `git-sign-nostr` and no signing config, so git uses the operator's own config. It also drops inherited `GIT_CONFIG_*` entries for the agent identity and signing keys, `author.*`/`committer.*`, and `include.path`/`includeIf.*.path`, so a nested agent in `user` mode can't pick up its parent agent's identity. Any other value fails startup with an error naming the variable and both allowed values. The resolved mode is forwarded in the managed env to MCP servers, which `buzz-agent` starts with a cleared env, so a nested `buzz-acp` launched from an MCP shell keeps the operator's choice instead of falling back to `agent`. **Known limitation:** in `user` mode, an operator whose own git config signs with `git-sign-nostr` has commits refused with a key-mismatch error, because the agent shell's `BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY` (needed by the `buzz` CLI) loads ahead of `nostr.keyfile` and NIP-GS requires the signer to exit when the loaded key doesn't match `-u`. Nothing is signed with the wrong key. SSH and GPG signing are unaffected. **Desktop reserves `GIT_CONFIG*`.** User env overrides are layered onto the spawn command after the relay credential helper, so a single `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=0` used to silently drop it. `GIT_CONFIG` and every `GIT_CONFIG_*` name are now reserved keys. **`session_new_forwards_complete_git_block_without_duplicate_names` no longer reads the runner's env.** Run inside an agent session, it picked up the session's own inherited `GIT_CONFIG_*` and failed. Agents worked around that by unsetting `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT`, and any commit made in that shell fell back to the human's git identity and signing key. The test now hides the runner's `GIT_CONFIG*` and `BUZZ_GIT_IDENTITY` under `ENV_LOCK` and restores them afterwards. **Agent instructions.** `base_prompt.md` and the nest `AGENTS.md` now say the runtime sets the agent's commit identity and signing, and that agents shouldn't override them with `user.*` config, `-c user.*`, `--author` or another signing key. Trailers are added only when the repository or the person the agent works for requires them. If a repository requires a different author, the agent tells the operator, who can switch to `BUZZ_GIT_IDENTITY=user`, instead of overriding the identity. The nest `AGENTS.md` scopes this to agents Buzz runs through its stock `buzz-acp` harness, and notes that custom harnesses get only relay git auth and control their own attribution. `NEST_AGENTS_VERSION` goes from 5 to 6. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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15772c54f3 |
fix(relay): deny channel writes when the channel lookup fails (#8007)
The ingest channel lookup and `check_channel_write` (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs`) both turned every lookup error into "no row" with `.ok()`. The archive check only runs when a row exists, and a membership check could still allow the write. So a database error let posts into archived channels. A new helper, `load_channel_for_write`, treats only `DbError::ChannelNotFound` as "no row". Every other lookup error denies the write as an internal error (`IngestError::Internal`), so no caller reports it as a client rejection or shows the database error text to the client. `check_channel_write` returns `IngestError`, which means the artifact-move source check maps a lookup failure to an internal error, while token, membership and archive denials stay `Rejected`. Only these two archive-gate lookups use it. The other direct channel reads on the write path (huddle validation, the membership and edit open-visibility fallbacks, and command/admin validators) already deny on error and are unchanged. Behavior: - A channel that doesn't exist yet is still "no row", so channel create is unchanged. - Unarchive keeps its exemption from the archive check, but a database error during unarchive is now denied. - No other exceptions were added. Tests: - `check_channel_write_denies_when_channel_lookup_fails` uses an unreachable database and a cached channel membership, the case where the old code allowed the write. - `cluster_global_ingest_denies_post_when_channel_lookup_fails` sends a kind-9 post through `ingest_event_inner`, from a cached member, to an archived channel. Its database role can do everything ingest needs except read `channels`. The post is denied with the channel-lookup error and nothing is stored. A control run with a working lookup is denied as archived, which proves the post reaches the archive gate. - `cluster_global_artifact_move_source_lookup_failure_is_internal` moves an artifact when only the source-channel lookup fails, and requires an internal error, not a rejection. - All three are marked `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` and run in the PostgreSQL CI job. - Each test fails when only its own caller goes back to `.ok()`, and passes with the fix. Hook note: this branch was pushed with `LEFTHOOK=0`, so the pre-push hook did not run on it. Pre-push runs on this machine were failing under heavy load, in crates this diff doesn't touch: the `buzz-acp` timing tests `idle_resets_on_stdout_activity` and `keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, `rust-tests` and `desktop-tauri-test` (`buzz-desktop`). CI is the gate for the full suite. 🤖 Implemented by Duncan (agent). --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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16839a0773 |
feat(nip-fi): admin disconnect/deny API with in-memory deny-until-TTL map (S4) (#7977)
This adds the NIP-FI S4 admin command surface. An authorized issuer principal can deny an `(issuer, pubkey)` pair until a TTL expires. When that happens, the relay records the entry in a bounded in-memory deny map, closes matching live sockets on every pod, and refuses new admissions while the entry is live. Supersedes #7265 ## Breaking In `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce`, every entry in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS` now has to carry `maximum_command_age_seconds` (1–60) and a non-empty `authorized_principals` list, and startup fails if any issuer is missing either one. That means an S3-only enforce config that boots on `main` won't boot with this change. No deployment sets `BUZZ_NIP_FI_*` yet. The per-issuer field table and a working example are in the `nip_fi_config.rs` module docs. ## What changes - **`buzz-auth`**: - `nip_fi/command.rs` verifies signed admin commands. It checks issuer policy, command age, the authorized principal (exact, case-sensitive `sub` match), and a `jti` of at most 512 bytes. - `nip_fi/deny_map.rs` is a per-issuer, capacity-bounded deny-until-TTL map on top of `DashMap`. Expired entries and `jti` reservations are only swept when a write would otherwise hit capacity. The sweep is O(n) and holds the lock every admission check takes, so this keeps it off the admission path. Reads compare against `now`, so an expired entry that hasn't been swept yet never counts as live. - **Cross-pod command replay fence**: `nip_fi/command_replay.rs` adds a `CommandReplayGuard` trait, and `buzz-pubsub` implements it in Redis (`RedisCommandReplayGuard`), following the NIP-98 replay guard. Once a command is authenticated, the verifier takes an atomic `SET buzz:nip-fi:command:{sha256(len(iss)‖iss‖len(jti)‖jti)} 1 NX EX <ttl>` claim, with the TTL set to the command's remaining validity rounded up to whole seconds plus skew, clamped like NIP-98, so the claim outlives acceptance by a verifier whose clock trails by the full skew. Before the claim, the verifier reserves a pending `jti` and deny-entry slot in this pod's deny map under the issuer lock, so a full deny set returns `503 deny set full` without touching Redis and the same signed command can be retried. The claim is taken only after the signature and claims verify, so a forged token cannot burn a real `jti`. A `jti` already claimed on any pod returns `403`. A Redis error fails closed with `503 authorization unavailable`: no deny entry, no session close, no publish. A replayed claim, a Redis error, or a cancelled request drops the reservation. After a successful claim the reservation commits to the `jti` record and deny entry, which cannot fail on capacity. A claim can still remain with no deny entry if Redis applied `SET` but the reply was lost, or the pod stops between claim and commit; that fails closed, and a retry gets `403` until the TTL expires. - **`api/nip_fi.rs`**: the admin disconnect/deny endpoint. It verifies the command, inserts the deny entry, disconnects locally, and publishes over `buzz-pubsub` `conn_control` so every other pod runs the same disconnect. A receiving pod clamps `until` to its own ceiling instead of rejecting it. Otherwise a pod whose clock trails the origin would drop a command the origin already answered with 200, and the target's sockets on that pod would stay open. Malformed pubkeys, unknown issuers, and unrepresentable timestamps are still rejected. - **Admission and live enforcement**: - WS upgrade (`router.rs`) and HTTP (`nip_fi_http.rs`) refuse keys that have a live entry with `403 authorization_denied`. - Root NIP-42 auth and audio auth register the proven identity (pubkey + admitting issuer) first, and only then check the deny map. With that order, a concurrent disconnect either finds the socket in its close scan or the check finds the entry. `OK(true)` isn't sent if a concurrent disconnect already cancelled the session. - `ConnectionManager::disconnect_nip_fi` and `CommunityConnectionRegistry::disconnect_nip_fi` are scoped to the issuer. - **One wire form for `authorization_denied`** (FI-TRACE-DENIAL-ORACLE): every root and audio WebSocket `authorization_denied` denial now goes through one first-writer-wins transition on `CommunityConnectionControl`. That covers the S4 deny-set hit and admin disconnect, and also the existing S3 key-mismatch, lease-expiry, and membership refusals. The transition sets the `AuthorizationDenied` reason only if nothing else has set a reason, and only the winner enqueues the denial frame. So every one of these denials is the class's denial frame followed by `Close(1008, "authorization denied")`, and a concurrent registry scan can't queue a second one. Before this, S3 key mismatch and expiry closed with `Close(None)`, which made them distinguishable from a deny-set hit on the wire. `evidence_rejected` and `authorization_unavailable` keep the bare close. - **Config**: see Breaking. `deny_set_capacity` is optional and defaults to 50000. Setting any command field without a command age fails closed. - **Boot** (`main.rs`): installs the command verifier and deny map. It subscribes to cross-pod disconnects before the Redis subscriber starts, so disconnects relayed during boot are buffered instead of dropped. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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04b040ef6c |
test(desktop): pin mention undo and status expiry smoke behavior (#7592)
🤖 ## Summary Make two desktop smoke tests reliably check existing behavior: manually mentioning an agent after turning off automatic mentions, and editing a status while the saved status expires. This changes only tests, not production UI behavior, helpers, or configuration. - **Manual mention recovery:** the old test expected a manual mention to restore the agent's automatic-mention badge. The test now checks that the badge disappears after undo and stays absent when the user manually mentions the agent, while the sent message goes to exactly that agent. Choosing **Automatically mention** explicitly restores the badge and keeps the agent's mention in the composer after sending. - **Status expiry while editing:** the old test gave the saved status two seconds to expire, racing the dialog setup. The test now controls the page clock, seeds a five-minute status, and establishes an open dialog with unsaved edits before advancing past expiry. The existing checks still require the saved status to disappear from the sidebar without losing the draft, show a future-duration warning, disable Save, and allow recovery by choosing **This week**. The two-file repair is unchanged from its previous version. This branch includes current main, including the MinIO startup fix in https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7599; that infrastructure change is not part of this PR's test-only diff. ### Related issue none found ### Testing Both specs exercise the UI through the existing test fixtures. Fresh normal CI for `ae6ff228f86f42d5203050c99bcb99cdce3a4626` is pending; historical test results and review of the earlier version do not validate this combined tree. Local dependency installation was blocked by network policy in the authoring environment, so no new local pass is claimed. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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83aab8cb5c |
feat(desktop): remove communities locally and stop their agent pairs (#7997)
🤖 Leave contacts the relay before it removes anything locally: it checks the relay's `/info` for NIP-43 membership support, then waits for the relay to accept a signed leave request. When a relay has been torn down, that check fails, Leave throws, and the community stays in the rail. Removing a community also left its relay's managed agent pairs running, and they kept reconnecting to it until the app was quit. **Remove from this device** - A new community action, **Remove from this device**, sits under **Leave community** in the profile menu's community actions. It never contacts the relay. A confirm dialog explains that relay membership isn't revoked. - `useCommunityNavigationTransitions` splits the old `removeCommunity` into `removeCommunityFromDevice` (local-only cleanup and navigation to a fallback community or the discovery screen) and `leaveAndRemoveCommunity` (calls `leaveCommunity`, then runs the same cleanup). Leave's flow hasn't changed. - When Leave fails, the error now adds: "If the community no longer exists, use Remove from this device." The error shown when community discovery state can't be saved no longer says "Membership was removed", so its wording fits both actions. **Agent pairs on a removed relay** - Once the local removal completes, the shared cleanup stops every live agent pair on that relay, including manually started ones. It matches relays with `canonicalRelayUrl`. Stopping is best-effort: failures are logged and the removal still completes. Pairs on other relays aren't touched, and nothing is stopped if another community still uses the same relay. - Both reconcile call sites (`useManagedAgentRuntimeReconciliation` and `bootstrapManagedAgentRuntimePairs`) now go through `reconcileConfiguredManagedAgentRuntimes`. A reconcile that is already running in Rust can't be cancelled, so after it resolves, this helper stops any pair it started whose relay is no longer in the saved community list. - Launch restore runs in the background after `apply_workspace` and can finish after its community is removed. `apply_workspace` takes a restore ticket (the current `launch_restore_generation` in `AppState`) before handing its lock to the restore task. Removing the active community calls the new `invalidate_launch_restore` command, which bumps that generation while holding the runtime transition lock. `restore_managed_agents_on_launch` re-checks its ticket under the same lock and spawns nothing if it changed. If restore takes the lock first, its pairs are registered before invalidation returns, and the removal stop then finds them. Removal never changes `relay_url_override`: the outgoing relay stays applied until the next `apply_workspace`, exactly as on `main`, so in-flight work never falls back to the default relay. Invalidation never takes `workspace_apply_lock`, which restore holds while waiting on the transition lock, so lock order is unchanged. - With no relay applied, backend readers fall back to the default relay, the same state as launch before the first `apply_workspace`. A normal quit and relaunch doesn't bring a pair back on a removed relay: restore targets the applied workspace, and the legacy per-record relay pin is ignored. **Tests** - A `community-rail` e2e case makes the mocked relay's membership check fail, the way an unreachable relay does. It checks that Leave shows the error and keeps the community, and that Remove from this device then removes it, switches to the fallback, stops the agent pair on the removed relay, and leaves the pair on the other relay running. - Unit tests in `managedAgentRelayCleanup.test.mjs` cover relay matching, a stop or listing failure not throwing, and the reconcile fence stopping a pair that started on a relay removed mid-flight. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tom Brow
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fad4ff637a |
fix(mobile): hide notification settings without relay push capability (#8025)
Hide the iOS Notifications settings section for communities that have not enabled push unless their relay advertises valid push support. A build with a configured gateway previously showed the switch even when the relay could not support push. Communities where push is already enabled retain an off switch and iOS Settings recovery during discovery or when push support is unavailable. The section explains that support is unavailable instead of claiming notifications will arrive. Capability discovery keeps its existing refresh behavior. Returning after at least five seconds in the background reconnects the session and fetches capability again. Tom explicitly chose this behavior without new retries, polling, or refresh triggers. Companion client change for squareup/buzz-releases#104. Related: #7826 (broader notification availability diagnostics). ### Validation Settings widget tests cover hidden first-time opt-in during loading, absent capability, and discovery errors. Recovery tests exercise the real off switch for already-enabled communities in all three states, verifying persisted opt-out, the native snapshot writer, a durable pending relay tombstone after failure, and the iOS Settings link. They also verify that pending recovery stays visible after a relay failure and disappears only after opt-out confirmation. Tests without a gateway definition verify hidden first-time settings and disabled native registration. Mobile analysis and the mobile test suite passed. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>mobile-v0.19.0-rc.2 |
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Logan Johnson
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2cca0ec157 |
test(mobile): cover presence ordering against delayed live events (#7526)
🤖 ## Summary This PR adds tests only. It locks in how the mobile app shows a member as Online or Offline when a live presence update arrives late. The app learns presence two ways: a periodic snapshot from the relay (the server), and live updates sent by each member's device. These use different clocks. A live update can reach the phone after a newer snapshot already counted it. Without a guard, that late update could flip a member to the wrong state until the next 60-second refresh. The guard itself already shipped in #7382 (see `presence_cache_provider.dart` on `main`). This PR adds the tests that prove it keeps working: - A late `offline` update, signed before the snapshot, does not show the member as Offline. The app asks the relay for one fresh snapshot instead. - A real change from a device whose clock runs behind the relay is not dropped. The fresh snapshot confirms it, and the member shows as Offline. - An update signed in the same second as the snapshot is not trusted directly in either direction (Online→Offline or Offline→Online). The app confirms it with a fresh snapshot. - If the same late update is delivered twice, the app asks for only one confirmation. No production code changes. No UI changes. ### Related issue Follow-up to #7382 (snapshot/live ordering, review item 2). It is the last PR in the #7382 → #7383 → #7526 stack; both parents have merged. None found beyond this stack. ### Testing The new file `mobile/test/features/profile/presence_ordering_test.dart` drives the real presence cache through a fake relay session and fake time. On this head, rebased on current `main`: `dart format` clean, `flutter analyze` clean, and the profile test suite passes (139 tests). Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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d56ed75424 |
fix(acp): add edit field to native-steer fallback test event (#8022)
🤖 ## Summary The Rust test build on `main` is broken. Two PRs each passed on their own, but together they do not compile: #4741 added a required `edit` field to queued relay events, and #7568 (merged later) added a test that builds a queued event without that field. Every Rust CI job (Unit Tests, Rust Lint, Windows Rust) now fails on `main` and on any PR that rebases onto it. This adds `edit: None` to that one test event. `None` means "not an edit of an earlier message", which is what the test intends. No production code changes. ### Related issue Breakage introduced by #7568 on top of #4741. Searched open PRs for an existing fix: none found. ### Testing - `cargo clippy -p buzz-acp --all-targets -- -D warnings` passes; `cargo fmt --check` passes. - CI on this PR is the authoritative test run. Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Matthew Boston
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036215636f |
Allow following channel messages before their first reply (#7692)
## Summary Channel messages only offered Follow thread after receiving a reply. Add Follow/Unfollow to delivered messages immediately, so users can opt into future replies. Keep the same follow state when broadcast replies gain replies of their own. Threads you authored, participated in, or explicitly followed offer Unfollow. A mention alone leaves Follow available. These controls apply to channel timelines; DM notification behavior remains unchanged. ### Related issue None found in existing issues or PRs. ### Testing - Browser regressions cover keyboard follow/unfollow, persistence after reload, first-reply unread and notification delivery, suppression after unfollow, pending-message exclusion, broadcast reply transitions after revealing buffered arrivals, and immediate unfollow for your own messages. - Additional regressions cover following after a mention and the absence of Follow/Unfollow controls in DM timelines. - Desktop unit tests, typecheck, lint, and production build pass. - Browser notification routing is covered; native OS banner appearance was not tested. ### Screenshots | Before | After | |--------|--------| | <img width="979" height="301" alt="before" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1a739187-5bc3-4e23-a334-723ca69672f5" /> | <img width="979" height="337" alt="after" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/57df4ff9-bac4-4b9d-a39f-5664e0f9ece0" /> | --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Boston <mboston@squareup.com> |
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klopez4212
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0ee2ad7fbf |
Fix rounded macOS icon on older Macs (#8018)
Older macOS versions display Buzz’s opaque icon as an oversized square. Bake rounded corners and transparent padding into the macOS `.icns`, preserving the original bee artwork and leaving other platforms unchanged. Generation uses Hermit-pinned uv, Python 3.14.3, and Pillow 12.2.0. `scripts/macos-icon.sh --check` regenerates temporarily and compares all decoded representations; macOS CI runs it before packaging. Pixel reproducibility is verified independently of Apple’s ICNS container encoding. Validated native AppKit preview, all 10 representations, fresh-cache generation, one-pixel/missing-representation drift rejection, workflow lint, and pre-push checks. Full local `just ci` is running. Packaged Dock checks on older/current macOS remain outstanding. --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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514a9a86d3 |
fix(acp): interrupted frame writes close the sole writer; fixed native-steer refusal reasons (#7568)
🤖 ## Summary - **A partly written message can no longer corrupt the stream between Buzz and an agent.** Buzz runs each coding agent as a child process and sends it one JSON message per line over the agent's stdin pipe. Previously, if such a write was cut off mid-line — a concurrent control operation won the race, its deadline expired, the task was aborted, or the pipe failed partway — the partial line stayed in the pipe and the next message was written directly behind it, leaving a single corrupted line on the agent's input that no parser can read. Now the connection's single stdin writer is owned by the write itself: it is handed back only after the whole line, its newline, and a flush have all completed. An abandoned or failed write closes the pipe instead, so nothing can ever append to a partial line — later operations get a clean broken-pipe transport error, which the existing retry and retirement policy already handles. - Intentionally unchanged: cancelling a prompt whose message was fully written works exactly as before, and an ordinary application-level error reply from the agent (for example, a JSON-RPC "bad input" error) does not close the transport — the next prompt reuses the same connection. - **Refused mid-run steers now log why, in fixed words.** While an agent task is running, Buzz can try to steer it — hand additional instructions to the running task — and falls back to the existing cancel-and-merge behavior when that is not possible. When a steer is refused before anything is written to the agent, the log now records one fixed reason instead of an opaque dump of the whole error: `task_absent` (no running task owns the scope), `sender_absent` (the task has no steer channel installed), `mailbox_full` (the one-slot steer mailbox already holds a steer), or `mailbox_closed` (the task's steer receiver is gone). Before-write refusals are now distinguishable from failures after a steer was accepted, which keep carrying the underlying transport error. Behavior is unchanged — same fallback, request ownership, and return values; only the log field changes. ### Related issue N/A ### Testing - **19 new tests.** In `crates/buzz-acp/src/acp_frame_writer.rs` (8): interrupting the write at the body or the newline boundary, or hitting an I/O failure, must close the writer and make every later write fail; a completed write keeps the writer; a real OS-pipe test interrupts a 300 KB prompt mid-body and asserts that cleanup and later requests fail with no frame appended; another real-pipe test asserts a completed prompt still cancels normally; an application-error reply leaves the connection reusable. In `crates/buzz-acp/src/pool.rs` (7): each fixed refusal label is produced by `send_steer` for its real cause, an admitted steer reaches the read loop, the labels round-trip without drift, and post-admission failures never classify as admission refusals. In `crates/buzz-acp/src/lib.rs` (4): the real `try_native_steer` is driven through each refusal branch with a real pool, queue, and signed event, and the emitted fallback log is captured and pinned — the exact fixed reason, exact message and channel, no request or error content, and the unchanged fallback return; forcing the production reason to a wrong label or deleting it fails all four. A mutation check (removing the writer-ownership transfer) fails the frame tests. - **Full local `just ci` at `45e00ec82` — all lanes passed**, including the buzz-acp 947 unit + 9 integration tests, desktop and mobile suites, fmt, clippy, web, security, and build lanes. - **Previous head `5276ef375` added only a one-line test fix.** Windows Clippy flagged the `wait_for` test helper as dead code because its only callers are Unix-only tests; it now carries the matching `#[cfg(unix)]` guard. No production code or assertions changed. Re-verified locally at this head: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-acp --all-targets -- -D warnings`, and the 8 frame-writer tests pass. No full local rerun — the full matrix ran remotely at this head. - **Remote CI at `5276ef375` was green** — [run 34530106246](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/34530106246): 42 jobs passed, 20 conditionally skipped, 0 failed, including the Windows Rust lane (the guard's purpose) and the desktop core lane; Docker image, desktop release-candidate, and DCO checks pass. The automated security review over `00209076c…5276ef375` reported no findings. - **Current head `2224ec228` adds the fallback-log regression tests.** Rebased onto `main` at `44c1cc7df` and extended with a test-only commit: the four `lib.rs` tests above now pin the production fallback log. Verified locally at this head: full `cargo test -p buzz-acp` (952 unit + 9 integration, 0 failed), `cargo clippy -p buzz-acp --all-targets -- -D warnings`, and `cargo fmt --check`, all clean; the DCO check passed remotely. Fresh remote CI is running on this head. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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bd0896f5c0 |
fix(desktop): read channel metadata and member lists from writer after writes (#7999)
🤖 This fixes two problems with the same cause. Since #3268, the relay can answer an unpinned `/query` from the Aurora read replica, as long as the replica has proved it's within `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` (1000 ms) of the writer. That's fine for display reads, but it doesn't guarantee a client sees its own write. **Problem 1: channel creation (Wes's report).** Right after creating a channel, the desktop read back the channel's kind:39000 metadata by `#d`. If that read landed on a replica that hadn't replayed the event yet, it failed with `channel created but metadata not yet available`. The channel existed, but the chosen template (canvas, agents) was never applied. **Problem 2: member lists.** After any membership change, the member-list refetch could also hit a lagging replica. The relay returned the list from before the change, and the desktop cached it as fresh for five minutes (`CHANNEL_MEMBERS_STALE_TIME_MS`). Someone just removed could still show as a member, or someone just added could be missing. ## Fix 1: metadata read-backs go to the writer `channel_metadata_filter` is a shared builder that adds `"consistency": "strong"`, so the relay serves the read from the writer. It follows the same pattern as the canvas head reads. All four metadata read-backs that follow a write use it: `create_channel`, `update_channel`, `fetch_starter_channel_metadata` (its retry and fallback are unchanged) and the open-DM refetch in `dms.rs`. A unit test fails if the flag is removed from the builder. The template's agent-add step also reads channel members (kind:39002) right after create. `get_channel_members` takes an opt-in `read_your_writes` flag that sends `"consistency": "strong"`. Only `createChannelManagedAgents` sets it on that path, so the agent-add step sees the creator's membership. ## Fix 2: a 31-second writer-read window after membership changes Every membership write the desktop makes calls `noteChannelMembershipChange` for each channel it changed: - the native write wrappers `createChannel`, `openDm`, `joinChannel`, `leaveChannel`, `addChannelMembers`, `removeChannelMember` and `changeChannelMemberRole` - the Bestie conversation open - huddle agent add and remove, for both the huddle channel and its parent - `ensure_starter_channels` and `sync_agents_to_active_huddle`. Both return every channel they created, joined or changed in `changed_channel_ids`, including ones that landed before a later step failed. The original error text is rethrown unchanged. - live join, leave, removed and `admin_kick` system messages, and member-added and member-removed notifications - a report kick resolved from the Admin Console, once the relay confirms it succeeded and only when the report's channel is in the active community. The kick goes through the admin HTTP API, not a channel event. Ban, timeout and their lifts only change `community_bans`, not channel membership, so they need no record. For 31 seconds after a change, measured on `performance.now()`, `getChannelMembers` for that channel sends `readYourWrites`. Why 31 seconds: the relay caps its replica staleness budget at `FENCE_STALENESS` (30 s), so once the window closes, no supported configuration can serve the pre-change list. The constant's comment ties it to `FENCE_STALENESS`. One app-level listener cancels any roster fetch already in flight and refetches. When it registers, it also refreshes every channel whose window is still open. All other member-list reads still use the replica. **Community switch.** The window map is cleared when the community changes. Each awaited write captures a generation through `beginChannelMembershipWrite()` before its first native call, and the reset advances it. So a write that settles after a community switch records nothing in the new community. Live events don't need this fence, because the reset disconnects the relay client first and frames from the old connection are dropped. ## Coverage - A Rust test drives `ensure_starter_channels` against a stub relay that accepts the creates but never serves metadata, and checks that both created starter channels are still reported. - Desktop tests cover the writer-read window, the Admin Console kick, and writes that settle after a community switch. - The desktop E2E test bridge (`desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts`) mirrors the strong reads and `changed_channel_ids`, so E2E runs exercise the fixed behavior. This doesn't address the smaller race in the relay's per-pod accessible-channels cache, and it doesn't change mobile. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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klopez4212
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6b5bb6f5a3 |
feat(mobile): refresh onboarding and smooth QR scanner motion (#8019)
## Summary Refresh mobile onboarding with light/dark gradients, an animated fuzzy Buzz wordmark and tagline, and bottom-aligned glass/ghost actions. Remove the dot grid and idle scroll bounce, and smooth the QR scanner's continuous corners and spring transitions by deferring camera teardown until dismissal finishes. ### Related issue N/A — no matching mobile onboarding issue or PR found. ### Testing - Mobile formatting, analysis, and full test suite passed at `0bb357f7a`. - Regression coverage includes shader animation/reduced motion, keyboard reachability, scanner interruption, deferred camera disposal, and rendered error contrast in both themes (mutation-checked). - Signed iOS release build installed on iPhone Air; Kenneth tried the onboarding and scanner during iteration and approved the final blur. - Agent review completed with no correctness blockers. Android device validation was not performed; hosted checks run separately. buzz-review-completed ### Preview Production-widget renders at 420 × 912; before: `5fdb2e536`, after: `443858a96`. | Before | After — light | After — dark | |---|---|---| |  |  |  | --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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5fdb2e5365 |
fix(acp): preserve routing for edited messages (#4741)
🤖 ## Summary When someone edits a message to add an @mention, the app does not change the original message. It publishes a separate hidden "edit" event that points back at it. An agent that handles the edit must work on the **original message**: it reacts, replies, and posts any error notice on that message or in its thread. Before this PR, an agent treated the hidden edit as a new message. It replied in the wrong place, and with per-thread sessions it started a new, empty conversation. This is the first of three PRs. It sets where agents reply to edits. It does not yet make edits wake agents by default (#6131 does that). - The agent looks up the original message once, when it accepts the edit. Every later step uses that result: the session, reactions, typing indicator, reply target, and failure notices. - **Per-thread sessions** (the `thread` session policy, where each thread has its own agent conversation): the edit joins the original message's thread session. It does not start a new session. - The original is a reply in a thread: the edit joins that thread. - The original is a top-level message: the edit joins the thread that starts at the original. - **Channel sessions** (the default policy) and DMs: nothing changes. The whole channel shares one conversation. - Setup mode (the reply that asks the owner to finish configuring the agent) now accepts edits. It replies at the original message or its thread. If the original could not be fetched, the reply posts at the top of the channel. - Error notices for an edit (sign-in failure, hard timeout, retries used up) now appear in the original's thread, or as a reply to a top-level original. Before, they appeared at the top of the channel. If the original could not be fetched when the edit was accepted, the notice looks it up once more. If it is still unknown, the notice posts at the top of the channel. - If a newer request interrupts a turn that is working on an edit, the next turn treats the edit as earlier work that the new request replaces. The old edit does not run again. ## Details - The lookup has a 2-second limit. It runs only for edits that already matched a subscription rule (by default, edits that newly mention this agent). It must finish before the edit is queued, because the session is chosen at that point. - If the lookup fails, the agent still targets the edited message's ID, never the hidden edit event. Notices and setup replies never claim that message as a thread root, because the relay rejects a root that does not match the message's real thread. **Known gap:** if that message is a reply in a thread, the agent cannot learn the thread root. So under per-thread sessions it uses a separate session rooted at that reply, and it loses the thread's earlier context. Its reply still goes to the right message. Closing this gap needs a second lookup, which is left out on purpose. - The original is fetched with an explicit kind (stream message or its edit) and a channel filter, because the relay rejects lookups without a kind. - Each queued event carries its own route, so an edit shares a batch with other events like any message. Batch order is unchanged from `main`. ### Stack **1 of 3**, based on `main`. Next: #6131 (edits wake agents by default), then #6132 (edits join a turn that is already running). ### Related issue Part of #2540. The issue is fixed when #6131 merges. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-acp --all-targets` passes. One existing test, `session_new_forwards_complete_git_block_without_duplicate_names`, fails in a shell where the git setting `nostr.keyfile` is set. It passes when the setting is removed. This PR does not touch that test. - Session tests: an edit uses the original's thread for a threaded original, a top-level original, and an original that could not be fetched. It never uses the edit event. - Tests check the signed events that the agent publishes: setup-mode replies and failure notices, each for a threaded original, a top-level original, and an original that could not be fetched (including a notice whose second lookup finds the original). If either routing fix is reverted, these tests fail. - A queue-to-prompt test interrupts a turn on an edit with a newer request. The next prompt has the edit as earlier work and the new request with the "replaces earlier work" framing, and nothing is left to run again. --------- Signed-off-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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cf5e83829a |
fix(mobile): distinguish unknown presence on identity surfaces (#7383)
<!-- Draft PR body for #7383 · fix(mobile): distinguish unknown presence on identity surfaces · https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7383 --> 🤖 ## Summary When mobile didn't know someone's presence — right after opening the app, or when the relay simply had no data — DM headers, DM-list avatars and profiles showed that person as **Offline**, with the same gray dot as someone genuinely offline. This PR separates "we don't know" from "we know they're offline": unknown presence now reads **Unknown** with no dot or notch, while confirmed Online/Away/Offline look exactly as before. - Applies to the DM header, DM-list avatars, and the profile sheet. Avatar geometry is unchanged — the unconfirmed indicator is hidden, not reshaped. - Confirmed Online/Away/Offline presentation is untouched. - The profile exposes one presence accessibility label, with no duplicate screen-reader announcements. ### Related issue - Fixes: N/A. No separate issue; the related work is the stack below. - Depends on #7382 (declared base), which supplies the presence data — this PR is the visible half of that change. - Draft — not requesting merge yet; the security advisory doesn't run on this stacked base (it reviews main-based ranges). ### Testing - Widget regressions cover unknown/online/away/offline transitions, fixed avatar bounds, DM-list colors, and profile semantics. - At the branch head: `just mobile-check` and the full mobile test suite pass independently, and every broader CI gate has successful evidence after isolated recovery runs (no monolithic local `just ci` run) — receipts in the [exact-head evidence comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7383#issuecomment-5573113048). - Verification is widget-test level; no native device or simulator run is claimed. To see it: open a DM whose presence isn't confirmed yet (e.g. right after a cold open) — the header and profile now read Unknown instead of Offline. ### Screenshots Flutter production-widget test renders — not native-device screenshots or acceptance captures. | Scenario | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Profile sheet for a person whose presence isn't confirmed yet (e.g. right after a cold open) |  |  | Confirmed Online/Away/Offline presentations are unchanged by this PR. <details> <summary>Capture provenance</summary> Rendered by the Flutter widget engine in a `flutter test` run (production widgets, production theme; no device or simulator). Before: this PR's declared base `a8e8028bfb9bb67de2db03ed448839e2f3ab2b0d`. After: its head `dd955a0c2ac80ada39b416a2f8b7481afb8773bf`. </details> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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965fe1dffa |
fix(mobile): hydrate and refresh relay presence snapshots (#7382)
<!-- Draft PR body for #7382 · fix(mobile): hydrate and refresh relay presence snapshots · https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7382 --> 🤖 ## Summary Mobile showed every person in a DM as **Offline** until they happened to publish a presence update while the app was connected. Presence was never loaded when the app opened, never refreshed, and a missing or failed read looked identical to actually being offline. This PR makes presence load and stay current: on connect or foreground, the app fetches the relay's presence snapshot for everyone visible, keeps the live subscription open while it does, and re-checks every 60 seconds while the app is in the foreground. A missing or failed read shows **Unknown** (no dot), not Offline. - Snapshot reads are authenticated like the rest of the session and batched by exact key (at most 100 per batch), instead of relying on live events only. - The live subscription opens before the snapshot, so updates published during the read are not dropped. Per-key revisions fence stale **query completions**: a snapshot that finishes after newer live evidence for that key does not overwrite it. - Refreshing every 60 foreground seconds observes relay lease expiry and retry failures; missing or failed evidence simply stays absent — it is never reported as Offline. - Disconnects, backgrounding, and account/community changes reset the cache cleanly. The app's existing subscription/recovery machinery is reused rather than duplicated. Mirrors Desktop's presence hydration (`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/profile.rs::get_presence`, `desktop/src/features/presence/hooks.ts`). ### Presence contract: best effort between polls Presence is a best-effort estimate that the next foreground poll corrects. This PR does not give strict causal order between snapshots and live events: - Snapshots carry relay time. Live kind:20001 events carry the signer's time. These clocks are not comparable. - A live event at or below a snapshot's relay second is not applied directly. The client confirms it with a fresh snapshot. This works because the relay persists presence before fan-out. - An empty (all-Offline) snapshot carries no relay second. If the relay stored an Online event, then its fan-out was delayed past lease expiry and an empty snapshot, the delayed event can show Online/Away until the next 60-second poll. Base `main` has the same stale-delivery exposure with no correction at all. Strict ordering needs relay-issued ordering metadata on both paths, or a fresh confirmation for every live event. Both are protocol or latency tradeoffs and are out of scope here. ### Related issue - Fixes: N/A. Closest open duplicates: #4417 (larger presence bootstrap + UI patch), #5617. Related: #6200, #7295. - First slice of the mobile remote-agent parity port. This PR includes the Unknown rendering at all three consumers (DM header, channel tile, profile sheet). #7383 and #7526 stack on it and add test coverage only. ### Testing - Rebased on `main` `95b018c87` (2026-09-30). At stack tip `7c8a93081`: `just mobile-check` clean; full `just mobile-test` **2,593 passed**. Earlier receipts below apply to the pre-rebase head. - Regressions cover cold-open hydration, live/snapshot races, lease expiry, failed reads and retries, disconnect/background/scope changes, and >100-key batching. - At the branch head: `just mobile-check` and the full mobile test suite pass independently, and every broader CI gate has successful evidence after isolated recovery runs (no monolithic local `just ci` run) — receipts in the [exact-head evidence comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7382#issuecomment-5573112882). - Verification is automated-test level; no native device or simulator run is claimed. No layout change in this slice. ### Screenshots No layout change in this slice — the renders below show the same existing profile sheet, with the presence status now following hydrated relay data. Flutter production-widget test renders — not native-device screenshots or acceptance captures. | Scenario | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Existing profile opened cold, with a signed relay snapshot saying Online |  |  | <details> <summary>Capture provenance</summary> Rendered by the Flutter widget engine in a `flutter test` run (production widgets, production theme; no device or simulator). Before: this PR's declared base `3c7f288c60d67df78577b237e27c3dfc8831aaa1`. After: its head `a8e8028bfb9bb67de2db03ed448839e2f3ab2b0d`. </details> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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f001ebbb6e |
feat(desktop): add Admin Console Actions tab for direct staff actions (#7904)
Builds on #7883 (merged). Adds an **Actions** tab to the Admin Console so relay staff can ban, time out, or delete directly through the #7883 endpoints (`POST /members/{pubkey}/ban`, `POST /members/{pubkey}/timeout`, `POST /events/{id}/delete`), with no report required. ## Design - **Frozen intent.** Review freezes the whole request (origin, relay, signer, community, action, target, reason, duration, `requestId`). Confirm and Retry resend it unchanged, so a manual retry reuses the same `requestId` and stays idempotent on the relay. The intent is cleared only on a definitive non-409 4xx (`preserveRequestIdOnError`). A 409 or a 202 pending keeps it, except `409 request_id_conflict`, which is final for that id and drops the intent so no futile Retry is offered. A 202 pending renders as a neutral notice, not an error. - **Bound to signer and relay.** The intent carries `expectedPubkey` and `expectedRelay`. Native `admin_direct_action` refuses before sending any request if either is blank or no longer matches (`assert_expected_signer` / `assert_expected_relay_scope`). The tab is keyed on pubkey + origin, so an identity or relay switch remounts it and drops any frozen intent. - **Survives tab switches.** `ActionsTab` stays mounted while the panel is open and is only hidden on other tabs, with the same pubkey + origin key, so a pending, ambiguous or in-flight action (and its `requestId`) is still there on return. - **Nothing-sent refusals.** Every native refusal before the first request leaves (malformed host, changed relay or signer, bad target or duration, the key-backup guard on Reason, a missing HTTP client, the first request build, the signing-key lookup) returns `AdminMutationError` with `notSent: true`; the tab drops the intent and offers no Retry. The request build for the retry after a 401 stays ambiguous, because the first request already went out. The changed-relay refusal says "active relay changed since the action was confirmed; nothing was sent". - **Disabled auth.** With `canMutate=false`, Review, Confirm and every field are disabled. - **Community host.** The host is prefilled from the active relay URL by `communityHostFromRelayUrl` (URL host, lowercased, default port and trailing dot stripped, matching the relay's `normalize_host`) and shown read-only as "Community: <host>" with a Change link. It follows the active community until the operator edits it; with no relay URL the input shows directly. Review derives the host from the same `getRelayWsUrl()` value it freezes into `expectedRelay`, so the two can't disagree. The host is validated natively (`validate_community_host`) and sent only as the `communityHost` query, never in the body. The body is `{requestId, reason?, expirationSecs?}`, built by the pure `direct_action_request`; only a timeout takes a duration. - **Member picker.** Ban and timeout pick the member the way `AddMemberDialog` does: `useUserSearchQuery` name search, `parsePubkeyInput` for a pasted npub or hex in any case, and a selected chip. The target is always sent as lowercase hex. Name search is a profile search on the active relay, not a member list, so it runs only when the host is the connected community; for another host the field takes npub or hex only, and the hint stays visible even with a key selected. Editing the host to a different community clears the pick and the search query, so returning to the original host doesn't bring it back; pressing Change alone keeps it. Each named result shows a short npub so same-name profiles can be told apart, the selected chip opens the full key, and the confirm step shows "Name (npub1…abcd)" plus the full npub (`PubKey variant="full"`). A search result's name is frozen for display only; a pasted key uses `useUserProfileQuery` on the active community, otherwise the short npub. Result buttons follow the disabled state. Changing the member or host drops a frozen intent. Delete keeps its hex event id (native `Hex64` route type, shared with pubkeys). A query that starts with `nsec1` or `ncryptsec1` in any case is never searched; the picker shows "That's a secret key. Never paste it here." instead. - **Errors.** `target_is_staff` and `request_id_conflict` get dedicated copy; other codes fall back to the relay message (`adminErrorCode`). An empty 404/405 from a relay without these routes reads "This relay doesn't support direct actions yet."; an uncoded 404/405 with a body keeps its own text. Success shows a toast. - **Key-backup guard.** Every admin JSON mutation body (the three direct routes and the existing report-resolve routes) passes `egress_guard::assert_no_key_backup_bytes` in `helpers.rs` before signing. The egress inventory points at that guarded boundary. - **One signer snapshot.** `admin_direct_action` reads `signing_keys()` once, checks `expectedPubkey` against it, and signs the request and any 401 retry with that same `Keys`. - **Serialized Review.** Review and its inputs lock while the relay URL resolves; a late Review cannot replace a frozen or submitting intent. - **Reason audience.** Before confirmation the tab states that the reason is delivered to the affected user, and for channel deletes posted publicly in the room tombstone (same copy as the Reports tab). Confirmation shows the frozen reason. ## Fix → test → mutation | Fix | Test | Mutation that turns it red | |---|---|---| | Manual retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-retry` | mint a new id per attempt | | Intent preserved across retryable outcomes | `actions-retry`, `actions-errors` | always clear the frozen intent | | Confirmation tied to signer + relay | Rust `direct_action_refuses_a_changed_signer_or_relay` | skip the signer check | | Identity/origin change drops intent | `actions-identity` | drop the tab key | | Disabled auth keeps Submit off | `actions-disabled-auth` | remove the `canMutate` gate | | Key-backup bytes never leave (`ncryptsec1…` / `NCRYPTSEC1…`, zero requests; ordinary reason sends) | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request` | remove the guard call → panics (request sent) | | Checked signer is the signing key | Rust `direct_action_signs_only_with_the_validated_snapshot` (identity swapped after the signer snapshot is taken, before validation) | re-read `signing_keys()` for signing → signed with the swapped key | | Late Review cannot replace the intent | `actions-review-race` (Review, Review, Confirm ambiguous, Retry → one `requestId`) | drop the Review lock | | Pending is a neutral notice | `actions-pending-neutral` | store pending in the error state → `pending notice must render` | | `request_id_conflict` offers no Retry | `actions-request-id-conflict` | keep the intent on every 409 → `request_id_conflict`, `no Retry for a spent request id` | | Reason audience copy + frozen reason | `actions-audience` | drop the audience copy; drop the frozen reason | | Host prefilled read-only, Change reveals the input | `actions-host-prefill` | drop the prefill → `host must be prefilled from the active relay` | | Name result sent as hex and named on confirm | `actions-member-search` | — | | npub and uppercase hex sent as lowercase hex | `actions-member-keys` | drop the direct key result → `no direct result for npub1…` | | Another community turns name search off with a hint | `actions-foreign-host` | — | | A host change clears the pick, even after returning to the first host; hint stays with a key selected | `actions-host-change-drops-member` | hide the pick by host instead of clearing it → `returning to the first host must not restore the old pick` | | Same-name results differ by key; confirm shows the chosen full npub and sends that key | `actions-same-name` | drop the full npub from confirm → `confirm must show the full npub` | | Results can't be selected once auth is disabled | `actions-results-disabled` | — | | Secret key never reaches search, warning shown | `actions-secret-key` | remove the check → `a secret key reached search_users` | | Pending action survives a tab round-trip, Retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-tab-roundtrip-pending` | render the tab conditionally → `pending notice survives` | | Ambiguous failure survives a tab round-trip | `actions-tab-roundtrip-ambiguous` | render conditionally → fails | | In-flight failure on another tab shows on return | `actions-tab-roundtrip-inflight` | render conditionally → fails | | Pre-send refusal drops the intent, no Retry | `actions-not-sent`, Rust `direct_action_marks_a_pre_send_refusal_not_sent` | ignore `notSent` → `intent dropped; no Retry` | | Key-backup refusal is nothing-sent; Review editable again | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request`, `actions-backup-reason-not-sent` | drop `not_sent` on the guard → panics at the `notSent` assert; stub `notSent: false` → `no Retry after a pre-send refusal` | | Only an empty 404/405 reads as an old relay | `actions-old-relay` | drop the empty-body condition → `404 admin API error: Not Found` | --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
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53a12100b3 |
fix(deletion): require sole owner at admission (#7966)
Follow-up to #7830: reject owner-origin deletion admission for a legacy co-owned community before creating a request. Under the existing community-row lock, admission locks all current owner memberships in pubkey order and requires exactly one matching asserted owner. Existing-request idempotent replay remains unchanged; completion retains its independent post-lock revalidation. **New optional operator field: `community_id`** (`ab0cd713`, `766eb07f`). Owner-origin `POST /operator/communities/delete` now accepts an optional `community_id` that binds the request to the host's community: - **Fresh submission:** checked after sole-owner authority is proven, so a non-owner still gets `404 community_not_found`. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch` and writes no request row. - **Replay:** checked against the stored request, and only when the stored request is for the same host. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch`, and the stored request is unchanged. A known UUID sent with a different host goes through the existing convergence check and returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. - **Omitted:** behaves as before. `admit_owner_request` takes `expected_community_id: Option<Uuid>` rather than a second public entry point, and existing callers pass `None`. - `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` documents the ordering. Also folds in the non-blocking review nits from #7969 (wpfleger96, at `e21151f4`): - **`limit_reached` has a stable `code`.** Create (`provision_community`) and transfer-in now return `409` with `code: "limit_reached"`, matching the other coded lifecycle errors. The `error` message keeps its `limit_reached:` prefix, so clients that match on the message still work. The provision limit test now asserts the code, and a new PostgreSQL test covers a transfer to an owner at the limit (coded 409, no membership change). - **Docs: an ack-version mismatch is a 400, not a 409.** `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` and the `delete_community` handler doc now say a changed host or owner under a known UUID is `409 deletion_request_conflict`, and an unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - **Docs: active-cap overrides above the lifetime cap can't be reached.** The `max_communities_per_owner` doc and the quota section now say `MAX_LIFETIME_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` (20) counts live ownership, so `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` above 20 can't be reached. - **Legolas P2s:** - The UUID-conflict docs now list every 409 case, including a stored ack version that doesn't match and a UUID held by an operator-origin request. - The runbook now says a legacy co-owned community is rejected as `404 community_not_found` and should be converged with a transfer first. - The preparation drift test now pins `DeletionSafety` plus "sole-owner authority drifted". - **Guard wording:** the `delete_community` handler doc now says "sole current owner", matching the admission check. What got simpler: admission and automatic preparation now enforce the same sole-owner authority, so no accepted-but-unexecutable co-owned request needs a new recovery path. `deletion_api_error` is renamed to `coded_api_error`, since it now carries non-deletion codes too. There's one helper for coded operator errors instead of a second one. Rebased onto main after #7969 merged (`d7a35afa`). The sole-owner commit applied cleanly. Earlier focused Blox verification (at the pre-rebase head `161e9857`): the new admission regression was red before the change and green after it. Five temporary, restored mutants each failed its matching production-seam regression. At the current head `766eb07f`, the relay `api::operator::` suite passes 23/0 on Blox. Each new `community_id` guard, removed one at a time, fails its own regression test. CI owns the full suites. Remaining debt: the separate P2-A purge/completion membership/community lock-order cycle is unchanged. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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965e1997b5 |
fix(agents): stop built-in prompts from teaching sleep polling (#7992)
An @mention wakes an agent only once its running tool call returns, so agents that loop `sleep` + `buzz messages get` (or poll CI) delay every reply that arrives in the meantime. Buzz's own prompts taught that loop. - `crates/buzz-acp/src/base_prompt.md`: replace "No push notifications — poll with …" with a rule to never use a tool call (`sleep`, `--watch`) to wait on CI, teammates, or other external events; hand off and end the turn. `buzz messages get --since` stays as a one-shot catch-up. "keep working until you publish the verified result" now reads "the result, handoff, …" so agents stop reading it as wait-for-green-CI. - `desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/nest_skill.md`: the "Polling Pattern" sleep-and-repeat loop becomes a "Catching Up" one-shot `--since` read. 🤖 Opened by Duncan. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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020193f8e3 |
feat(relay): add direct staff ban/timeout/delete with staff guard (#7883)
Relay staff (the `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` config roster, the owner fallback, and DB operator/moderator rows) can now ban, time out, and delete without a report through the admin API. Staff never join the community transport: these are admin-host, NIP-98 signed routes that drive the existing report enforcement state machine. Community admission, bans, and right-click menus are unchanged from `main`. Stack: this PR → #7904 ## Routes | Route | Body | |---|---| | `POST /api/admin/v1/members/{pubkey}/ban?communityHost=` | `{requestId, reason?}` | | `POST /api/admin/v1/members/{pubkey}/timeout?communityHost=` | `{requestId, expirationSecs, reason?}` | | `POST /api/admin/v1/events/{eventId}/delete?communityHost=` | `{requestId, reason?}` | Responses: `200 {actionId, state: "succeeded", replayed}`, `202 {state: "pending"}` when the action is accepted but not yet converged (the recovery worker finishes it; the same `requestId` replays), `409 request_id_conflict`, `409 target_is_staff`, `404 event_not_in_community`, `400 invalid_community_host` / `unknown_community_host`, and `422 enforcement_failed`. `422` is now the single failed-enforcement code for both the report and direct paths (shared `enforcement_failed()` mapping). ## Design - **Migration 0055.** `relay_admin_actions.report_id` becomes nullable. A direct row has `report_id NULL`, and `report_community_id` stays the tenant. New columns: `enforcement_target_event_id` and `timeout_secs`. The `relay_admin_actions_direct_shape` CHECK spells out each direct action: timeout needs both `timeout_secs` and `timeout_until`, ban and delete need neither, and delete needs both the event id and the author. A partial unique index on `(report_community_id, request_id) WHERE report_id IS NULL` makes direct actions idempotent. `pgschema` drops multi-column CHECKs, so `scripts/reconcile-schema-after-pgschema.sql` re-adds `relay_admin_actions_direct_shape` on desired-state databases. - **Atomic acceptance.** `claim_direct_action` inserts the action row and its `moderation_actions` audit row (`ban` / `timeout` / `delete_message`, `relay_operator` / `relay_moderator`) in one transaction. `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` sends a concurrent same-key request to the comparison. Retries compare actor, action, reason, `timeout_secs`, and the client-named target: the event id for delete, the pubkey otherwise. The event author, channel, and `timeout_until` are derived at acceptance and never compared. - **Retry racing its own first attempt.** Handler order: stored-action lookup → validation → staff guard → accept. If validation fails (for example B's event lookup runs after A already deleted the event), the handler re-reads the stored action. It returns a replay or 409 rather than 404. - **Report-less enforcement.** `finalize_success(report_id: Option<Uuid>)` skips the report CAS and the `reporter_notice` for direct actions. Tombstone and affected-user notices are unchanged. `recover_one` drives a direct action from its persisted row. `deliver_reporter_notice` treats a missing `report_id` as a terminal error instead of panicking. - **Permanent bans clear old expiry.** The ban upsert shared by direct and report-backed bans sets `ban_expires_at = NULL`, matching the kind-9040 path, so a permanent ban over an active or lapsed timed ban is in effect with no deadline. Timeouts are untouched. - **Community purge removes admin-action rows.** `purge_postgres` deletes the community's `relay_admin_outbox` rows (joined through their action), then its `relay_admin_actions` rows by `report_community_id`, before `moderation_reports`. That order satisfies both FKs and covers report-backed and direct (`report_id NULL`) rows in one pass. The same keyed row sources (`RELAY_ADMIN_TABLES`) feed the deletion inventory, which now records row counts for both tables, and post-purge logical verification, which now fails if either table still has a row for the community. Before this, a community with any admin-resolved report could never finish deletion (23503 on `relay_admin_actions_report_community_id_report_id_fkey`, stuck at `bindings_removed`). The `_operator_global_tables` registry reasons for both tables (seeded in migration 0036) are updated in 0055 and `schema.sql` to say community deletion purges them explicitly. - **Staff bans disconnect clusterwide.** The shared enforcement driver (`drive_enforcement`, used by the report and direct paths, fresh and recovery) calls `disconnect_pubkey_clusterwide` for `ban` before finalizing, matching the kind-9040 ban. A crash before finalize leaves the action non-terminal, so recovery re-runs the disconnect (idempotent) even when the ban step marker is already set. Timeouts do not disconnect, matching in-community timeout. - **Staff guard (D2).** `lookup_admin_principal` returns `Result<Option<AdminPrincipal>>`, with the same precedence as `resolve_admin_principal` (now a wrapper). `Ok(None)` means not staff. A roster lookup error is a 500, so the guard fails closed. Ban and timeout (direct) and ban/timeout/kick (via `resolve_report`) refuse any effective-roster target with `409 target_is_staff`, including the actor. The report path refuses before claim, so the report stays `open`. Delete is not guarded on either path. The check runs only when an action is first accepted: a replay or crash recovery completes an accepted action even if its target became staff afterwards. - **`communityHost` grammar (D4).** `buzz_core::tenant::validate_community_host` accepts only DNS labels and an optional port, and rejects schemes, paths, queries, userinfo, IP brackets, and whitespace before tenant binding. ## Tests binding fixes (red under mutation → green) Postgres tests are in `api/admin/mod.rs` `postgres_tests`, run against a DB migrated through 0055. Every rejection test seeds an existing restriction and asserts, through the shared `assert_no_effects` helper, that restriction values and action/audit/outbox/restriction/event counts are unchanged. | Fix | Test | Mutation → red | |---|---|---| | Racing retry replays | `direct_delete_retry_racing_first_attempt_replays_not_404` (barrier-paused HTTP interleaving; same-intent → 200 replay, conflicting reason → 409; the retry is checked with `assert_no_effects` against a snapshot taken after the first attempt, with the event author's restriction seeded) | drop the post-failure re-read → `left: 404 right: 200`; conflicting retry updates a restriction on the re-read path → `raced retry` snapshot mismatch (`ban_reason: "mutated"` vs `"seeded ban"`) | | Per-action retry comparison | `direct_ban_replays_same_request_and_conflicts_on_changed_intent` | drop `reason` from the comparison → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("request_id_conflict"))` | | Lookup fails closed (helper-level, calls `refuse_staff_target` directly) | `staff_lookup_failure_fails_closed` | `.unwrap_or(None)` on lookup error → panics on `unwrap_err` (guard passed) | | Direct staff guard | `direct_ban_and_timeout_refuse_staff_targets` (config/self and DB staff over HTTP with seeded restrictions unchanged; owner fallback checked at helper level via `refuse_staff_target`) | remove `refuse_staff_target` → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("target_is_staff"))` | | Report-path guard incl. kick | `resolve_report_refuses_kick_and_ban_of_staff_target` | remove report-path guard → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("target_is_staff"))` | | Accept-time-only check | `recovery_completes_accepted_ban_after_target_became_staff` | re-check staff in `drive_direct_action` → `left: "pending" right: "succeeded"` | | Timeout CHECK | `migration_0055_rejects_half_filled_direct_timeout` (buzz-db, migrated schema) and `direct_timeout_shape_check_holds_on_desired_state_schema` (buzz-relay, `pgschema` + reconcile schema) | loosen timeout branch of the CHECK, or drop the reconcile block → half-filled insert accepted | | No reporter notice for direct | `direct_ban_replays_…` (outbox assertion) | enqueue `reporter_notice` unconditionally → assertion at the `reporter_notice` check fails | | Delete unguarded | `direct_delete_removes_staff_authored_event` | — (behavioral control) | | Unauthorized direct requests have no effect | `direct_routes_refuse_unauthorized_requests_without_effects` (nonstaff, community owner, disabled auth, wrong host, wrong URL, altered body; restrictions on the targeted member and on the delete target's author, plus action/audit/outbox rows, unchanged) | roster bypass / drop mutation-principal check / admit owner / skip host check → `200 vs 403`; drop URL binding / payload hash → `200 vs 401` | | Foreign-community delete | `direct_delete_of_foreign_community_event_has_no_effect` | unscoped event lookup → `(200, None) vs (404, "event_not_in_community")` | | Banned staff actor still acts | `community_banned_staff_actor_still_acts_under_membership_enforcement` (membership enforcement on) | gate the actor on community bans → `403 vs 200` | | Timeout idempotency | `direct_timeout_keeps_expiry_on_retry_and_conflicts_on_changed_intent` | compare derived `timeout_until` → `409 vs 200`; compare action only → code `None vs Some("request_id_conflict")` | | Competing claims | `competing_direct_claims_accept_once` (identical → existing, conflicting → conflict; one action + one audit row each) | join skips compare → `[claimed, existing] vs [claimed, conflict]`; join always conflicts → the reverse | | Aborted acceptance rolls back | `aborted_direct_acceptance_rolls_back` | accept outside the transaction → effects `(1,0,0,0,0) vs (0,0,0,0,0)` | | Recovery exactly once | `recovery_after_committed_mutation_finalizes_exactly_once` (one recovery, `succeeded`, one `affected_user_notice`; each `recover_one` bounded by a 30s timeout) | ignore the enforcement step marker → `recovery did not converge: Elapsed(())` after 30s | | Permanent ban over a timed ban | `direct_ban_clears_prior_ban_expiry` (active and expired prior ban; asserts `ban_expires_at` NULL, admission `moderation_restriction_state` banned, timeout unchanged) | drop `ban_expires_at = NULL` → active: `left: Some(+1 day) right: None`; expired: `left: Some(-1 day) right: None` | | Rejections never rewrite restrictions | `direct_ban_and_timeout_refuse_staff_targets`, `resolve_report_refuses_kick_and_ban_of_staff_target` (value snapshot via `assert_no_effects`) | staff guard updates the target's existing restriction before returning 409 → counts equal but `ban_reason: "mutated"` vs `"seeded ban"` | | Purge with admin-action rows | `purge_postgres_succeeds_with_relay_admin_action_rows` (buzz-db; report-backed and direct rows with outbox rows; inventory counts both tables; deleted community left with none, second community untouched; a straggler direct row fails logical verification) | remove the new purge deletes → `23503 … violates foreign key constraint "relay_admin_actions_report_community_id_report_id_fkey"`; drop the relay admin tables from verification → `straggler relay admin action must fail verification` | | Ban disconnects, timeout doesn't | `direct_ban_disconnects_target_and_timeout_does_not` | remove the disconnect call (run alone) → `ban must close the target's socket` | | Recovery still disconnects | `recovery_past_ban_step_still_disconnects_target` | remove the disconnect call → `recovery must disconnect the banned target` | | Purge result keyed by table | `checkpointed_resume_is_idempotent_and_tombstone_blocks_name_reuse` compares returned keys to the scoped tables plus the two relay admin tables | — (existing regression, updated) | | Failed replay | `direct_replay_of_failed_action_returns_422_without_effects` | — (coverage) | | Pending under contention | `direct_action_under_contention_returns_202_pending` | — (coverage) | | Timeout/delete recovery | `recovery_completes_accepted_direct_timeout_and_delete` (test-only `claim_stranded` acquires just the requested action through `acquire_action_lease`, then runs `recover_one`, so tests don't claim each other's rows) | — (coverage) | ## Rollout note Before rolling the relay back to a binary without this PR, drain non-terminal direct rows (`report_id IS NULL AND state IN ('pending','enforcing')`). An older binary cannot decode `report_id NULL`, and recovery batches containing such rows stall. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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0ee6093790 |
fix(ci): gate security review on repo write access (#7986)
🤖 The Codex Security Review gate trusted GitHub's `author_association` (`MEMBER`/`OWNER`), but GitHub only reports `MEMBER` to viewers who can see the membership. The workflow `GITHUB_TOKEN` cannot see private `block` org membership, which is GitHub's default, so most Block employees read as `CONTRIBUTOR` and their PRs never reviewed automatically. The same applied to the comment path, where private members could not authorize a review with `@buzz-security-review <sha>`. Trust is now repo write access, read from `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/collaborators/{user}/permission` via `getCollaboratorPermissionLevel`, which is independent of membership visibility and works with the authorize job's existing `contents: read` and `pull-requests: read` permissions. A user is trusted only when `permission` is `write` (which includes `maintain`) or `admin`. A successful lookup is not enough: on this public repository, an account with no relationship to it returns `200` with `read`, not 404. Outside contributors can only push to forks and come back `read`, so they still need an explicit command from a trusted user. The check covers the PR author on `pull_request_target`, the commenter on `issue_comment` (the job-level `author_association` filter is removed so the trusted script makes that decision), and the stale-marking path on PR updates. Transient API errors are retried. Authorization fails closed: any lookup error other than 404 fails the job instead of authorizing. Stale-marking is conservative: an existing review is always marked stale without consulting permissions, and a failed lookup counts as untrusted, so a previous range's review can never appear current for a new head. A commenter without write access is logged and ignored instead of failing the run. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Alex Rosenzweig
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95b018c871 |
feat(acp): wrap workers at the subprocess launch boundary (#7985)
## Summary Replacing `BUZZ_ACP_AGENT_COMMAND` with a sandbox launcher hides the real adapter from Buzz: for example, Goose loses its default `acp` argument. Add optional `BUZZ_ACP_LAUNCH_PREFIX`, a JSON argument array applied at the shared subprocess boundary, after normal worker configuration. On Unix, every spawn runs `prefix... worker args...` without shell interpolation. Worker identity, environment setup, stdio and existing process cleanup are preserved. Invalid or unavailable prefixes fail launch without falling back to the worker; unset keeps direct launch on every platform. Configured prefixes fail closed on non-Unix because per-worker process-tree cleanup is unavailable. Desktop reserves the key against saved user-environment overrides, and spawn failures name the executable. ### Related issue Prerequisite for [Buzz-App #415](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/415). One commit directly on `main`, independent of #7942–#7944. No duplicate launch-prefix PR found. Policy enforcement, verified launcher staging, protected paths and the supporting runtime pin remain Buzz-App/plugin work. ### Testing - Original head `9ae9d82f8`: complete ACP suite (990 passed, three existing ignored), shipped local-task test, real-Goose probe, and full repository-wide `just ci` passed. - Review fixes: five launch tests and 44 Desktop environment-filter tests pass locally, covering the real production platform gate, save rejection, both merge layers, case variants, and executable error context. - Subprocess tests cover direct/wrapped argument defaults, Pi skills, Hermes/Codex environment, adapter identity, repeated spawns and invalid/missing prefix refusal. - Shipped `buzz-acp run` entrypoint completes a task through the wrapper and deterministic ACP peer. - Real Goose 1.52.0: direct and wrapped `auth-methods` return identical results; the wrapper receives `goose acp` with initially empty worker args. - Independent agent review: no blocking findings. - Required push checks passed on the updated head. The existing native Windows CI job now explicitly runs the platform-contract tests. Its result is pending; the non-Unix refusal branch was not exercised on this macOS host. Repeated-spawn coverage is not a full lazy-pool wake/crash test. Protected Goose in the Buzz-App UI and human acceptance remain pending. To try the hook after building `buzz-acp`, use an installed Goose path: ```sh BUZZ_ACP_LAUNCH_PREFIX='["/usr/bin/env"]' target/debug/buzz-acp auth-methods \ --agent-command /absolute/path/to/goose --agent-args '' --json ``` Expect the same authentication methods as without the prefix. Changing the prefix to `["/missing-launcher"]` must fail. Draft pending human testing. Signed-off-by: Alex Rosenzweig <arosenzweig@squareup.com> |
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|
Luke Tornquist
|
d7a35afa98 |
feat(buzz-relay): idempotent owner community deletion with quota reservation (#7969)
## Summary This is the relay side of owner community deletion. - **Idempotent delete is the recovery call.** - `POST /operator/communities/delete` checks the request UUID first. - If the request already exists with the same host, owner and acknowledgement version, it returns `202` with the request's current `status`. That holds at any stage, even after membership is purged, and no new work is admitted. - The same UUID with a different host or owner returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. An unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first, with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - There's **no receipt endpoint**. Clients recover by resending. - **Active quota reservation.** An incomplete owner deletion holds the owner's slot until the deletion logically completes. Migration `0054` adds the supporting index. Migrations 0052 and 0053 are unchanged. - **Lifetime cap.** Deleted communities keep their hosts as permanent tombstones. - On create and on transfer-in, the relay counts live ownership plus every non-aborted owner deletion, completed ones included. - That total is capped at an absolute 20, regardless of the active limit, and going over returns `limit_reached`. - This stops create-then-delete host squatting. - **Stable lifecycle conflict codes,** plus `acknowledgement_version` in the 202. - **Owner-list quota projection:** `quota_used`, `quota_limit` and `can_create`. - `can_create` reflects both caps. - The projection is advisory, and `limit_reached` is authoritative. - **Operator doc** (`docs/operator-community-deletion.md`): the acknowledgement version is a compile-time constant. Admission and the executor's claim/lease both filter on it. A version bump must keep replaying and executing old-version requests. This follows on from #7830. The foundation PRs #7818, #7827 and #7830 are merged. ## Testing New tests: - `owner_delete_resubmission_reports_current_status_without_new_intent` - A replay returns 202 `submitted`, including after membership purge. - Changing any field returns 409 `deletion_request_conflict`. - A non-operator gets 403. - A replay after abort returns 202 `aborted`. - No request rows are added. - `completed_owner_deletions_count_toward_lifetime_cap` - After 20 created-then-deleted communities, the active count is 0 but `can_create` is false. - The next create and a transfer-in both return `LimitReached`. - `owner_quota_admits_only_under_active_and_lifetime_caps`: a unit test. Fellowship gate: PASS at `59375c00`. The code review was clean. The E2E run covered authenticated KGoose → relay → the real drain executor. The later commits only change the operator doc. ## Rollout - Deploy order: this relay first, then KGoose squareup/cash-server#130634, then Web squareup/ext-builderbot-ui#241 and App block/buzz-app#403. - No shipped client ever called a receipt route, so removing it doesn't break any existing client. - The quota changes have no deploy-order requirement. - Keep owner deletion off until this relay and the drain executor are live. - If you need to roll back, turn deletion off before rolling back the relay. - Recreate any database that ran the earlier version of migration 0054. That only applies to disposable preview databases. Never apply this to a database holding real data. The earlier draft 0054 has a different checksum and index predicate. ## Complexity Net simpler: - One route, its handler and a writer-routed `get` are removed. Recovery reuses the existing idempotent admission path. - A single `OwnerQuota::admits()` backs create, transfer and the projection. - The stale "clients fail closed / strict deployment order" doc section is replaced by the advisory quota contract. --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> Signed-off-by: OpenAI Codex <codex@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> |
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|
Logan Johnson
|
7a1910e700 |
feat(mobile): show contextual names in lists, Search and Pulse (#7896)
🤖 ## Summary This PR finishes the change on the remaining mobile screens. After it, every place that names a person or agent uses a contextual name: - The channel list, DM labels, and the new-DM picker - The channel header and details, and the members and add-members sheets - Huddle avatars, spotlight, and overlay - The Activity inbox - Search results for people and messages - Pulse notes, agent cards, and reply previews Screens that belong to a channel compare names against its members. Search, Pulse, and the new-DM picker have no channel, so they compare the identities shown together. In the example below, Search showed four results all named "murderbot". Now the human keeps the plain name, and baxen's three agents are labeled by owner and key suffix. Part 3 of 3: #7894 (resolver) → #7895 (conversations) → #7896 (lists, Search, Pulse). ### Related issue Related to #2910. The desktop search change in #6483 addresses the same problem in a different app. ### Testing - Widget tests cover the Activity inbox, Search, and Pulse notes with colliding names. - `flutter analyze` is clean, and the full `flutter test` suite passes. - Checked on an Android emulator against the live relay by searching for "murderbot". The after image also shows "classy-murderbot", a new account that was created between the two captures. | Before | After | | --- | --- | | <img width="300" alt="Before: Search shows four people all named murderbot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/21bbcc52-fea8-4b31-ab8c-ff3ec9b32a39" /> | <img width="300" alt="After: three results show as baxen's murderbot with a key suffix, and the human shows as murderbot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d59584d9-4a35-46da-b39a-83addfad3cd2" /> | --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Shawn Hank
|
2664d14316 |
Add Kimi Code's default install path to managed-agent binary discovery (#5997)
## Summary Buzz Desktop fails to detect a freshly-installed Kimi Code CLI, even though `kimi --version` works fine in the terminal. Root cause is in binary discovery, not in Kimi's install. ## Problem After running Kimi Code's installer, Buzz Desktop's harness list doesn't pick up the `kimi` binary — it stays undetected until the user manually sources their shell config. ## Repro 1. Install Kimi Code: `curl ... code.kimi.com/kimi-code/install.sh | bash` — installs to `~/.kimi-code/bin`, and the installer appends a PATH export only to `~/.zshrc`. 2. Open a fresh terminal or restart Buzz Desktop without `source ~/.zshrc`. 3. Buzz Desktop does not detect `kimi`, even though it's on disk and executable. ## Root cause `find_via_login_shell()` in `desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/discovery.rs` resolves binaries by spawning `zsh -l -c 'command -v <bin>'`. A login shell sources `~/.zprofile`/`~/.zshenv`, but zsh only sources `~/.zshrc` for *interactive* shells — so a PATH export that lives only in `~/.zshrc` (which is where Kimi's installer puts it) is invisible to this probe. `~/.kimi-code/bin` is also absent from the static fallback list in `common_binary_paths()`. This is the same root-cause class already handled for `nvm` in this file (see the `find_nvm_default_bin` comment) — Kimi just doesn't have an equivalent fallback yet. ## Fix Add `~/.kimi-code/bin` to the Unix branch of `common_binary_paths()`, alongside the existing `.volta/bin` / `.bun/bin` / `.asdf/shims` entries. ## Scope note This PR only fixes detection (finding the binary). It does not address that Kimi shows a "Ready" badge regardless of login status — that's a separate, larger gap affecting all five preset harnesses (Kimi, OpenCode, Amp, Hermes, OpenClaw), tracked separately. ## Test plan - [x] `just ci` passes - [x] Manual: fresh Kimi install per repro steps above, confirm Buzz Desktop shows it without sourcing `~/.zshrc` Signed-off-by: Shawn Hank <shawn@shawnhank.com> |
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|
Diem Nguyen
|
12dbb114aa |
test(desktop): fix flaky forum empty-draft replacement e2e (#7981)
## Summary
The `replacement=` cases (`add` and `publish`) of `forum source visit …:
A→B→A retains source draft` in `forum-agent-invitation.spec.ts` are
flaky. They fail at line 449 because the source draft still reads
`@RemoteScout hello`.
Cause: Playwright's `fill("")` on a contenteditable sets a DOM selection
and then presses `Delete`. ProseMirror handles `Delete` with its own
selection, which sometimes hasn't synced from the DOM yet. When that
happens the key press does nothing, `onUpdate` never fires, and the
clear is never recorded. I confirmed this with temporary logging:
failing runs have no authored-content update after the fill. Non-empty
`fill` uses `insertText`, which goes through ProseMirror's DOM input
path, so it isn't affected.
Fix (test only):
- Clear the draft with `ControlOrMeta+a` followed by `Delete`, so
ProseMirror owns the selection.
- Assert the replacement text before navigating away.
### Related issue
None found. The spec hasn't changed since #7125. This test failed in 10
of the last 40 CI runs of `Desktop Smoke E2E (2)`, for example #3700.
### Testing
- `--repeat-each=100 --retries=0 --workers=4` on the two affected cases:
- Before the fix: 14 of 200 runs failed at `:449`.
- After the fix: 200 of 200 passed.
- Full `forum-agent-invitation.spec.ts`: 19 passed.
- Pre-push hooks passed (desktop typecheck and desktop tests).
Signed-off-by: Fizz <6be7be23ec5bba868f3e1db5ec86013d76bd1a293dce5b435a192158fec13641@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Fizz <6be7be23ec5bba868f3e1db5ec86013d76bd1a293dce5b435a192158fec13641@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
fccc07ebe3 |
chore(release): release Buzz Desktop version 0.5.26 (#7980)
## Buzz Desktop release v0.5.26 - **Frozen main:** `7ebf1beb44139264e9c5c7fee6970429ff66f934` - **Reviewed candidate:** `2b4b138dc5cf2d9cc1a0ceb21d9063ff56fe8bf4` - **Previous desktop release:** `desktop-v0.5.25` - **Proposed immutable tag:** `desktop-v0.5.26` This PR may be **squash merged** after the Desktop Release Candidate check and all protected-branch checks pass. Merging authorizes publication of the exact reviewed candidate; later or unrelated changes on `main` cannot alter it. The checked-in changelog accounts for every non-merge commit in the release range. The Desktop tag points to the reviewed candidate commit, not the later squash commit. Publication remains bound to that immutable candidate tag. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Release Automation <release-automation@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Jobi Armstrong
|
7ebf1beb44 |
fix(desktop): correct Grok Build setup guide URL (#4846)
## Problem The **Grok Build** harness preset points its "Setup guide" link at `https://build.x.ai/docs`, which is unreachable — the hostname has no DNS record at all, so the button leads to a dead page rather than a 404. ```console $ getent hosts build.x.ai (no output — no record) $ getent hosts docs.x.ai 2606:4700::6812:1350 docs.x.ai $ curl -sS https://build.x.ai/docs curl: (6) Could not resolve host: build.x.ai ``` This is user-facing: the link sits behind the **Setup guide** button in the harness picker, so anyone trying to connect Grok Build hits it while looking for install instructions. ## Fix Point the preset at xAI's live Grok Build documentation. ```diff - install_instructions_url: "https://build.x.ai/docs", + install_instructions_url: "https://docs.x.ai/build/overview", ``` The preset's `command` and `args` are **unchanged and remain correct** — Grok Build ships native ACP over stdio, which `grok agent stdio` exposes: ```console $ grok agent --help Commands: stdio Run the agent over stdio headless Run the agent headlessly over the Grok WebSocket relay ... ``` ## Testing - `just ci` passes locally (fmt, clippy, desktop lint, Tauri clippy, unit tests, mobile tests). - Verified `https://docs.x.ai/build/overview` resolves and returns `200`. - Verified the harness itself still connects: installed Grok Build 0.2.118 via `irm https://x.ai/cli/install.ps1 | iex` and confirmed `grok agent stdio` matches the preset's invocation. No UI changes — this is a string constant, so no screenshots apply. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: armstrongj2001 <110222228+armstrongj2001@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Diem Nguyen <ngthuydiem@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Ian Oberst
|
14a752fb24 |
fix(db): audit partition catalog before creation (#6515)
## Why
The partition manager checks partition existence by name only and treats
Postgres 42P17 "would overlap partition" errors as success. On databases
where a catch-all partition (`events_p_future` /
`delivery_log_p_future`) covers future months, the monthly creation path
silently does nothing while real coverage erodes toward a write outage.
There is currently no visibility into partition catalog health and no
signal before writes start failing.
## What
- **Read-only catalog audit** in `buzz-db` (`partition.rs`): classifies
the live partition catalog for `events` and `delivery_log` via
`pg_inherits` and bound parsing — coverage bounds, catch-all detection,
anomalous children, and trigger parity checked recursively down to
routable leaf partitions.
- **Creation gated on the audit verdict**: the 42P17-to-success swallow
is removed; monthly CREATE runs only for months the audit proves
uncovered, a canonical-name mismatch is an error, and per-month outcome
capture replaces first-error abort. New
`BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_CREATE_ENABLED` kill switch (default `true`).
- **Prometheus metrics** per table: `buzz_partition_serving_safe`,
`buzz_partition_uncovered_months` (audit window is now through +3
months), `buzz_partition_catch_all_covered_months`,
`buzz_partition_anomalous_children`,
`buzz_partition_trigger_parity_missing`/`_extra`,
`buzz_partition_audit_duration_seconds`,
`buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{outcome}`,
`buzz_partition_audit_failures_total`,
`buzz_partition_create_attempts_total`, and
`buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds` for staleness
alerting.
- **Cached diagnostics**: `/_status.partition_catalog` reports partition
serving-safety, audit age, and freshness. `/_readiness` stays
process-local, consistent with #7341; missing, unsafe, or stale audits
do not remove pods from service.
- **Periodic audit task** in the relay, plus config surface for the
audit interval and the monthly-create kill switch. Catch-alls are
detected from catalog bounds rather than configured names.
- Doc correction: the mesh heartbeat comment no longer claims readiness
gating (it never was gated; behavior unchanged).
## Behavior changes & risk
- No DETACH/DROP/ATTACH and no schema migrations. The only DDL is the
pre-existing monthly CREATE path, now strictly narrower
(audit-proven-uncovered months only) and behind a kill switch.
- Partition audit health does not gate readiness. Until the first
completed audit, read-only retries back off from 5 seconds to a
60-second cap. Any completed audit, including unsafe coverage, restores
the normal interval.
- Partition-overlap errors now surface as errors instead of being
swallowed as success.
- Rollback: revert the commit, or set
`BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_CREATE_ENABLED=false` to disable the creation
path while keeping the audit and metrics.
## Validation
- New Postgres-backed regression tests for catalog classification and
trigger parity (disabled child trigger, `ENABLE ALWAYS` parent, disabled
nested leaf clone in a multi-level layout, healthy-catalog zero-parity
checks). Each new regression was verified to fail against the previous
logic before the fix.
- Local affected-target validation passed against a disposable
current-schema database, with the known mesh forwarded-echo and tracing
callsite failures excluded. This is not a claim that the full suite
passes.
Follow-up work (separate PRs): bounded catch-all advance (empty-only
golden path; non-empty reattach only behind an explicit operator flag,
default off), fresh-install convergence, and proactive coverage-runway
alerting.
---
## Update — 2026-08-21
- Fixed nested-leaf trigger parity auditing so child-only row triggers
are checked on every routable descendant leaf and reported as
`{leaf}:{trigger}` under the owning root child.
- Added a Postgres regression test for a child-only trigger on a nested
leaf; mutation-reverting to immediate-child-only extra-trigger scanning
makes it fail.
Generated with Codex
Signed-off-by: coder 0 <d97ebdbb198c7237c94f84ea8bb8a73583ea067407eebd0062abbb3962527fb1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: coder 0 <d97ebdbb198c7237c94f84ea8bb8a73583ea067407eebd0062abbb3962527fb1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
Logan Johnson
|
4ef23609b7 |
feat(mobile): show contextual names in channel conversations (#7895)
🤖 ## Summary In a channel conversation, two identities with the same display name looked identical. In the example below, the channel shows "Bad Janet" twice, for two different identities. A reader cannot tell which one was added and then removed. This PR uses the contextual names from the previous PR everywhere a conversation names someone: - Message authors, threads, forum posts and replies - Reactions, the typing indicator, and system rows (joined, added, removed) - Inline mentions and the agent activity sheet - The profile sheet title, which now matches the row that opened it Names are compared against the channel's members, so a label only gets longer when a real collision exists in that channel. The mention picker labels each choice against every candidate, so two "Honey" choices look different. When you pick one, it still inserts the identity's own name ("@Honey"), so the message text does not change. Part 2 of 3: #7894 (resolver) → #7895 (conversations) → #7896 (lists, Search, Pulse). ### Related issue Related to #2910. ### Testing - A widget test checks that the profile sheet names an author the same way the channel does. - A unit test checks that two same-name mention choices get different labels but insert the same wire name. - `flutter analyze` is clean, and the full `flutter test` suite passes. - Checked on an Android emulator against the live relay, in an archived channel with two identities named "Bad Janet". | Before | After | | --- | --- | | <img width="300" alt="Before: the channel shows two different identities both as Bad Janet" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7f6c345-12d8-4e11-9434-bbd2c63722db" /> | <img width="300" alt="After: the second identity shows as Bad Janet · sqxl" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51c6b9fc-8900-4200-8ce0-ad1887f41dba" /> | --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
8519db1532 |
feat(buzz-relay): NIP-FI stateless enforcement (S3) — upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, JWKS warm (#7224)
## What this PR does Implements NIP-FI stateless enforcement at the relay WebSocket upgrade point. Every connection attempt on a NIP-FI–enabled relay must carry a valid federated identity assertion signed for the connecting Nostr pubkey; the relay validates it before the first frame is read, pairs it with NIP-42 AUTH, and enforces a bounded session lifetime without persistent state. ### Core enforcement seam - **Assertion at upgrade** (`nip_fi_upgrade.rs`): identity header is parsed with the same `extract_bearer_token` and denied with the same `http_denial` as HTTP ingress (`nip_fi_http.rs`), JWT verified (RS256/ES256/EdDSA), expiry checked, and the Nostr pubkey embedded in the sub claim must match the NIP-42 AUTH pubkey that arrives in the socket within the AUTH timeout. Denial returns exact byte contracts — `401 + WWW-Authenticate: Nostr + "authentication required\n"` for missing evidence, `403 + "evidence rejected\n"` for malformed or invalid evidence. The active HTTP/1.1 gate runs before `bind_community`, so denied upgrades pay zero DB cost. - **NIP-42 pairing** (`nip_fi_gate.rs`, `audio/handler.rs`): after the assertion is validated at upgrade, a `SessionAdmissionGate` is created with the assertion's expiry deadline and a `CancellationToken`. The gate is passed to every effect-acquiring path so no new effect permit is granted after the session expires. AUTH is verified against the assertion pubkey; a mismatched AUTH key receives `NOTICE restricted: authorization denied` and a socket close. Every other post-upgrade AUTH denial on an FI connection uses the same terminal shape — the canonical spec NOTICE on the terminal queue, then close — so frame type and close behaviour reveal nothing about private policy: ban, allowlist, or relay-membership denial → `restricted: authorization denied`; ban/allowlist/membership lookup failure or an internal verifier failure → `restricted: authorization unavailable`; an invalid NIP-42 proof → `restricted: evidence rejected`. Connections without an assertion keep today's `OK false` replies. - **Session lifetime** (`nip_fi_session.rs`): three independent deadlines bound each session — token `exp`, max assertion age from config, and relay max connection lifetime. The first to fire cancels the gate and sends the terminal denied frame. - **Effect admission at expiry** (`audio/join.rs`, `handlers/req.rs`): no new effect permit is granted after expiry. Two paths carry calculated budgets. The audio **lease resolver** holds its permit for at most `worst_case::PERMIT_HOLD` (14.5 s), and cancellation **during that resolver** reaches socket close within `worst_case::EXIT` (25 s: resolver, release of the won lease, terminal flush). Redis checkout has one total deadline and directory scripts are single-round-trip `EVAL`, which is what makes those budgets hold. When post-write fence verification fails after a landed CAS, the acquire keeps the reply and attempts an exact owner+generation cleanup on the same connection without a serving-write lease; if that cleanup fails or its reply is uncertain, the lease expires by its 30 s TTL. Neither number bounds audio close in general: other admission and teardown waits (for example the channel lookup after the resolver) and the known limitations below have no client-side deadline. REQ liveness, search and history reads race gate cancellation: a lost race drops the read, releases the permit, retires the claim through `close_if_owner`, and sends no further EVENT or EOSE. A history statement timeout ends the read with a timed-out outcome, and its owner-checked retirement (`CLOSED`, map, index and topic release) runs after the race with the permit dropped, so cancellation cannot drop it halfway. Subscription registration stays one uncancellable unit, and the permit is still taken before the claim. - **JWKS recovery** (`main.rs`): builds on main's `warm_nip_fi_jwks_snapshots` / `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop`. Issuers warm concurrently and the first refresh is seeded from the warm result (one interval for a warm issuer, 5 s for a cold one). A refresh that finds no live snapshot retries at the fast cadence (5 s after a warm issuer dies, doubling to a 300 s cap) instead of waiting a full interval, and `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` restarts the loop after a panic (1 s → 60 s backoff); On shutdown it is cancelled and awaited before the drain backstop is disarmed; cancel drops an in-flight fetch and starts no further issuer, so the join stays inside the drain bound. Logs carry `issuer_index` only. ### Known limitations - **Known limitations: bounded only by the dependency.** No new effect is admitted after expiry. Two awaits that are already admitted have no client-side bound, so if a dependency stalls at expiry, teardown waits for it: - **Audio join commit:** its effect permit spans `tx.commit()`, room publication and the `event_mentions` insert. During a DB or Redis stall, audio cleanup and socket close wait for the dependency. - **REQ subscription setup:** the first subscriber to a topic sends `Subscribe` to the pubsub task through a bounded channel (capacity 4096). The send blocks only if that queue is full, which happens when the pubsub task isn't keeping up (for example during reconnect backoff or a burst). Registration holds the connection's `conn.subscriptions` lifecycle lock across the send, so a blocked send also blocks other claims on that connection, including search, and any cleanup waiting on that lock. The send itself predates this PR; holding the REQ permit across it is new here. ### Archive/join serialization `commit_participant_join` now takes a row-level write lock (`SELECT ... FOR NO KEY UPDATE`) on the channel row at step 3. This serializes all join commits against concurrent `archive_channel` calls — the archive UPDATE (`archived_at` non-key column) blocks on the row lock, closing the READ COMMITTED race on both the `Existing` and `AutoAddRequired` paths. ### HTTP/2 extended-CONNECT gate (latent path) The root WebSocket handler uses a belt-and-suspenders approach. The HTTP/1.1 path (currently the only live WebSocket shape — workspace Axum does not enable `http2`) is gated pre-extractor via the `Upgrade: websocket` + `Connection: Upgrade` header predicate. A second gate point inside the `Ok(ws)` arm is structural future-proofing: if `http2` is ever enabled, any h2 extended-CONNECT shape the extractor accepts but the h1 predicate misses is caught there. The active HTTP/1.1 fire-point sits before `bind_community` (zero DB cost on denial); the latent h2 fire-point runs after it. ### Mixed-version huddle control (rolling deploy) Owners advertise the `huddle-commit-phase` mesh capability. The ingress selects the mode after the owner stream opens: it sends the appended `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` variant, and later `CommitConfirmed`, only when the owner's exact runtime gossip record carries that flag at that point, and latches the result for the session. A successful open implies the owner's record is present, so a record that lands during acquisition is not missed. Otherwise it sends plain `RegisterPeer`, which every owner decodes. A new owner publishes a plain `RegisterPeer` once at registration (pre-commit-phase behavior) and holds a `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` peer until its confirm; duplicate or legacy confirms publish nothing. Existing wire variant indices are unchanged. ### Off-mode compatibility When `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off` (or unset), the relay reads no identity header and installs no upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing check, or session deadline. Existing NIP-42 AUTH flows are unchanged. Huddle commit-before-publish is not FI-gated and applies in every mode, so huddle join publication timing differs from main even in Off mode. External connection cancellation (socket close, archival, revoke) now stops an in-flight liveness, search or history read at its next await; an uncancelled connection's frames and payload bytes are unchanged. ## Test coverage Every test this PR adds, or whose assertions it changes, runs in exactly one CI lane: infra-free tests in `just test-unit`, Postgres-backed tests in `postgres_tests` modules under the PostgreSQL lane. The `buzz-relay` bin tests run whole in `just test-unit`. `scripts/run-tests.sh` mirrors the effective relay unit selection for machines without nextest, except main's pre-existing `api::admin::` module. Every `buzz-relay` test fixture reads `Config` through `Config::for_test()`, which holds `NIP_FI_ENV_LOCK`, so a single-process `cargo test` run cannot observe a half-written FI environment (`fixture_config_read_waits_for_fi_env_lock`). The stub pools in the router and AUTH fixtures use a 100ms acquire timeout, which shortens a database fallthrough rather than removing it. - **Upgrade/router gate** (`router::tests`): Enforce-mode `nip_fi_*` gate tests for h1 WS upgrade, NIP-11 content negotiation, and audio ingress. Off-mode witnesses `nip_fi_off_root_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_root_ignores_malformed_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_ignores_malformed_header` prove the gate is bypassed (status outside 401/403/503, and no-header status equals malformed-header status); they do not prove a successful upgrade. - **NIP-FI units**: `nip_fi_config`, `nip_fi_upgrade`, `nip_fi_gate`, `nip_fi_session`, covering assertion contracts, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, and gate behavior. - **Effect barrier at cancellation** (`postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `w3_b2_req_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_subscription_registration`, `w4_b2_count_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_count_query`. - **AUTH denial uniformity** (`handlers::auth::tests`): each production-handler witness asserts the exact terminal frame, no denial on the data or ctrl channel, and cancellation, plus the unchanged Off-mode `OK false`. Unit: `fi_invalid_nip42_proof_emits_terminal_evidence_rejected`, `fi_ban_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `handle_auth_pairing_mismatch_runs_full_root_denial_path`, and `nip42_denial_class_separates_internal_failure_from_bad_evidence` (internal verifier failure → `authorization unavailable`; each client-evidence NIP-42 failure → `evidence rejected`). PostgreSQL lane: `fi_ban_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied` (real `community_bans` row; Off mode keeps `OK false` on ctrl, then close), `fi_relay_membership_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied`, `fi_allowlist_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fi_relay_membership_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fix_4a_allowlist_denial_with_fi_assertion_emits_canonical_restricted_frame`. - **Bounded audio exits** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `check_cancel_exit_with_never_ready_sink_returns_within_flush_budget` drives the production `check_cancel!` fence with a queued FI denial into a never-ready sink and requires it to return within `WS_TERMINAL_FLUSH_TIMEOUT`; `challenge_send_to_never_ready_sink_exits_within_flush_budget_on_cancel` requires the NIP-42 challenge send to yield to cancellation and exit within the same budget; every pre-`send_loop` audio exit write goes through the same `connection::send_exit_frames_bounded` helper. - **Audio NIP-42 classification** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `audio_bad_nip42_proof_with_fi_emits_one_evidence_rejected_then_cancels` requires exactly one canonical `restricted: evidence rejected` frame and cancellation; `audio_bad_nip42_proof_off_mode_keeps_auth_failed_frame` pins the Off-mode frame. - **Effect permit before pre-auth writes** (PostgreSQL lane): `handlers::auth::tests::postgres_tests::expiry_before_nip_oa_materialize_writes_no_rows_and_commits_no_auth` expires the session just before NIP-OA materialize and asserts no `users` or agent-owner row and no committed auth. - **Community admission** (`just test-unit`): `state::tests::on_not_run_runs_once_on_each_deny_arm_and_never_on_admit`. - **Auth metrics contract**: `connection::tests::auth_lifecycle_reconciles_every_terminal_and_never_leaks_gauge` records every terminal including `PairingMismatch`; `metrics::contract_tests::*` derive the series count from `AuthOutcome::ALL`. - **JWKS** (`main.rs`): `hard_dead_warm_issuer_resets_to_fast_cadence` and `jwks_refresh_success_waits_interval_failure_uses_fast_backoff` drive the real loop with paused Tokio time; `cold_issuer_*` cover the backoff helper; `f1_supervisor_loop_drives_recovery_and_restores_admission` runs `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` over a real `ProductionJwksSource` through injected panic → restart → hard-dead → 5 s retry → recovery, then checks `key_set` admission and that the first post-restart fetch follows the cold cadence (every issuer restarts cold); `jwks_refresh_cancel_drops_in_flight_fetch_and_skips_remaining_issuers` cancels during a pending fetch with a second issuer due. - **Bounded lease acquire** (`audio::handler::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `failed_post_cas_verification_is_fenced_and_discards_the_won_lease` requires a won-then-unverified lease to return fenced and be deleted by exact owner+generation; `stalled_lease_sql_and_stalled_exit_release_close_within_exit_bound` stalls lease SQL and the exit release and requires socket close within `worst_case::EXIT`. `audio::join::tests` pins `PERMIT_HOLD` at 14.5 s and `EXIT` at 25 s. - **REQ/search cancellation** (`handlers::req::tests`, `just test-unit`): `expiry_during_stalled_history_read_releases_permit_and_claim` and `expiry_during_stalled_search_read_releases_permit_and_claim` stall the read inside production `handle_req`, expire the gate, and require `expire()` to return within 2 s, an empty subscription map, and no EVENT or EOSE. - **History timeout retirement** (`handlers::req::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `history_timeout_retirement_survives_expiry` drives a two-channel history REQ into a real statement timeout, pauses retirement after the index removal and before the topic release, expires the gate, then resumes. It requires the map and index entries gone and both channel topic refcounts at zero. - **Archive/join serialization** (PostgreSQL lane): `f2a_archived_channel_rejects_existing_join`, `f2b_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_existing_path`, `f2c_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_auto_add_path`. - **Huddle room and handler**: `audio::room::tests` pending-peer tests, including `roster_revisions_are_ordered_and_snapshot_is_authoritative`; `fix_b_w1_w3_handler_pre_commit_cancel_emits_no_delta`, `fix_b_w2_success_emits_exactly_one_delta_with_monotone_revision`. PostgreSQL lane: `b1_cross_pod_bootstrap_precedes_buffered_owner_delta`, `commit_confirm_timeout_at_seam_triggers_teardown_on_stalled_owner_stream`, `confirm_failure_combined_outcome_no_orphan_join_exactly_one_48102`, `confirm_send_pending_expiry_terminates_client_with_denial_within_1s`, `c1_handler_ingress_sends_only_base_frames_to_legacy_owner`, `f7a_cross_pod_joined_payload_includes_owner_pod_peers`. - **Mixed-version control** (`audio::join::tests`): `shared_control_variants_are_byte_identical_to_base_wire` (against frozen `audio::join::base_wire`), `c1_new_ingress_speaks_base_wire_to_legacy_owner`, `c2_base_ingress_register_publishes_once_on_new_owner`, `c3_capable_owner_record_selects_commit_phase_hold_back`, `capability_record_installed_during_open_selects_commit_phase`, `duplicate_or_legacy_commit_confirmed_is_a_no_op`, `fix_b_commit_confirmed_arm_commits_peer_and_broadcasts_joined`, `pending_remote_stream_close_emits_no_joined_no_left`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Ian Alloway
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b9d22a273f |
feat(web): add Browse releases link next to invite download (#2255)
Related to https://github.com/block/buzz/issues/2093 Invite pages offered a platform-resolved binary download with no path to the GitHub releases listing for users who wanted information first. ### Changes - Keep the smart **Download it now** CTA - Add an always-visible **Browse releases** link pointing at `https://github.com/block/buzz/releases` - Extend invite smoke coverage for the new link Note: the marketing-site “Get the App” button on buzz.xyz appears to live outside this repository; this improves the in-repo web invite flow. Signed-off-by: Ian Alloway <ianalloway@usf.edu> Signed-off-by: Fizz <300bd4cedcdddb62f77935de51c301034bdb4cd97da9aaca46d59673a1ebc7cf@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Zach Meyer
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12423f2868 |
docs(nips): fix stray angle brackets in created_at clauses (#4486)
## Summary The `<` in a `created_at<` condition is the comparison operator, but in three places it had been paired with a closing `>` as if it opened a `<placeholder>` bracket: - **NIP-OA** clause list: `created_at<unix-timestamp>` → `created_at<unix-timestamp` - **NIP-OA** satisfaction rule: `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` - **NIP-GS** "Conditions in Git Context": `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` (line 437 of the same file already used the correct form) This matches the `created_at>...` forms used alongside them, which never carried a closing bracket. Also normalizes the NIP-OA headings to ATX style and pretty-prints the signed-event JSON example for readability. ## Verification Docs-only change. The NIP-OA test vectors are untouched and were re-verified by recomputing them: the preimage SHA-256, `tag-bytes-hex`, and the signed-event `id` all still match the documented values. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: zmeyer44 <zmmeyer44@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Tom Brow
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45c288c179 |
docs: specify desktop-driven mobile push suppression (#7809)
## Summary Define when desktop activity suppresses otherwise eligible mobile message notifications: a ten-minute inactivity window, short-lived relay-owned suppression, and per-installation push preferences. Include a shared glossary and renewal timing diagram. The gateway remains unaware of suppression. This is a design draft ready for review, not an implementation-ready protocol. Wire format, synchronization, and several failure-handling details remain explicitly open. Please also review the tension between the agreed relay-confirmed preference changes and VISION_MOBILE.md's requirement that stopping notifications must not depend on a relay response. ### Related issue Related: #3234 covers per-channel notification settings and push filtering; this spec focuses on desktop-activity suppression. No duplicate spec PR found. ### Testing Documentation-only change. Local Markdown links and anchors resolve; whitespace validation and commit hooks passed. The full local CI gate could not complete: dependency compilation exhausted local disk space (OS error 28). GitHub checks currently report no failures. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Diem Nguyen <ngthuydiem@users.noreply.github.com> |
