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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
klopez4212	6b5bb6f5a3	feat(mobile): refresh onboarding and smooth QR scanner motion (#8019) ... ## Summary Refresh mobile onboarding with light/dark gradients, an animated fuzzy Buzz wordmark and tagline, and bottom-aligned glass/ghost actions. Remove the dot grid and idle scroll bounce, and smooth the QR scanner's continuous corners and spring transitions by deferring camera teardown until dismissal finishes. ### Related issue N/A — no matching mobile onboarding issue or PR found. ### Testing - Mobile formatting, analysis, and full test suite passed at `0bb357f7a`. - Regression coverage includes shader animation/reduced motion, keyboard reachability, scanner interruption, deferred camera disposal, and rendered error contrast in both themes (mutation-checked). - Signed iOS release build installed on iPhone Air; Kenneth tried the onboarding and scanner during iteration and approved the final blur. - Agent review completed with no correctness blockers. Android device validation was not performed; hosted checks run separately. buzz-review-completed ### Preview Production-widget renders at 420 × 912; before: `5fdb2e536`, after: `443858a96`. | Before | After — light | After — dark | |---|---|---| |  |  |  | --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>	2026-10-01 15:17:04 +01:00
Logan Johnson	5fdb2e5365	fix(acp): preserve routing for edited messages (#4741) ... 🤖 ## Summary When someone edits a message to add an @mention, the app does not change the original message. It publishes a separate hidden "edit" event that points back at it. An agent that handles the edit must work on the **original message**: it reacts, replies, and posts any error notice on that message or in its thread. Before this PR, an agent treated the hidden edit as a new message. It replied in the wrong place, and with per-thread sessions it started a new, empty conversation. This is the first of three PRs. It sets where agents reply to edits. It does not yet make edits wake agents by default (#6131 does that). - The agent looks up the original message once, when it accepts the edit. Every later step uses that result: the session, reactions, typing indicator, reply target, and failure notices. - **Per-thread sessions** (the `thread` session policy, where each thread has its own agent conversation): the edit joins the original message's thread session. It does not start a new session. - The original is a reply in a thread: the edit joins that thread. - The original is a top-level message: the edit joins the thread that starts at the original. - **Channel sessions** (the default policy) and DMs: nothing changes. The whole channel shares one conversation. - Setup mode (the reply that asks the owner to finish configuring the agent) now accepts edits. It replies at the original message or its thread. If the original could not be fetched, the reply posts at the top of the channel. - Error notices for an edit (sign-in failure, hard timeout, retries used up) now appear in the original's thread, or as a reply to a top-level original. Before, they appeared at the top of the channel. If the original could not be fetched when the edit was accepted, the notice looks it up once more. If it is still unknown, the notice posts at the top of the channel. - If a newer request interrupts a turn that is working on an edit, the next turn treats the edit as earlier work that the new request replaces. The old edit does not run again. ## Details - The lookup has a 2-second limit. It runs only for edits that already matched a subscription rule (by default, edits that newly mention this agent). It must finish before the edit is queued, because the session is chosen at that point. - If the lookup fails, the agent still targets the edited message's ID, never the hidden edit event. Notices and setup replies never claim that message as a thread root, because the relay rejects a root that does not match the message's real thread. **Known gap:** if that message is a reply in a thread, the agent cannot learn the thread root. So under per-thread sessions it uses a separate session rooted at that reply, and it loses the thread's earlier context. Its reply still goes to the right message. Closing this gap needs a second lookup, which is left out on purpose. - The original is fetched with an explicit kind (stream message or its edit) and a channel filter, because the relay rejects lookups without a kind. - Each queued event carries its own route, so an edit shares a batch with other events like any message. Batch order is unchanged from `main`. ### Stack **1 of 3**, based on `main`. Next: #6131 (edits wake agents by default), then #6132 (edits join a turn that is already running). ### Related issue Part of #2540. The issue is fixed when #6131 merges. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-acp --all-targets` passes. One existing test, `session_new_forwards_complete_git_block_without_duplicate_names`, fails in a shell where the git setting `nostr.keyfile` is set. It passes when the setting is removed. This PR does not touch that test. - Session tests: an edit uses the original's thread for a threaded original, a top-level original, and an original that could not be fetched. It never uses the edit event. - Tests check the signed events that the agent publishes: setup-mode replies and failure notices, each for a threaded original, a top-level original, and an original that could not be fetched (including a notice whose second lookup finds the original). If either routing fix is reverted, these tests fail. - A queue-to-prompt test interrupts a turn on an edit with a newer request. The next prompt has the edit as earlier work and the new request with the "replaces earlier work" framing, and nothing is left to run again. --------- Signed-off-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 21:36:59 -04:00
Logan Johnson	cf5e83829a	fix(mobile): distinguish unknown presence on identity surfaces (#7383) ... <!-- Draft PR body for #7383 · fix(mobile): distinguish unknown presence on identity surfaces · https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7383 --> 🤖 ## Summary When mobile didn't know someone's presence — right after opening the app, or when the relay simply had no data — DM headers, DM-list avatars and profiles showed that person as **Offline**, with the same gray dot as someone genuinely offline. This PR separates "we don't know" from "we know they're offline": unknown presence now reads **Unknown** with no dot or notch, while confirmed Online/Away/Offline look exactly as before. - Applies to the DM header, DM-list avatars, and the profile sheet. Avatar geometry is unchanged — the unconfirmed indicator is hidden, not reshaped. - Confirmed Online/Away/Offline presentation is untouched. - The profile exposes one presence accessibility label, with no duplicate screen-reader announcements. ### Related issue - Fixes: N/A. No separate issue; the related work is the stack below. - Depends on #7382 (declared base), which supplies the presence data — this PR is the visible half of that change. - Draft — not requesting merge yet; the security advisory doesn't run on this stacked base (it reviews main-based ranges). ### Testing - Widget regressions cover unknown/online/away/offline transitions, fixed avatar bounds, DM-list colors, and profile semantics. - At the branch head: `just mobile-check` and the full mobile test suite pass independently, and every broader CI gate has successful evidence after isolated recovery runs (no monolithic local `just ci` run) — receipts in the [exact-head evidence comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7383#issuecomment-5573113048). - Verification is widget-test level; no native device or simulator run is claimed. To see it: open a DM whose presence isn't confirmed yet (e.g. right after a cold open) — the header and profile now read Unknown instead of Offline. ### Screenshots Flutter production-widget test renders — not native-device screenshots or acceptance captures. | Scenario | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Profile sheet for a person whose presence isn't confirmed yet (e.g. right after a cold open) |  |  | Confirmed Online/Away/Offline presentations are unchanged by this PR. <details> <summary>Capture provenance</summary> Rendered by the Flutter widget engine in a `flutter test` run (production widgets, production theme; no device or simulator). Before: this PR's declared base `a8e8028bfb9bb67de2db03ed448839e2f3ab2b0d`. After: its head `dd955a0c2ac80ada39b416a2f8b7481afb8773bf`. </details> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com>	2026-09-30 21:35:48 -04:00
Logan Johnson	965fe1dffa	fix(mobile): hydrate and refresh relay presence snapshots (#7382) ... <!-- Draft PR body for #7382 · fix(mobile): hydrate and refresh relay presence snapshots · https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7382 --> 🤖 ## Summary Mobile showed every person in a DM as **Offline** until they happened to publish a presence update while the app was connected. Presence was never loaded when the app opened, never refreshed, and a missing or failed read looked identical to actually being offline. This PR makes presence load and stay current: on connect or foreground, the app fetches the relay's presence snapshot for everyone visible, keeps the live subscription open while it does, and re-checks every 60 seconds while the app is in the foreground. A missing or failed read shows **Unknown** (no dot), not Offline. - Snapshot reads are authenticated like the rest of the session and batched by exact key (at most 100 per batch), instead of relying on live events only. - The live subscription opens before the snapshot, so updates published during the read are not dropped. Per-key revisions fence stale **query completions**: a snapshot that finishes after newer live evidence for that key does not overwrite it. - Refreshing every 60 foreground seconds observes relay lease expiry and retry failures; missing or failed evidence simply stays absent — it is never reported as Offline. - Disconnects, backgrounding, and account/community changes reset the cache cleanly. The app's existing subscription/recovery machinery is reused rather than duplicated. Mirrors Desktop's presence hydration (`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/profile.rs::get_presence`, `desktop/src/features/presence/hooks.ts`). ### Presence contract: best effort between polls Presence is a best-effort estimate that the next foreground poll corrects. This PR does not give strict causal order between snapshots and live events: - Snapshots carry relay time. Live kind:20001 events carry the signer's time. These clocks are not comparable. - A live event at or below a snapshot's relay second is not applied directly. The client confirms it with a fresh snapshot. This works because the relay persists presence before fan-out. - An empty (all-Offline) snapshot carries no relay second. If the relay stored an Online event, then its fan-out was delayed past lease expiry and an empty snapshot, the delayed event can show Online/Away until the next 60-second poll. Base `main` has the same stale-delivery exposure with no correction at all. Strict ordering needs relay-issued ordering metadata on both paths, or a fresh confirmation for every live event. Both are protocol or latency tradeoffs and are out of scope here. ### Related issue - Fixes: N/A. Closest open duplicates: #4417 (larger presence bootstrap + UI patch), #5617. Related: #6200, #7295. - First slice of the mobile remote-agent parity port. This PR includes the Unknown rendering at all three consumers (DM header, channel tile, profile sheet). #7383 and #7526 stack on it and add test coverage only. ### Testing - Rebased on `main` `95b018c87` (2026-09-30). At stack tip `7c8a93081`: `just mobile-check` clean; full `just mobile-test` **2,593 passed**. Earlier receipts below apply to the pre-rebase head. - Regressions cover cold-open hydration, live/snapshot races, lease expiry, failed reads and retries, disconnect/background/scope changes, and >100-key batching. - At the branch head: `just mobile-check` and the full mobile test suite pass independently, and every broader CI gate has successful evidence after isolated recovery runs (no monolithic local `just ci` run) — receipts in the [exact-head evidence comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7382#issuecomment-5573112882). - Verification is automated-test level; no native device or simulator run is claimed. No layout change in this slice. ### Screenshots No layout change in this slice — the renders below show the same existing profile sheet, with the presence status now following hydrated relay data. Flutter production-widget test renders — not native-device screenshots or acceptance captures. | Scenario | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Existing profile opened cold, with a signed relay snapshot saying Online |  |  | <details> <summary>Capture provenance</summary> Rendered by the Flutter widget engine in a `flutter test` run (production widgets, production theme; no device or simulator). Before: this PR's declared base `3c7f288c60d67df78577b237e27c3dfc8831aaa1`. After: its head `a8e8028bfb9bb67de2db03ed448839e2f3ab2b0d`. </details> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com>	2026-09-30 20:10:24 -04:00
Will Pfleger	f001ebbb6e	feat(desktop): add Admin Console Actions tab for direct staff actions (#7904) ... Builds on #7883 (merged). Adds an **Actions** tab to the Admin Console so relay staff can ban, time out, or delete directly through the #7883 endpoints (`POST /members/{pubkey}/ban`, `POST /members/{pubkey}/timeout`, `POST /events/{id}/delete`), with no report required. ## Design - **Frozen intent.** Review freezes the whole request (origin, relay, signer, community, action, target, reason, duration, `requestId`). Confirm and Retry resend it unchanged, so a manual retry reuses the same `requestId` and stays idempotent on the relay. The intent is cleared only on a definitive non-409 4xx (`preserveRequestIdOnError`). A 409 or a 202 pending keeps it, except `409 request_id_conflict`, which is final for that id and drops the intent so no futile Retry is offered. A 202 pending renders as a neutral notice, not an error. - **Bound to signer and relay.** The intent carries `expectedPubkey` and `expectedRelay`. Native `admin_direct_action` refuses before sending any request if either is blank or no longer matches (`assert_expected_signer` / `assert_expected_relay_scope`). The tab is keyed on pubkey + origin, so an identity or relay switch remounts it and drops any frozen intent. - **Survives tab switches.** `ActionsTab` stays mounted while the panel is open and is only hidden on other tabs, with the same pubkey + origin key, so a pending, ambiguous or in-flight action (and its `requestId`) is still there on return. - **Nothing-sent refusals.** Every native refusal before the first request leaves (malformed host, changed relay or signer, bad target or duration, the key-backup guard on Reason, a missing HTTP client, the first request build, the signing-key lookup) returns `AdminMutationError` with `notSent: true`; the tab drops the intent and offers no Retry. The request build for the retry after a 401 stays ambiguous, because the first request already went out. The changed-relay refusal says "active relay changed since the action was confirmed; nothing was sent". - **Disabled auth.** With `canMutate=false`, Review, Confirm and every field are disabled. - **Community host.** The host is prefilled from the active relay URL by `communityHostFromRelayUrl` (URL host, lowercased, default port and trailing dot stripped, matching the relay's `normalize_host`) and shown read-only as "Community: <host>" with a Change link. It follows the active community until the operator edits it; with no relay URL the input shows directly. Review derives the host from the same `getRelayWsUrl()` value it freezes into `expectedRelay`, so the two can't disagree. The host is validated natively (`validate_community_host`) and sent only as the `communityHost` query, never in the body. The body is `{requestId, reason?, expirationSecs?}`, built by the pure `direct_action_request`; only a timeout takes a duration. - **Member picker.** Ban and timeout pick the member the way `AddMemberDialog` does: `useUserSearchQuery` name search, `parsePubkeyInput` for a pasted npub or hex in any case, and a selected chip. The target is always sent as lowercase hex. Name search is a profile search on the active relay, not a member list, so it runs only when the host is the connected community; for another host the field takes npub or hex only, and the hint stays visible even with a key selected. Editing the host to a different community clears the pick and the search query, so returning to the original host doesn't bring it back; pressing Change alone keeps it. Each named result shows a short npub so same-name profiles can be told apart, the selected chip opens the full key, and the confirm step shows "Name (npub1…abcd)" plus the full npub (`PubKey variant="full"`). A search result's name is frozen for display only; a pasted key uses `useUserProfileQuery` on the active community, otherwise the short npub. Result buttons follow the disabled state. Changing the member or host drops a frozen intent. Delete keeps its hex event id (native `Hex64` route type, shared with pubkeys). A query that starts with `nsec1` or `ncryptsec1` in any case is never searched; the picker shows "That's a secret key. Never paste it here." instead. - **Errors.** `target_is_staff` and `request_id_conflict` get dedicated copy; other codes fall back to the relay message (`adminErrorCode`). An empty 404/405 from a relay without these routes reads "This relay doesn't support direct actions yet."; an uncoded 404/405 with a body keeps its own text. Success shows a toast. - **Key-backup guard.** Every admin JSON mutation body (the three direct routes and the existing report-resolve routes) passes `egress_guard::assert_no_key_backup_bytes` in `helpers.rs` before signing. The egress inventory points at that guarded boundary. - **One signer snapshot.** `admin_direct_action` reads `signing_keys()` once, checks `expectedPubkey` against it, and signs the request and any 401 retry with that same `Keys`. - **Serialized Review.** Review and its inputs lock while the relay URL resolves; a late Review cannot replace a frozen or submitting intent. - **Reason audience.** Before confirmation the tab states that the reason is delivered to the affected user, and for channel deletes posted publicly in the room tombstone (same copy as the Reports tab). Confirmation shows the frozen reason. ## Fix → test → mutation | Fix | Test | Mutation that turns it red | |---|---|---| | Manual retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-retry` | mint a new id per attempt | | Intent preserved across retryable outcomes | `actions-retry`, `actions-errors` | always clear the frozen intent | | Confirmation tied to signer + relay | Rust `direct_action_refuses_a_changed_signer_or_relay` | skip the signer check | | Identity/origin change drops intent | `actions-identity` | drop the tab key | | Disabled auth keeps Submit off | `actions-disabled-auth` | remove the `canMutate` gate | | Key-backup bytes never leave (`ncryptsec1…` / `NCRYPTSEC1…`, zero requests; ordinary reason sends) | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request` | remove the guard call → panics (request sent) | | Checked signer is the signing key | Rust `direct_action_signs_only_with_the_validated_snapshot` (identity swapped after the signer snapshot is taken, before validation) | re-read `signing_keys()` for signing → signed with the swapped key | | Late Review cannot replace the intent | `actions-review-race` (Review, Review, Confirm ambiguous, Retry → one `requestId`) | drop the Review lock | | Pending is a neutral notice | `actions-pending-neutral` | store pending in the error state → `pending notice must render` | | `request_id_conflict` offers no Retry | `actions-request-id-conflict` | keep the intent on every 409 → `request_id_conflict`, `no Retry for a spent request id` | | Reason audience copy + frozen reason | `actions-audience` | drop the audience copy; drop the frozen reason | | Host prefilled read-only, Change reveals the input | `actions-host-prefill` | drop the prefill → `host must be prefilled from the active relay` | | Name result sent as hex and named on confirm | `actions-member-search` | — | | npub and uppercase hex sent as lowercase hex | `actions-member-keys` | drop the direct key result → `no direct result for npub1…` | | Another community turns name search off with a hint | `actions-foreign-host` | — | | A host change clears the pick, even after returning to the first host; hint stays with a key selected | `actions-host-change-drops-member` | hide the pick by host instead of clearing it → `returning to the first host must not restore the old pick` | | Same-name results differ by key; confirm shows the chosen full npub and sends that key | `actions-same-name` | drop the full npub from confirm → `confirm must show the full npub` | | Results can't be selected once auth is disabled | `actions-results-disabled` | — | | Secret key never reaches search, warning shown | `actions-secret-key` | remove the check → `a secret key reached search_users` | | Pending action survives a tab round-trip, Retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-tab-roundtrip-pending` | render the tab conditionally → `pending notice survives` | | Ambiguous failure survives a tab round-trip | `actions-tab-roundtrip-ambiguous` | render conditionally → fails | | In-flight failure on another tab shows on return | `actions-tab-roundtrip-inflight` | render conditionally → fails | | Pre-send refusal drops the intent, no Retry | `actions-not-sent`, Rust `direct_action_marks_a_pre_send_refusal_not_sent` | ignore `notSent` → `intent dropped; no Retry` | | Key-backup refusal is nothing-sent; Review editable again | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request`, `actions-backup-reason-not-sent` | drop `not_sent` on the guard → panics at the `notSent` assert; stub `notSent: false` → `no Retry after a pre-send refusal` | | Only an empty 404/405 reads as an old relay | `actions-old-relay` | drop the empty-body condition → `404 admin API error: Not Found` | --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 18:53:13 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	53a12100b3	fix(deletion): require sole owner at admission (#7966) ... Follow-up to #7830: reject owner-origin deletion admission for a legacy co-owned community before creating a request. Under the existing community-row lock, admission locks all current owner memberships in pubkey order and requires exactly one matching asserted owner. Existing-request idempotent replay remains unchanged; completion retains its independent post-lock revalidation. **New optional operator field: `community_id`** (`ab0cd713`, `766eb07f`). Owner-origin `POST /operator/communities/delete` now accepts an optional `community_id` that binds the request to the host's community: - **Fresh submission:** checked after sole-owner authority is proven, so a non-owner still gets `404 community_not_found`. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch` and writes no request row. - **Replay:** checked against the stored request, and only when the stored request is for the same host. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch`, and the stored request is unchanged. A known UUID sent with a different host goes through the existing convergence check and returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. - **Omitted:** behaves as before. `admit_owner_request` takes `expected_community_id: Option<Uuid>` rather than a second public entry point, and existing callers pass `None`. - `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` documents the ordering. Also folds in the non-blocking review nits from #7969 (wpfleger96, at `e21151f4`): - **`limit_reached` has a stable `code`.** Create (`provision_community`) and transfer-in now return `409` with `code: "limit_reached"`, matching the other coded lifecycle errors. The `error` message keeps its `limit_reached:` prefix, so clients that match on the message still work. The provision limit test now asserts the code, and a new PostgreSQL test covers a transfer to an owner at the limit (coded 409, no membership change). - **Docs: an ack-version mismatch is a 400, not a 409.** `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` and the `delete_community` handler doc now say a changed host or owner under a known UUID is `409 deletion_request_conflict`, and an unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - **Docs: active-cap overrides above the lifetime cap can't be reached.** The `max_communities_per_owner` doc and the quota section now say `MAX_LIFETIME_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` (20) counts live ownership, so `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` above 20 can't be reached. - **Legolas P2s:** - The UUID-conflict docs now list every 409 case, including a stored ack version that doesn't match and a UUID held by an operator-origin request. - The runbook now says a legacy co-owned community is rejected as `404 community_not_found` and should be converged with a transfer first. - The preparation drift test now pins `DeletionSafety` plus "sole-owner authority drifted". - **Guard wording:** the `delete_community` handler doc now says "sole current owner", matching the admission check. What got simpler: admission and automatic preparation now enforce the same sole-owner authority, so no accepted-but-unexecutable co-owned request needs a new recovery path. `deletion_api_error` is renamed to `coded_api_error`, since it now carries non-deletion codes too. There's one helper for coded operator errors instead of a second one. Rebased onto main after #7969 merged (`d7a35afa`). The sole-owner commit applied cleanly. Earlier focused Blox verification (at the pre-rebase head `161e9857`): the new admission regression was red before the change and green after it. Five temporary, restored mutants each failed its matching production-seam regression. At the current head `766eb07f`, the relay `api::operator::` suite passes 23/0 on Blox. Each new `community_id` guard, removed one at a time, fails its own regression test. CI owns the full suites. Remaining debt: the separate P2-A purge/completion membership/community lock-order cycle is unchanged. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 15:04:23 -04:00
Will Pfleger	965e1997b5	fix(agents): stop built-in prompts from teaching sleep polling (#7992) ... An @mention wakes an agent only once its running tool call returns, so agents that loop `sleep` + `buzz messages get` (or poll CI) delay every reply that arrives in the meantime. Buzz's own prompts taught that loop. - `crates/buzz-acp/src/base_prompt.md`: replace "No push notifications — poll with …" with a rule to never use a tool call (`sleep`, `--watch`) to wait on CI, teammates, or other external events; hand off and end the turn. `buzz messages get --since` stays as a one-shot catch-up. "keep working until you publish the verified result" now reads "the result, handoff, …" so agents stop reading it as wait-for-green-CI. - `desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/nest_skill.md`: the "Polling Pattern" sleep-and-repeat loop becomes a "Catching Up" one-shot `--since` read. 🤖 Opened by Duncan. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 18:28:54 +00:00
Will Pfleger	020193f8e3	feat(relay): add direct staff ban/timeout/delete with staff guard (#7883) ... Relay staff (the `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` config roster, the owner fallback, and DB operator/moderator rows) can now ban, time out, and delete without a report through the admin API. Staff never join the community transport: these are admin-host, NIP-98 signed routes that drive the existing report enforcement state machine. Community admission, bans, and right-click menus are unchanged from `main`. Stack: this PR → #7904 ## Routes | Route | Body | |---|---| | `POST /api/admin/v1/members/{pubkey}/ban?communityHost=` | `{requestId, reason?}` | | `POST /api/admin/v1/members/{pubkey}/timeout?communityHost=` | `{requestId, expirationSecs, reason?}` | | `POST /api/admin/v1/events/{eventId}/delete?communityHost=` | `{requestId, reason?}` | Responses: `200 {actionId, state: "succeeded", replayed}`, `202 {state: "pending"}` when the action is accepted but not yet converged (the recovery worker finishes it; the same `requestId` replays), `409 request_id_conflict`, `409 target_is_staff`, `404 event_not_in_community`, `400 invalid_community_host` / `unknown_community_host`, and `422 enforcement_failed`. `422` is now the single failed-enforcement code for both the report and direct paths (shared `enforcement_failed()` mapping). ## Design - **Migration 0055.** `relay_admin_actions.report_id` becomes nullable. A direct row has `report_id NULL`, and `report_community_id` stays the tenant. New columns: `enforcement_target_event_id` and `timeout_secs`. The `relay_admin_actions_direct_shape` CHECK spells out each direct action: timeout needs both `timeout_secs` and `timeout_until`, ban and delete need neither, and delete needs both the event id and the author. A partial unique index on `(report_community_id, request_id) WHERE report_id IS NULL` makes direct actions idempotent. `pgschema` drops multi-column CHECKs, so `scripts/reconcile-schema-after-pgschema.sql` re-adds `relay_admin_actions_direct_shape` on desired-state databases. - **Atomic acceptance.** `claim_direct_action` inserts the action row and its `moderation_actions` audit row (`ban` / `timeout` / `delete_message`, `relay_operator` / `relay_moderator`) in one transaction. `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` sends a concurrent same-key request to the comparison. Retries compare actor, action, reason, `timeout_secs`, and the client-named target: the event id for delete, the pubkey otherwise. The event author, channel, and `timeout_until` are derived at acceptance and never compared. - **Retry racing its own first attempt.** Handler order: stored-action lookup → validation → staff guard → accept. If validation fails (for example B's event lookup runs after A already deleted the event), the handler re-reads the stored action. It returns a replay or 409 rather than 404. - **Report-less enforcement.** `finalize_success(report_id: Option<Uuid>)` skips the report CAS and the `reporter_notice` for direct actions. Tombstone and affected-user notices are unchanged. `recover_one` drives a direct action from its persisted row. `deliver_reporter_notice` treats a missing `report_id` as a terminal error instead of panicking. - **Permanent bans clear old expiry.** The ban upsert shared by direct and report-backed bans sets `ban_expires_at = NULL`, matching the kind-9040 path, so a permanent ban over an active or lapsed timed ban is in effect with no deadline. Timeouts are untouched. - **Community purge removes admin-action rows.** `purge_postgres` deletes the community's `relay_admin_outbox` rows (joined through their action), then its `relay_admin_actions` rows by `report_community_id`, before `moderation_reports`. That order satisfies both FKs and covers report-backed and direct (`report_id NULL`) rows in one pass. The same keyed row sources (`RELAY_ADMIN_TABLES`) feed the deletion inventory, which now records row counts for both tables, and post-purge logical verification, which now fails if either table still has a row for the community. Before this, a community with any admin-resolved report could never finish deletion (23503 on `relay_admin_actions_report_community_id_report_id_fkey`, stuck at `bindings_removed`). The `_operator_global_tables` registry reasons for both tables (seeded in migration 0036) are updated in 0055 and `schema.sql` to say community deletion purges them explicitly. - **Staff bans disconnect clusterwide.** The shared enforcement driver (`drive_enforcement`, used by the report and direct paths, fresh and recovery) calls `disconnect_pubkey_clusterwide` for `ban` before finalizing, matching the kind-9040 ban. A crash before finalize leaves the action non-terminal, so recovery re-runs the disconnect (idempotent) even when the ban step marker is already set. Timeouts do not disconnect, matching in-community timeout. - **Staff guard (D2).** `lookup_admin_principal` returns `Result<Option<AdminPrincipal>>`, with the same precedence as `resolve_admin_principal` (now a wrapper). `Ok(None)` means not staff. A roster lookup error is a 500, so the guard fails closed. Ban and timeout (direct) and ban/timeout/kick (via `resolve_report`) refuse any effective-roster target with `409 target_is_staff`, including the actor. The report path refuses before claim, so the report stays `open`. Delete is not guarded on either path. The check runs only when an action is first accepted: a replay or crash recovery completes an accepted action even if its target became staff afterwards. - **`communityHost` grammar (D4).** `buzz_core::tenant::validate_community_host` accepts only DNS labels and an optional port, and rejects schemes, paths, queries, userinfo, IP brackets, and whitespace before tenant binding. ## Tests binding fixes (red under mutation → green) Postgres tests are in `api/admin/mod.rs` `postgres_tests`, run against a DB migrated through 0055. Every rejection test seeds an existing restriction and asserts, through the shared `assert_no_effects` helper, that restriction values and action/audit/outbox/restriction/event counts are unchanged. | Fix | Test | Mutation → red | |---|---|---| | Racing retry replays | `direct_delete_retry_racing_first_attempt_replays_not_404` (barrier-paused HTTP interleaving; same-intent → 200 replay, conflicting reason → 409; the retry is checked with `assert_no_effects` against a snapshot taken after the first attempt, with the event author's restriction seeded) | drop the post-failure re-read → `left: 404 right: 200`; conflicting retry updates a restriction on the re-read path → `raced retry` snapshot mismatch (`ban_reason: "mutated"` vs `"seeded ban"`) | | Per-action retry comparison | `direct_ban_replays_same_request_and_conflicts_on_changed_intent` | drop `reason` from the comparison → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("request_id_conflict"))` | | Lookup fails closed (helper-level, calls `refuse_staff_target` directly) | `staff_lookup_failure_fails_closed` | `.unwrap_or(None)` on lookup error → panics on `unwrap_err` (guard passed) | | Direct staff guard | `direct_ban_and_timeout_refuse_staff_targets` (config/self and DB staff over HTTP with seeded restrictions unchanged; owner fallback checked at helper level via `refuse_staff_target`) | remove `refuse_staff_target` → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("target_is_staff"))` | | Report-path guard incl. kick | `resolve_report_refuses_kick_and_ban_of_staff_target` | remove report-path guard → `left: (200, None) right: (409, Some("target_is_staff"))` | | Accept-time-only check | `recovery_completes_accepted_ban_after_target_became_staff` | re-check staff in `drive_direct_action` → `left: "pending" right: "succeeded"` | | Timeout CHECK | `migration_0055_rejects_half_filled_direct_timeout` (buzz-db, migrated schema) and `direct_timeout_shape_check_holds_on_desired_state_schema` (buzz-relay, `pgschema` + reconcile schema) | loosen timeout branch of the CHECK, or drop the reconcile block → half-filled insert accepted | | No reporter notice for direct | `direct_ban_replays_…` (outbox assertion) | enqueue `reporter_notice` unconditionally → assertion at the `reporter_notice` check fails | | Delete unguarded | `direct_delete_removes_staff_authored_event` | — (behavioral control) | | Unauthorized direct requests have no effect | `direct_routes_refuse_unauthorized_requests_without_effects` (nonstaff, community owner, disabled auth, wrong host, wrong URL, altered body; restrictions on the targeted member and on the delete target's author, plus action/audit/outbox rows, unchanged) | roster bypass / drop mutation-principal check / admit owner / skip host check → `200 vs 403`; drop URL binding / payload hash → `200 vs 401` | | Foreign-community delete | `direct_delete_of_foreign_community_event_has_no_effect` | unscoped event lookup → `(200, None) vs (404, "event_not_in_community")` | | Banned staff actor still acts | `community_banned_staff_actor_still_acts_under_membership_enforcement` (membership enforcement on) | gate the actor on community bans → `403 vs 200` | | Timeout idempotency | `direct_timeout_keeps_expiry_on_retry_and_conflicts_on_changed_intent` | compare derived `timeout_until` → `409 vs 200`; compare action only → code `None vs Some("request_id_conflict")` | | Competing claims | `competing_direct_claims_accept_once` (identical → existing, conflicting → conflict; one action + one audit row each) | join skips compare → `[claimed, existing] vs [claimed, conflict]`; join always conflicts → the reverse | | Aborted acceptance rolls back | `aborted_direct_acceptance_rolls_back` | accept outside the transaction → effects `(1,0,0,0,0) vs (0,0,0,0,0)` | | Recovery exactly once | `recovery_after_committed_mutation_finalizes_exactly_once` (one recovery, `succeeded`, one `affected_user_notice`; each `recover_one` bounded by a 30s timeout) | ignore the enforcement step marker → `recovery did not converge: Elapsed(())` after 30s | | Permanent ban over a timed ban | `direct_ban_clears_prior_ban_expiry` (active and expired prior ban; asserts `ban_expires_at` NULL, admission `moderation_restriction_state` banned, timeout unchanged) | drop `ban_expires_at = NULL` → active: `left: Some(+1 day) right: None`; expired: `left: Some(-1 day) right: None` | | Rejections never rewrite restrictions | `direct_ban_and_timeout_refuse_staff_targets`, `resolve_report_refuses_kick_and_ban_of_staff_target` (value snapshot via `assert_no_effects`) | staff guard updates the target's existing restriction before returning 409 → counts equal but `ban_reason: "mutated"` vs `"seeded ban"` | | Purge with admin-action rows | `purge_postgres_succeeds_with_relay_admin_action_rows` (buzz-db; report-backed and direct rows with outbox rows; inventory counts both tables; deleted community left with none, second community untouched; a straggler direct row fails logical verification) | remove the new purge deletes → `23503 … violates foreign key constraint "relay_admin_actions_report_community_id_report_id_fkey"`; drop the relay admin tables from verification → `straggler relay admin action must fail verification` | | Ban disconnects, timeout doesn't | `direct_ban_disconnects_target_and_timeout_does_not` | remove the disconnect call (run alone) → `ban must close the target's socket` | | Recovery still disconnects | `recovery_past_ban_step_still_disconnects_target` | remove the disconnect call → `recovery must disconnect the banned target` | | Purge result keyed by table | `checkpointed_resume_is_idempotent_and_tombstone_blocks_name_reuse` compares returned keys to the scoped tables plus the two relay admin tables | — (existing regression, updated) | | Failed replay | `direct_replay_of_failed_action_returns_422_without_effects` | — (coverage) | | Pending under contention | `direct_action_under_contention_returns_202_pending` | — (coverage) | | Timeout/delete recovery | `recovery_completes_accepted_direct_timeout_and_delete` (test-only `claim_stranded` acquires just the requested action through `acquire_action_lease`, then runs `recover_one`, so tests don't claim each other's rows) | — (coverage) | ## Rollout note Before rolling the relay back to a binary without this PR, drain non-terminal direct rows (`report_id IS NULL AND state IN ('pending','enforcing')`). An older binary cannot decode `report_id NULL`, and recovery batches containing such rows stall. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 14:23:54 -04:00
Will Pfleger	0ee6093790	fix(ci): gate security review on repo write access (#7986) ... 🤖 The Codex Security Review gate trusted GitHub's `author_association` (`MEMBER`/`OWNER`), but GitHub only reports `MEMBER` to viewers who can see the membership. The workflow `GITHUB_TOKEN` cannot see private `block` org membership, which is GitHub's default, so most Block employees read as `CONTRIBUTOR` and their PRs never reviewed automatically. The same applied to the comment path, where private members could not authorize a review with `@buzz-security-review <sha>`. Trust is now repo write access, read from `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/collaborators/{user}/permission` via `getCollaboratorPermissionLevel`, which is independent of membership visibility and works with the authorize job's existing `contents: read` and `pull-requests: read` permissions. A user is trusted only when `permission` is `write` (which includes `maintain`) or `admin`. A successful lookup is not enough: on this public repository, an account with no relationship to it returns `200` with `read`, not 404. Outside contributors can only push to forks and come back `read`, so they still need an explicit command from a trusted user. The check covers the PR author on `pull_request_target`, the commenter on `issue_comment` (the job-level `author_association` filter is removed so the trusted script makes that decision), and the stale-marking path on PR updates. Transient API errors are retried. Authorization fails closed: any lookup error other than 404 fails the job instead of authorizing. Stale-marking is conservative: an existing review is always marked stale without consulting permissions, and a failed lookup counts as untrusted, so a previous range's review can never appear current for a new head. A commenter without write access is logged and ignored instead of failing the run. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 12:19:56 -04:00
Alex Rosenzweig	95b018c871	feat(acp): wrap workers at the subprocess launch boundary (#7985) ... ## Summary Replacing `BUZZ_ACP_AGENT_COMMAND` with a sandbox launcher hides the real adapter from Buzz: for example, Goose loses its default `acp` argument. Add optional `BUZZ_ACP_LAUNCH_PREFIX`, a JSON argument array applied at the shared subprocess boundary, after normal worker configuration. On Unix, every spawn runs `prefix... worker args...` without shell interpolation. Worker identity, environment setup, stdio and existing process cleanup are preserved. Invalid or unavailable prefixes fail launch without falling back to the worker; unset keeps direct launch on every platform. Configured prefixes fail closed on non-Unix because per-worker process-tree cleanup is unavailable. Desktop reserves the key against saved user-environment overrides, and spawn failures name the executable. ### Related issue Prerequisite for [Buzz-App #415](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/415). One commit directly on `main`, independent of #7942–#7944. No duplicate launch-prefix PR found. Policy enforcement, verified launcher staging, protected paths and the supporting runtime pin remain Buzz-App/plugin work. ### Testing - Original head `9ae9d82f8`: complete ACP suite (990 passed, three existing ignored), shipped local-task test, real-Goose probe, and full repository-wide `just ci` passed. - Review fixes: five launch tests and 44 Desktop environment-filter tests pass locally, covering the real production platform gate, save rejection, both merge layers, case variants, and executable error context. - Subprocess tests cover direct/wrapped argument defaults, Pi skills, Hermes/Codex environment, adapter identity, repeated spawns and invalid/missing prefix refusal. - Shipped `buzz-acp run` entrypoint completes a task through the wrapper and deterministic ACP peer. - Real Goose 1.52.0: direct and wrapped `auth-methods` return identical results; the wrapper receives `goose acp` with initially empty worker args. - Independent agent review: no blocking findings. - Required push checks passed on the updated head. The existing native Windows CI job now explicitly runs the platform-contract tests. Its result is pending; the non-Unix refusal branch was not exercised on this macOS host. Repeated-spawn coverage is not a full lazy-pool wake/crash test. Protected Goose in the Buzz-App UI and human acceptance remain pending. To try the hook after building `buzz-acp`, use an installed Goose path: ```sh BUZZ_ACP_LAUNCH_PREFIX='["/usr/bin/env"]' target/debug/buzz-acp auth-methods \ --agent-command /absolute/path/to/goose --agent-args '' --json ``` Expect the same authentication methods as without the prefix. Changing the prefix to `["/missing-launcher"]` must fail. Draft pending human testing. Signed-off-by: Alex Rosenzweig <arosenzweig@squareup.com>	2026-09-30 10:52:29 -05:00
Luke Tornquist	d7a35afa98	feat(buzz-relay): idempotent owner community deletion with quota reservation (#7969) ... ## Summary This is the relay side of owner community deletion. - **Idempotent delete is the recovery call.** - `POST /operator/communities/delete` checks the request UUID first. - If the request already exists with the same host, owner and acknowledgement version, it returns `202` with the request's current `status`. That holds at any stage, even after membership is purged, and no new work is admitted. - The same UUID with a different host or owner returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. An unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first, with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - There's **no receipt endpoint**. Clients recover by resending. - **Active quota reservation.** An incomplete owner deletion holds the owner's slot until the deletion logically completes. Migration `0054` adds the supporting index. Migrations 0052 and 0053 are unchanged. - **Lifetime cap.** Deleted communities keep their hosts as permanent tombstones. - On create and on transfer-in, the relay counts live ownership plus every non-aborted owner deletion, completed ones included. - That total is capped at an absolute 20, regardless of the active limit, and going over returns `limit_reached`. - This stops create-then-delete host squatting. - **Stable lifecycle conflict codes,** plus `acknowledgement_version` in the 202. - **Owner-list quota projection:** `quota_used`, `quota_limit` and `can_create`. - `can_create` reflects both caps. - The projection is advisory, and `limit_reached` is authoritative. - **Operator doc** (`docs/operator-community-deletion.md`): the acknowledgement version is a compile-time constant. Admission and the executor's claim/lease both filter on it. A version bump must keep replaying and executing old-version requests. This follows on from #7830. The foundation PRs #7818, #7827 and #7830 are merged. ## Testing New tests: - `owner_delete_resubmission_reports_current_status_without_new_intent` - A replay returns 202 `submitted`, including after membership purge. - Changing any field returns 409 `deletion_request_conflict`. - A non-operator gets 403. - A replay after abort returns 202 `aborted`. - No request rows are added. - `completed_owner_deletions_count_toward_lifetime_cap` - After 20 created-then-deleted communities, the active count is 0 but `can_create` is false. - The next create and a transfer-in both return `LimitReached`. - `owner_quota_admits_only_under_active_and_lifetime_caps`: a unit test. Fellowship gate: PASS at `59375c00`. The code review was clean. The E2E run covered authenticated KGoose → relay → the real drain executor. The later commits only change the operator doc. ## Rollout - Deploy order: this relay first, then KGoose squareup/cash-server#130634, then Web squareup/ext-builderbot-ui#241 and App block/buzz-app#403. - No shipped client ever called a receipt route, so removing it doesn't break any existing client. - The quota changes have no deploy-order requirement. - Keep owner deletion off until this relay and the drain executor are live. - If you need to roll back, turn deletion off before rolling back the relay. - Recreate any database that ran the earlier version of migration 0054. That only applies to disposable preview databases. Never apply this to a database holding real data. The earlier draft 0054 has a different checksum and index predicate. ## Complexity Net simpler: - One route, its handler and a writer-routed `get` are removed. Recovery reuses the existing idempotent admission path. - A single `OwnerQuota::admits()` backs create, transfer and the projection. - The stale "clients fail closed / strict deployment order" doc section is replaced by the advisory quota contract. --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> Signed-off-by: OpenAI Codex <codex@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>	2026-09-30 10:49:42 -04:00
Logan Johnson	7a1910e700	feat(mobile): show contextual names in lists, Search and Pulse (#7896) ... 🤖 ## Summary This PR finishes the change on the remaining mobile screens. After it, every place that names a person or agent uses a contextual name: - The channel list, DM labels, and the new-DM picker - The channel header and details, and the members and add-members sheets - Huddle avatars, spotlight, and overlay - The Activity inbox - Search results for people and messages - Pulse notes, agent cards, and reply previews Screens that belong to a channel compare names against its members. Search, Pulse, and the new-DM picker have no channel, so they compare the identities shown together. In the example below, Search showed four results all named "murderbot". Now the human keeps the plain name, and baxen's three agents are labeled by owner and key suffix. Part 3 of 3: #7894 (resolver) → #7895 (conversations) → #7896 (lists, Search, Pulse). ### Related issue Related to #2910. The desktop search change in #6483 addresses the same problem in a different app. ### Testing - Widget tests cover the Activity inbox, Search, and Pulse notes with colliding names. - `flutter analyze` is clean, and the full `flutter test` suite passes. - Checked on an Android emulator against the live relay by searching for "murderbot". The after image also shows "classy-murderbot", a new account that was created between the two captures. | Before | After | | --- | --- | | <img width="300" alt="Before: Search shows four people all named murderbot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/21bbcc52-fea8-4b31-ab8c-ff3ec9b32a39" /> | <img width="300" alt="After: three results show as baxen's murderbot with a key suffix, and the human shows as murderbot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d59584d9-4a35-46da-b39a-83addfad3cd2" /> | --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 10:46:14 -04:00
Shawn Hank	2664d14316	Add Kimi Code's default install path to managed-agent binary discovery (#5997) ... ## Summary Buzz Desktop fails to detect a freshly-installed Kimi Code CLI, even though `kimi --version` works fine in the terminal. Root cause is in binary discovery, not in Kimi's install. ## Problem After running Kimi Code's installer, Buzz Desktop's harness list doesn't pick up the `kimi` binary — it stays undetected until the user manually sources their shell config. ## Repro 1. Install Kimi Code: `curl ... code.kimi.com/kimi-code/install.sh | bash` — installs to `~/.kimi-code/bin`, and the installer appends a PATH export only to `~/.zshrc`. 2. Open a fresh terminal or restart Buzz Desktop without `source ~/.zshrc`. 3. Buzz Desktop does not detect `kimi`, even though it's on disk and executable. ## Root cause `find_via_login_shell()` in `desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/discovery.rs` resolves binaries by spawning `zsh -l -c 'command -v <bin>'`. A login shell sources `~/.zprofile`/`~/.zshenv`, but zsh only sources `~/.zshrc` for *interactive* shells — so a PATH export that lives only in `~/.zshrc` (which is where Kimi's installer puts it) is invisible to this probe. `~/.kimi-code/bin` is also absent from the static fallback list in `common_binary_paths()`. This is the same root-cause class already handled for `nvm` in this file (see the `find_nvm_default_bin` comment) — Kimi just doesn't have an equivalent fallback yet. ## Fix Add `~/.kimi-code/bin` to the Unix branch of `common_binary_paths()`, alongside the existing `.volta/bin` / `.bun/bin` / `.asdf/shims` entries. ## Scope note This PR only fixes detection (finding the binary). It does not address that Kimi shows a "Ready" badge regardless of login status — that's a separate, larger gap affecting all five preset harnesses (Kimi, OpenCode, Amp, Hermes, OpenClaw), tracked separately. ## Test plan - [x] `just ci` passes - [x] Manual: fresh Kimi install per repro steps above, confirm Buzz Desktop shows it without sourcing `~/.zshrc` Signed-off-by: Shawn Hank <shawn@shawnhank.com>	2026-09-29 19:36:01 -07:00
Diem Nguyen	12dbb114aa	test(desktop): fix flaky forum empty-draft replacement e2e (#7981) ... ## Summary The `replacement=` cases (`add` and `publish`) of `forum source visit …: A→B→A retains source draft` in `forum-agent-invitation.spec.ts` are flaky. They fail at line 449 because the source draft still reads `@RemoteScout hello`. Cause: Playwright's `fill("")` on a contenteditable sets a DOM selection and then presses `Delete`. ProseMirror handles `Delete` with its own selection, which sometimes hasn't synced from the DOM yet. When that happens the key press does nothing, `onUpdate` never fires, and the clear is never recorded. I confirmed this with temporary logging: failing runs have no authored-content update after the fill. Non-empty `fill` uses `insertText`, which goes through ProseMirror's DOM input path, so it isn't affected. Fix (test only): - Clear the draft with `ControlOrMeta+a` followed by `Delete`, so ProseMirror owns the selection. - Assert the replacement text before navigating away. ### Related issue None found. The spec hasn't changed since #7125. This test failed in 10 of the last 40 CI runs of `Desktop Smoke E2E (2)`, for example #3700. ### Testing - `--repeat-each=100 --retries=0 --workers=4` on the two affected cases: - Before the fix: 14 of 200 runs failed at `:449`. - After the fix: 200 of 200 passed. - Full `forum-agent-invitation.spec.ts`: 19 passed. - Pre-push hooks passed (desktop typecheck and desktop tests). Signed-off-by: Fizz <6be7be23ec5bba868f3e1db5ec86013d76bd1a293dce5b435a192158fec13641@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <6be7be23ec5bba868f3e1db5ec86013d76bd1a293dce5b435a192158fec13641@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 15:59:30 -07:00
Will Pfleger	fccc07ebe3	chore(release): release Buzz Desktop version 0.5.26 (#7980) ... ## Buzz Desktop release v0.5.26 - **Frozen main:** `7ebf1beb44139264e9c5c7fee6970429ff66f934` - **Reviewed candidate:** `2b4b138dc5cf2d9cc1a0ceb21d9063ff56fe8bf4` - **Previous desktop release:** `desktop-v0.5.25` - **Proposed immutable tag:** `desktop-v0.5.26` This PR may be **squash merged** after the Desktop Release Candidate check and all protected-branch checks pass. Merging authorizes publication of the exact reviewed candidate; later or unrelated changes on `main` cannot alter it. The checked-in changelog accounts for every non-merge commit in the release range. The Desktop tag points to the reviewed candidate commit, not the later squash commit. Publication remains bound to that immutable candidate tag. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Release Automation <release-automation@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-29 18:31:44 -04:00
Jobi Armstrong	7ebf1beb44	fix(desktop): correct Grok Build setup guide URL (#4846) ... ## Problem The **Grok Build** harness preset points its "Setup guide" link at `https://build.x.ai/docs`, which is unreachable — the hostname has no DNS record at all, so the button leads to a dead page rather than a 404. ```console $ getent hosts build.x.ai (no output — no record) $ getent hosts docs.x.ai 2606:4700::6812:1350 docs.x.ai $ curl -sS https://build.x.ai/docs curl: (6) Could not resolve host: build.x.ai ``` This is user-facing: the link sits behind the **Setup guide** button in the harness picker, so anyone trying to connect Grok Build hits it while looking for install instructions. ## Fix Point the preset at xAI's live Grok Build documentation. ```diff - install_instructions_url: "https://build.x.ai/docs", + install_instructions_url: "https://docs.x.ai/build/overview", ``` The preset's `command` and `args` are **unchanged and remain correct** — Grok Build ships native ACP over stdio, which `grok agent stdio` exposes: ```console $ grok agent --help Commands: stdio Run the agent over stdio headless Run the agent headlessly over the Grok WebSocket relay ... ``` ## Testing - `just ci` passes locally (fmt, clippy, desktop lint, Tauri clippy, unit tests, mobile tests). - Verified `https://docs.x.ai/build/overview` resolves and returns `200`. - Verified the harness itself still connects: installed Grok Build 0.2.118 via `irm https://x.ai/cli/install.ps1 | iex` and confirmed `grok agent stdio` matches the preset's invocation. No UI changes — this is a string constant, so no screenshots apply. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: armstrongj2001 <110222228+armstrongj2001@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Diem Nguyen <ngthuydiem@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-29 13:58:25 -07:00
Ian Oberst	14a752fb24	fix(db): audit partition catalog before creation (#6515) ... ## Why The partition manager checks partition existence by name only and treats Postgres 42P17 "would overlap partition" errors as success. On databases where a catch-all partition (`events_p_future` / `delivery_log_p_future`) covers future months, the monthly creation path silently does nothing while real coverage erodes toward a write outage. There is currently no visibility into partition catalog health and no signal before writes start failing. ## What - **Read-only catalog audit** in `buzz-db` (`partition.rs`): classifies the live partition catalog for `events` and `delivery_log` via `pg_inherits` and bound parsing — coverage bounds, catch-all detection, anomalous children, and trigger parity checked recursively down to routable leaf partitions. - **Creation gated on the audit verdict**: the 42P17-to-success swallow is removed; monthly CREATE runs only for months the audit proves uncovered, a canonical-name mismatch is an error, and per-month outcome capture replaces first-error abort. New `BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_CREATE_ENABLED` kill switch (default `true`). - **Prometheus metrics** per table: `buzz_partition_serving_safe`, `buzz_partition_uncovered_months` (audit window is now through +3 months), `buzz_partition_catch_all_covered_months`, `buzz_partition_anomalous_children`, `buzz_partition_trigger_parity_missing`/`_extra`, `buzz_partition_audit_duration_seconds`, `buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{outcome}`, `buzz_partition_audit_failures_total`, `buzz_partition_create_attempts_total`, and `buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds` for staleness alerting. - **Cached diagnostics**: `/_status.partition_catalog` reports partition serving-safety, audit age, and freshness. `/_readiness` stays process-local, consistent with #7341; missing, unsafe, or stale audits do not remove pods from service. - **Periodic audit task** in the relay, plus config surface for the audit interval and the monthly-create kill switch. Catch-alls are detected from catalog bounds rather than configured names. - Doc correction: the mesh heartbeat comment no longer claims readiness gating (it never was gated; behavior unchanged). ## Behavior changes & risk - No DETACH/DROP/ATTACH and no schema migrations. The only DDL is the pre-existing monthly CREATE path, now strictly narrower (audit-proven-uncovered months only) and behind a kill switch. - Partition audit health does not gate readiness. Until the first completed audit, read-only retries back off from 5 seconds to a 60-second cap. Any completed audit, including unsafe coverage, restores the normal interval. - Partition-overlap errors now surface as errors instead of being swallowed as success. - Rollback: revert the commit, or set `BUZZ_PARTITION_MANAGER_CREATE_ENABLED=false` to disable the creation path while keeping the audit and metrics. ## Validation - New Postgres-backed regression tests for catalog classification and trigger parity (disabled child trigger, `ENABLE ALWAYS` parent, disabled nested leaf clone in a multi-level layout, healthy-catalog zero-parity checks). Each new regression was verified to fail against the previous logic before the fix. - Local affected-target validation passed against a disposable current-schema database, with the known mesh forwarded-echo and tracing callsite failures excluded. This is not a claim that the full suite passes. Follow-up work (separate PRs): bounded catch-all advance (empty-only golden path; non-empty reattach only behind an explicit operator flag, default off), fresh-install convergence, and proactive coverage-runway alerting. --- ## Update — 2026-08-21 - Fixed nested-leaf trigger parity auditing so child-only row triggers are checked on every routable descendant leaf and reported as `{leaf}:{trigger}` under the owning root child. - Added a Postgres regression test for a child-only trigger on a nested leaf; mutation-reverting to immediate-child-only extra-trigger scanning makes it fail. Generated with Codex Signed-off-by: coder 0 <d97ebdbb198c7237c94f84ea8bb8a73583ea067407eebd0062abbb3962527fb1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: coder 0 <d97ebdbb198c7237c94f84ea8bb8a73583ea067407eebd0062abbb3962527fb1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 13:43:40 -07:00
Logan Johnson	4ef23609b7	feat(mobile): show contextual names in channel conversations (#7895) ... 🤖 ## Summary In a channel conversation, two identities with the same display name looked identical. In the example below, the channel shows "Bad Janet" twice, for two different identities. A reader cannot tell which one was added and then removed. This PR uses the contextual names from the previous PR everywhere a conversation names someone: - Message authors, threads, forum posts and replies - Reactions, the typing indicator, and system rows (joined, added, removed) - Inline mentions and the agent activity sheet - The profile sheet title, which now matches the row that opened it Names are compared against the channel's members, so a label only gets longer when a real collision exists in that channel. The mention picker labels each choice against every candidate, so two "Honey" choices look different. When you pick one, it still inserts the identity's own name ("@Honey"), so the message text does not change. Part 2 of 3: #7894 (resolver) → #7895 (conversations) → #7896 (lists, Search, Pulse). ### Related issue Related to #2910. ### Testing - A widget test checks that the profile sheet names an author the same way the channel does. - A unit test checks that two same-name mention choices get different labels but insert the same wire name. - `flutter analyze` is clean, and the full `flutter test` suite passes. - Checked on an Android emulator against the live relay, in an archived channel with two identities named "Bad Janet". | Before | After | | --- | --- | | <img width="300" alt="Before: the channel shows two different identities both as Bad Janet" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7f6c345-12d8-4e11-9434-bbd2c63722db" /> | <img width="300" alt="After: the second identity shows as Bad Janet · sqxl" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51c6b9fc-8900-4200-8ce0-ad1887f41dba" /> | --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 15:47:43 -04:00
Will Pfleger	8519db1532	feat(buzz-relay): NIP-FI stateless enforcement (S3) — upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, JWKS warm (#7224) ... ## What this PR does Implements NIP-FI stateless enforcement at the relay WebSocket upgrade point. Every connection attempt on a NIP-FI–enabled relay must carry a valid federated identity assertion signed for the connecting Nostr pubkey; the relay validates it before the first frame is read, pairs it with NIP-42 AUTH, and enforces a bounded session lifetime without persistent state. ### Core enforcement seam - **Assertion at upgrade** (`nip_fi_upgrade.rs`): identity header is parsed with the same `extract_bearer_token` and denied with the same `http_denial` as HTTP ingress (`nip_fi_http.rs`), JWT verified (RS256/ES256/EdDSA), expiry checked, and the Nostr pubkey embedded in the sub claim must match the NIP-42 AUTH pubkey that arrives in the socket within the AUTH timeout. Denial returns exact byte contracts — `401 + WWW-Authenticate: Nostr + "authentication required\n"` for missing evidence, `403 + "evidence rejected\n"` for malformed or invalid evidence. The active HTTP/1.1 gate runs before `bind_community`, so denied upgrades pay zero DB cost. - **NIP-42 pairing** (`nip_fi_gate.rs`, `audio/handler.rs`): after the assertion is validated at upgrade, a `SessionAdmissionGate` is created with the assertion's expiry deadline and a `CancellationToken`. The gate is passed to every effect-acquiring path so no new effect permit is granted after the session expires. AUTH is verified against the assertion pubkey; a mismatched AUTH key receives `NOTICE restricted: authorization denied` and a socket close. Every other post-upgrade AUTH denial on an FI connection uses the same terminal shape — the canonical spec NOTICE on the terminal queue, then close — so frame type and close behaviour reveal nothing about private policy: ban, allowlist, or relay-membership denial → `restricted: authorization denied`; ban/allowlist/membership lookup failure or an internal verifier failure → `restricted: authorization unavailable`; an invalid NIP-42 proof → `restricted: evidence rejected`. Connections without an assertion keep today's `OK false` replies. - **Session lifetime** (`nip_fi_session.rs`): three independent deadlines bound each session — token `exp`, max assertion age from config, and relay max connection lifetime. The first to fire cancels the gate and sends the terminal denied frame. - **Effect admission at expiry** (`audio/join.rs`, `handlers/req.rs`): no new effect permit is granted after expiry. Two paths carry calculated budgets. The audio **lease resolver** holds its permit for at most `worst_case::PERMIT_HOLD` (14.5 s), and cancellation **during that resolver** reaches socket close within `worst_case::EXIT` (25 s: resolver, release of the won lease, terminal flush). Redis checkout has one total deadline and directory scripts are single-round-trip `EVAL`, which is what makes those budgets hold. When post-write fence verification fails after a landed CAS, the acquire keeps the reply and attempts an exact owner+generation cleanup on the same connection without a serving-write lease; if that cleanup fails or its reply is uncertain, the lease expires by its 30 s TTL. Neither number bounds audio close in general: other admission and teardown waits (for example the channel lookup after the resolver) and the known limitations below have no client-side deadline. REQ liveness, search and history reads race gate cancellation: a lost race drops the read, releases the permit, retires the claim through `close_if_owner`, and sends no further EVENT or EOSE. A history statement timeout ends the read with a timed-out outcome, and its owner-checked retirement (`CLOSED`, map, index and topic release) runs after the race with the permit dropped, so cancellation cannot drop it halfway. Subscription registration stays one uncancellable unit, and the permit is still taken before the claim. - **JWKS recovery** (`main.rs`): builds on main's `warm_nip_fi_jwks_snapshots` / `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop`. Issuers warm concurrently and the first refresh is seeded from the warm result (one interval for a warm issuer, 5 s for a cold one). A refresh that finds no live snapshot retries at the fast cadence (5 s after a warm issuer dies, doubling to a 300 s cap) instead of waiting a full interval, and `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` restarts the loop after a panic (1 s → 60 s backoff); On shutdown it is cancelled and awaited before the drain backstop is disarmed; cancel drops an in-flight fetch and starts no further issuer, so the join stays inside the drain bound. Logs carry `issuer_index` only. ### Known limitations - **Known limitations: bounded only by the dependency.** No new effect is admitted after expiry. Two awaits that are already admitted have no client-side bound, so if a dependency stalls at expiry, teardown waits for it: - **Audio join commit:** its effect permit spans `tx.commit()`, room publication and the `event_mentions` insert. During a DB or Redis stall, audio cleanup and socket close wait for the dependency. - **REQ subscription setup:** the first subscriber to a topic sends `Subscribe` to the pubsub task through a bounded channel (capacity 4096). The send blocks only if that queue is full, which happens when the pubsub task isn't keeping up (for example during reconnect backoff or a burst). Registration holds the connection's `conn.subscriptions` lifecycle lock across the send, so a blocked send also blocks other claims on that connection, including search, and any cleanup waiting on that lock. The send itself predates this PR; holding the REQ permit across it is new here. ### Archive/join serialization `commit_participant_join` now takes a row-level write lock (`SELECT ... FOR NO KEY UPDATE`) on the channel row at step 3. This serializes all join commits against concurrent `archive_channel` calls — the archive UPDATE (`archived_at` non-key column) blocks on the row lock, closing the READ COMMITTED race on both the `Existing` and `AutoAddRequired` paths. ### HTTP/2 extended-CONNECT gate (latent path) The root WebSocket handler uses a belt-and-suspenders approach. The HTTP/1.1 path (currently the only live WebSocket shape — workspace Axum does not enable `http2`) is gated pre-extractor via the `Upgrade: websocket` + `Connection: Upgrade` header predicate. A second gate point inside the `Ok(ws)` arm is structural future-proofing: if `http2` is ever enabled, any h2 extended-CONNECT shape the extractor accepts but the h1 predicate misses is caught there. The active HTTP/1.1 fire-point sits before `bind_community` (zero DB cost on denial); the latent h2 fire-point runs after it. ### Mixed-version huddle control (rolling deploy) Owners advertise the `huddle-commit-phase` mesh capability. The ingress selects the mode after the owner stream opens: it sends the appended `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` variant, and later `CommitConfirmed`, only when the owner's exact runtime gossip record carries that flag at that point, and latches the result for the session. A successful open implies the owner's record is present, so a record that lands during acquisition is not missed. Otherwise it sends plain `RegisterPeer`, which every owner decodes. A new owner publishes a plain `RegisterPeer` once at registration (pre-commit-phase behavior) and holds a `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` peer until its confirm; duplicate or legacy confirms publish nothing. Existing wire variant indices are unchanged. ### Off-mode compatibility When `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off` (or unset), the relay reads no identity header and installs no upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing check, or session deadline. Existing NIP-42 AUTH flows are unchanged. Huddle commit-before-publish is not FI-gated and applies in every mode, so huddle join publication timing differs from main even in Off mode. External connection cancellation (socket close, archival, revoke) now stops an in-flight liveness, search or history read at its next await; an uncancelled connection's frames and payload bytes are unchanged. ## Test coverage Every test this PR adds, or whose assertions it changes, runs in exactly one CI lane: infra-free tests in `just test-unit`, Postgres-backed tests in `postgres_tests` modules under the PostgreSQL lane. The `buzz-relay` bin tests run whole in `just test-unit`. `scripts/run-tests.sh` mirrors the effective relay unit selection for machines without nextest, except main's pre-existing `api::admin::` module. Every `buzz-relay` test fixture reads `Config` through `Config::for_test()`, which holds `NIP_FI_ENV_LOCK`, so a single-process `cargo test` run cannot observe a half-written FI environment (`fixture_config_read_waits_for_fi_env_lock`). The stub pools in the router and AUTH fixtures use a 100ms acquire timeout, which shortens a database fallthrough rather than removing it. - **Upgrade/router gate** (`router::tests`): Enforce-mode `nip_fi_*` gate tests for h1 WS upgrade, NIP-11 content negotiation, and audio ingress. Off-mode witnesses `nip_fi_off_root_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_root_ignores_malformed_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_ignores_malformed_header` prove the gate is bypassed (status outside 401/403/503, and no-header status equals malformed-header status); they do not prove a successful upgrade. - **NIP-FI units**: `nip_fi_config`, `nip_fi_upgrade`, `nip_fi_gate`, `nip_fi_session`, covering assertion contracts, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, and gate behavior. - **Effect barrier at cancellation** (`postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `w3_b2_req_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_subscription_registration`, `w4_b2_count_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_count_query`. - **AUTH denial uniformity** (`handlers::auth::tests`): each production-handler witness asserts the exact terminal frame, no denial on the data or ctrl channel, and cancellation, plus the unchanged Off-mode `OK false`. Unit: `fi_invalid_nip42_proof_emits_terminal_evidence_rejected`, `fi_ban_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `handle_auth_pairing_mismatch_runs_full_root_denial_path`, and `nip42_denial_class_separates_internal_failure_from_bad_evidence` (internal verifier failure → `authorization unavailable`; each client-evidence NIP-42 failure → `evidence rejected`). PostgreSQL lane: `fi_ban_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied` (real `community_bans` row; Off mode keeps `OK false` on ctrl, then close), `fi_relay_membership_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied`, `fi_allowlist_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fi_relay_membership_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fix_4a_allowlist_denial_with_fi_assertion_emits_canonical_restricted_frame`. - **Bounded audio exits** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `check_cancel_exit_with_never_ready_sink_returns_within_flush_budget` drives the production `check_cancel!` fence with a queued FI denial into a never-ready sink and requires it to return within `WS_TERMINAL_FLUSH_TIMEOUT`; `challenge_send_to_never_ready_sink_exits_within_flush_budget_on_cancel` requires the NIP-42 challenge send to yield to cancellation and exit within the same budget; every pre-`send_loop` audio exit write goes through the same `connection::send_exit_frames_bounded` helper. - **Audio NIP-42 classification** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `audio_bad_nip42_proof_with_fi_emits_one_evidence_rejected_then_cancels` requires exactly one canonical `restricted: evidence rejected` frame and cancellation; `audio_bad_nip42_proof_off_mode_keeps_auth_failed_frame` pins the Off-mode frame. - **Effect permit before pre-auth writes** (PostgreSQL lane): `handlers::auth::tests::postgres_tests::expiry_before_nip_oa_materialize_writes_no_rows_and_commits_no_auth` expires the session just before NIP-OA materialize and asserts no `users` or agent-owner row and no committed auth. - **Community admission** (`just test-unit`): `state::tests::on_not_run_runs_once_on_each_deny_arm_and_never_on_admit`. - **Auth metrics contract**: `connection::tests::auth_lifecycle_reconciles_every_terminal_and_never_leaks_gauge` records every terminal including `PairingMismatch`; `metrics::contract_tests::*` derive the series count from `AuthOutcome::ALL`. - **JWKS** (`main.rs`): `hard_dead_warm_issuer_resets_to_fast_cadence` and `jwks_refresh_success_waits_interval_failure_uses_fast_backoff` drive the real loop with paused Tokio time; `cold_issuer_*` cover the backoff helper; `f1_supervisor_loop_drives_recovery_and_restores_admission` runs `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` over a real `ProductionJwksSource` through injected panic → restart → hard-dead → 5 s retry → recovery, then checks `key_set` admission and that the first post-restart fetch follows the cold cadence (every issuer restarts cold); `jwks_refresh_cancel_drops_in_flight_fetch_and_skips_remaining_issuers` cancels during a pending fetch with a second issuer due. - **Bounded lease acquire** (`audio::handler::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `failed_post_cas_verification_is_fenced_and_discards_the_won_lease` requires a won-then-unverified lease to return fenced and be deleted by exact owner+generation; `stalled_lease_sql_and_stalled_exit_release_close_within_exit_bound` stalls lease SQL and the exit release and requires socket close within `worst_case::EXIT`. `audio::join::tests` pins `PERMIT_HOLD` at 14.5 s and `EXIT` at 25 s. - **REQ/search cancellation** (`handlers::req::tests`, `just test-unit`): `expiry_during_stalled_history_read_releases_permit_and_claim` and `expiry_during_stalled_search_read_releases_permit_and_claim` stall the read inside production `handle_req`, expire the gate, and require `expire()` to return within 2 s, an empty subscription map, and no EVENT or EOSE. - **History timeout retirement** (`handlers::req::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `history_timeout_retirement_survives_expiry` drives a two-channel history REQ into a real statement timeout, pauses retirement after the index removal and before the topic release, expires the gate, then resumes. It requires the map and index entries gone and both channel topic refcounts at zero. - **Archive/join serialization** (PostgreSQL lane): `f2a_archived_channel_rejects_existing_join`, `f2b_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_existing_path`, `f2c_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_auto_add_path`. - **Huddle room and handler**: `audio::room::tests` pending-peer tests, including `roster_revisions_are_ordered_and_snapshot_is_authoritative`; `fix_b_w1_w3_handler_pre_commit_cancel_emits_no_delta`, `fix_b_w2_success_emits_exactly_one_delta_with_monotone_revision`. PostgreSQL lane: `b1_cross_pod_bootstrap_precedes_buffered_owner_delta`, `commit_confirm_timeout_at_seam_triggers_teardown_on_stalled_owner_stream`, `confirm_failure_combined_outcome_no_orphan_join_exactly_one_48102`, `confirm_send_pending_expiry_terminates_client_with_denial_within_1s`, `c1_handler_ingress_sends_only_base_frames_to_legacy_owner`, `f7a_cross_pod_joined_payload_includes_owner_pod_peers`. - **Mixed-version control** (`audio::join::tests`): `shared_control_variants_are_byte_identical_to_base_wire` (against frozen `audio::join::base_wire`), `c1_new_ingress_speaks_base_wire_to_legacy_owner`, `c2_base_ingress_register_publishes_once_on_new_owner`, `c3_capable_owner_record_selects_commit_phase_hold_back`, `capability_record_installed_during_open_selects_commit_phase`, `duplicate_or_legacy_commit_confirmed_is_a_no_op`, `fix_b_commit_confirmed_arm_commits_peer_and_broadcasts_joined`, `pending_remote_stream_close_emits_no_joined_no_left`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 14:27:40 -04:00
Ian Alloway	b9d22a273f	feat(web): add Browse releases link next to invite download (#2255) ... Related to https://github.com/block/buzz/issues/2093 Invite pages offered a platform-resolved binary download with no path to the GitHub releases listing for users who wanted information first. ### Changes - Keep the smart **Download it now** CTA - Add an always-visible **Browse releases** link pointing at `https://github.com/block/buzz/releases` - Extend invite smoke coverage for the new link Note: the marketing-site “Get the App” button on buzz.xyz appears to live outside this repository; this improves the in-repo web invite flow. Signed-off-by: Ian Alloway <ianalloway@usf.edu> Signed-off-by: Fizz <300bd4cedcdddb62f77935de51c301034bdb4cd97da9aaca46d59673a1ebc7cf@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 10:27:08 -07:00
Zach Meyer	12423f2868	docs(nips): fix stray angle brackets in created_at clauses (#4486) ... ## Summary The `<` in a `created_at<` condition is the comparison operator, but in three places it had been paired with a closing `>` as if it opened a `<placeholder>` bracket: - **NIP-OA** clause list: `created_at<unix-timestamp>` → `created_at<unix-timestamp` - **NIP-OA** satisfaction rule: `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` - **NIP-GS** "Conditions in Git Context": `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` (line 437 of the same file already used the correct form) This matches the `created_at>...` forms used alongside them, which never carried a closing bracket. Also normalizes the NIP-OA headings to ATX style and pretty-prints the signed-event JSON example for readability. ## Verification Docs-only change. The NIP-OA test vectors are untouched and were re-verified by recomputing them: the preimage SHA-256, `tag-bytes-hex`, and the signed-event `id` all still match the documented values. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: zmeyer44 <zmmeyer44@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 10:02:30 -07:00
Tom Brow	45c288c179	docs: specify desktop-driven mobile push suppression (#7809) ... ## Summary Define when desktop activity suppresses otherwise eligible mobile message notifications: a ten-minute inactivity window, short-lived relay-owned suppression, and per-installation push preferences. Include a shared glossary and renewal timing diagram. The gateway remains unaware of suppression. This is a design draft ready for review, not an implementation-ready protocol. Wire format, synchronization, and several failure-handling details remain explicitly open. Please also review the tension between the agreed relay-confirmed preference changes and VISION_MOBILE.md's requirement that stopping notifications must not depend on a relay response. ### Related issue Related: #3234 covers per-channel notification settings and push filtering; this spec focuses on desktop-activity suppression. No duplicate spec PR found. ### Testing Documentation-only change. Local Markdown links and anchors resolve; whitespace validation and commit hooks passed. The full local CI gate could not complete: dependency compilation exhausted local disk space (OS error 28). GitHub checks currently report no failures. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Diem Nguyen <ngthuydiem@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-29 09:54:08 -07:00
Logan Johnson	efe04288ea	feat(mobile): add the contextual identity-name resolver (#7894) ... 🤖 ## Summary When two identities share a display name, Buzz mobile shows the same label for both. A reader cannot tell a person from an agent, or one person's agent from another's. For example, a channel can show three agents and one human all named "murderbot". This PR adds the naming rules that fix this, without changing any screen yet. It ports the contextual identity-name contract (v1) from the desktop app to Dart. Given the identities shown together, the resolver gives each public key a distinct label: - A human keeps the plain name. Agents that share it get a qualifier. - The viewer's own agents are named before other people's agents. - An agent is qualified by its owner's name first ("Wes's Honey"). A short public-key suffix is added only if that is still ambiguous ("baxen's murderbot · xa8v"). It also adds two providers that screens will use: - `channelIdentityNamesProvider` compares names against a channel's members, plus any referenced non-member such as an old author or an outside mention. - `watchIdentityNames` compares a set of identities shown together outside a channel, and loads their profiles. The next PRs in this stack connect these to the screens. Part 1 of 3: #7894 (resolver) → #7895 (conversations) → #7896 (lists, Search, Pulse). ### Related issue Related to #2910 (default "Fizz" agents from different users collide in one channel). ### Testing - The contract's 31 portable fixture cases run against the production resolver. The fixture file is copied unchanged from the contract, so reviewers can skip it. - Unit tests cover owner and suffix qualification, the viewer's own identities, and invalid public keys. - Provider tests check that a channel keeps its names while its roster reloads, that an offline cached bot still counts as an agent, and that changing relay or account never shows the old roster. - `flutter analyze` is clean. No UI change, so there are no screenshots. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 12:21:14 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	bba75a71eb	Automate owner deletion preparation (#7830) ... ## Why Owner deletion admission stops at `submitted`. Manual inventory and approval still stand between owner intent and the existing deletion executor, preventing self-serve deletion. ## What The existing `buzz-admin deletions drain` process prepares and automatically approves operator-attested owner requests. Operator-origin requests retain manual approval. ## How The drain prioritizes approved work, then claims one owner submission with the existing generation lease. It freezes inventory and records digest-bound `owner_automatic` approval in one transaction before entering the unchanged executor. Before approval, the transaction rechecks archived state and current ownership. It locks the deletion advisory fence, community, owner memberships, and request in that order. A regression test pins privileged abort during a live preparation lease. What got simpler: one drain still owns preparation and execution. There is no second worker, queue, lifecycle, or retry authority. The rebased branch contains only this feature and its review fixes. ## Risk Automatic approval permits irreversible deletion without a human grace period. Operator attestation is not a cryptographic owner signature. Provenance, locked authority checks, generation fences, and digest-bound approval constrain the operation. This remains work in progress. Broad test failures and incomplete mobile checks are disclosed below; publication is not a merge-ready verdict. ## Testing Published head: `e059ae9056b447ca3b5d0c2893da86550ef16f5c`. All seven commit trees match tested source `5605f27eaece1e809f746cc1839b55c7ceef8d80`; only attribution metadata changed. Source-SHA results below are not new-head execution receipts. At source commit `5605f27eaece1e809f746cc1839b55c7ceef8d80`, isolated PostgreSQL tests showed stale archive and ownership fixtures fail closed after the fix. Before the fix both reached automatic approval. Removing abort's generation increment or stage transition made the new live-lease regression fail; restored production passed. `just test` failed in two ACP native-git fixtures and one agent body-timeout test. The failing source files match the pinned base, but there is no exact-base execution comparison proving those failures unrelated. `just test-unit` also failed in the ACP fixtures, leaving 18 tests unrun. `just ci` stopped in Flutter tooling package resolution; separately run non-mobile lanes do not constitute a full `just ci` pass. No live tenant deletion or human testing was performed. A dedicated populated `0052` → `0053` approval-backfill fixture remains a coverage gap. Final-head hosted CI and security review are required. ## Bigger picture Rebased directly onto main `12670bd0f037c66a682272bb81c46c3f254fad74`; prerequisite #7818/#7827 are already merged. Main owns `0052_channel_artifacts`, so this feature's automatic-approval migration is now `0053`. Client/KGoose and quota work are separate PRs and are not part of this diff. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 11:39:33 -04:00
Bradley Axen	12670bd0f0	feat(relay): implement NIP-AR channel artifacts (#7919) ... ## Summary Implements NIP-AR channel artifacts (spec merged in #7791) on the relay, after a simplicity pass over the earlier two-agent implementation. An artifact is an editable record (kind 45010) with a stable identity (`d`), one home channel (`h`), and full-snapshot revisions chained by `prev`: - **Writes:** one transaction per write. It locks the artifact's head row, requires `prev` to name the current revision, records the revision in a ledger that survives retention, and advances the head. Two competing edits can't both win. A stale edit gets `conflict: artifact head changed`. Resubmitting an accepted event succeeds without applying it twice. - **Permissions:** writes pass the same gates as a kind 9 message in `h`. A move also passes them in the source channel. The move stores the destination snapshot and a relay-signed kind 45011 removal marker for the source in the same transaction, so both channels recover by replay. The marker never names the destination. - **Moderation:** redaction is the ordinary kind 9005 removal. The ledger keeps the ID so `prev` checks still work. Redacting the current revision retires the artifact. - **Reads:** HTTP `/query` and `/count` accept explicit `artifact: current|history` filters with exact multi-character tag matching (e.g. `#assignee`). Generic REQ and search return only current revisions. Kind 5 against artifacts is rejected. NIP-11 advertises the limits. - **Spec:** NIP-AR updated to match: kind 9 permission checks, 9005 redaction and retirement, no creator-only delete rule. A separate small commit routes `insert_channel_head_checked` through the metered writer pool (`acquire_writer`), like every other event write in that module. ### Related issue Follows #7791. No separate issue found. ### Testing - Clippy clean. - Unit lane passes. Failures seen along the way came from agent env leaking into `buzz-acp` tests (they pass in a clean env) and known timing flakes (`keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, two `buzz-agent` databricks tests that passed on retry). This diff doesn't touch those crates. - Postgres lane passes, including new `artifact_postgres_tests` in `buzz-db` and `buzz-relay`. Three presence tests need `REDIS_URL` set. - Docker smoke against a fresh local relay, 29/29: create and idempotent resubmit, update and stale conflict, current, `#assignee` and history queries, generic REQ, kind 5 rejection, delete and restore, move with source marker, private-channel isolation, and 9005 retirement. - A pasteable curl walkthrough of the same flows was shared with the reviewer. Draft until the human hands-on check (AGENTS.md step 3) is confirmed. The pre-push hook was skipped because every lane above had already run on this tree. CI is the gate. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 16:52:09 -06:00
crgallego	c96553eb13	fix(desktop): resolve unlisted project channel requests (#7619) ... ## Summary - resolve project channel-creation approvals through the authoritative home-channel selector - permit owner-visible unlisted project homes when their channel and repository binding match - add regression coverage for the unlisted authoritative-home path ## Validation - `just ci` - focused project-home regression tests (10/10) - full Desktop suite (6,451/6,451) - `pnpm check` - `pnpm build` ## Manual verification After merging into a Desktop build, approve the pending LBX Copywriting workroom request from the Litbox OS project. Signed-off-by: crgallego <chris.cokerconstruction@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: crgallego <chris.cokerconstruction@gmail.com>	2026-09-28 15:46:07 -07:00
Luke Tornquist	6918dd3a83	Schedule the deletion drain safely (#7827) ... ## Why The deletion engine already exposes a one-shot `buzz-admin deletions drain` command, but operators have no safe way to schedule it. A generic workload wrapper could expose arbitrary commands or inherit relay credentials, which would add a second control plane and widen the blast radius. ## What This PR adds an opt-in Kubernetes CronJob for the typed deletion drain command. It is stacked on #7818, which adds owner-request admission. ## How The chart keeps the job disabled by default. The CronJob uses `Forbid`, zero Kubernetes retries, bounded runtime and history, and only the database, Redis, and object-store settings required by the executor. PostgreSQL leases, checkpoints, and retry timing remain the sole durable retry authority. The closed `_operator-jobs.tpl` helper centralizes safe CronJob mechanics without creating an arbitrary command or environment registry. This leaves the touched system simpler than a general job framework would. ## Risk The deployment blast radius is low because the job is disabled by default. When enabled, it can run destructive deletion work that the database has already approved, so the chart limits concurrency, retries, credentials, and execution time. ## Testing Rendered every `deploy/charts/buzz/ci/*.yaml` fixture with `helm template`; all passed at `e68cb753bb6673aa1baa60046969bdb2d4738b62`. Ran the full independent Desktop, Tauri, and web lanes; all passed at `e68cb753bb6673aa1baa60046969bdb2d4738b62`. Flutter package resolution made no progress within three minutes, so the mobile lane is not claimed green. ## Bigger picture A later stack layer must inventory and approve admitted owner requests. Until then, this scheduler cannot make a new owner request destructive. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> chart-v0.1.10	2026-09-28 18:23:42 -04:00
Tom Brow	662014d544	fix(mobile): stale community selection during mobile invite setup (#7951) ... Buzz sets up starter channels when a person accepts an invite. If the phone already had a saved community, the first attempt could fail. Retry could then succeed. A delayed read could replace the new active community with the old one. The read now leaves the saved selection unchanged. The fix also delays channel-status updates until the channel provider finishes initialization. ### Before and after Controlled Flutter app captures against local relays, with the same delayed storage read. The before capture restores the pre-fix active-community provider in the test harness. The after capture uses the fixed provider. These are separate from the native iOS validation below. | Before: first attempt fails | After: first attempt succeeds | | --- | --- | |  |  | ### Validation - Regression tests reproduce the delayed-read ordering and passing timing control; removing the channel sequencing safeguards makes their regressions fail. - Production app against local relays passes the forced race on the first attempt. - Native iOS simulator with an existing saved community accepted the original invite using a fresh identity, joined on the first attempt, and opened the welcome channel without Retry. Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> mobile-v0.19.0-rc.1 mobile-v0.18.0-rc.2	2026-09-28 14:44:43 -07:00
Logan Johnson	f1e50be410	test(desktop): wait for channel head refresh before paging thread summary test (#7955) ... 🤖 ## Summary Main's Desktop Smoke E2E (4) job fails on `scroll-history.spec.ts` ("thread summary badge survives a retained older-history prepend"). This change fixes the test's timing. It does not change app code. When a channel opens, the app starts a live subscription. When that subscription is ready, the app fetches the newest page again, and that fetch replaces the whole loaded history. This test scrolled up before that refresh happened. On slower CI runners, the refresh came after the older page loaded but before it showed on screen. The older rows went away, the reader stayed at the top, and no more pages loaded. All three attempts failed that way. The test now calls `waitForMockChannelHeadReady` before it scrolls, like the other pagination tests in this file already do. That helper waits for the live subscription and its refresh to finish. ### Related issue Main CI failure at `15d44dcc` (https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36470599751/job/109092076235). The same failure was reported on #7827. ### Testing - Added temporary logs to see the order of events. Locally, the refresh ran after the older page had loaded: the loaded history went from 2 pages back to 1. The test passed only because it checked before the next render. With the wait, the refresh runs first and nothing replaces the loaded pages later. - `playwright test --project=smoke tests/e2e/scroll-history.spec.ts`: 18 passed. This test with `--repeat-each=8`: 8 passed. ### Follow-up (not in this PR) The app has the same race for real users. If someone scrolls up before the live subscription is ready, or during a reconnect, the refresh can drop the older history they loaded. If they are at the top of the list, paging stops until they scroll down and back up. Signed-off-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 14:44:16 -06:00
Will Pfleger	9b1c4f98e2	🤖 perf: bound long-thread aux reads and make query deadlines terminal (#7854) ... Long threads (over ~100 replies) time out in desktop. The aux hop that loads reactions and other e-tag references builds its filter as one `tags @> …` term per id, joined with `OR`. Past about 100 ids the planner switches to walking each partition's primary key backward, expecting to stop early. When few rows actually match, it scans the whole community. With a dirty GIN pending list, a 188-reply thread never finishes. ### What changes - **Set-based e-tag reads (`buzz-db`).** The aux e-tag query now puts the id set behind a `MATERIALIZED` CTE and matches with `ANY`. Each e-tag read also runs under a transaction-local `statement_timeout` of 20 s. - **Terminal timeout contract (`buzz-relay`).** When a read hits the deadline, the client gets a terminal timeout (`CLOSED` for REQ, the timeout error for COUNT and search), not a retryable failure. - **Subscription lifecycle (`buzz-relay`).** The per-connection subscription map lock is now the lifecycle lock. Claims, replacement, client `CLOSE`, owner-checked timeout and search cleanup, revoke, and connection teardown all change the map, the registry, topic refcounts and terminal frames while holding it. As a result, a timed-out subscription's `CLOSED` goes out before any replacement with the same id can claim it, and claims made after teardown are refused. - **Dropped terminal frame disconnects (`buzz-relay`).** If the `CLOSED` for a retired subscription (owner-checked timeout or channel eviction) can't be queued, the relay cancels the connection instead of leaving the client holding a subscription that will never receive fan-out. A client-initiated `CLOSE` ack is exempt. - **COUNT under the same deadline (`buzz-db`).** The fast COUNT path runs e-tag counts under the same transaction-local 20 s cap as SELECT, so WS COUNT and HTTP `/count` produce the terminal timeout too. - **Replica reads surface the deadline (`buzz-db`).** When a replica-routed read is cancelled by `statement_timeout` (SQLSTATE `57014`), the error is returned instead of re-running the query on the writer, which would run the same slow statement. Other replica errors still fall back to the writer. `PLANS/REPLICA_FULL_READ_ROUTING_DESIGN.md` records the exception. - **Deadline handling (desktop).** Only the relay's `query timed out` counts as a query deadline. A client-side `request timed out` stays retryable. For one-shot reads a deadline is terminal: the global query retry (budget 1), thread-replies retry and reaction hydration don't re-send the same slow query. Reaction ids held back by a deadline are released when the channel is opened again, so reopening retries them while same-channel re-renders don't. Live subscriptions, in both the renderer and the native archive-sync socket, keep treating a deadline `CLOSED` as transient: they back off and resubscribe with the same filter instead of being dropped. - **Deadline handling (mobile).** Mobile recognizes the deadline on both transports: HTTP `503 {"error":"query timed out"}` and the WS `CLOSED` reason. - The root `ProviderScope` retry policy returns no retry for deadline errors and keeps Riverpod's default backoff for everything else. - Background thread-summary recounts don't retry a deadline. - Forum posts polling pauses while the last load settled on a deadline; reopening the forum retries. - A channel's newest-window load surfaces a deadline instead of falling back to legacy WS history, and the channel list's batched queries return "unavailable" on a deadline instead of fanning out to per-filter fallbacks. An unavailable batch is not treated as empty. Known last-message timestamps and unread state are kept, and unread catch-up moves `lastMessageAt` forward (never backward) the same way live events do, so a cold start with no known timestamp still gets one. - A live subscription that gets a deadline `CLOSED` backs off and resubscribes with the same filter. History requests still fail on it. - Settled load failures show a Retry control, matching desktop's thread-replies error card: a shared `LoadErrorView` on the channel timeline, forum thread and forum posts list, and an icon button beside the thread replies summary. While the thread query has no value, the thread page shows the route snapshot plus live, cached and optimistic replies, with the loading or error status still visible. - Other re-sends (reconnect, foreground resume, live events, the unread backstop, scroll) are not suppressed; each is bounded by the relay's 20 s statement deadline. - **Long-thread seeder.** `just seed-long-thread [replies]` posts one thread (default 187 replies) with some reactions to the local dev relay, for reproducing long threads in the apps. It uses a throwaway key, refuses non-loopback relays and ignores ambient `BUZZ_*` credentials. Writes are paced to fit the stock relay rate limit. **Lifecycle concurrency.** The lock serializes one connection's subscription changes. Other connections can still be delayed by pressure on the shared pubsub command queue, and by serial eviction loops waiting behind a blocked connection. This PR does not claim strict isolation between connections. **Recovery vs. load.** Clients stop automatic retries of the same one-shot read, but they don't remember deadlines across other triggers: reconnect, resume, live events and the unread backstop can each send the read again later, bounded by the 20 s statement deadline. A live subscription that hits the deadline resubscribes with its original filter under the existing 1–30 s backoff, and against a filter that keeps timing out it retries at the 30 s cap indefinitely, so the worst case is one bounded query per subscription every 30 s. `since` is deliberately not advanced to now on resubscribe, because that would skip events missed while the subscription was closed. Unchanged from `main`: when mobile's channel history sync fails with cached messages available, the cached messages are shown without the error or Retry control. ### Benchmark Local reproduction on an isolated bench stack (not committed): - PG16, migrations applied, one 188-reply thread plus 5M background events in the same community. - Each request replays the desktop thread-replies filter through the relay, with `include_aux` on. Times are total ms for 3 runs, with a 60 s client cap. GIN pending-list state is controlled with `VACUUM` (clean) or by refilling the pending list (dirty), and recorded per partition with `pgstatginindex`. Dirty runs held 402 pending pages on every partition's tags index at the start and end of each matrix. Clean runs held 0–1 pages (relay startup writes). | build | GIN pending state | limit 10 | 50 | 100 | 200 (188 ids) | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `main` | clean | 26 / 16 / 13 | 56 / 51 / 52 | 92 / 93 / 95 | 662 / 639 / 641 | | `main` | dirty | 315 / 298 / 327 | 22141 / 15888 / 16769 | 28992 / 27819 / 28080 | timeout ×3 (>60 s) | | this PR | clean | 35 / 21 / 14 | 57 / 49 / 48 | 82 / 80 / 75 | 153 / 150 / 135 | | this PR | dirty | 290 / 254 / 251 | 1257 / 1204 / 1206 | 2432 / 2378 / 2382 | 4333 / 4706 / 5104 | Baseline `origin/main` `b37e47721`; this PR at `5f2650f5f`, whose e-tag read builders are identical to the current head. At head `1ad81d868` against `origin/main` `15d44dcce`, limit 200 measured 145–179 ms clean (`main` 683–715) and 4.41–4.51 s dirty (`main` timeout ×3). Every completed cell returns the same signed event set: 209 events, 187 replies at limit 200. With `include_aux` off, every cell is ≤66 ms. The thread-window loader (`select_aux`) is unchanged from `main`, and its timings and captured plans match `main`'s. Actual aux-hop statements captured from each relay binary with `auto_explain` (analyze + buffers), execution ms: | build | clean, 100 ids | clean, 188 ids | dirty, 100 ids | dirty, 188 ids | |---|---|---|---|---| | `main` (N-way `OR`) | 40 | 298 | 28785 | 62892 | | this PR (`MATERIALIZED` fence + `ANY`) | 23 | 45 | 1992 | 3539 | **What the fence changes** - On `main`, the planner combines `ORDER BY created_at … LIMIT` with an overestimated match count and walks each partition's primary key backward, expecting to stop early. With few real matches it scans the whole community: the dirty 188-id statement touches ~4.9M shared buffers on `main` vs ~0.6M with the fence. - The fence prevents that early-stop plan. Across the measured cases (1–188 ids, both pending states), the planner used the GIN tags index. The fence doesn't force GIN in general; a broad enough filter could still get a different plan. **Tradeoff:** the fence materializes every match before sorting. In this bench small limits stayed within run-to-run noise of `main`. A single hot id (5,000 reactions, limit 100) measured 30–34 ms unfenced vs 35 ms fenced. **Deadline:** each e-tag read (SELECT and COUNT) runs under a transaction-local `statement_timeout` of 20 s. It only tightens: a shorter operator timeout (`BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS`) is kept. It's a per-statement limit, not a per-request one, so a request that runs several pages or hops can take longer than 20 s in total. The benchmark does not force the deadline. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 16:36:40 -04:00
Jordan Mecom	cc36d25bec	Add native HPKE encryption for nsec backups (#7849) ... ## Summary Add a Rust API that encrypts an nsec into a backup envelope using RFC 9180 Base mode: DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256), HKDF-SHA256, and AES-256-GCM. --------- Signed-off-by: jm <jm@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>	2026-09-28 12:46:43 -07:00
Bradley Axen	548718e042	test(desktop): scope video menu e2e probes to emitted messages (#7953) ... ## Summary Fixes the `Desktop Smoke E2E (4)` failure on `main`. The test at `desktop/tests/e2e/video-attachment.spec.ts` ("right-click menus expose distinct selectors for links, relay video, and off-relay video") fails 3/3 attempts on main and on every PR branch since ~Sept 25. Because "Desktop" is a required check, that blocks merges. **Cause:** the relay-video and off-relay-video probes picked their player with `getByTestId("video-player").last()`. When mock messages share a second, timeline ordering can put a different video last. The locator then resolves to the wrong player, and the "Download video" menu detaches before the click, so the test times out. **Fix:** scope each probe to the `data-message-id` of the message `emitVideoMessage` just returned. Test-only change, 16 lines. ## Attribution This is a cherry-pick of `dfd5db4e0` by @tornquist, originally part of #7827 (the deletion-drain cron, which is stacked on another feature branch). It's pulled out on its own so main can go green without waiting on that stack. Authorship is preserved. ## Testing - `pnpm build:e2e && playwright test tests/e2e/video-attachment.spec.ts --project=smoke`: 13/13 passed locally, including the target test. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>	2026-09-28 19:46:14 +00:00
Luke Tornquist	15d44dccee	Add owner deletion admission control plane (#7818) ... ## Summary Adds the relay and database admission boundary for owner-requested deletion of archived hosted communities. The operator endpoint records accepted owner intent with stable UUID idempotency and immutable owner/operator provenance. Admission serializes with unarchive and owner transfer, and accepted requests disappear from actionable owner listings. This keeps destructive execution out of the request path. The existing durable deletion engine remains the only executor, so this change adds no lifecycle state or second deletion mechanism. Complexity stays bounded: one durable request is both the idempotency record and the mutation fence. ### Related issue None found. ### Testing - `REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379 BUZZ_POSTGRES_ADMIN_URL=postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@localhost:5432/postgres PGHOST=localhost PGPORT=5432 PGUSER=buzz PGPASSWORD=buzz_dev PG_BIN_DIR=/tmp/buzz-pg-bin ./scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --lib --tests` — 385 passed. - `cargo test -p buzz-db` — passed. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` — passed. - `just desktop-test desktop-build desktop-tauri-check desktop-tauri-test web-build` — passed; Desktop ran 6,589 tests. - Full `just test` could not start uncached Keycloak dependencies because `quay.io` reset connections. Full `just ci` reached Flutter dependency resolution, then `pub.dev` reset connections. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 15:12:15 -04:00
Will Pfleger	52c4c08c9e	fix(sidebar): converge stale-at-open state across devices (sections/sort/stars/mutes) (#7805) ... Adds bounded-backoff recovery reads to all four sidebar sync hooks (sections, sort, stars and mutes). A stale relay read at app open now converges without a user edit or a reconnect. ## What this does **Shared recovery hook (`useStaleReaderRecovery`).** All four hooks use one retry effect. It reads immediately on mount, then at 5, 10, 30 and 60 s, staying at 60 s after that. A change of `visibilityState` to `visible` triggers an immediate read. Reads are single-flight. The effect restarts whenever `pubkey` or `relayUrl` changes, so a hook that stays mounted while switching relays drops the old relay's in-flight reads. **Guards that stop a recovery read from rolling back a local edit:** 1. **Skip the read while an edit is pending.** If an edit is pending when a tick starts, the tick skips its read and just schedules the next one. Without this, the read could return the pre-edit blob after the edit published and pending cleared. At that point neither apply-time guard could reject it. 2. **Pending check inside the state updater.** `hasPending()` and the effect lifetime are re-read inside `setStore(prev => ...)`. That way the check runs when React executes the updater, not when the response arrives. 3. **Local-mutation revision.** Each hook counts its local edits. The count is snapshotted when a read starts and checked again at apply time. If an edit landed while the read was in flight, the response is discarded. 4. **Head advanced only after a successful cache write.** A failed `write*Store()` leaves the same head retryable on the next tick. **Ownership-aware pending clear.** Each sync manager's `doPublish(store)` now clears `pendingStore` only while it still holds that same `store`, on both the identical-payload early return and the success path. Before, an older publish that finished after a newer edit had replaced `pendingStore` wiped the newer edit's pending marker, so a recovery read before the newer debounce could apply the older relay head over it. `destroy()` still clears unconditionally. ## Scope Reader-side recovery plus the ownership-aware pending clear. No outboxes, arbitration or replay changes. It applies to `useChannelSections`, `useChannelSortPreference`, `useChannelStars` and `useChannelMutes`. Related: [#7806](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7806) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 12:48:16 -06:00
Will Pfleger	f7ff4294fa	feat(nip-fi): harden Blossom kind-24242 verifier to NIP-FI spec (#7288) ... Brings `buzz-media`, `buzz-relay`, all first-party kind-24242 minters, and desktop token minting into compliance with [NIP-FI §kind-24242](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/main/docs/nips/NIP-FI.md). ## What changed **`buzz-media/src/auth.rs`** - Add `BlossomStrictness` enum (`Strict` | `Permissive`). `Strict` applies full NIP-FI rules (active modes); `Permissive` preserves pre-NIP-FI Off-mode behavior byte-identical [FI-INV-15]. - Rewrite `verify_blossom_auth_event_for_verb` with count-based cardinality: exactly one `t`/`expiration`/`server` in `Strict`; duplicate `x` also rejected. `Permissive` keeps main's boolean semantics exactly: any valued `t` other than the verb (including `""`) rejects, valueless `t` is ignored. - `Strict`: mandatory `server` tag on all proofs (upload + read); absent or mismatched → `evidence_rejected` (`ServerMismatch`). - `Strict`: 60-second proof window (`now - created_at <= 60s`, `expiration <= created_at + 60s`). `Permissive`: 3600s / optional server. - **[F1]** Permissive server validation uses any-match semantics: a proof with multiple `server` tags is accepted if any tag matches the bound host. This restores origin/main base behavior. Strict duplicate-rejection unchanged. - **[F1 compat]** Permissive server gate uses `server_values.is_empty()` (valued tags only) rather than `server_count > 0` (includes valueless tags). A lone valueless `["server"]` tag is treated as absent in Permissive/Off mode, matching pre-NIP-FI base behavior [FI-INV-15]. - **[F4]** Valueless `x` tags in Strict get reads are tracked before `filter_map` so they cannot become absent scope (host-wide authorization). Any `x` tag present in Strict must contain the exact requested sha256. - **[F3 unit]** Cases A–D in `auth.rs` are helper-level unit tests: they call `verify_blossom_upload_auth` and `verify_upload_hash_only` directly. They do not enter the upload pipeline (`process_upload`/`process_video_upload`). Retained as helper evidence. **`buzz-media/src/error.rs`** - Add `DuplicateTag(&'static str)` variant. - Add `blossom_denial_kind()` method: classifies each auth error as `MissingEvidence`, `EvidenceRejected`, or `AuthorizationDenied`. Non-auth errors return `None`. - `IntoResponse` retains the legacy JSON 401 shape [FI-INV-15]. **`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs`** - Add `MediaDenial(MediaError, BlossomStrictness)` wrapper mapping to byte-exact NIP-FI fixed responses in `Strict`; falls through to legacy JSON in `Permissive`. - `blossom_strictness_from_state()` selects `Strict` when `state.config.nip_fi.is_enforce()`, otherwise `Permissive`. Strictness is threaded through the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` NIP-98 closures on upload and read, and through the post-admission X-SHA-256, hash-binding, and membership denials. - `extract_blossom_auth` keeps first-value `Authorization` extraction; Enforce rejects repeated fields at the `admit_nip_fi_http` cardinality gate, and Off keeps legacy behavior [FI-INV-15]. - Both membership-denial call sites use `media_denial(RelayMembershipRequired, strictness)` so Strict mode produces the correct fixed-text response. - `upload_blob` serving-write fence conversion (`:406`) uses `map_err(|e| media_denial(e, strictness))` — a community fence committed between auth admission and lease acquisition no longer resets Strict to Permissive. - Mode-driven regressions in `mod postgres_tests` (selected by the nextest `postgres-ci` profile via `test(/postgres_tests::/)`, `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]`), run through the full relay router with a real Enforce verifier and assertion: Enforce rejects Permissive-only proofs (300s lifetime, missing `server` tag) on both upload routes and reads with `evidence rejected`; Off accepts the same proofs with pre-NIP-FI responses; DenyProtected answers 503 before any proof check; membership denials are `authorization denied` text/plain in Enforce and exact legacy JSON 403 in Off, with a member positive control. GET and HEAD are each discriminated (HEAD with a suppressed body). Both upload routes pin the handler's `X-SHA-256` missing/malformed/unsigned and post-body hash-mismatch denials in both modes. Off rejects an empty-valued `t` beside a valid one with legacy 401 JSON in either order, and ignores a valueless one. Exact status, Content-Type, challenge, and body bytes are pinned. **`buzz-media/src/upload.rs`** (`mod minio_tests`) - **[F3 pipeline]** Four tests exercising the actual post-body call sites (`process_upload` `:85`, `process_video_upload` `:413`) with real MinIO I/O: buffered/streaming × expired-proof-accept + mismatched-hash-reject. The positive cases use `fresh_strict_upload_auth` (`created_at = now-58`, `expiration = now+2`, lifetime = 60s) — Strict-admissible at sign time — followed by a real 3s sleep so the proof is expired when the upload completes. `nostr::Timestamp::now()` reads the OS wall clock directly; paused Tokio time does not advance it. The negative cases use a pre-expired proof with a mismatched `x` tag. All four are `#[ignore = "requires MinIO"]`; no CI lane runs them automatically. **`buzz-media/src/validation.rs`** - `minimal_valid_mp4()` promoted to `#[cfg(test)] pub(crate)` — a 618-byte pre-computed H.264/avc1 fast-start MP4 available to all `buzz-media` test modules; smoke-tested by `test_minimal_valid_mp4_passes_validate_video_file`. **`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/media.rs`** - `sign_blossom_upload_auth`: `server` tag mandatory; upload expiry 60s (was 3600s/300s). - `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s). **`desktop/src-tauri/src/media_proxy.rs`** - Single re-mint+retry on 401/403 for range requests; non-auth failures do not retry. **`crates/buzz-cli/src/client.rs`** - Read expiry: 60s (was 600s). Upload expiry: 60s. `server` tag mandatory on upload. **`crates/buzz-dev-mcp/src/view_image.rs`** - `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s). Test updated. **`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_auth.dart`** - `_mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 600). Refresh margin updated. **`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_upload.dart`** - `_uploadAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 300). `server` tag mandatory. **`mobile/lib/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer.dart`** - **[F2]** Remove Android-specific `VideoPlayerController.networkUrl` streaming path. `video_player_android` 2.9.5 freezes headers into static `DefaultHttpDataSource` request properties — a 60s proof minted at controller creation time becomes stale on seeks. All platforms use the authenticated local-file download path. - **[F2 transport]** `unawaited(request.sink.close())` before `client.send()`. `AbortableStreamedRequest` carries no request body; without closing the sink, `IOClient.send()` awaits `stream.pipe(ioRequest)` which blocks until the sink ends — every video download hung in loading indefinitely on every platform. - **[F2 pending-ctrl]** `pendingController` ref set before the first `await (initialize())`, cleared in all exit paths. Effect cleanup disposes `pendingController.value` so a close-during-init releases the native player even if the initialized event never arrives. - **[F2r(a)]** On native init failure (post-create, pre-initialized-event), the inner catch starts disposal detached via `unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` — the `.catchError` handler absorbs any disposal exception so it does not reach the test error zone — then rethrows the original load error. `video_player` 2.11.1 completes the init future with an error without disposing the native player. - **[F2r(b)]** Non-2xx error body cancelled via `_cancelVideoResponse()` (subscribe+cancel) instead of `drain()`. `drain()` waits for the upstream to close; a stalled server body blocked `initializeVideo` indefinitely. - **[F2r(d)]** `unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` in the catch — not `await`. Two failure mechanisms exist: (1) when `createWithOptions()` throws, `_creatingCompleter` is never completed and `await dispose()` deadlocks at `:682-683`, blocking the outer catch from setting error state. (2) when `createWithOptions()` succeeds but initialization fails, `dispose()` runs but its thrown exception becomes an unhandled async error reaching the test zone. Both are fixed: `unawaited` lets the outer catch run immediately and set `error.value`; `.catchError(...)` on the detached disposal future absorbs any disposal exception. **`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_test.dart`** - `_FinalizingFakeClient`: calls `request.finalize().drain()` — a test without the sink fix times out because the drain never completes, validating the transport contract. - F2r(a): `forceInitError=true` fake emits `PlatformException` on subscribe; `disposeCallCount >= 1` verifies disposal even on init failure. - F2r(b): `stalledBody` `StreamController` with `onCancel` Completer (bounded completion signal, not a sleep). Asserts: (1) `bodyStreamCancelled=true` while body stream is still open (impossible with `drain()`); (2) error UI visible while body remains open. Restoring `drain()` breaks both. - F2r(c): `neverInitialize=true` fake never sends initialized event; unmount asserts `disposeCallCount >= 1` via `pendingController`. Distinct from the event-error case. - F2r(d): `forceCreateError=true` fake throws `PlatformException` from `createWithOptions()` itself (before any player ID is returned). Asserts error UI visible within a bounded deadline. With the old `await dispose()` the outer catch is blocked — `error.value` is never set and the error UI assertion fails at the deadline; with `unawaited(dispose())` the error text appears immediately. **`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_transport_test.dart`** (separate file) - Real-IO loopback probes using `flutter_test` (not `package:test`) to avoid `depend_on_referenced_packages` lint. No `TestWidgetsFlutterBinding` — no HttpClient override interfering with `dart:io`. - Probe 1: `HttpServer.bind(loopbackIPv4, 0)` reads the full request body before replying. Without `sink.close()`, `req.drain()` hangs and the test times out. - Probe 2: server signals request arrival via a Completer (not a sleep); abort fires after confirmed arrival; `client.send()` must throw `RequestAbortedException` (typed assertion) within a bounded 5s deadline. **`scripts/test-video-upload.sh`** - Proof minted with `+60` expiry and mandatory `server` tag. **`buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_media*.rs`** + **`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs` test fixtures** - All fixtures updated to 55s expiry + `server` tag. **`RELEASING.md`** - New "NIP-FI upload proof freshness (relay floor)" section documenting that 60s proofs require the first relay release carrying this PR's post-body hash-only check (the first tag > `v0.2.1` — update once cut) for reliable large-file uploads. Operators on older self-hosted relays (≤ `v0.2.1`) must upgrade before receiving these clients. ## Finding 3: 60s upload proofs vs old-relay compatibility Desktop/CLI/mobile upload proofs are now 60s. Older relays re-run full expiry verification after the body is transferred. A valid upload whose body transfer takes >60s will fail on an old relay. **Resolution (relay floor prerequisite):** `RELEASING.md` requires that verified supported deployments (relay releases confirmed to carry the post-body hash-only check, commit `75e9bef748`) be in place before distributing 60s-proof client builds. Unknown or unverified self-hosted relay deployments are excluded from distribution until they upgrade. This makes the verified-deployment status a prerequisite for release distribution, not a post-distribution advisory. The concrete tag (`> v0.2.1`) is to be recorded once cut. ## Sequencing note Builds on #7264 (merged): Blossom strictness is derived from its `config.nip_fi` mode in this PR, so enabling `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce` activates the strict verifier with no further wiring. ## GIF compatibility exception An unauthenticated Off-mode request on a configured tenant with no GIF provider changes from 404 to 401 (base `gifs.rs:269-275` checked an unconfigured provider first; the current code authenticates first). All other Off-mode Blossom responses are byte-identical to pre-NIP-FI behavior. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 14:46:56 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	b37e477211	Make relay readiness process-local (#7341) ... ## Summary Make Kubernetes readiness depend only on the relay process lifecycle, so a shared Postgres or Redis slowdown cannot withdraw every pod at once. Move dependency checks to one fixed-cadence loop per pod. The loop permits only one evaluation at a time, emits metrics after each sample, and caches a timestamped report. `/_status` reads that cache without calling Postgres, Redis, or the deletion catalog. It reports `not_yet_sampled`, `fresh`, or `stale`. Each completed sample also writes a Unix timestamp gauge, so Datadog can compute sample age at query time. Fail closed when the community lifecycle lookup errors. An inconclusive tenant-state lookup no longer admits a socket to AUTH or REQ handling. ### Related issue None found. This addresses the elevated relay HTTP 500 and reconnect incident investigated on 2026-09-03. ### Tradeoff The readiness gauge now reports the latest private-probe observation, not the shutdown transition itself. After shutdown starts, a scrape can still see `1` until the next readiness probe refreshes the gauge to `0`. Kubernetes routing is unaffected because it uses the readiness response from the authoritative process state. A terminal `0` was never guaranteed: even a transition-owned gauge could update in process and then exit before Prometheus scraped it. If no scrape occurs before exit, both designs miss the terminal sample. The new design adds at most the interval until the next readiness probe when a scrape occurs during shutdown. Dependency status is now sampled every 30 seconds rather than on demand. A slow evaluation delays the next sample instead of stacking more work. The status payload exposes the cached report age. The completion timestamp stays unchanged when sampling stops, so `time() - timestamp` crosses the stale threshold without a server aging loop. Outcome counters and duration histograms remain cumulative and cannot provide no-data detection. ### Testing Gimli exercised exact SHA `edff1ec4a5362e132e367bf7449d2b0a68f1e9a9` on an isolated Blox stack. Repeated `/_status` bursts caused no dependency calls, metrics advanced without status traffic, stale status remained visible, and lifecycle lookup failures admitted no AUTH or REQ handling. Follow-up verification at `fdbb394ed598c94cde85ed01cb11e9de0ee8f00d` confirmed sampler-owned outcome and duration emission without status traffic and bound the real startup seam. The final timestamp-gauge change is covered by targeted red/green tests and the same boot regression at `c0f36e22b527c2fd6a63a548d036d006ffa17171`. ### Complexity Readiness remains one process-local sample per probe. Dependency I/O now has one owner and one execution path; request volume cannot increase dependency-check load. One completion timestamp replaces the prior server-side age update path; Datadog computes age without another loop. Community admission also returns to one fail-closed rule for inactive and unknown tenant state. Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com>	2026-09-28 14:02:12 -04:00
Will Pfleger	447951a19c	🤖 docs(nip-fi): remove implementation references from the spec (#7912) ... This removes implementation references and implementation status from `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` so the spec holds normative text only. It drops the Blossom compliance note, the known-gap notes, crate/file paths and PR numbers, roadmap "supersedes" sentences, doc-history lines, and the design-rationale note on session-only vs deny-until-TTL (its restart re-push SHOULD remains stated normatively elsewhere). Two wording changes carry normative weight: `PUT /media/upload` is listed as a plain kind-24242 upload route instead of a temporary alias, and the JWKS fetcher's SSRF controls become a MUST instead of a description. It doesn't depend on any enforcement PR and can merge at any time. Related: #7265 --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 16:56:52 +00:00
Jarrod Sibbison	ebe99a46e8	fix(relay): fail startup on invalid operator listener config (#7933) ... Addresses point 3 of [previous comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7793#pullrequestreview-5333444423) "3. Fail fast on a bad BUZZ_OPERATOR_LISTENERS (config.rs:857)" ## Summary - Propagate malformed `BUZZ_OPERATOR_LISTENERS` values from `Config::from_env` as `ConfigError`, including invalid UTF-8. - Update startup config tests to assert returned errors and restore the original admin warning capture helper, removing the shared helper introduced only for listener log assertions. - Cover valid and absent listener values through `Config::from_env`. ## Context Follow-up to the review of #7793 specifically [reverting some config logging parts](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7793/changes#diff-eaa0eeb209ff1ad6212ffa56d3a983bb732858647c9fb227ef7483a3363b5a71). Invalid listener configuration currently logs an error and silently disables listener delivery. ## Verification - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed with Hermit. Signed-off-by: Implementor <691cca7a870db1dad6990d5938d1b4a2a2ca9647ca81290b536c17b06b2e473f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Implementor <691cca7a870db1dad6990d5938d1b4a2a2ca9647ca81290b536c17b06b2e473f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 23:18:15 +10:00
Jarrod Sibbison	1846094b31	fix(db): limit event transactions to listener mention kinds (#7932) ... ## Summary - Keep non-listener-mention event writes on the plain insert path without opening a transaction. - Preserve the transaction around listener mention event insertion and outbox enqueue. ## Validation - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` (Hermit) - Tests not run. Follow-up to Baxen’s review of #7793, point 1. Signed-off-by: Implementor <691cca7a870db1dad6990d5938d1b4a2a2ca9647ca81290b536c17b06b2e473f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Implementor <691cca7a870db1dad6990d5938d1b4a2a2ca9647ca81290b536c17b06b2e473f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 23:17:40 +10:00
Jarrod Sibbison	c4c86006f2	feat(relay): deliver pubkey mentions to relay companions (#7793) ... We are introducing a companion service to the relay that needs pubkey event mentions for pubkeys it manages. This PR introduces an outbox for pubkey mentions that will be sent to these "operator listener" services. ## Summary Deliver mentions of registered pubkeys to deployment-global operator listeners. - Configure listeners with `BUZZ_OPERATOR_LISTENERS`; listeners manage target pubkeys through NIP-98-authenticated `POST`/`DELETE /operator/listener/pubkeys` requests. - During supported event ingestion, match `p` tags to registrations and insert one outbox row per listener in the event transaction. - A background worker claims up to 10 rows, sends NIP-98-signed notifications, and retries transient failures with exponential backoff for up to 9 attempts (idle polling backs off from 250 ms to 2 s). - Outbox rows are ineligible for delivery after 15 minutes and are reaped every 5 minutes. Registered pubkeys live for 30 days; re-registering renews them, and a daily reaper removes expired registrations. - Keep persistence app-managed: no database triggers, functions, foreign keys, or separate match queue. ## Changed behavior Listener outbox rows are enqueued inside the shared event-insert and thread-metadata transactions; enqueue failure rolls back the event. `event_mentions` behavior is unchanged: ordinary event/reaction mention indexing remains post-commit best effort with warning-only failures. ## Testing - `cargo fmt --all` - `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib` - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib config::tests::operator_listener_routes` - `cargo check -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay`	2026-09-28 13:04:40 +10:00
Bradley Axen	b0d6fb8ad2	docs(protocol): propose simplified channel artifacts (#7791) ... ## Summary Adds a short, proposal-only **NIP-AR: Channel Artifacts** in `docs/nips/NIP-AR.md`, as a simpler alternative to the closed #7771. - Defines complete-snapshot artifact events with stable identity and atomic, `prev`-based revisions. - Uses channel access and posting permissions for reads, edits, moves, and writer-authorized deletion. - Keeps client-defined content opaque to the relay, with exact tag filtering over current accessible state and bounded queries. - Covers durable source removal on moves, terminal deletion, and safe client fallbacks without defining task/project schemas or changing application behavior. ### Remaining design work This is a compact draft, not a complete implementation-ready wire contract. Concrete query request/pagination/error/limit-discovery formats, removal/replay wire details, and numeric query limits remain follow-up work. Prefer extending shared WebSocket `REQ` / HTTP `/query` surfaces rather than adding plugin-specific endpoints. No database layout or scale guarantees are proposed. ### Related issue Closest prior proposal: #7771 (closed). Searched existing PRs and issues for channel artifacts; no matching issue found. ### Testing - Verified the committed document is byte-for-byte identical to the reviewed local draft. - Parsed the example JSON and its embedded JSON content; checked unique two-element example tags. - Reviewed the entire one-file diff and ran `git diff --check`. - Commit and push hooks passed (including DCO sign-off and differential file-size checks). - Full application CI was not run locally: this changes only a Markdown proposal, with no implementation or UI changes. --------- Signed-off-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-26 09:07:57 -07:00
Tom Brow	781d39510c	feat(push): support configurable HTTP(S) delivery URLs (#7877) ... The relay can use a configurable HTTP(S) gateway delivery URL and signs the same URL it sends. The gateway verifies NIP-98 against the received request URL, including authority, port, path and query. App Attest, scoped grants, replay checks and delivery quotas are unchanged. Forwarding proxies must preserve Host and supply the original request scheme through X-Forwarded-Proto. The NIP relay-delivery wording now defines the configured HTTP(S) URL as the signed URL and labels the public URL as an example. <!-- buzz-review-completed --> --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-25 18:57:49 -07:00
Tom Brow	02c6309f53	fix(ci): select runtime suites from PR changes only (#7843) ... A documentation-only update to #7809 selected desktop builds and E2E tests because path detection compared an old PR base SHA with GitHub's newer synthetic merge commit. The [failing run's path-detection log](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/35789957773/job/106955810630) includes four unrelated desktop files from `main`; `VISION_MOBILE.md` did not match a runtime filter. Use GitHub's PR file list for pull requests so unrelated changes in the synthetic merge commit cannot select runtime suites. The existing directory filters are unchanged: root and docs/ Markdown do not select runtime suites, while Markdown under runtime directories still selects its affected suites. Mixed code/documentation changes retain normal coverage. Always-on security, policy, and source-contract checks and full push-to-main coverage are unchanged. Added regression coverage runs the pinned paths-filter action against real fixture repositories, including a synthetic merge containing unrelated upstream desktop code. All 35 selection scenarios and 26 required-check scenarios pass; the new regressions failed before the fix. Existing required-context isolation, file-size policy, and security-review contract checks pass, as do script lint and workflow syntax validation. Full workflow lint reports the same two pre-existing shell-quoting findings in the untouched dead-token guard. A desktop E2E build was run to diagnose the unrelated required smoke failure. Related: #7809 (incident, unchanged) and #5756 (shared-input path coverage, separate scope). No matching issue found. PRs with at least 3,000 changed files now select every runtime suite, avoiding GitHub's PR-file-list ceiling. Boundary tests cover 2,999, 3,000, and 3,001 files, including a runtime file omitted beyond the API cap; disabling the safeguard makes the latter two regressions fail. Required checks now run and fail when path selection fails, is cancelled, or is skipped. Regression coverage exercises the workflow conditions and shell checks for all 13 required wrappers, plus an API-denial case against the pinned action. Mutating either the scheduling guard or the result check makes all 13 failure regressions fail. The required mention-settings smoke test expected a pin after explicitly disabling automatic mentions. Waiting for its old avatar to exit reproduced the CI failure 3/3; the test now checks that subsequent mentions remain manual and retains outgoing recipient-tag assertions. Corrected browser regression: 20/20 repeated runs; related picker unit tests: 18/18. No desktop production behavior changed. The always() requirement is now pinned in required-wrapper regression tests; deleting it fails all 26 gate cases. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-25 23:19:32 +00:00
Bradley Axen	a1fb6645d9	test(desktop): synchronize upload edit smoke test (#7903) ... ## Summary Fix the upload/edit smoke-test race observed on main at `6410e685a80d42db0645fadc9bbe710559ef911e`. - Hold the mock upload at the Tauri IPC boundary and release it explicitly after checking edit rejection, rather than assuming menu interaction finishes within one second. - Wait for the Radix menu to unmount: edit dispatch happens in `onCloseAutoFocus`, after the click. Without that wait, the negative assertion can pass before the edit callback actually runs. - Keep the existing attachment-preservation and subsequent successful-edit assertions. No production code or CI coverage is changed. ## Evidence and scope - [Main failure](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36189213149/job/108250341388): `opening edit during an immediate photo upload preserves the draft`, including an upload-progress timeout on retry. - Investigated from #7791, which changes only `docs/nips/NIP-AR.md`. Its PostgreSQL failures and video-menu timeout are separate; PostgreSQL passed on this main run, and the video spec passed locally. This PR does not claim to fix those failures or the separate pointer-interception failure seen in the main job. - #7843 already addresses unrelated runtime suites being selected for docs-only PRs. ## Validation - Full desktop `pnpm test`: 6,676 Node tests + 92 jsdom tests passed. - Upload/edit regression repeated 5 times: passed. Holding the upload without waiting for menu teardown failed all 5 runs, demonstrating the second race. - Complete file-attachment and video-attachment Playwright specs: 30 passed. - Pre-push desktop lint, typecheck, full desktop tests, and file-size gate passed at `46e3d4392e5b56dcb74ea864aa19aa10287f27d3`. - `just ci` attempted: initial formatting issue corrected; second run exceeded the 5-minute local limit during Tauri clippy. Not claiming full repository CI green. ## Review / human verification Self-reviewed the diff against the test contract; no production behavior changes. Draft pending human verification and CI. To verify: activate Hermit, then `cd desktop && pnpm test:e2e:smoke file-attachment.spec.ts --grep "opening edit during" --repeat-each=5`. Expect all five runs to pass, retaining the upload in the draft and allowing edit only after upload release. Originating conversation: buzz://message?channel=aa7f2b48-d367-4ca1-be09-116a2eb45b99&id=1b68585ba4483a87f5a453fd7bbdd11d434e332dcb4aff8acfe1f5d2601b6561 Signed-off-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-25 22:52:02 +00:00
Will Pfleger	6410e685a8	feat(relay): enforce NIP-FI assertion+NIP-98 pairing on HTTP ingress (#7264) ... Implements NIP-FI HTTP ingress enforcement per the merged spec (PR #7254). Every protected HTTP surface in enforce mode requires a valid `Nostr-Federated-Identity: Bearer <JWS>` assertion alongside its NIP-98 authorization, bound to the same key. The NIP-98 pubkey (proven actor) must equal the assertion's `nostr_pubkey`; absent, mismatched, or unverifiable assertions are denied fail-closed with byte-exact text/plain responses per the spec's rejection table. This is S5 of the `buzz-enterprise-identity` program. WS enforcement (S3) is separate. ## What changed **New `nip_fi_http` module:** `admit_nip_fi_http()` covers the full admission sequence — `Nostr-Federated-Identity` extraction, offline JWKS verification, NIP-98 key pairing [FI-INV-05], issuer-qualified deny-map check via `(iss, pubkey, now)` [FI-INV-14], and byte-exact denial for all four `DenialClass` variants. `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state()` is the single call-site wrapper for all surfaces [FI-TRACE-AUTHORITY-UNIFORM]. **Protected surfaces** (all gated via the uniform authority): - HTTP bridge: `POST /events`, `/query`, `/count` - GIF proxy: `POST /gifs/search`, `/gifs/share` - Workflow reads: `GET /workflows/{id}/runs`, `GET /workflows/{id}/runs/{id}/approvals` - Moderation reads: `GET /moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`, `/moderation/restricted` - Media/Blossom: `PUT /upload`, `/media/upload` - Git smart-HTTP: `info/refs`, `upload-pack`, `receive-pack` - Git settings control plane: `GET`/`POST /git/:owner/:repo/default-branch` (now routed through `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` for full assertion key-pairing) - Invites: `POST /api/invites` (mint only; claim exempt as pre-membership enrollment door) **NIP-98 strictness in NIP-FI mode:** - When NIP-FI is not Off, bridge POST handlers force `require_auth_token = true` — the `X-Pubkey` dev-mode fallback cannot satisfy the pairing requirement [NIP-FI.md:547-567] - POST bodies on `/events`, `/query`, `/count` require a matching `payload` tag in enforce mode [NIP-FI.md:579-597] - A payload tag present with no content (one-element `["payload"]` or empty string) is rejected as a structurally invalid claim — NIP-98 requires the content to be a valid 64-char lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Malformed payload diagnostics use a static error message (no attacker-controlled content in logs). - Off mode preserves pre-NIP-FI behavior per [FI-INV-15] **Off-mode compatibility changes:** Admission now runs before request validation on every protected surface, so Off mode differs from pre-NIP-FI behavior in these ways: - **GIF routes:** NIP-98 authentication happens before the upstream provider lookup. An unauthenticated request on a tenant with no GIF provider now returns 401 instead of 404. The 401 goes through the legacy `api_error()` path, so the body is JSON `{"error":"..."}` with no `WWW-Authenticate` header. - **Workflow runs** (`GET /workflows/{id}/runs`): the query string is parsed after admission. A request with a missing credential and a malformed query (for example `?limit=abc`) now returns 401 instead of 400. - **Authorized malformed query:** once admitted, a malformed query returns a JSON 400 `{"error":"invalid query: ..."}` from `parse_query_or_400` instead of axum's `text/plain` `Query` rejection. - **Moderation reads** (`/moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`): same extraction change as workflow runs. Admission comes first, then a JSON 400 for a malformed query. - **Malformed `payload` tag:** shared NIP-98 verification now rejects a malformed `payload` tag in every mode, including on bodyless requests. That means a one-element `["payload"]`, an empty digest, or anything other than 64 lowercase hex characters. Before this change, a bodyless request ignored the tag. **Auth header cardinality:** Enforce mode rejects requests with more than one `Authorization` header with 403 `evidence rejected\n`. DenyProtected returns 503 `authorization unavailable\n` before this check (and before NIP-98 or assertion verification) runs. The cardinality gate is enforced at the NIP-FI admission boundary (`admit_nip_fi_http`), not via legacy auth boolean flags, so it applies uniformly to all Enforce-mode surfaces including Git. Off mode passes through the first header value unchanged, preserving pre-NIP-FI behavior [FI-INV-15]. **Denial-class remapping:** In Enforce mode, NIP-98 extraction/verification failures from the closure are mapped to the appropriate `DenialClass`: `MissingEvidence` when no `Authorization` header is present, `EvidenceRejected` when the header is present but invalid. Off mode propagates legacy responses unchanged [FI-INV-15]; for example, the Git missing-Authorization and wrong-scheme 401s keep their legacy bytes with no `content-type` header. **JWKS refresh scheduling:** The refresh timer's `*last` checkpoint is set after the fetch completes, not from the pre-fetch timestamp, preventing interval drift under network latency. The loop is extracted to `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop` for unit-testability. **Log hygiene [NIP-FI.md:777-779]:** Issuer identity is never written to logs or error messages. All startup/refresh diagnostics use an ordinal index (`issuer_index = N`). Config parse errors for malformed issuers use classify()/line/column codes rather than raw config values. **Admin SPA document routes:** `/reports`, `/reports/{id}`, and `/feedback` are exempt from the NIP-FI assertion guard only on the admin host (host-qualified via `is_admin_host`). These paths are not added to the broad `NIP_FI_EXEMPT_PREFIXES` list — tenant hosts remain fully protected. **Deny-map seam (`HttpDenyMap` trait):** signature is `(issuer, pubkey, now)` matching `NipFiDenyMap::is_denied` from S4 (PR #7265) so integration is a one-liner. Stub is `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` — named to accurately describe stub-phase semantics (fail-open intentionally pending S4). **Route inventory:** every authenticated HTTP route is classified as Protected or Exempt with justification. Documented in the F4 seam-test comment in `bridge.rs`. **Outer-guard tests:** `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` tests in `bridge.rs` drive the full router (`build_router`) in Enforce mode with valid NIP-98 but no `Nostr-Federated-Identity` header. These exercise the **outer `nip_fi_assertion_guard` middleware** in `router.rs` — the layer that fires before any handler runs. They prove the guard's exact response bytes (401 `authentication required\n`, `text/plain; charset=utf-8`, `WWW-Authenticate: Nostr`) for each protected route. Per-handler `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wiring is proven separately by the cardinality test and the media/settings/git handler-level suites. ## Seams **S3 seam:** `nip_fi_config.rs` is duplicated (S3 not landed; session-deadline parts stripped). Removed when S5 rebases onto S3. **S4 seam:** `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` until S4 provides the real map. Integration is one line at the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wrapper. ## Evidence At head `ee338ea9c` (branch `hayt/nip-fi-http-enforcement`), hosted CI run [36167450853](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853): - **Rust / Unit Tests** ([job 108179338458](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853/job/108179338458)): passed. The `buzz-relay` `test-unit` step ran 171 tests with 171 passes. Its PASS lines include all 57 non-ignored tests this PR adds to the relay: `nip_fi_http::tests` (25), `nip_fi_config::tests` (8), `router::tests` (8), `api::parse_query_tests` (5), `api::transport::off_mode_precedence_tests` (5), `tests::jwks_refresh_*` (3), and `composition_tests` (3). The same job ran the `buzz-auth` suite, which includes `nip_fi::jwks::tests::key_set_serves_live_snapshot_under_reader_and_refresh_overlap`. - **Rust / Rust Lint**: passed. - **Relay and PostgreSQL / Backend Integration (relay e2e)**: passed. - **PostgreSQL Domain / PostgreSQL Tests** ([job 108183303436](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853/job/108183303436)): passed. 542 tests run, 542 passed. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> mobile-v0.18.0-rc.1	2026-09-25 21:01:31 +00:00
Will Pfleger	b65cff31a4	fix(ci): run the admin disabled-mode DB test in the PostgreSQL lane (#7900) ... `api::admin::postgres_tests::disabled_mode_allows_unauthenticated_requests_on_the_admin_host` falls through to a DB-backed read route but was not `#[ignore]`d. The `test-unit` exclusions meant to skip it still named `api::admin::tests::…`, which stopped matching when #6730 moved the admin tests into `mod postgres_tests`. As a result the test ran in the infra-free unit job and only passed after waiting out the sqlx acquire timeout (~150s in hosted CI), while the ignored-only PostgreSQL lane never ran it against a real database. - The test is now `#[ignore = "requires PostgreSQL"]`, like its DB-backed peers, so the PostgreSQL lane runs it. - The two dead exclusions are removed, and the `api::admin` clause is just `test(/^api::admin::/)`. `nip98_mode_unrostered_signer_does_not_consume_a_replay_slot` was already ignored and runs in the PostgreSQL lane. - The `Justfile` comment now states the convention (DB-backed admin tests are ignored; non-ignored ones reject before touching the DB), drops the stale reference to a ci.yml step that no longer exists, and keeps the timeout-trap warning. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-25 19:03:21 +00:00
Will Pfleger	9c7687cc91	🤖 docs: add pre-PR checklist and review guidance to AGENTS.md (#7897) ... Adds a "Before opening a PR" checklist and "Reviewing" guidance to `AGENTS.md`, and makes the Review-Proven Rules the shared reviewer checklist. PRs stay in draft until an agent review has run, an agent has exercised the change on the affected surface, and a human has tested it. The review-completed passphrase goes in the description only once that checklist holds for the current change, and comes out if later edits change behavior. Docs-only changes use the light path: content, link, and diff checks plus human confirmation. Reviews read `VISION.md` and the surface's `VISION_*.md` first, check the change against the Review-Proven Rules, recommend blocking only for concrete correctness, security, or contract defects with a realistic failure, label everything else optional, and put all findings in the first pass. Agents comment and never use Request Changes; humans decide which findings must be fixed. Related: [block/buzz-app#268](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/268) --------- Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-25 14:41:56 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	9263cda845	docs: specify durable data backfills (#7326) ... ## Why Data backfills need a durable contract outside schema migrations. The contract must survive crashes and support automatic or manual operation without adding version-selection machinery. ## What - Define one PostgreSQL-backed lifecycle for finite data repair - Treat the stable backfill ID as the only durable execution and readiness identity - Use eventually consistent, idempotent registration; compatible workers compete for one exclusive claim - Require bounded batches, atomic mutation and checkpoint commits, generation fencing, and validation before completion - Define all four migration and automatic-backfill configurations - Define the authorized admin API and honest client projection ## How A backfill captures one immutable upper bound, processes finite batches, and commits each target mutation with its checkpoint. PostgreSQL owns lifecycle state, claims, progress, and completion. Registration order and build metadata do not choose a definition. Compatible processes are interchangeable. A material behavior change requires a new stable ID. The orchestrator does not resolve different behavior registered under one active ID. Diagnostic validation on completed rows records only its bounded outcome and audit; it does not create an execution claim. The spec now starts with a six-step mental model and follows the operator flow. It removes repeated requirements and cuts the document from 614 lines and 4,835 words to 474 lines and 3,656 words. ## Risk Low. This PR changes documentation only. It commits Buzz to a design contract, but it does not add runtime, schema, configuration, or protocol behavior. ## Testing No manual runtime testing. A fresh full-spec review checked the lifecycle, safety rules, four configuration cells, admin contract, and production-seam conformance requirements. `git diff --check` and the repository file-size policy pass at `13681664674d4667b181a6211f012090fa40a2cf`. ## Bigger picture The design keeps the relay as orchestrator, a focused backfill crate as domain owner, and `buzz-db` as narrow transaction infrastructure. It removes deployment generations and definition precedence from the implementation plan. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 13:05:41 -04:00
Bradley Axen	930b8bb800	docs(vision): add /buzz/v1 read endpoints to the protocol contract (#7879) ... Adds a short paragraph to the Protocol section of `VISION.md` about `/buzz/v1` endpoints, which are backend-for-frontend (BFF) reads. - **Dividing line:** every write is a signed Nostr event. Nostr reads must cover all of that state. `/buzz/v1/...` can add reads shaped for specific use cases (thread catch-up, sync) over the same store. - We start with this rule and refine it as more exceptions come up.	2026-09-25 08:09:44 -07:00
Will Pfleger	2013148852	🤖 fix(justfile): point just staging at the current staging relay (#7881) ... The staging recipe pointed at the retired `sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co` relay. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-24 16:06:27 -07:00