## Summary Operators can enable, disable and inspect a community's stored NIP-FI requirement through signed POST/GET `/operator/communities/nip-fi-policy` and `buzz-admin nip-fi-policy`. This replaces the old enable-only endpoint and drops the `nip-fi-upgrade` command added earlier in this PR, along with obsolete compatibility code. Each saved intent binds its desired state and observed generation/state. Every accepted new intent advances the generation, including same-state changes. Committed retries recover history without reapplying policy; stale requests are refused. Current status exposes one pair of reusable `expected_*` preconditions. Historical receipts remain readable after policy changes or target deletion, including old rows with null preconditions. Their UUIDs cannot be reused for new requests. Migration 0085 stays additive; main’s default-channel recovery migration retains version 0084. It preserves old receipt rows and INSERT compatibility. Operator instructions cover use, recovery and client migration: [usage guide](33a1c0bb87/docs/operator-nip-fi-upgrade.md), [client contract](33a1c0bb87/docs/operator-nip-fi-policy-client.md). ### Rollout and containment The old `/operator/communities/nip-fi-upgrade` route is removed; GET and POST return 404 without its old auth handler. A pending sponsorship client still targets that route. Migrate that client to the supported API and deploy it with mutation dispatch paused before this relay version reaches its fleet. Its complete CAS preconditions must be durably saved before first dispatch and reused unchanged after a crash or lost response. This is a pending integration dependency, not a claim that the caller is deployed. Close `BUZZ_NIP_FI_UPGRADES_ENABLED` on every old relay. Keep `BUZZ_NIP_FI_CHANGES=false` on new relays. Apply schema first and finish the whole-fleet rollout before opening the new gate and resuming migrated clients. Before opening the new gate, verify the deployed artifact SHA on every pod and probe each pod directly: the old route must return 404, and a fresh, well-formed, signed policy request with a new UUID must return 503 `upgrades_disabled`. A committed retry is not a gate probe. Old pods with the old gate open can still accept unfenced enables. Do not roll back to those writers after a policy operation. The old variable is no longer read by this version; the new gate defaults off and controls both directions. Read accepted intent in `receipt`, current preconditions/effective policy through status, and effective discovery through `/info`. Enable stays `pending` because receipts cannot certify fleet-wide socket closure. Under global `enforce`, stored disable leaves FI effectively required. Closing the gate preserves receipt recovery; use a fresh CAS disable or existing archive controls for containment. Preserve uncertain requests and their UUIDs. This PR performs no live state change or deployment. ### Related issue N/A ### Testing Published repair head: `33a1c0bb87a6fa10212eb4ec60788e24189627e2`, incorporating main `39d5159caf`. The Git policy guards now apply only to matched paths. Unknown GET/POST paths on relays without a web directory return 404 instead of inheriting the internal endpoint’s 403. The matched internal endpoint retains its localhost restriction and 1 MB body limit, including its method fallback. The signed removed-route 404 assertion is unchanged. Main’s migration 0084 is unchanged; the additive policy migration is now 0085 with identical SQL. Its populated-receipt upgrade test starts at schema 84. Formatting and commit hooks pass; independent source review has no findings. At this exact head, formatting, all-target Clippy (`-D warnings`, relay/db/admin/pubsub), and test compilation (relay/db/admin, `--lib --tests --no-run`) pass with exit 0. The full native PostgreSQL lane passes: 1,373/1,373 tests, exit 0, including the unchanged signed removed-route 404 assertion, fresh-database migration and populated receipt upgrade from main schema 84 to 85. The first full package run used an uninitialized private database and stopped with two missing-table errors; that failed attempt is retained. After schema initialization and verification, the corrected full package rerun passes: 2,041/2,041 tests, exit 0 (1,396 skipped by unit selection). The separate PostgreSQL lane skips 2,064 tests by its selection. Both full runs use the exact published repair head. Hosted CI remains pending. The new router test reproduced the old failure with the exact localhost-only response body; the new production-router regression also passes in the corrected package run. Four individual guard mutations are running serially; their assertion-failure receipts and the restored final green run remain pending. Brad authorized one `git push --no-verify` of this repair conditional on passing lint and compilation. Those gates passed; the push exited 0 and both the remote branch and GitHub PR SHA were verified as `33a1c0bb87a6fa10212eb4ec60788e24189627e2`. The normal publication attempt was stopped before completion and its log is retained. This exception leaves remaining tests and acceptance requirements outstanding. Historical evidence below applies to the earlier published head, not the published repair. Published head: `d31793ccbcdfd748361bcd559358915862b5ed57`. This integrates main's missing `ChannelEvent.received_at` fixture correction and corrects the newly integrated initial-policy test to use `nip_fi_changes`, with matching documentation. Independent source review has no open findings. At this exact head, all-target Clippy with `-D warnings` passes for buzz-relay, buzz-db, buzz-admin and buzz-pubsub; independent Clippy and formatting checks also passed. The normal push hooks failed (push exit 1): - Rust: `buzz-acp` recovery test hit its 15-second test deadline. Nextest completed 844/1101 tests: 843 passed, 1 failed, 3 skipped; 257 were not run. - Tauri: `buzz-terminal` login-shell test received no child output within its 10-second test deadline; 26 passed, 1 failed. - Mobile: gallery test `2 trailing images match carousel at 208.0, scale 1.0` expected no loading placeholders and found two; 4,524 passed, 60 skipped, 1 failed. These are two test-level deadline failures and one assertion failure, not compiler errors. The failing source paths are unchanged from main `6c3ffd160b`; no baseline reproduction or flaky classification is claimed. Desktop JS checks/tests/typecheck, branch-skew and file-size checks passed. Full hooks are not reported as passing. The first hosted PostgreSQL run atd31793ccfailed the removed-route assertion (expected 404, got 403); the router repair above addresses that failure. That hosted run’s Rust unit, Tauri and mobile jobs passed. Historicald31793ccpublication exception: Brad explicitly authorized a single `git push --no-verify` for this head on 2026-11-06 after the failed normal-hook run. That push exited 0 and its remote SHA was verified. Failed-hook evidence is retained. The earlier `cf2c9ba599` publication also used an explicit exception. Neither exception waives outstanding validation, review or human acceptance before merge. Historical evidence at `5b2eb6f09366b8a8f480a5fc61e8e5368f62302d`: 2,006 affected-package tests and 32 disposable-relay checks passed. These predate the latest main merge and are not final-head evidence. Earlier native PostgreSQL and separate `just ci` / `just test` attempts were incomplete, interrupted or failed and are not passing results. No staging run or human runtime confirmation is claimed. This PR is not a draft and is ready for review; readiness does not attest human runtime confirmation. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Brad Seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@seiler-test.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
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NIP-FI Community Issuer Bindings
A deployment that provisions communities under one host suffix, for example
<name>.communities.buzz.xyz, stores the NIP-FI issuers allowed to vouch for
each community in community_nip_fi_issuers. The relay writes these rows when
it creates a community; buzz-admin nip-fi backfills and edits them.
To make an existing community require federated sign-in, use the separate community policy management command. An issuer binding alone does not change that community's required policy.
A host may hold a binding only when it is exactly one DNS label under the
suffix, has no port, and is not reserved. A host is reserved when
https://<host> is a command_audiences entry of any issuer in
BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS, so a command audience can never become a community
assertion audience. The relay refuses to start while a reserved host holds a
binding, and the operator lookup route reports no issuers for a host that is not
bindable or for an issuer that is not configured.
A community with durable requires_nip_fi=true always retains its last issuer.
The internal allow_last exception for unbindable hosts cannot override this
policy. Bind a replacement first, or archive/delete the community for containment.
Bulk backfill skips required communities whose bindings are missing; its closing
report still counts them as unbound. Repair those bindings with an explicit bind.
Configuration
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING is read in every NIP-FI mode. Unset or empty
binds nothing.
{
"host_suffix": "communities.buzz.xyz",
"authorized_issuers": ["https://app.builderlab.xyz/api/goose"]
}
host_suffixis a lowercase domain name without a port or trailing dot.authorized_issuersis non-empty, and every entry must be anissuerinBUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS. Each issuer is 1 to 2048 bytes.- The suffix must not cover any
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIEShost, and everycanonical_urithere must be readable. The relay andbuzz-adminboth refuse to start otherwise.
buzz-admin parses the same variables with the relay's parser. Run it with the
relay's environment: BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING, BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS,
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES, and DATABASE_URL.
Database community source
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database resolves communities from these
bindings instead of BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES. The relay refuses to start if
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING is unset or BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES is set.
In off mode no snapshot is loaded.
| Variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE |
env |
env or database |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS |
1,000,000 | 1 to 10,000,000 community-issuer rows; a larger load fails |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS |
10,000 | under the 30s refresh interval |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MAX |
100,000 | 1 to 1,000,000 hosts |
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHT |
8 | at least 1, clamped below the database pool size |
Each pod loads a snapshot before it binds any listener, and refreshes it
every 30s. A removed binding stops admitting new connections within 30s plus
the configured refresh timeout (40s by default) while refreshes succeed, and within two minutes of the last good load while they
fail. Open WebSocket sessions are not rechecked when a binding is removed;
they end at their own session deadline. Alert on
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120 and on
absent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds).
Initial policy on operator creation
A trusted NIP-98 operator may send initial_requires_nip_fi: true with
create_only: true to POST /operator/communities. The community, owner,
issuer bindings and required policy (generation 1) commit in one transaction.
Omitted, null or false creates an optional community at generation 0. A non-null
policy field without create_only: true returns 400
initial_policy_requires_create_only.
Required insertion needs an effective provision binding for the host; otherwise
400 nip_fi_binding_required leaves no row. Reserved hosts retain the existing
reserved_host refusal. The successful response includes the stored
requires_nip_fi and status: "created" for insertion or "existed" for a
same-owner replay. A replay changes neither policy nor bindings, including after
an operator disable or a change in issuer configuration. A different owner
retains the existing conflict. Legacy ensure and deployment bootstrap remain
optional and do not accept an explicit initial policy.
This policy is independent of BUZZ_NIP_FI_CHANGES. Mode off stores
it but bypasses enforcement. The production creation paths are operator
create-only, legacy operator ensure, and deployment bootstrap; only create-only
accepts this choice.
Upgrade the whole serving relay fleet before callers request true. Older writers may ignore the unknown field and insert an optional row. Checking the created response for stored true detects that incompatible writer, but cannot undo its insertion; a later existing-row lookup remains read-only. Turn caller targeting off before rolling back the relay. Turning it off affects future insertions only; it does not clear existing policy.
Commands
buzz-admin nip-fi backfill
buzz-admin nip-fi bind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host acme.communities.buzz.xyz --issuer https://issuer.example
backfill binds the authorized issuers to every active, unbound, bindable
community, a page of 1000 hosts at a time. Archived communities are bound on
purpose, so unarchiving leaves a community that can log in. A community whose
deletion has started is skipped. It always prints its counts and exits 1 while
any bindable community remains unbound:
{"rows_bound": 12, "unbound": 0, "unbound_hosts": [], "truncated": false}
unbound_hosts lists at most 100 hosts; truncated is true when there are
more.
bind refuses a reserved host, a host that is not one label under the suffix,
and an issuer not in BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS.
unbind works without BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING. It refuses to remove a
community's last issuer, because an empty community looks never-provisioned and
the next backfill would bind it again. To swap issuers, bind the new one and
then unbind the old one. To stop a community logging in, archive or delete it.
When the provisioning config is present and shows the host is not bindable (a
reserved host or one outside the suffix), unbind removes the last issuer too;
this is how to clear a reserved-host binding that blocks relay startup.
backfill never adds the default issuers beside an operator bind: both lock
the community row, and the backfill only inserts while the community still has
no binding.
Lookup route
GET /operator/communities/nip-fi-binding?host=<host> is operator-signed and
returns {"host": ..., "active": ..., "issuers": [...]}. kgoose relies on this
contract:
hostis the host stored on the community row.- Every lifecycle state answers 200.
activeisfalseonce the community is archived or its deletion has started quiescing, including a tombstoned community; it staystruewhile a deletion is only requested. issuersis[]whenBUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDINGis unset, the host is not bindable, or nothing is bound. Only issuers inBUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERSare reported, in byte order.- 404 means no community has this host; 400 means the host is malformed.
Rollout
- Deploy the relay with
BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDINGset. New communities are bound at creation from then on. - Run
buzz-admin nip-fi backfillwith the relay's environment. Repeat it until it exits 0. - Do not turn on the database binding source in enforce mode while any bindable community is unbound: an unbound community fails closed.
Database source runbook
BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database reads communities from these bindings
instead of BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES. Move one mode at a time, and only move
forward when the step's go signals hold.
Off
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITY_SOURCE=database with BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off. No
snapshot loads in off, but every BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_* and
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_* value is validated, so a bad one fails this deploy.
- Go: the rollout completes, and
buzz-admin nip-fi backfillexits 0. - No-go: a pod fails config validation. Fix the named variable.
Shadow
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=shadow. Each pod now loads the snapshot before any
listener binds, refreshes it every 30 s, and records what enforce would decide
without refusing anything. Shadow labels database-source records
community="bound" or "unmapped", never a host.
- Go, held for at least a day of normal traffic:
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_secondsstays under 60 on every pod.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_totalis flat.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rowsis under 0.5.buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_totalis flat.- The non-
admitshare ofbuzz_nip_fi_shadow_totalis only what you expect to deny;community="unmapped"comes only from hosts you do not serve. stage="owner"counts as would-deny: each is an agent enforce will refuse for its token owner.
- No-go: any of these fails. Return to
offand investigate.
Enforce
Set BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce. Watch the same signals, plus the rate of 503
responses on login.
- Go: the shadow signals keep holding, and 503s stay at their shadow baseline.
- No-go: logins return 503 or are refused unexpectedly. Set
mode=off(below).
Alerts
- Stale snapshot:
time() - buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds > 120, together withabsent(buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_loaded_timestamp_seconds)for a database-source pod. - Near the row cap:
buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rows / buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_max_rows > 0.8.buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_rowsis the size of the last good load. - Over the cap or too slow: any increase of
buzz_nip_fi_binding_snapshot_load_failures_total{reason=~"over_cap|timeout"}. - Live lookups shed: any increase of
buzz_nip_fi_resolver_miss_rejections_total.
When the snapshot is too big or too slow
A load fails when the snapshot has more rows than
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS or takes longer than
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS. Both get worse as communities are
added, so they usually arrive during normal growth, not at a deploy.
- New pods: the startup load fails and the process exits, so new pods crash-loop and a rollout stalls. Boot already fails when the database is unreachable; what this source adds is that snapshot size and load time can also fail it.
- Running pods: their refreshes fail but the last good snapshot keeps
answering. Once it is 120 s old it is stale, and every login's host goes to
a live lookup. Live lookups share
BUZZ_NIP_FI_RESOLVER_MAX_INFLIGHTslots (8 by default). Concurrent logins for the same host share one lookup, and a login waits up to 50 ms for a free slot; how many are shed depends on login load across distinct hosts and on lookup latency. In enforce, a shed login gets 503 (authorization_unavailable); in shadow it is only recorded as a would-deny.
Ways out, in order:
- Raise
BUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_MAX_ROWS(up to 10,000,000) orBUZZ_NIP_FI_SNAPSHOT_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS(under 30,000), whichever the failurereasonnames, and roll out. - If that cannot land quickly, set
BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off.offloads no snapshot, so pods boot and admit as they did before NIP-FI.
Assertion policy ID change
This release changes every verified assertion's policy ID once, on purpose.
The base ID (derive_assertion_policy_id in crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/config.rs)
no longer hashes the configured community audiences. The ID carried on a
verified assertion is now IssuerPolicy::id_for_community: a hash of that base
and the one community audience the request resolved to. The issuer is still
committed through the base.
Policy IDs from earlier releases therefore do not match. Inside the relay the ID is only carried on the verified assertion and never compared with a stored ID, so admission is unaffected. Anything outside the relay that recorded old policy IDs, such as dashboards, log queries or allow-lists, should expect new values after the upgrade.